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                       One of the most important developments in European history took 
                             place in communication. A transition is clearly visible from illiterate
                              societies to societies in which most members are active users of the
                              written word. This complex process, which started in Antiquity, and
                           is still not complete, gained momentum during the Middle Ages. This 
series is intended to provide a forum for publications on the history of non-verbal, oral 
and written communication in the Middle Ages. Interest in the subject is now 
widespread within the worldwide community of medieval studies; and ever more 
scholars are becoming convinced of the potential of studying the tensions between 
oral and literate modes of thought.
Accounts and Accountability 
in Late Medieval Europe
Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political Impact
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe traces the momentous 
transformation of institutions and administration under the impact of accounting 
records and procedures, c. 1250–1500. The volume’s focus on the materiality and 
organising logic of a range of accounts is complemented by close attention to the 
socio-political contexts in which they functioned and the agency of central and local 
officials. 
The volume is divided into three parts: the role of financial accountability in the 
political designs of late medieval states, the uses of accounts auditing and information 
management as tools for governance, and their impact on the everyday life of local 
communities. Covering both the centre and the periphery of medieval Europe, from 
England and the Papal curia to Savoy and Transylvania, the case studies evince the 
difficult passage from the early experiments with financial accounts towards an 
accountability of office.







































Account (computus) of the revenues of justice, Savoy, 1394–1396. 
Chambéry, Archives départementales de la Savoie, SA 1444, 
membrane 1 (detail). 
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to Institutional Accountability
in Late Medieval Europe*
IONUÞ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI
B
ecause the history highlighted in this volume still reverberates today, six
or seven centuries later, to reflect on the institutional and fiscal innova-
tions of the later Middle Ages one might start from late modern ordi-
nary language. An idiomatic feature of the contemporary world’s lingua franca
– (American) English – is to describe the apportioning of responsibility and
blame, from politics to the judiciary, as ‘bringing to account’, ‘holding account-
able’, or more generally ‘demanding accountability’. So widespread is this
vernacular that one rarely reflects on the fact that its original meaning was
linked to financial records and numeracy, except for the occasional care to
distinguish between ‘accountability’ in the broader sense and ‘accountancy’ in
the narrow sense of financial numeracy. That counting should have become the
* The research leading to the results published here has received funding from the European
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme (grant agreement No. 638436).
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preferred metaphor for political and judicial responsibility is explained by the
social history driving the semantic shift. Beyond the crucial but recent part
played by financial capitalism, this history goes back to the twelfth century and
the political and institutional reforms that entailed a use of accounts unprece-
dented since the Roman Empire. These twelfth-century beginnings were
marked by considerable ambivalence between financial accountancy, the ac-
countability of officials and administrators, and a more traditional sense of
social and moral responsibility – an ambivalence reflected in the different uses
of the very term computus, ‘account’ (from Latin computare: to ‘reckon’,
‘count’, or ‘calculate’). It might denote both the financial record itself as well
as the act of taking responsibility for one’s conduct in office and the process
whereby this was achieved, i.e. some form of auditing – hence the phrase ‘veni-
re ad computum’ (‘to come to account’).1 Computus was used together or inter-
changeably with ratio,2 translatable as the ‘reason’ or ‘rationale’ for one’s
deeds; in the late Middle Ages ratio appears in the title of the private registers
and account books of (generally) bourgeois and literate professionals, the libri
rationis or livres de raison. This points to the complex dynamic of mutual
influence between the use of financial accounts in government and in society
at large.3
Between them, the individual contributions to the present volume show
how financial and administrative accountability developed and left its mark on
society as the accounting innovations of the twelfth and early thirteenth centu-
ries became widespread throughout Latin Europe in the succeeding period, c.
1250-1500. It falls to this introductory chapter to sketch a conceptual frame-
work through a discussion of salient issues in the recent historiography of the
subject, illustrated with examples from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries.4 The
1 T. BISSON, Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the Early Count-Kings (1151-1213), 2
vols. (Berkeley, 1984), 1, p. 17.
2 “rendre bon compte et loyal raison”, in Savoy’s 1351 ordinances on the auditing of
accounts; C. NANI, “I primi statuti sopra la Camera dei conti nella monarchia di Savoia”, Memorie
della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 2nd series,
34 (1881), pp. 161-215, at p. 200 (article IV); and see infra, n. 48.
3 What is more, the church made important advances in managerial accountability; see R.
BERKHOFER, Day of Reckoning: Power and Accountability in Medieval France (Philadelphia,
2004), and Armand Jamme’s chapter in this volume for the Papal States.
4 The fundamental overview of twelfth-century institutional accountability is T. BISSON,
The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government
(Princeton, 2008), pp. 322-349; a very useful conceptual framework and up-to-date review of the
literature is provided in J. SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability in Medieval England, 1170-
1300 (Oxford, 2014); see also A. JAMME, “Histoire médiévale et comptabilités: Renouveau d’un
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final section of this introduction highlights what the volume brings new to the
study of accounts and accountability in the later Middle Ages and explores
how the findings of the different chapters relate to each other.
Arguably the most important of these interwoven threads, at least for the
purposes of the present volume, are finances and administration. Their close
interrelation is evident from the earliest extant series of fiscal accounts mass-
produced by medieval governments, starting in the twelfth century. In an in-
creasingly monetised economy, governments needed financial accounts as well
as procedures and trained personnel for their verification: first, to keep track of
individual revenues; and secondly, to access credit, which was made all the
more necessary by ballooning payments to suppliers. As the examples of
twelfth-century Normandy, Catalonia, and Flanders suggest, fiscal administra-
tions relying on large series of financial records and their examination by audi-
tors and preservation in archives tended to emerge in regions of sustained com-
mercial activity.5 Throughout the late medieval and early modern period the
state relied on the financial expertise of the bourgeois traders and bankers.6
This notwithstanding, land – in the broadest sense, with rivers and mills, roads
and tolls, and so on – and men continued for many centuries to represent by far
the most important resources. In such a society of highly territorialised power,
keeping tabs on the conduct and performance of local agents was paramount.
England is a case in point:7 the introduction of financial accounts (the pipe
rolls) and auditing in the mid-twelfth century went hand in glove with the com-
mercialisation of society. But the latter development was driven by the prolifer-
ation of markets not only in towns but throughout the countryside,8 and the
champ historiographique, renouvellement des perspectives d’édition”, in: Pourquoi éditer des
textes médiévaux au XXIe siècle (Paris, 2014: Discussions 9), <https://www.perspectivia.net/
publikationen/discussions/9-2014>. 
5 V. MOSS, “Normandy and England in 1180: The Pipe Roll evidence”, in: England and
Normandy in the Middle Ages, ed. D. BATES and A. CURRY (London, 1994), pp. 185-195, at pp.
194-195; BISSON, Fiscal Accounts; W. BLOCKMANS, “Flanders”, in: The New Cambridge
Medieval History, 5, ed. D. ABULAFIA (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 405-416, at pp. 407-410.
6 This is one of the themes of a recent general synthesis of the topic: J. SOLL, The
Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nations (New York, 2004); a
detailed case study of the relation between financial auditing and the late medieval bourgeois
milieu is A. LEMONDE, “Le premier banc des comptes delphinal: Composition, influences et
pratiques (1307-1340)”, in: De l’autel à l’écritoire: Genèse des comptabilités princières en
Occident, ed. Th. PÉCOUT (Paris, 2017), pp. 249-268.
7 M.J. JONES, “Origins of medieval Exchequer accounting”, Accounting, Business and
Financial History 19.3 (2009), pp. 259-285.
8 R. BRITNELL, The Commercialisation of English Society, 1000-1500 (Cambridge, 1993).
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English court of accounts, the Exchequer, reached out to every county of the
kingdom (for comparison, in the mid-twelfth century the effective control of
the king of France barely reached beyond the Île-de-France).9 The Exchequer,
it has been recently argued, might also have benefitted from the experiments in
managerial accountability of lords who entrusted the administration of their
landed estates to stewards and bailiffs.10 The example of Savoy, ‘the guardians
of the Alps’, similarly indicates that even a principality that relied on the taxa-
tion of international trade prioritised the auditing of the financial accounts of
local administrators, the castellans. Castellany computi are by far and away the
bulk of the huge Savoyard fiscal archive, were at the centre of the fourteenth-
century regulations on the auditing of accounts, and predate by several years
the records of trans-Alpine tolls and customs.11 In sum, financial and adminis-
trative accountability were functionally and almost inextricably linked from the
beginning.
But the two are obviously not the same. Today we distinguish between
financial and administrative auditing, the latter focussing on whether officials’
actions are justified and authorised. Thus, while one should not force twenty-
first-century categories on medieval realities that were more fluid, it remains
important to draw analytical distinctions for heuristic and comparative pur-
poses. To reiterate, verifying if local officials kept balanced account books is
by no means the only way of holding them to account. In the twelfth century,
the auditing of financial accounts was preceded by efforts to enforce the ac-
countability of local officials through judicial procedures.12 It is debatable
whether a direct link can be proven between the crises precipitated by unruly
local lordship usurping public authority and the emergence of government
through institutions in the twelfth century, as argued by Thomas Bisson. There
remained some scope for practices of government in the eleventh century, and
certainly the ideal of public authority did not die with the last scions of the
Carolingian dynasty.13 Be that as it may, the point is that twelfth-century mon-
9 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, p. 92.
10 Ibid., pp. 76-80.
11 On taxation of trade, see E. COX, “The kingdom of Burgundy, the lands of the house of
Savoy and adjacent territories”, in: The New Cambridge Medieval History, 5, pp. 358-374, at p.
365; the accounts of Alpine tolls have been analysed by M.C. Clotilde DAVISO DI CHARVENSOD,
I pedaggi delle Alpi occidentali nel Medio Evo (Turin, 1961).
12 BISSON, Crisis, pp. 320-324.
13 S. REYNOLDS, “Government and community”, in: The New Cambridge Medieval History,
4.1, ed. D. LUSCOMBE and J. RILEY-SMITH (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 86-112. 
5From the Auditing of Accounts to Institutional Accountability
archs began their reform work with the restoration of justice and turned to
inquests to hear locals’ complaints against abusive officials. In Bisson’s words,
this accountability was “moral, remedial, judicial”,14 rather than financial.
This early accountability had roots in Christian culture: reddere rationem,
(‘to render account’), was a biblical phrase evoking the final judgement15 (the
association persisted and it lent a moral dimension to late medieval accounting
and auditing procedures, as discussed below). Inasmuch as such procedures
were exceptional rather than routine they might not qualify as administrative –
a point that has been made in relation to Louis IX’s inquests. These fact-finding
missions were central to Louis’s efforts at better government, proof that reme-
dial accountability remained central even in the middle of the thirteenth cen-
tury. The inquests had a strong moral dimension. As with Alfonso I of Aragon
in the second half of the twelfth century, it was the king of France who on the
eve of his crusade took the initiative of inviting local communities to voice
their complaints against the abuses of government agents. His inquests have
recently been described as “enquêtes de réparation”, akin to appellate justice
(“une justice d’appel”), seeking to restore social order by (eventually) making
reparation.16 The aim was to correct the officials’ conduct, not sack them (the
inquisitors had no mandate in this regard); to give redress for wrongs rather
than punish.17
The developments reviewed above can be seen as characteristic of a transi-
tional phase from traditional ideas of social and moral responsibility to one’s
superior – a lord, in most cases – to the emergence of institutional accountabil-
ity. It has been recently suggested that the two should be approached as ideal
types,18 and it seems the case that outside the late modern West accountability
relying on procedures and trained professionals never fully did away with
considerations of social bonds of family, friendship, or patronage. The key
point, however, is that institutional accountability, at first judicial and reme-
dial, while not explicitly developed as an alternative to traditional loyalties, in
the long run came to displace them, without, however, eliminating them alto-
14 BISSON, Crisis, p. 324.
15 Ibid.; and see C. LENOBLE, “Comptabilité, ascèse et christianisme: Note sur la formation
et la diffusion d’une culture comptable chrétienne au Moyen Âge”, in: De l’autel à l’écritoire,
pp. 21-47, esp. pp. 35-41.
16 M. DEJOUX, Les enquêtes de Saint Louis: Gouverner et sauver son âme (Paris, 2014), pp.
73-76.
17 Ibid., pp. 201-202.
18 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, p. 90 n. 48.
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gether. While the loyalty of official agents remained essential, their perfor-
mance in office could be put into numbers and evaluated more readily. An
official’s attachment to his lord could now be expressed not only through the
traditional idiom of loyalty, deference, and gift-giving but also through keeping
his accounts in order, responding with due diligence to written memoranda,19
and most importantly through the size of his financial contribution. The ‘new
men’ who rose from modest backgrounds to the highest levels of power, of
whom Enguerran de Marigny, Philip IV’s chief minister, is the most famous,
were skilful political operators and knowledgeable of the law, but they increas-
ingly had expertise in financial accounts.
Even once financial accountancy became individualised from the more
traditional practices of moral and judicial accountability, the path to financial
auditing in the modern sense was by no means linear. The auditing of local
officials’ yearly accounts of revenues and expenses was preceded in the twelfth
century by a kind of ‘prescriptive accountability’ of land surveys and invento-
ries.20 The aim was to assess the yield of the prince’s local patrimony and fix
in writing the revenues that were expected annually from local administrators.
As such, these records constituted a necessary first step for the production and
verification of yearly financial accounts. The transition towards full account-
ability involved hybrid accounts that included both prescriptive information
and real data on annual revenues, as in late twelfth-century Catalonia.21 As
Thomas Bisson has argued, the early Catalan experiments in accounting were
“still more concerned with defining the rights and domain than with ascertain-
ing balances of receipt and expense”,22 in contradistinction to the goals of
modern financial administration.
The imbrication of financial genres similarly characterises the late thir-
teenth century financial accounts of the count of Provence.23 But it is the
Savoyard case that exemplifies the persistence into the fifteenth century of
19 See Alberti’s famous valorisation of neat accounts without signs of suspicious alterations
as proof of both financial and by implication moral trustworthiness: Leon Battista Alberti, The
Family in Renaissance Florence: Book III, trans. R. NEU WATKINS (Prospect Heights, 1994), p.
67. I analyse the ideal of diligence in office – bona or debita diligencia in the computi of the
Savoyard castellans – in a forthcoming article. 
20 BISSON, Crisis, 325-28.
21 BISSON, Fiscal Accounts, 1, pp. 100-101, 153.
22 Ibid., p. 152.
23 Th. PÉCOUT, “Aux origines d’une culture administrative: Le clergé des cathédrales et la
genèse d’une comptabilité princière en Provence à la fin du XIIIe siècle”, in: De l’autel à
l’écritoire, pp. 49-67, at p. 54.
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hybrid accounts, with features of prescriptive or patrimonial accountability and
modern financial accountability based on periodic audits – this despite the
existence of separate and detailed patrimonial records, the extente. The extente
were land and revenue surveys drawn for each castellany – the basic territorial-
administrative unit – as a prerequisite for the castellans’ periodic accounts of
revenues and expenses.24 But in practice the extente or a summary thereof –
extractus extente – were used more rarely than the theory would suggest and
were not renewed for decades. The current account was commonly drafted on
the basis of the previous one. Not surprisingly, the castellans’ regular (often
yearly) accounts of revenues and expenses came to include memoranda and
injunctions from auditors of a prescriptive nature, meant to prevent the usurpa-
tion of the count’s lands and rights – quite frequently to ensure that a grant for,
say, twenty years did not lead through negligence to the permanent loss of that
revenue. This overabundance of caution was in response to the increased au-
tonomy of castellans from the middle of the fourteenth century25 – in part a
function of the count’s need for loans from his officials – and the traumatic
effects of the plague. But more profoundly, it reflected the need to draw more
heavily on the revenues of the castellanies, farming them out for years in return
for advance payments as the realm’s finances became stretched by wars and
building projects. As such, the concern for keeping tabs on temporary alien-
ations of patrimony was accompanied by instructions to castellans to raise
more revenue by exploiting more efficiently the resources under their control.
The preservation of patrimony and its more efficient exploitation were two
facets of the same accounts.26
Similarly, it is essential to note the close connection between accounting
and numeracy on the one hand, and pragmatic literacy on the other. Simply put,
the distinctive mark of late medieval accountability is that it was written. Its
procedures, starting with financial auditing itself, were made possible by a
24 N. CARRIER and F. MOUTHON, “Extentes et reconnaissances de la principauté savoyarde:
Une source sur les structures agraires des Alpes du Nord (fin XIIIe – fin XVe siècle)”, in: Terriers
et plan-terriers du XIIIe au XVIIIe siècle, ed. G. BRUNEL, O. GUYOTJEANNIN, and J.-M. MORICEAU
(Paris, 2002), pp. 217-242.
25 As early as the 1330s in the bailiwick of Vaud: B. ANDEMATTEN, “Officier princier et
patrimoine familial: Châtelains et vidomnes dans le pays de Vaud savoyard”, in: “De part et
d’autre des Alpes”: Les châtelains des princes à la fin du Moyen Âge, ed. G. CASTELNUOVO and
O. MATTÉONI (Paris, 2006), pp. 177-188, at p. 185.
26 I. EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, “The castellany accounts of late-medieval Savoy: A source-
oriented approach’, New Europe College Odobleja program Yearbook (2014), pp. 81-109, at  pp.
86-87. 
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documentary trail of parchment and paper connecting agents spread throughout
the territory, sometimes over mountain ranges and seas, as was the case of the
House of Savoy and the Crown of Aragon, both discussed in several contribu-
tions to this volume. The proliferation of financial accounts is one manifesta-
tion of an increase in the volume of socio-economic records, down to the level
of everyday affairs, so spectacular that is has been termed a ‘documentary’
revolution.27 Literacy was just as important as numeracy in the twelfth-century
Catalan and fourteenth-century Savoyard computi, in which numerical figures
co-exist with large chunks of text, including, as discussed above, notes and
memoranda.28 Conversely, in accounts such as the pipe rolls of the Exchequer
and the paper cahiers of the Dauphiné the textual bits are streamlined – notably
through heavy abbreviation in the former case.29 The key point then, as already
intimated, is that the trail or network of records underpinning late medieval
accountability included a range of supporting documents in addition to the
accounts themselves, from the descriptive inventories (extente) on the basis of
which the yearly accounts were drawn to writs to letters of receipt (littera de
testimonio et recepta pecunie in Savoy).30 On the other hand, it is worth
emphasising that accounting records were individualised within the mass of
writings brought forth by the general advances of pragmatic literacy: in Eng-
land, the rolls of parchment were a novel documentary format, introduced by
the Exchequer and associated almost exclusively with its accounting.31
The foregoing discussion has highlighted how accountability was asserted
by governments in a moral, judicial, and eventually administrative sense. The
other side of this picture is that in the later Middle Ages financial accountabil-
ity might run counter to administrative accountability. In chronic need of li-
quidities to finance their projects of consolidation and expansion, dynasties put
27 P. BERTRAND, Les écritures ordinaires: sociologie d’un temps de révolution documen-
taire (entre royaume de France et Empire, 1250-1350) (Paris, 2015).
28 For an example of the narrativité of the Catalan computi, see BISSON, Fiscal Accounts,
vol. 2, p. 177; and see infra, note 48, for their dialogical element. 
29 A sizeable sample of Dauphinois accounts has been edited in G. DE MANTEYER, “Les
finances delphinales: Documents (1268-1370)”, Bulletin de la Sociéte d’études des Hautes-Alpes
63 (1944), pp. 201-782.
30 The reason why there are more numbers and less descriptive text in the pipe rolls in
comparison with the Savoyard accounts that they inspired is that the Exchequer kept its
memoranda in a separate series of rolls, whereas the Savoyards inserted them in the computi; see
J. CONWAY DAVIES, “The memoranda rolls of the Exchequer to 1307”, in: Studies presented to
Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. J. CONWAY DAVIES (Oxford, 1957), pp. 97-154.
31 M. CLANCHY, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307, 2nd edn. (Oxford,
1993), pp. 135-142. 
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pressure on local officials to raise more money, either through new taxes,
which were resisted,32 or through a more rigorous and exacting exploitation of
traditional rights and revenues. The maximisation of fiscal revenues, itself
made possible by the techniques of financial accountability, conflicted with the
traditional imperative of good governance, and thus with the accountability of
local officials in a moral-judicial and administrative sense. As John Sabapathy
has put it, summarising the historiographical debate, “money and fiscal compe-
tence in one arena; ethics, conduct, lawbreaking in another is the apparent
division of labour”.33
Thirteenth-century England is an excellent example of this scenario. There,
a highly efficient central government machine continually increased the finan-
cial targets on the firma comitatus or county farm, a lump sum which the sher-
iff had to raise as administrator of the county’s various economic resources.
When this proved insufficient, an alternative was explored: curtailing the sher-
iffs’ autonomy by demanding itemised accounting of each and every revenue
and expense – hence the name ‘custodial sheriffs’. As the increasingly onerous
financial demands were passed by sheriffs onto local communities, these com-
plained to the king, insisting on the appointment of local notables as sheriffs,
in the hope they would be more sparing of the local economy.34 Elsewhere, as
governments prioritised financial administration, the adverse repercussions on
local agents’ accountability in office manifested themselves differently. In
Savoy, the need to finance the expansion of the principality was similarly the
driving factor behind the falling standards of castellans’ conduct in office from
the second half of the fourteenth century, but the scenario was different. The
office of castellan was increasingly given to aristocrats (and some urban nota-
bles) who could advance large sums of money to the count, so that some castel-
lanies stayed in the same family for the better part of a century.35 It is in this
period that locals’ complaints against castellans’ conduct become noticeable.36
32 See Nicolas Carrier’s chapter in this volume. 
33 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, p. 90.
34 Ibid., pp. 116-120, 122; R. CASSIDY, “Simon de Montfort’s sheriffs, 1264-65”, Historical
Research 251 (2018), pp. 3-21; and see Cassidy’s chapter in this volume.
35 See G. CASTENUOVO, Ufficiali e gentiluomini: La società politica sabauda nel tardo
medioevo (Milan, 1994), pp. 328-329, and the lists of castellans compiled in A. DUPERRAY,
Inventaire-index des comptes de châtellenie et de subsides (Chambéry, 1996).
36 Gabriel PÉROUSE, Les communes et les institutions de l’ancienne Savoie d’après les
archives communales (Chambéry, 1911), pp. 5-7; on the slow development of collective action
to resist the administration, see M. GELTING, “Between prince and peasant: The ambiguous role
of the parish community in fourteenth-century Maurienne”, in: Bauern zwischen Herrschaft und
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Were then such castellans officials of the state? While this is a specific
question that calls for a specific answer, it is put here as an entry-point into the
larger issue of the parameters that define administrative service in the later
Middle Ages (including baillis, seneschals, and other kinds of local officer). To
this end I draw on John Sabapathy’s discussion of how historians and social
scientists have defined institutional office, and his own conceptual framework
for studying the accountability of medieval officers.37 On a basic standard of
administrative professionalisation, namely that officials should be replaceable
– relegated or removed from the system altogether – the status of fifteenth-
century Savoyard castellans is actually difficult to decide, for while some con-
tinued to be appointed for limited intervals, others monopolised the office.
More parameters, then, need to be taken into account – both to answer this
question and to define late medieval administrative accountability. Useful
criteria include the delineation of officials’ responsibilities and jurisdictions,
their place in a hierarchical structure governed by rules, and their use of re-
sources that belong to the office rather than themselves. The last point is partic-
ularly open to interpretation. It has been pointed out that in contrast to the
agents of the modern state, medieval officials drew more heavily on their own
socio-economic assets and correspondingly were less reliant on the resources
of their office (not coincidentally they were generally recruited from the socio-
political elites). This, together with the observation that until the end of the
Middle Ages there was no conception of ‘the state’ as distinct from social and
political relations, forms the basis of a critique of the state as an analytical
category in the study of medieval history;38 but one may accept both points
without being thereby committed to the vision of a ‘stateless’ Middle Ages.
Lastly, to answer the question of castellans’ status as public officials within a
professional administrative structure it may prove useful, as Sabapathy sug-
gests, to examine the dynamic of their accountability to the central govern-
ment: beyond the formalism of regular auditing, what do test cases tell us about
the balance of power between auditors and castellans (and other local offi-
Genossenschaft: Peasant Relations to Lords and Government, Scandinavia and the Alpine
Region (1000-1750), ed. J.R. MYKING, G. THOMA, and T. IVERSEN (Trondheim, 2007), pp. 109-
32; for a case-study exploration of the tensions between castellans and the local community, see
P. LAFARGUE, “Entre ancrage et déracinement: Les élites chambériennes et la fonction châtelaine
(fin XIIIe – XVe siècle)”, in: “De part et d’autre des Alpes”, pp. 189-219.
37 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, pp. 20-22.
38 R. DAVIES, “The medieval state: The tyranny of a concept?”, Journal of Historical
Sociology 16.2 (2003), pp. 280-300, at pp. 289-293.
11From the Auditing of Accounts to Institutional Accountability
cers)? Bearing in mind the considerable regional and chronological variation,
was accountability through financial and administrative audits modelled on
judicial procedures and thus rather conflictual, or was it more (for these are not
mutually exclusive options) about dialogue and negotiation between central
and local officials?
Recent and important work on late medieval institutional accountability
has focussed on the chambres des comptes, thus approaching the auditing pro-
cess from an institutional perspective. The emphasis falls on those elements
that auditing process had in common with judicial procedures, while the
dialogical dimension of auditing, although not rejected, is subordinated to a
judicial and symbolic framework.39 This works well in the English case, where
the upper chamber of the Exchequer was a court of account, but does not work
well for twelfth-century Catalonia or thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Savoy.
The merits of such studies notwithstanding, there are obvious problems with
this approach: the advent of the chambres des comptes often amounted to little
more than the institutionalisation of auditing practices that had developed
gradually over a century and now received formal codification. For example,
in the first rule book of the French chambre des comptes, the focus is not on
institution-building in the positive sense of (re-)defining the substance of audit-
ing procedures, but on specifying the personnel of the chambre and asserting
royal control through a stricter regulation of their operations, notably injunc-
tions against specific practices under the threat of severe sanctions (for in-
stance articles 8, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 24).40 The precocious English Exchequer
is an exceptional case, but the functioning of this institution was not beyond
controversy in the late twelfth century. As John Sabapathy has argued, veiled
polemics centred precisely on the arbitrary aspects of the auditing process.41 In
France there was considerable overlap between the functions and personnel of
the chambre des comptes and the treasury.42
39 O. MATTÉONI, “Vérifier, corriger, juger: Les chambres des comptes et le contrôle des
officiers en France à la fin du Moyen Âge”, Revue historique 641 (2007), pp. 31-69, at pp. 33-35. 
40 Les chambres de comptes en France aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Ph. CONTAMINE and O.
MATTÉONI (Paris, 1998), pp. 3-8.
41 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, pp. 106-107.
42 É. LALOU, “La chambre des comptes de Paris: Sa mise en place et son fonctionnement”,
in: La France des principautés: Les chambres des comptes en France aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed.
Ph. CONTAMINE and O. MATTÉONI (Paris, 1996), pp. 3-15, at pp. 8-9.
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More problematic is the choice of privileging the so-called ritual nature of
auditing process.43 It highlights the ceremonial pomp and visual rhetoric staged
by the auditors so as to assert their authority over the officials who came to
render account. While this is obviously interesting, it is based on a few extant
illuminations in manuscripts emanating from the French chambre des comptes,
whose auctorial agendas are left unexplored (the promotion of the ideology of
the rising late medieval state and its institutions is the obvious possibility). The
key point is that we simply cannot verify the effects of this visual rhetoric.44
That recourse was made to it might well suggest that the auditors were doubtful
in the first place of the effectiveness of the institutional censures available to
them. When learned but low-origin magistri audited the accounts of prominent
officials drawn from the ranks of magnates, they would understandably have
turned to visual rhetoric and religious symbolism as a way of offsetting the
imbalance of status. Routine exposure, however, as is the case with the audit-
ing of annual accounts, would have taken off much of the edge of the ceremo-
nial and visual symbolism: a novice official might have felt overwhelmed the
first few times he faced the auditors but would eventually get over it.
The alternative view of late medieval audits as processes predicated on
dialogue and negotiation has much to recommend it, although, to reiterate, this
was obviously not an either / or scenario. For one, it has been recognised that
the administrative sanctions imposed on delinquent officials were rare and hard
to enforce on the ground – something that does not square with the idea of
auditing as a judicial practice of sorts.45 That officials’ abuses were often
solved in the courts of justice rather than of account points to the limits of
administrative censures.46 On the other hand, softer means were sometimes
preferred, such as a discourse emphasising the moral value of officials’ good
conduct, albeit with limited success.47 The dialogical dimension of late twelfth-
43 MATTÉONI, “Vérifier, corriger, juger”, pp. 41-47.
44 On the general question of studies of medieval ritual, see Ph. BUC, The Dangers of Ritual
(Princeton, 2001).
45 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, pp. 123-25; MATTÉONI, “Vérifier, corriger,
juger’, p. 62; A. DEMURGER, “Carrières normandes: Les vicomtes (1350-1450)”, in: L’État
moderne et les élites, XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles: Apports et limites de la méthode prosopographique, ed.
J.-Ph. GENET and G. LOTTES (Paris, 1996), pp. 97-109 (p. 100 for two revealing examples). 
46 More than half of those accused of abuse of office in fourteenth-century France were mid-
level administrators, not unlike the Savoyard castellans discussed in several chapters of this
volume; R. TELLIEZ, “Per potentiam officii”: Les officiers devant la justice dans le royaume de
France au XIVe siècle (Paris, 2005), pp. 251-252.
47 SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability, p. 23.
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century Catalan accounts (for example) hardly needs to be brought into relief:
in one record the king directly addresses an official, in the vocative case and
the second person singular: “...you, Guilelme, have come to an account and
reason with me, Alfonso, through God’s grace king of Aragon, etc.”.48 Further-
more, the Savoyard castellany computi, as intimated above, are a good example
of hybrid administrative documents that included accounting figures but also
detailed instructions to local officials, often cast in value-laden language ex-
horting compliance in the name of an ideal of service. The visual rhetoric of
the French chambre des comptes is itself more profitably understood within the
framework of dialogue between auditors and officials than of judicial process.
As with all organisations, late medieval financial administration was shaped by
the interests of the participating parties, of which the focus here has been on
auditors and local officials, yet the former should not be seen as a mere exten-
sion of the Crown. Tensions were bound to occur when the dynasty was willing
to compromise on administrative standards to raise money expeditiously, as in
the case of the sale of administrative positions in the territory. Through up-
bringing and socialisation, the prince shared the cultural outlook of the aristoc-
racy, which continued to provide the most important officials. Conversely, by
force of their training and profession, the magistri were more invested in insti-
tutional procedure and know-how, notwithstanding that they might use their
institutional position to look after their private business interests.49 Their ef-
forts to ensure the promotion of financially competent local officials met with
mixed results at best.50
The path from accounts to accountability, then, was anything but straight-
forward. It is not hard to see why historians of medieval accountability have
concerned themselves so much with the accounting records themselves – their
structure and internal logic – and the technicalities of auditing procedures. It is
simply because the evidence is so rich and inviting. It provides so much detail
on record-keeping and auditing procedures that the opportunity to document
them with more accuracy than is usually possible in medieval studies is a diffi-
cult one to pass up. The minutiae of the chambres des comptes rule books and
48 “Sit notum… quod tu Guilelme Montispessulani uenisti mecum Ildefonso, Dei gratia rege
Aragonensi, comite Barchinonensi et marchione Prouincie, ad computum et racionem omnibus
debitis et firmanciis et negociis mis, quibus pro me obligatus eras uel ego tibi obligatus eram”;
BISSON, Financial Accounts, 2, p. 78.
49 See the case of the Parisian bourgeois Géraud Gueite, master at the chambre des comptes,
in LALOU, “La chambre des comptes”, p. 14.
50 MATTÉONI, “Vérifier, corriger, juger”, p. 60.
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of the accounting records themselves are an invitation to historians to immerse
themselves into the world of late medieval financial bureaucracy. But one runs
the risk of losing sight of the larger and more consequential – if less readily
documented – socio-political context from which the accounts that we scruti-
nise today emanated. Because most of the evidence available to historians was
shaped by the auditores computorum and penned by the clerks working under
them, it tends to grant them a role that can be easily exaggerated. But late me-
dieval audits were intended not as exercises in accounting proficiency for the
professionals of the chambres des comptes but as controls on how territorial
officials exercised their financial and administrative roles. While the auditing
of accounts proved perfectly capable of providing a correct diagnosis of finan-
cial and administrative misconduct, achieving accountability in the strong
sense of the term required political will and the means to enforce it. In the first
place, a ruler had to embrace the picture that emerged from the clerks’ numbers
crunching and procedural zeal over the excuses of aristocratic administrators
professing their probity in the traditional idiom of loyalty to one’s lord. Even
then, enforcing administrative censures against officials proved complicated,
as the evidence briefly reviewed above suggests. Accounting and auditing
practices were embedded in a larger political culture in which the standing of
the official whose accounts were examined often mattered more than the ac-
counts’ inconsistencies, particularly in the case of well-connected aristocrats.
Armand Jamme’s chapter in the present volume evinces the Papal curia’s toler-
ance of a good deal of financial irregularity in just such a case. Even as ac-
counting and auditing techniques were perfected in the fourteenth century,
accountability remained about more than just record-keeping and bureaucratic
procedures: it involved the inculcation of an ethos of administrative responsi-
bility through conduct literature and a variety of memoranda and instructions,
at times quite didactic, issued in conjunction with the auditing of accounts.
Beyond the perpetual tension between the administrative accountability of
officials expected to ensure good governance at the local level and a strict
fiscal accountancy centred on the more efficient exploitation of local resources
(as discussed above), the introduction of accounting records could have per-
verse effects on the stability of a realm if financial and political accountability
failed to take root. Detailed, rigorous accounting records made it possible for
a dynasty to access credit, including by demanding loans from officials upon
their appointment, to be repaid from the positive balance of the administrative
unit with which they were entrusted – as was increasingly the case with the
15From the Auditing of Accounts to Institutional Accountability
aristocrats and urban notables serving as castellans in Savoy. But the practice
spiralled out of control, and at the end of the fourteenth century the count of
Savoy complained of the difficulty of removing from office those to whom he
owed money.51 His predicament did not stem from the lack of sophistication of
late fourteenth-century Savoyard financial accounting, whose ample cross-
references between the computi of various local and central officials made it
possible to track the flow of assets in ways not very different from double-
entry bookkeeping.52 Rather, it reflected fundamental problems in Savoyard
political culture – which, as long as the principality kept expanding, did not
escalate into crisis.
Historians of medieval accountability should arguably pay more attention
to the agency of administrators,53 both at centre and in the territory. This would
involve different modes of history writing, such as microhistory with its atten-
tion to revealing case studies, as an alternative to narratives that see institutions
develop organically in response to the needs of the monarchy. The transfer of
administrative models, to give one example, cannot be understood without
reference to the agency of administrators (see Alessandro Silvestri’s chapter in
this volume for the instrumental role played by handpicked Aragonese adminis-
trators in the organisation of Sicilian finances). Count Pierre II of Savoy has
been deservedly credited with introducing in Savoy the system of castellany
accounts modelled on the pipe rolls and Exchequer audits with which he had
become familiar over a decade spent in England. But as important as the source
of inspiration is the way in which the rolls of accounts were reworked and
adapted to Savoyard realities. This was not the offspring of one mind but the
result of several decades of experimentation, dialogue, and negotiation between
the auditors and local castellans, with the count’s involvement. In turn, the
transfer of the Savoyard system of accounting to Piedmont, an apanage under
the dynasty’s cadet branch from 1295, entailed efforts to adapt it to the finan-
cial practices of northern Italy. Notably, the parchment rolls of daily expenses
of the court (rotuli hospicii) were soon replaced by paper registers.54 There are
51 CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali e gentiluomini, pp. 258-59.
52 Cf. the case made for double-entry bookkeeping in SOLL, The Reckoning.
53 Cf. J.-L. BONNAUD, Un État en Provence: Les officiers locaux du comte de Provence au
xiv e siècle (1309-1382) (Rennes, 2007), e.g. pp. 24-25; see also the remarks in J.-Ph. GENET,
“Conclusion: Chambres des comptes des principautés et genèse de l’état moderne”, in: La France
des principautés, pp. 267-279, at pp. 271-273.
54 P. BUFFO, “Gérer la diversité: Les comptables des Savoie-Achaïe face aux comptabilités
urbaines et ecclésiastiques”, in: De l’autel à l’écritoire, pp. 393-413, at pp. 395-398.
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limits to the transactional approaches of sociology and anthropology,55 notably
that the focus on the interactions between parties tends to leave out the larger
culture in which they are embedded, but in this context a version thereof would
be welcome.
* * *
While the present book obviously shares perspectives and approaches with
similar volumes on the accounts of the late medieval principalities, its distinc-
tive features are the close, microhistorical focus on how accountability func-
tioned at the local level in connection to finances, administration, and politics,
and the interest in both the agency of administrators and the materiality of the
records. Some of the areas explored here have not featured prominently in
collective volumes on medieval accountability (and certainly not in English) –
this is the case of Savoy, whose vast archive of castellany accounts is just
beginning to be researched in depth. (The substantial attention paid to Savoy
in the present volume reflects the research agenda of the project from which
the volume stems, aimed at advancing the study of the Savoyard accounts from
an interdisciplinary perspective and in the larger European context.) The vol-
ume is divided into three parts, focussing on the links between financial ac-
countability and late medieval politics, the tools of governance – with analyses
of the materiality of financial accounts, auditing, and information management
– and the impact of accounting on the life of late medieval communities. This
division is inevitably artificial as many chapters have several thematic foci.
Part One, “Financial accountability and late medieval politics”, opens with
Richard Cassidy’s take on arguably the turning point in the history of late me-
dieval England, the baronial reform movement and the civil war (1258-1264).
These crucial events are approached here from the hitherto little explored per-
spective provided by the Exchequer financial records for those years. Cassidy’s
analysis of the Exchequer revenues gives a quantifiable sense of the sheriffs’
exploitation of the counties in the years immediately preceding the reform
movement. The chapter spotlights a side of accountability that is less well
documented for the medieval period but crucial for understanding the modern
55 See B. KAPFERER, “Transactional models reconsidered”, in: Transactions and Meaning:
Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behaviour, ed. B. KAPFERER
(Philadelphia, 1976), pp. 1-22. 
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state and its politics: the debate on whether there should be “checks on the
king’s own financial autonomy”.56 Cassidy highlights the reformers’ successes,
for instance with respect to their insistence that sheriffs be selected in coordi-
nation with the local communities (and ideally from the local elites) and that
their administration of the counties be sensitive to locals’ needs. Exploitative
fiscal administration is further explored in Roberto Biolzi’s chapter on Pied-
mont under a cadet branch of the House of Savoy (the so-called Savoy-Achaea
dynasty), focussing on the political expedient of manipulating communities’
duty to provide armed men to military expeditions. Fines (banna) were strictly
enforced in cases of no-show or incomplete equipment, with the aim of using
this revenue to fund a professional army. Like Wirth-Jaillard in Part Three (see
below), Biolzi shows that the banna were the most elastic source of local reve-
nue. This should not come as a surprise: the other revenues of the Savoyard
castellanies were either fixed because of their roots in seigniorial dues or, in
the case of resources such as the market taxes or the mills, whose exploitation
was farmed out annually through negotiation with locals, could not be in-
creased substantially. Wirth-Jaillard’s and Biolzi’s observations about the
banna are supported by Victoria Bufanio’s findings in her chapter on the ac-
counting techniques necessitated by the management of building sites under
Philip of Savoy-Achaea, who turned to ‘monumental politics’ to consolidate
his control of Piedmont. Like Biolzi, Bufanio highlights the crucial link be-
tween financial accounting and late medieval politics, but from a different
angle. She shows that a more exacting collections of revenues, notably from
the banna, was accompanied by accounting records and procedures capable of
ensuring the accurate monitoring of the building expenses, while control of the
construction sites was made more efficient by decentralising it once Philip of
Savoy had built a network of trusted professionals in the territory.
The contributions to Part Two, “The tools of governance: auditing, infor-
mation management, and budgeting”, share an interest in both the materiality
of the accounting records and the procedures sustained by these accounts, from
the Papal curia to the Crown of Aragon (Catalonia and Sicily) to present-day
eastern France (Savoy and Burgundy). Both strands, accounting records and
auditing procedures, are analysed in detail in the chapter by Esther Tello
Hernández on the Aragonese office of the maestre racional, the Crown’s chief
financial officer; the entire procedural sequence of the auditing process is
56 On early modern attempts to control the monarchy’s spending, see SOLL, The Reckoning,
pp. 9, 98-99, 133-142.
18 IONUÞ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI
illustrated through the case study of the collection of the so-called papal tithe.
Ekaterina Nosova focuses on the materiality of the records through a detailed
codicological analysis of a series of late fifteenth-century Burgundian account-
ing ledgers that have puzzled historians. The emphasis shifts to procedures in
Armand Jamme’s chapter on administrative accountability in the Papal States.
Jamme uses a case-study approach to call into question the notion that late
medieval financial audits were not fit for purpose, and points to a political
culture in which some level of discrepancy in an administrator’s accounts was
permissible as long as he could be relied on to get the job done. Equally, the
contributions to Part Two bring up the agency of the administrators that shaped
the functioning of financial institutions such as the courts of account – notably
Alessandro Silvestri’s account of the creation of a new financial office in early
fifteenth-century Sicily, the conservatoria, which discusses the appointment of,
and the work undertaken by, the office’s holder. Noting the initial tensions and
potential for overlap between the traditional Sicilian financial officers, the
magistri rationales, and the conservator maior regis patrimonii transplanted to
the island by its new Aragonese masters “a la manera de Castella”, Silvestri
explains that the “two magistracies operated at different but intertwined levels
of governance, respectively financial planning and accounts auditing”. Lastly,
Guido Castelnuovo revisits a late fourteenth-century dispute on the traditional
right of the Savoyard capital of Chambéry to host the princely accounts in
order to explore the consequences of late medieval archival practices for mod-
ern historians’ work.
The studies in Part Three, “Financial accounts and local communities”,
seek to assess the impact of institutional accountability at the town and parish
level. In contrast with the still common approach of writing the history of late
medieval institutions from the perspective of the central power in a triumphal-
ist narrative about the rise of the modern state, Nicolas Carrier’s analysis of the
introduction of direct taxation in fourteenth-century Savoy spotlights the dy-
namic of negotiation and compromise between the Savoyard dynasty and their
local partners in the dialogue of power: lords, boroughs, and villages. Local
communities’ resistance to heavy subsidia based on rigorous accounts of tax-
payers was successful in securing a key role for local notables in the apportion-
ing of the fiscal burden; the consequence was lower than anticipated tax reve-
nue for the dynasty. Still in Savoy, Aude Wirth-Jaillard offers a comprehensive
treatment of the administration of justice in the castellany of Pont-de-Vaux
(Bresse), with particular emphasis on developments in society and everyday
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life as reflected in the judicial accounts. Her foray into the world of everyday
transgressive conduct brings up the enormous challenges facing the castellan
and his handful of aides in policing the territory effectively, but her final as-
sessment of the administration’s efforts is overall favourable. Beyond its find-
ings about Savoyard Bresse, this chapter offers a model of how two different
sections of the castellany computi, the banna and the laudes et vende (taxes on
property transactions) can be analysed in conjunction, notwithstanding the
pitfalls that Wirth-Jaillard identifies. Credit, and the accounts and complex
procedures that ensured its proper functioning in thirteenth-century England,
is the subject of Dean Irwin’s chapter on Anglo-Jewish moneylending. Irwin’s
close analysis of the administrative context in which the original debt records
were scrutinised and transcribed into rolls demonstrates that the process bene-
fitted not only the Crown, which thereby gained precious fiscal information,
but also the debtors and creditors, by providing additional security for their
transactions. The volume ends with Adinel Dincã’s meticulous review of the
fragmentary and little explored accounting records of the church wardens from
Transylvania, offered here as a stepping stone for a full analysis of the use of
financial accounts at the parish level.
Notwithstanding the close attention paid to the medieval manuscripts,
taken as a whole, the contributions to this volume avoid the pitfalls of seeing
the affirmation of institutional accountability in the later Middle Ages as mere-
ly a matter of technical advances in the production, storage, and verification of
accounting records. What is more, rather than privileging the institutional ini-
tiatives of the central power (the royal or princely dynasties), the emphasis in
this volume falls largely on understanding how the reforms that ushered in
more rigorous financial and administrative accountability were embedded in
socio-political contexts in which the interests of the local aristocracy, town
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A
recent book called the period of baronial reform beginning in 1258,
leading to civil war in 1264, The First English Revolution.1 This revo-
lution was marked by rapid changes of fortune, as the king and his op-
ponents vied for control of government. In these years, new ideas emerged
about the limits of royal power and the need to take account of local opinion,
and for the first time the peasants became visible as holding political views.
Parliament was established as a body which met regularly, to consider legisla-
tion, agree to taxation and decide on matters of state. Even after the defeat of
the reforming movement, the restored royal government adopted some of the
reformers’ proposals in matters of local administration and law.2 The political
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War (London, 2012): the best brief guide to the confused events of this period.
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and military aspects of the revolutionary period, and the role of the Church,
have received much attention over the last few years. There has been less inter-
est in government finance in the 1250s and 1260s, despite the survival of ex-
tensive records of the Exchequer, the government department chiefly con-
cerned with finance.3 Few of the Exchequer accounts have yet been published,
so that much of the detail of financial activities has remained obscure.4
From the Exchequer documents it is possible to gain a new view of the
financial problems of central government, the struggle for control of royal
expenditure, and the difficulties of raising revenue from its principal source in
the counties. Some of the reformers’ successes and failures can be traced in the
surviving accounts. They are also relevant to questions of accountability, a
major issue dividing the king from the reformers: should there be checks on the
king’s own financial autonomy? Were government officials and sheriffs just
servants of the king, or should they answer for their actions, and even be ap-
pointed by the communities which they governed? This paper begins with a
brief summary of the major events of 1258-1264, as they affected government
finance, and the ideas which emerged during this period. It then looks at the
major surviving series of accounts, and their relation to these events. Finally,
it considers some ways in which the developments of these years continued to
have an influence, even after the defeat of the reforming movement and the
restoration of royal power. The surviving accounts have to be seen in the con-
text of the political fluctuations of these years.5 Only a very brief summary is
and Justices: The Making and Enforcement of Legislation in Thirteenth-Century England (Cam-
bridge, 2006).
3 An exception: N. BARRATT, “Crisis management: Baronial reform at the Exchequer”, in:
Baronial Reform and Revolution in England, 1258-1267, ed. A. JOBSON (Woodbridge, 2016),
pp. 56-70, largely concerned with the alleged failure of administrative reform in the first few years
of this period.
4 The Exchequer records are all in The National Archives, London (henceforth TNA). All
references to unpublished documents are to the TNA catalogue numbers. The only relevant
accounts as yet in print, so far as I am aware, are those in The Wardrobe Accounts of Henry III,
ed. B.L. WILD (London, 2012: Pipe Roll Society, New Series 58 ). The Pipe Roll Society has
agreed to publish editions of the pipe roll, memoranda roll and sheriffs’ accounts for 1258-1259,
but these may not appear for several years.
5 The classic account of this period, which unfortunately was never completed by a
promised second volume, is in R.F. TREHARNE, The Baronial Plan of Reform, 1258-1263
(Manchester, 1932; reprinted with additional material 1971). On particular episodes, see: D.A.
CARPENTER, “What happened in 1258?”, in: The Reign of Henry III, pp. 183-197; H.W.
RIDGEWAY, “What happened in 1261?”, in: Baronial Reform, ed. JOBSON, pp. 89-108.
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possible here, but it should indicate how rapidly control swayed back and forth,
and the evolution of ideas about governance.
The revolution began in April 1258, when a group of magnates confronted
king Henry III. At the Oxford parliament, in June and July 1258, the reformers’
initial proposals were set out in a programme later known as the Provisions of
Oxford. Henry swore to abide by these provisions, which included the estab-
lishment of a system of government by a council. The Provisions of Oxford
included two sections which were particularly relevant to government finance.
On the Exchequer, the Provisions said that the treasurer should be appointed by
the council for one year at a time, and render account at the end of the year;
good men should be appointed at the Exchequer, as ordained by the council; all
the revenues of the land should come to the Exchequer, and nowhere else; and
any necessary reforms should be carried out. As to the sheriffs, they should be
loyal and substantial landholders of the counties where they held office; they
should deal fairly with the people of the county; they should only hold office
for a year at a time, and account at the Exchequer; they should be paid suffi-
ciently for their services, and not take bribes.6
The council returned to the issue of sheriffs in October 1258, issuing the
Ordinance of Sheriffs. Sheriffs were to do justice impartially, take only moder-
ate hospitality, not take bribes and not farm out the subdivisions of the coun-
ties. Sheriffs would account at the end of the year, and be paid for their ser-
vices, so that they did not need to take anything else.7 The council appointed
new sheriffs in nearly all the counties, and a new treasurer, John of Crakehall,
as well as making some technical reforms to government finance. They in-
quired into the management of the exchanges and mints, and increased reve-
nues by ensuring that the Treasury received profits which had previously disap-
peared into officials’ pockets.8
6 Documents of the Baronial Movement of Reform and Rebellion 1258-1267, selected by
R.F. TREHARNE, ed. I.J. SANDERS (Oxford, 1973) [henceforth DBM], pp. 106-109.
7 DBM, pp. 118-123.
8 Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry III [henceforth CPR], 4 vols. (London, 1906-1913),
1258-66, p. 1; H.W. RIDGEWAY, “Mid thirteenth-century reformers and the localities: The sheriffs
of the baronial regime, 1258-61”, in: Regionalism and Revision: The Crown and its Provinces
in England 1200-1650, ed. P. FLEMING, A. GROSS, and J.R. LANDER (London, 1998), pp. 59-86;
A. JOBSON, “John of Crakehall: The ‘forgotten’ baronial Treasurer, 1258-60”, Thirteenth Century
England 13 (2011), pp. 83-99; R. CASSIDY, “The royal exchanges and mints in the period of
baronial reform”, British Numismatic Journal 83 (2013), pp. 134-148. For a generally positive
view of the reformers’ financial achievements, TREHARNE, Baronial Plan, pp. 369-376.
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There was a further stipulation a year later. In October 1259, the Provisions
of Westminster included a section on sheriffs: it proposed that each county
court should elect four suitable men, from whom the barons of the Exchequer
should choose the best men to be sheriffs.9 This proposal did not come to pass,
as the reforming council gradually lost control of events. Henry gained the
support of Louis IX of France, and in June 1261 produced letters from the pope,
absolving him from his oath to the Provisions. Henry thus recovered power,
appointing his own treasurer and sheriffs.10 By the end of 1261, Henry
appeared to be back in control, and disagreement over the appointment of sher-
iffs was referred to the king’s brother, Richard of Cornwall; Richard, perhaps
unsurprisingly, decided that sheriffs should be appointed and removed by the
sole and untrammelled will of the king.11 Simon de Montfort, who had emerged
as one of the leaders of the reform movement, withdrew to France, returning in
1263 to seize power for a brief period, with competing officials claiming to
control the counties and collect revenues. In the autumn of 1263, Henry once
more resumed his hold over the administration, and both sides agreed to submit
their differences to Louis IX for arbitration. Each side produced a statement of
its case to submit to Louis. These submissions provide a clear summary of the
positions which the king and his opponents had adopted, after six years of
dispute. Their views on finance and the control of the administration were
irreconcilable. The king defended his absolute powers: the king should be able
to choose his own ministers, including the treasurer, as he had been accus-
tomed to do; the king and his ancestors were also accustomed to appoint and
remove sheriffs at their own will; the treasurer and the sheriffs should preserve
the king’s rights; the barons should pay the king enormous sums as compensa-
tion. The reformers’ case recapitulated many of the points they had been mak-
ing since 1258: the king was too generous to undeserving people, and so the
council had to appoint a reliable treasurer; the king’s advisers had farmed out
the counties for excessive sums, leading to extortion and oppression; the king
had appointed strangers as sheriffs, because courtiers supported them; instead,
good and responsible men from each county should choose their own sheriffs;
officials should hold office for one year, then account for their conduct.12
9 DBM, pp. 154-155.
10 Appointment of sheriffs and castellans: CPR 1258-66, pp. 163-164.
11 TREHARNE, Baronial Plan, pp. 272-274, 279.
12
DBM, pp. 252-279.
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These statements reflected two very different views: the royal doctrine of
an absolute monarch with untrammelled freedom to appoint officials and spend
money as he wished, with no regard for local preferences; versus the reform-
ers’ plans to elect officials, reform the administration, control expenditure,
restrain corruption and enforce accountability. In January 1264 Louis found
wholly in favour of his fellow-monarch (apart from the compensation). This
left little room for compromise, and armed conflict broke out. A short cam-
paign ended with a crushing victory for Simon de Montfort at the battle of
Lewes in May 1264, in which the king was taken captive.
Before looking at the struggles over accountability, it would be best to
consider the big picture, the total amount of government revenue and the way
it was administered. To put the following figures in context, the appropriate
comparison is the series of estimates for the early 1240s produced by Robert
Stacey. He calculated that in most years Henry III’s “total expendable income”
averaged about £33,000; the exception was 1241-1242, when the total rose to
more than £50,000, thanks to extraordinary taxation to finance Henry’s cam-
paign in France.13 Total revenue in the early 1250s would still have been over
£30,000 a year, sometimes as much as £37,000.14 All such estimates are neces-
sarily tentative, because the Exchequer’s accounts were not intended to record
total revenue and expenditure, but rather amounts owed and amounts paid;
there was no such thing as a budget, nor even a daily record of the amount of
cash in hand, until much later in the century.15 Matters were also confused
because there were several branches of government involved in collecting and
spending money, acting independently of one another. Two of these, the Irish
Exchequer and the Exchequer of the Jews, can be disregarded, as they made
little material difference to the overall picture at this time. Ireland appears to
have contributed little or nothing to royal income in this period. The Jewish
community had been impoverished by punitive taxation, and had little left to
contribute. From 1259 onwards, they were assessed to pay a tallage of £333
each half-year, but there is no record of payments having been made after
1260-1261.16 The two departments which dealt with significant sums, and
13 R.C. STACEY, Politics, Policy, and Finance under Henry III 1216-1245 (Oxford, 1987),
pp. 206-207.
14 Estimate based on Wardrobe Accounts, pp. CXV, CXXII, and pipe rolls TNA: E 372/94-97.
15 M.H. MILLS, “Exchequer agenda and estimate of revenue, Easter term 1284”, English
Historical Review 40 (1925), pp. 229-234. The jornalia rolls in TNA series E 405 run from 1292.
16 R.C. STACEY, “1240-60: A watershed in Anglo-Jewish relations?”, Historical Research
61 (1988), pp. 135-150: list of tallages p. 137, collection p. 138. Payments of tallage to the
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which overlapped and sometimes conflicted, were the Exchequer and the
Wardrobe.
The Exchequer was based in Westminster, where it carried out its three
major functions: as the office which supervised and audited the financial activ-
ities of government officials; as the Treasury, receiving cash revenues and
making cash payments as instructed by the king; and as a law court, the Exche-
quer of Pleas. Each of these functions generated records, in particular: the
memoranda rolls, recording the administrative activities of the Exchequer; the
pipe rolls, recording the audited accounts of other branches of government; the
receipt and issue rolls, recording payments of cash into and out of the Trea-
sury; and the plea rolls recording judicial activities.17 The pipe rolls were con-
sidered the most significant records, large and cumbersome listings of debts
owed, in the counties and in the major branches of the administration; the pay-
ments received; and the destination of the cash that had been collected, as
verified by the regular process of auditing conducted by the Exchequer.18 Each
account was entered under the name of the relevant official: for the counties,
the sheriffs; for the exchange and mint, the wardens; for vacant bishoprics, the
custodians; and so on.
In the case of the counties, at least in principle, there was an annual pipe
roll account in which each sheriff accounted for the revenue due from his coun-
ty for the year ending at Michaelmas (29 September). The sheriffs, and the
representatives of many boroughs, were supposed to come to the Treasury
twice a year, after Easter and after Michaelmas, to pay in the cash they had
collected; this was known as the adventus.19 In the pipe roll, the sheriffs de-
clared how much they owed, how much they had paid into the Treasury, and
how much they had paid elsewhere, as instructed by the king’s writs. This
expenditure included payments into the Wardrobe, of which more below, and
Treasury in receipt rolls TNA: E 401/40 m. 11, E 401/41 m. 7, E 401/42 m. 11, E 401/44 m. 12.
Payments to the Wardrobe in 1260-61: Wardrobe Accounts, pp. 86, 107.
17 The plea rolls need not concern us further in this context. Examples and further details
in: Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, ed. H. JENKINSON and B. FORMOY (London, 1932: 
Selden Society 48).
18 R. CASSIDY, “Recorda splendidissima: The use of pipe rolls in the thirteenth century”,
Historical Research 85 (2012), pp. 1-12. There is no comprehensive account of Exchequer
procedure in this period; the following description is based on the pipe rolls from 1250 to 1268,
TNA: E 372/94-112.
19 R. CASSIDY, “Adventus vicecomitum and the financial crisis of Henry III’s reign”, English
Historical Review 126 (2011), pp. 614-627.
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£ £ £ £
1258 10,924 2,164 9,434 22,521
1259 12,704 2,118 9,647 24,469
1260 12,647 1,850 8,564 23,061
1261 12,025 3,316 8,193 23,534
1262 11,051 3,589 7,350 21,990
1263 6,762 2,006 3,781 12,548
1264 ?
Source: pipe rolls TNA: E 372/102-112. Revenue from accounts covering more than one
year has been divided pro rata between the relevant years, to give these adjusted fig-
ures. There is no figure for 1264, because of the breakdown in Exchequer procedures
when civil war broke out.
local expenditure, for instance on building works in royal castles, or on pur-
chases of provisions for the court. All these transactions were checked during
the annual audit, and were supposed to be supported by the evidence of written
instructions, the testimony of expert witnesses, or the production of tally sticks,
which were used as receipts. Other officials produced similar accounts, which
were also audited and recorded in the pipe rolls. From these accounts, it is
possible to produce an estimate of the amounts of cash paid each year into the
Treasury, or paid directly to the Wardrobe, or spent locally by sheriffs and
others (Table 1).
Table 1 shows, at least approximately, how the revenue recorded in the
pipe rolls was used in these years. It is clear that total pipe roll revenue was
fairly steady in the initial years of the reform period (although lower than in the
early 1250s), and roughly halved in 1263. No estimate is possible for 1264,
because that was the year in which civil war broke out and Exchequer proce-
dures collapsed. The Easter 1264 adventus did not take place; the pipe roll for
the year 1262-1263, compiled during 1263-1264, covers only nine counties,
compared to more than twenty counties, which had been normal in earlier
years.20 In all years, only about half of the revenue collected was delivered in
20 There is a table of counties covered in pipe rolls, 1261-1277, in C.A.F. MEEKINGS, “The
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£ £ £ £ %
1258 ? ?
1259 8,639 215 2,613 11,467 23
1260 4,513 875 15,020 20,408 74
1261 3,332 293 5,127 8,759 59
1262 1,707 590 11,545 13,837 83
1263 2,362 1,345 3,465 7,172 48
1264 1,575 1,359 3,043 5,977 51
Source: Wardrobe Accounts, pp. cxlviii, clxi. There is no figure for 1258 because no
accounts were produced for the period up to 8 July 1258; total Wardrobe revenues for
the last four months of the regnal year to 27 October 1258 were £1,630.
cash to the Treasury; the rest was either spent locally, following instructions
from central government, or paid to the Wardrobe.
The Wardrobe was the branch of government dealing with the provision of
the royal household. It purchased food, cloth and other domestic items, it or-
ganised transport for the court, and it paid many royal servants and officials,
such as the household knights. Unlike the Exchequer, which remained fixed at
Westminster, the Wardrobe’s senior staff travelled with the king, who was
frequently on the move. The Wardrobe’s permanent bases were also separate
from the Exchequer, with some stores at the Tower of London, and some trea-
sure and jewels entrusted to the New Temple, the English headquarters of the
Knights Templar (as was shown when the king’s son, lord Edward, raided the
treasure in the Temple in 1263).21 The Wardrobe was both administratively and
physically separate from the Exchequer. It was thus significant that in October
1262 Henry instructed the treasurer that all revenues raised should be placed in
the Tower for the king’s use.22 The Wardrobe became particularly important
pipe roll order of 12 February 1270”, in: Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. J.C.
DAVIES (London, 1957), pp. 222-253, at p. 253.
21 Brief description of Wardrobe activities in Wardrobe Accounts, pp. XI-XIII; T.F. TOUT,
Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England, 6 vols. (Manchester, 1920-1933,
reprinted 1937), 1, pp. 299-303; JOBSON, First English Revolution, p. 91.
22 Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 14 vols. (London, 1902-38), 1261-64, pp. 157, 166.
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when the king went overseas, for instance on campaign; the Wardrobe then
became the office dealing with military finance. As the Wardrobe travelled
around, it was often convenient for it to collect cash on the spot, from individu-
als who owed money to the government. The Wardrobe also received payments
from sheriffs, out of the revenues which they had collected; this provided an
administrative short-cut for the Wardrobe to gain access to cash while on the
road, rather than having to wait for cash to be sent from Westminster. Such
payments from individuals or officials were supposed to be notified to the
Exchequer, to prevent the payer being charged twice. This was done through
writs authorising payments and allowances to be made, recorded in the liberate
rolls. The Exchequer was also supposed to be kept informed through the
originalia rolls, recording fines, including those which had been paid directly
into the Wardrobe.
In principle, the pipe rolls should have included the audited accounts of the
Wardrobe, as a major branch of government which received and spent large
sums of money. In practice, this process was showing signs of breaking down.
There had been no Wardrobe account for the period from October 1252 to
January 1255; there was another gap from April 1256 to July 1258; and the
account from July 1258 to July 1261 survives only as two drafts, produced
during the audit process but never entered into the pipe rolls.23 This is a signifi-
cant omission from the record, not least because of the amounts of money
passing through the Wardrobe, without being subjected to the usual checks.
Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, the Wardrobe was receiving cash from sources
outside the Exchequer’s control. It received large amounts from the Treasury,
and sums which might be called ordinary revenues, out of the routine revenues
collected by the sheriffs in the counties, or by the exchanges. But it also re-
ceived occasional and extraordinary payments, from such sources as the reve-
nues of vacant bishoprics, tallage of the Jewish community, loans and the sale
of treasure. Many of these payments would only become known after the event,
when (and if) the Exchequer audited the Wardrobe’s accounts. It was the inci-
dence of these extraordinary items of revenue which produced the marked
fluctuations which can be seen in Table 2. This shows that the reformers had
only brief success in taking control of Wardrobe finance, in 1258-1259, when
23 Wardrobe Accounts, pp. XIV, CXXXVII. A little detail from the years when accounts are
missing, in a report from several years later, shows that Wardrobe spending was at a high level,
and partly conducted on credit. The buyers of the Wardrobe had spent £1,937 on cloths of gold
and other cloths and furs between 29 September 1257 and 3 July 1258, of which £772 was still
owed to merchants some ten years later: Close Rolls 1264-68, pp. 421-422.
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Source: Calendar of the Fine Rolls, 1254-1264.
they ensured that the bulk of the Wardrobe’s cash was provided from the Trea-
sury, and thus under Exchequer supervision; this was what the reformers had
demanded in the Provisions of Oxford in June-July 1258: “And all the revenues
of the land shall come there [the Exchequer], and nowhere else”.24
Thereafter, the king succeeded in gaining access to large sums paid directly
to the Wardrobe, rather than via the Exchequer, which he could spend on build-
ing up support, including military support. Some of these extraordinary items
can be identified as very large one-off payments: the vacant bishoprics of Win-
chester and Durham produced major windfalls, with ecclesiastical vacancies
contributing £1,940 in 1258-1259, £3,474 in 1259-60 and £3,220 in 1260-1261;
the king’s visit to France in 1259-1260, to negotiate the Treaty of Paris, was
partly financed by loans and by £2,181 from sales of gold which the king con-
tracted in France; this visit produced a payment of £5,863 from the king of
France, under the terms of the treaty, with a further advance of £9,930 in 1261-
1262; the king’s brother, Richard of Cornwall, contributed a loan of £1,333 in
24 DBM, pp. 106-107.
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1263-1264.25 Such large individual amounts were of course unusual and unre-
peatable. The Wardrobe also drew on large numbers of smaller payments,
again bypassing the Exchequer, by collecting fines and amercements from
individuals and officials in the counties, particularly as the king travelled
around the country. Fines, the sums offered to have writs, charters, reliefs and
exemptions from obligations such as knighthood, were a major source of gov-
ernment income. By tapping into this source directly, Henry III could again
ensure that he had cash under his own control.
Henry had done this throughout the 1250s, and such practices may have led
to the reformers’ demand for supervision of royal finance. On his return from
his Gascon campaign of 1253-1254, Henry began to build up a treasure in gold.
We have relatively little detail about this treasure, because of the lack of Ward-
robe accounts for several years. Where we do have accounts, for fifteen months
in 1255-1256, we can see that the Wardrobe received gold worth over £2,600.26
Much of this treasure was used to produce Henry III’s gold pennies, introduced
in 1257 and an immediate flop: “Henry III decided to try his own hand at the
business of coining. As might have been expected the result was very beautiful
and quite useless”.27 But he still had a stock of some 500 gold marks, worth
about £3,300, when the reforming council took over the government in 1258.28
Much of this gold, as the extant Wardrobe accounts show, came from fines,
and we do have the fine rolls for the whole of this period, recording the
amounts offered to have writs, charters, and privileges.29 The fine rolls also
show that many of these fines were paid into the Wardrobe, often denominated
in marks of gold, and paid either as actual gold coin or leaf, or in silver coins,
described as being intended for the purchase of gold. Table 3 shows the fines
recorded as having been paid into the Wardrobe. The fluctuations in amount
show the pattern of Wardrobe finance outside Exchequer control: large
amounts in 1256 and 1257; a decline at the end of the decade as the reform
movement tried to impose control over the Wardrobe’s autonomy; minor re-
25 Wardrobe Accounts, pp. CXLVIII, CLXI, 85-122; D.A. CARPENTER, “The meetings of kings
Henry III and Louis IX”, Thirteenth Century England 10 (2005), pp. 1-30, at p. 21; 5,000 mark
loan from king of France: CPR 1258-66, p. 74; acknowledgement of receipt of money from Louis
for payment of knights, December 1261: CPR 1258-66, p. 194.
26 Wardrobe Accounts, p. 84.
27 N. DENHOLM-YOUNG, Richard of Cornwall (Oxford, 1947), p. 64.
28 D.A. CARPENTER, “The gold treasure of king Henry III”, in: The Reign of Henry III, pp.
107-136, at p. 122.
29 Calendar of the Fine Rolls of the Reign of Henry III (henceforth CFR; available online at
<http://www.finerollshenry3.org.uk>; accessed 28 March 2019).
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Table 4: Estimated total government revenue
Year to Michael-
mas










Source: Tables 1 and 2, adjusted to eliminate double-counting. No estimates for 1258,
due to the absence of Wardrobe accounts, or for 1264, because of the collapse in Ex-
chequer procedures.
coveries from 1260 as Henry attempted to exert his authority. What is striking
about the fines paid in the late 1250s is that they are recorded in the fine rolls,
but were not copied into the originalia rolls, which were used to pass informa-
tion to the Exchequer. This was the period when gold fines reached their peak,
but there are no Wardrobe accounts which would put the fines into context.
The Exchequer was kept in the dark; it did not know that the fines existed, or
whether or not they had been paid. After the reformers took power, there was
an attempt to restore Exchequer control. Late in 1258, a long list of about one
hundred unpaid fines, amounting to £1,300, imposed over the previous three
years, was sent to the Exchequer. Many of these were fines of gold, most com-
monly for respite from knighthood or from having to serve on assizes, for hav-
ing charters, or for having a warren. This list gave the Exchequer the necessary
information to include the outstanding debts in the summons sent to the sher-
iffs of the relevant counties, and to record them in the pipe rolls. The sheriffs
were then able to pursue the unpaid fines, and even managed to collect pay-
ment for a few of them.30
Henry appears to have returned to this practice of collecting fines ‘off the
record’, as it were, in 1264, when war had just broken out, and again in 1266.
Immediately before the battle of Lewes he was imposing fines which were not
30
CFR 1257-58, Nos. 1182-1288. Fines listed in Nova oblata sections of 1259 pipe roll,
TNA: E 372/103. 
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Table 5: Treasury receipts and issues
Term Receipts Issues
£ £
E 1257 5,224 7,711
M 1257 8,540 8,518
E 1258 5,028 5,000
M 1258 8,592 7,414
E 1259 7,431 7,320











E = term beginning after Easter; M = term beginning after Michaelmas. Source: receipt
rolls TNA: E 401/31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45A; issue rolls TNA: E 403/13, 15A,
3114, 17B, 1217, 3115, 18, 19.
recorded in the usual way, but in a separate roll of fines in expeditione regis,
now lost. We only know about some of these fines because they were recorded
in the patent rolls, or in the pipe rolls several years later, after the restoration
of Henry’s authority. The abbot of Ramsey, for example, owed £500 in such
fines, and had paid much of this to the Wardrobe, but these payments were not
separately recorded in the Wardrobe accounts.31
Such fines should be seen in the context of the other attempts to secure
autonomous funding for the Wardrobe, with the Exchequer either not informed
or only informed after the event. They were important, as the Wardrobe dealt
31 S.T. AMBLER, “The fines and loans of the Montfortian bishops and the missing fine roll
In expedicione of 1264”, Fine of the Month November 2008, Henry III Fine Rolls Project,
<https://finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/month/fm-11-2008.html>, accessed 28 March 2019 ; the
abbot of Ramsey’s fines are in the 1267 pipe roll, TNA: E 372/111 rot. 4.
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Table 6: Adventus receipts
Term Counties Boroughs Total
£ £ £
E 1258 1,011 284 1,295
M 1258 1,150 584 1,734
E 1259 1,225 418 1,643
M 1259 1,246 816 2,062
E 1260 996 441 1,437
M 1260 918 866 1,784
E 1261 1,652 469 2,121
M 1261 791 795 1,586
E 1262 1,074 578 1,652
M 1262 1,753 904 2,657
E 1263 1,137 389 1,526
M 1263 747 651 1,397
E 1264 0 0 0
M 1264 126 339 465
Source: memoranda rolls TNA: E 159/31-39; E 368/33-39.
with such a large proportion of total government finance. It is difficult to be
precise about this, because of the gaps in the Wardrobe accounts, the different
year-ends, and the problem of double-counting revenue which passed through
the Exchequer to the Wardrobe. It is possible, however, to produce some very
rough estimates of the total amount of money received by the government, by
adding Exchequer and Wardrobe revenues, after eliminating duplication in the
figures. Table 4 indicates that total government revenue was about £25,000 in
1258-1259, much higher in 1259-1260 (thanks largely to the sums received by
the king in France), back to around £25,500 in 1260-1261, then up again in
1261-1262, before the collapse in 1262-1263. The fluctuations, before 1263,
were largely the result of the swings in extraordinary Wardrobe revenue, and
thus reflect the changing fortunes of the king and his opponents.
Such fluctuations can also be traced in the receipt and issue rolls recording
the flow of cash into and out of the Treasury, respectively (Table 5). Both
series of rolls were produced in duplicate for each half-year, beginning after
Michaelmas and after Easter, but unfortunately only a few survive from the
1260s. Such receipt rolls as we have indicate that there was relatively little
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Table 7: Sources of Treasury cash receipts
Category 1258-1259 1259-1260 E 1261 E 1263
£ £ £ £
County farm and profit 642 875 402 107
Farms of boroughs and manors 4,053 4,170 1,411 1,243
Dividend tallies 2,776 2,340 1,947 1,271
Amercements 225 233 132 148
Fines 1,336 2,089 501 406
Revenue from lands etc. 690 505 183 86
Debts 564 738 211 150
Tallage 34 696 926 2
Winchester bishopric 3,867 2,035 0 0
Other 1,837 1,443 465 274
Total 16,024 15,124 6,176 3,687
Source: as in table 5.
change between 1257 and 1258, then a marked increase in cash revenue in
1259.32 Although there is insufficient evidence to talk about trends, it is clear
that revenue in Easter term 1263 was much lower than in preceding Easter
terms. The receipt rolls also show how much was received each day, with sub-
totals for each week ending on Saturday. They indicate, firstly, that the bulk of
the year’s income arrived in a few weeks at the beginning of each term, and
secondly, that the Michaelmas term was usually more productive than the Eas-
ter term. This reflects the importance of the adventus of the sheriffs and bor-
oughs at the beginning of each term, delivering the revenues they had collected
(Table 6). As one might expect from what has been said about overall reve-
nues, adventus receipts were relatively low at the beginning of the reform pe-
riod, then recovered and were fairly consistent for the next few years, but col-
lapsed in 1263. The fall in revenues in 1263 was followed by the complete
failure of the Easter 1264 adventus, as civil war was breaking out. Until then,
the adventus produced up to a third of the total cash receipts of the Treasury.
32 This is contrary to the contention that “Receipt roll evidence also shows that the volume
of revenue paid into the Exchequer declined dramatically during the period of baronial control”
(N. BARRATT, “Counting the cost: The financial implications of the loss of Normandy”,
Thirteenth Century England 10 (2005), pp. 31-39, at pp. 34-35).
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It is also clear that revenue from the counties was more affected by the disor-
ders of late 1263 and 1264 than was the contribution of the boroughs.
Table 7 gives more detail about the sources of cash, for two full years for
which we have evidence, and for the Easter terms of 1261 and 1263. The coun-
ty farms were clearly no longer a major source of income, despite their tradi-
tional importance, and, as with the adventus, they fell markedly in 1263. Much
of the other revenue collected by sheriffs, particularly fines and amercements,
was paid into the Treasury as undifferentiated lump sums, with the sheriffs
receiving dividend tallies as receipts; these tallies covered the whole amount
received, with the sheriff being expected to give his own tallies as receipts to
the individual payers for the sum to be divided up between them. The relatively
high figures for fines in 1259 and 1260 may reflect the reformers’ temporary
success in ensuring that these were paid into the Treasury, rather than going
directly to the Wardrobe, as they had done earlier. The low figures for amerce-
ments may have been influenced by two factors: many amercements were col-
lected by sheriffs and paid in as part of the lump sums covered by dividend
tallies; and most of the income from the last judicial eyre in 1252-1258 had
already been received.33
Some other, irregular, sources of income reflect political developments. As
with the Wardrobe, the first two years of reform were evidently greatly depend-
ent on revenue from the bishopric of Winchester, left vacant when the bishop,
the king’s half-brother, fled abroad. Such income from regalian rights over
vacant bishoprics and abbacies was clearly a matter of chance, and could not
be relied upon. In a similar way, tallage could not be used a regular source of
income: it was an occasional and arbitrary tax, imposed on the Jewish commu-
nity and on the towns and manors of the royal demesne. Tallage of the royal
demesne had last been imposed in 1255. A new tallage was announced in June
1260, with assessors to cover the country. There was no specific reason given
for this tallage, apart from the payment of the king’s expenses.34 The tallage
therefore began under the reforming regime, and continued into the period
early in 1261 when Henry was re-establishing his authority. The bulk of the
revenue should have been received in 1260-1261, for which we have a receipt
roll only for the Easter term. In the counties covered by the pipe roll for
33 The pipe roll accounts for that eyre, in TNA: E 372/96-105, show that it produced some
£17,860, of which only £1,540 was paid during the reform period.
34
CPR 1258-66, pp. 75-76; S.K. MITCHELL, Taxation in Medieval England (New Haven,
1951), pp. 337-338; Close Rolls 1259-61, p. 135; CFR 1260-61, Nos. 91-92.
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Table 8: Destinations of Treasury cash payments
1257-58 1258-59 M 1259 E 1263
£ £ £ £
King’s household,
Wardrobe, etc.
5,643 6,345 4,679 369
Queen and royal children 1,281 777 165 80
Other royal family 892 67 58 0
Wine 322 93 161 132
Works at Westminster 933 0 360 157
Annual fees 1,525 1,518 1,470 922
Simon & Eleanor de
Montfort
800 1,637 200 0
Pope 667 0 667 0
Loan repayments 37 2,113 5 0
Military and castles 69 700 567 753
Other 1,349 1,483 897 698
Total 13,518 14,734 9,229 3,110
Source: as in Table 5.
1261, the sum assessed was £3,019, of which £1,647, some 55 per cent, was
collected in that year. Another record from a few years later shows the total
assessment as at least £3,446.35
The sources of cash receipts were thus affected by political developments,
and reflected both the early attempts by the reformers to keep control of royal
revenue, and the later decline in authority, as king and reformers struggled for
control. Something similar can be seen in the issue rolls, recording the applica-
tion of cash paid out by the Treasury. Table 8 shows two full years and two
terms from 1259 and 1263, the only relevant periods for which these records
survive. The continuous series of issue rolls from the late 1250s shows that the
most important beneficiary of cash was the royal household. Payments were
made as lump sums to the keepers of the Wardrobe, or to the buyers of the
Wardrobe to purchase cloths, candles, and so on, or directly to merchants for
goods supplied to the household. Payments to wine merchants were recorded
separately, and often made years in arrears. There were many routine payments
35 Nova oblata in pipe roll TNA: E 372/105; Close Rolls 1264-68, pp. 534-540.
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of annual fees for officials such as judges, much the largest being £667 a year
for Hugh Bigod, the Justiciar appointed by the reforming council. The pope
was supposed to receive an annual payment of £667, known as the census, but
this often fell into arrears; it is notable that the reformers made this payment in
Michaelmas 1259, perhaps as an attempt to gain papal support. They had ear-
lier, in 1258-1259, repaid loans of over £2,000 from Italian merchants, much
of which had been used to pay arrears of the census.36 Simon and Eleanor de
Montfort had long-running disputes with Henry about money they claimed to
be owed for Simon’s service in Gascony and Eleanor’s dower; Simon appears
to have used his leading position among the reformers to ensure that they re-
ceived large sums in cash in these years, as well as a grant of several manors to
provide an income of £400 a year in future.37 The Treasury was clearly well
provided with cash in Michaelmas 1259 term: it issued £2,400 to the Wardrobe
to be taken to France with the king, followed by further instalments of £1,267
to be delivered to the king while he was in France.38 The unsophisticated state
of royal finance is shown by the fact that the money sent to Henry in France
was sent as silver coins (rather than, for example, by using the services of
merchants or the Templars): the Exchequer paid for overtime for the three days
its clerks and tellers spent sorting out pennies to send to the king in France, and
for five barrels to pack the money in.39
One reason that the reforming council was in a position to make payments
to the pope and the de Montforts, and to support the king’s munificence in
France, was that they had clamped down on payments to the royal family, other
than the king and queen. It had been one of the reformers’ grievances that the
king wasted money by giving it to undeserving favourites. Henry’s half-broth-
ers, Aymer, Geoffrey and Guy de Lusignan, and William de Valence, were
particularly resented, because of their arrogance and the apparent impunity of
their brutal officials. William de Bussey, the steward of William de Valence,
behaved as if he was above the law, and famously taunted his victims: “Si ego
injuriam tibi facio, quis tibi faciet justitiam?” (“If I do you wrong, who will do
36 Loan to cover two years’ census in May 1258: CPR 1247-58, p. 631; W.E. LUNT,
Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), pp. 150-152.
37 J.R. MADDICOTT, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 188-189; S.T. AMBLER, The
Song of Simon de Montfort (London 2019), pp. 220-223.
38 TNA: E 403/18, m. 1, 2. 
39 Calendar of the Liberate Rolls, 6, 1267-72 (London, 1964), No. 2302B; CPR 1258-66,
p. 118.
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you right?”).40 Henry gave cash to such favourites, as annual fees or simply as
gifts. In 1257-1258, for example, Guy de Lusignan received £250 and William
de Valence £375.41 Such payments almost stopped in 1258-1259, and in
Michaelmas 1259 there was just one such payment, of £58 to the king’s brother
Richard of Cornwall.42 Henry’s generosity resumed as he regained control,
restoring William de Valence to the king’s grace in April 1261.43
After the gap in the records for the early 1260s, the Easter 1263 issue roll
is clearly the odd one out. Overall payments are much lower than in previous
records. The amount going to the royal household and family is almost insig-
nificant (although it does include £10 for plants for the king’s garden at the
Tower), presumably reflecting Henry’s success in obtaining cash directly for
the Wardrobe, evading Exchequer control; there are only two big individual
payments, £667 for lord Edward’s proposed campaign in Wales, and £333 as
a half-year’s fee for the Justiciar, who was then Philip Basset, one of Henry’s
firmest supporters.44 The Treasury was evidently under royal control, but the
bulk of the payments recorded in the issue roll fell near the beginning of the
term. Only routine payments of stipends for servants (master Roger the cook,
Helen the laundrywoman, and so on) are recorded after 31 July. There were
clearly financial problems at this stage: in May the king had to resort to pledg-
ing his jewels to borrow money for the purchase of cloth, and in June lord
Edward granted the Jewry to Cahors merchants in return for a loan.45 The sum-
mer of 1263 is the period when Simon de Montfort returned and briefly took
control of the government, while disorder broke out in the counties. The receipt
roll for Easter 1263 also reflects these events, with a fairly strong start to the
term, but little received in June and almost nothing from July onwards.
There is no surviving receipt roll for the Michaelmas term of 1263, but
such evidence as we have shows that government finance was approaching
collapse. The Michaelmas adventus produced only £1,397 (although only one
sheriff was absent), little more than half of the receipts of the previous
Michaelmas.46 A few weeks later, on 14 November 1263, shortly after Henry
40 Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. H.R. LUARD, 7 vols. (London: Rolls Series, 1872-
83), 5, p. 738.
41 TNA: E 403/15A, 3114.
42 TNA: E 403/18 m. 1.
43 CPR 1258-66, pp. 150, 223.
44 TNA: E 403/19 m. 1.
45
CPR 1258-66, pp. 257, 263.
46
TNA: E 159/38 m. 7, E 368/38 m. 14.
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Table 9: County farm and profit (selected years)
Net farm Increment Profit Total
£ £ £ £
1241-1242 2,122 163 1,566 3,851
1250-1251 1,851 163 2,563 4,577
1256-1257 1,836 163 2,815 4,813
1258-1259 2,042 163 1,312 3,517
Source: pipe rolls TNA: E 372/86, 95-96, 101-104.
III had again recovered control of the machinery of government, his new acting
treasurer, John of Chishall, drew up an inventory of what he found in the Trea-
sury at Westminster: £10; 40s. of old money (presumably the old short-cross
pennies, replaced by the re-coinage of 1247-1250); 39 purses, each containing
44s.; 104s. which had been set aside for carrying out an assay; silver plate
weighing 104s. 7d.; and two golden seals of the emperor Otto.47 This pathetic
list is a far cry from the Treasury of 1259-1260, cheerfully counting out £1,000
to send to the king in France.
The receipt rolls and the records of the adventus (Tables 6 and 7) both
show how the sheriffs’ contribution to government finance was affected by the
events of 1263. The sheriffs’ major traditional source of revenue, the county
farm, had long since diminished in relative importance. A large part of the farm
had once been produced by the manors of the royal demesne, for which the
sheriffs were traditionally responsible. The Exchequer reforms of the 1230s
had removed most of the manors from the sheriffs’ control, and new financial
targets were set for the sheriffs in 1240-1241. These targets, profits totalling
£1,552, were set out in the originalia roll, the roll sent to the Exchequer to
inform it of the fines it should collect and other royal decisions relevant to its
work.48 The profit target was added to the county farm (net of deductions for
the manors which were no longer contributing to the sheriffs’ income), and the
traditional fixed increment found in four counties. The total expected from the
47 TNA: E 159/38 m. 2d, E 368/38 m. 2.
48 CFR 1240-41, Nos. 800-827. The profit target for Gloucestershire was given as 43 marks
(£29), which may have been an error, as the target in the subsequent pipe roll was £43. This
explains the difference between the originalia figure and the pipe roll figure in Table 9. 
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sheriffs, £3,851, was recorded in the subsequent pipe roll (Table 9). From that
level, the amount demanded from the sheriffs was inexorably increased, with
the total reaching £4,577 in 1251 and £4,813 in 1257.49 The sheriffs themselves
were allowed to keep any amounts they collected over and above the targets
they had been set, giving them a strong incentive to exploit the counties with
unchecked ruthlessness. This increase in the cash demanded, and the exploita-
tion of the counties by unscrupulous sheriffs, were among the sources of dis-
content with Henry III’s rule in the counties, which fed into the demands for
reform in 1258.
The reformers took a very different view of the role of the sheriffs, and the
way in which they should raise revenue, and brought in a radical new ap-
proach. Nearly all of the sheriffs of 1258-1259 were newly appointed, as custo-
dians rather than farmers. They were not set a fixed profit target, but were
instead expected simply to collect the revenues of the county and deliver them
to the Exchequer, with full accounts of the sources of the cash.50 This approach
only lasted for one year, delivering a much lower level of revenue to the Ex-
chequer, £3,517 for farm, increment and profit in 1258-1259. This fall in reve-
nue could be in part attributable to poor economic circumstances (1258 was the
year of a particularly severe famine), or to the uncertainties of new sheriffs
appointed by a new regime; it could also show that this was a fairer and more
realistic level of revenue to be expected from the counties. This could well
have influenced the lower levels of profit demanded from farmer sheriffs in the
following few years. The originalia show profit targets totalling £2,220 for the
next set of sheriffs appointed by the reformers in 1259-1260; when Henry III
recovered power, he replaced the sheriffs, but the target remained at much the
same level, £2,023 in 1260-1261.51 Even after Henry’s definitive return to
power, following the battle of Evesham, the profit targets set for his new sher-
iffs for 1265-1266 came to just £1,749.52 The years of reform had thus pro-
49 The fall in the net farm shown in Table 9 was largely due to the changing treatment of the
Kent county farm and income from the manor of Milton, which was sometimes treated as part of
the profit rather than the farm: CFR 1250-51, No. 367; TNA: E 372/95 rot. 13.
50 This had been done before, in a previous episode of Exchequer reform in 1236: D.A.
CARPENTER, “The decline of the curial sheriff in England, 1194-1258”, in: The Reign of Henry
III, pp. 151-182, at pp. 169-171.
51 CFR 1259-60, Nos. 312, 754-774; CFR 1260-61, Nos. 1065-1086. The list of profit targets
for 1260-1261 omits Cumberland, which was usually set a profit of £40. 
52 CFR 1265-66, Nos. 744-852. This list omits Lincolnshire, which would usually add
another £200. The custodian sheriffs appointed by Simon de Montfort for 1264-1265 reported
a profit of only £830, but that was clearly an unusual year of civil war and disruption: TNA: E
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duced at least some small improvement in the burdens placed on the counties
by the demand for profits.
This financial development was echoed, to some extent, by a modification
of other expectations placed upon the sheriffs. For Henry III, their job was
simply to serve his interests. For the reformers, the sheriffs owed a duty to the
people of their counties. And a little of this attitude survived even after the
defeat of the reform movement, as can be seen in the oaths which the sheriffs
had to swear. There are frequent references to thirteenth-century sheriffs taking
an oath when they were appointed, although we do not have the full text of
such an oath before 1258.53 Matthew Paris, for example, reported that, when
new sheriffs were appointed in 1236, they were made to swear that they would
accept no gifts except food and drink, in moderation, nor any earthly reward by
which justice might be corrupted.54 Henry III’s expectations of his sheriffs were
shown when he called them all together at the Exchequer in 1250. He ad-
dressed them in person, ordering them: to maintain the liberties of the Church;
to do justice to widows and orphans; to repress blasphemy; to correct the mis-
deeds of the magnates towards their tenants; not to farm out the hundreds or
wapentakes (sub-divisions of the counties) for excessive amounts, or to those
who would treat the people unjustly; to inquire into markets held without war-
rant; and to safeguard the king’s rights and liberties, not allowing any of the
king’s prerogatives to be claimed by anyone who did not have a royal charter
or ancient rights.55 This is the wish-list of a pious monarch, who expects the
sheriffs to protect the rights of the king, with no reference to honesty or impar-
tiality in their dealings with the people of their counties.
The reformers of 1258 had a quite different attitude, shown in the oath
sworn by the new sheriffs whom they appointed. This oath was in French,
which the sheriffs would understand, rather than the Latin used by the clerks in
all other official records. The sheriffs swore: to serve the king loyally; to do
justice impartially; to take only normal quantities of food and drink; not to
impose excessively on people’s hospitality; not to take presents worth more
than 12d.; not to have too many subordinate officials, and to ensure that these
372/109-113.
53 W.A. MORRIS, The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300 (Manchester, 1927; reprinted 1968),
p. 176.
54 Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, 3, p. 363. Elsewhere, Paris noted that this oath soon
vanished: Historia Anglorum, ed. F. MADDEN, 3 vols. (London: Rolls Series, 1866-69), 2, p. 389.
55 M.T. CLANCHY, “Did Henry III have a policy?”, History 53 (1968), pp. 203-216, at pp.
215-216.
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officials took nothing from anyone; and not to farm out hundreds, wapentakes
or other bailiwicks. The emphasis has shifted from safeguarding the king’s
interests to the protection of the inhabitants of the counties, and the repression
of corruption.56 In addition, the counties were told about the new requirements
for sheriffs’ behaviour in Latin, French and English, in an ordinance to be read
out at the county court, so that the ordinary people would know what was ex-
pected under the new regime. The counties were told that they should not offer
bribes to sheriffs, who would be properly paid and have no reason to take any-
thing else; sheriffs would hold office for only one year, so that people could
safely complain about any wrongdoings.57
These ideals did not survive long, of course, and farming of counties and
their sub-divisions soon resumed. Nevertheless, some of the principles intro-
duced by the reformers must have left an impression. The next known sheriffs’
oath was introduced by Edward I in 1274. It restores the emphasis on the sher-
iffs’ duties to the king, but recognises that they have obligations to the counties
too. They swear: to serve the king loyally; to protect the king’s rights and liber-
ties, and prevent encroachments; not to respite the king’s debts for fear or
favour; to treat the people loyally and fairly; to do justice impartially to rich
and poor; to harm no-one for gifts, promises or favour; to acquit at the Exche-
quer those who had paid their debts to the king; to take nothing which would
harm the king’s interests or justice; to return and execute royal writs; to have
no bailiffs for whom they cannot answer, and to impose the same oath on
them.58 The reformers’ initiatives made another contribution in Edward’s reign:
their 1258 inquiry into the conduct of officials was the forerunner of his more
extensive inquiry of 1274.59
Some of the reformers’ other ambitions continued to have an influence.
Even the idea of sheriffs being chosen in the counties, rather than imposed by
the king, was to return later: in 1300, the Articuli super cartas included the
provision that each county could choose its own sheriff, if it wished.60 And, as
56 Text of the oath in TNA: E 159/32 m. 2. 
57 Ordinance of Sheriffs, sent to the counties: DBM, pp. 118-123.
58 TNA: E 159/49 m. 1d. See also MADDICOTT, “Edward I and the lessons of baronial
reform”, p. 20.
59 H.M. CAM, Studies in the Hundred Rolls: Some aspects of thirteenth-century adminis-
tration (Oxford, 1921: Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, ed. P. VINOGRADOFF 6), p.
14.
60 MORRIS, Medieval English Sheriff, pp. 184-185.
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G.L. Harriss pointed out, Henry III had abandoned the ill-fated control of gov-
ernment through the household:
The scope for ad hoc, emergency, even arbitrary action by the itinerant King de-
clined, as officials of the Chancery and the Exchequer multiplied in the shires,
attentive to royal rights and revenues. By the end of the reign the Wardrobe was
fast becoming institutionalised, acquiring a definite and formal place within an
administrative system dominated by the great departments of state.61 
Such controls over the Wardrobe were strained, however, by the far greater
expenditure required by Edward I’s military activities. The Wardrobe remained
extremely important in his reign as the vehicle for war finance, handling very
large sums and contracting loans, despite periodic attempts to curb its auton-
omy.62
The revolutionary ideas of the reform era thus made a lasting impression.
The accounts of those few years show something of the reformers’ successes
and failures during their brief period in power. In the short term, they accom-
plished many of the proposals set out in the Provisions of Oxford, at least as far
as they concerned finance: reform at the Exchequer, conciliar control of Exche-
quer appointments and local input to sheriffs’ appointments, curbs on the
king’s financial autonomy, and the recognition that sheriffs owed duties to the
counties as well as to the king. In the longer term, their ambitions continued to
find a response: less extortion through county farm and profit; inquiries to hear
complaints about financial malpractice in the counties, with attempts to estab-
lish some controls over officials’ behaviour; and a recognition that counties
should have a say in their own administration. The Exchequer remained at the
centre of financial administration, using its accounts to ensure that government
was at least moderately efficient and moderately honest.
61 G.L. HARRISS, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369
(Oxford, 1975), pp. 200-201.
62 M. PRESTWICH, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), pp. 156-158,
219-222.
Military Recruitment and Funding in Savoy:




n the past fifty years, many studies have been published on the relation
between the increase in warfare and the development of fiscal systems and
institutional structures in late medieval states. Research carried out on both
France and England as well as smaller principalities has evinced the direct link
between war, taxation, and institutional development, to the point that it is
almost commonplace to assert that war was the driving engine behind the con-
solidation of most European states between the end of the Middle Ages and the
beginning of the Modern Age.1 According to one of the principles of the fa-
* The research leading to the results published here has received funding from the European
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme (grant agreement No. 638436).
1 There are countless studies on the relation between the funding of war through taxation
and the development of the state’s institutions. See, for example: Genèse de l’État moderne:
Prélèvement et redistribution: Actes du colloque de Fontevraud 1984, ed. J.-Ph. GENET and M.
LE MENÉ (Paris, 1987); Guerre et concurrence entre les États européens du XIV e au XVIII e siècle,
......................................................................................................................................
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political
Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2020), pp. 47-72.
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mous ‘military revolution’, the endemic presence of war between the end of the
Middle Ages and the beginning of the Modern Age pushed the European pow-
ers to build ever larger armies and therefore more efficient fiscal systems to
fund them.2 In sum, this process was conducive to advances in the number,
tactics, and technology of the European armies, paving the way for the attain-
ment of European military supremacy over the rest of the world.3
From this perspective, the study of the finances of the principality of Savoy
through the many accounting records preserved at the Archivio di Stato in
Turin represents a significant contribution to this important historiographical
debate.4 In my recent doctoral thesis I investigated the correlation between the
increasing cost of war and the development of more efficient direct taxation in
Savoy. One of the most interesting aspects of my research is precisely the ac-
count of the fourteenth-century shift from a seigniorial-style taxation – still
justified by feudal pretexts such as the crusade or the prince’s knighting – to
ed. Ph. CONTAMINE (Paris, 1998); A. RIGAUDIÈRE, “L’essor de la fiscalité royale du règne de
Philippe le Bel (1285-1314) à celui de Philippe VI (1328-1350)”, in: Europa en los umbrales de
la crisis: 1250-1350: Actas de la XXI Semana de estudios medievales de Estella, 18 al 22 de julio
de 1994 (Pamplona, 1995), pp. 323-392; L. SCORDIA, ‘Le roi doit vivre du sien’: La théorie de
l’impôt en France, XIIIe-XVe siècles (Paris, 2005); J.B. HENNEMAN, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-
Century France: The Development of War-Financing: 1322-1356 (Princeton, 1971); E.B. FRYDE,
“The financial policies of the royal governments and popular resistance to them in France and
England, c. 1270-c.1420”, Revue belge de philosophie et d’histoire 57 (1979), pp. 824-860; M.
PRESTWICH, War, Politics, and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972); S. CAROCCI and S.M.
COLLAVINI, “Il costo degli stati: Politica e prelievo nell’Occidente medievale (VI-XIV secolo)”,
Storica 18 (2012), pp. 7-48; War, Gouvernement, and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon,
ed. D.J. KAGAY (Aldershot, 2007).
2 M. ROBERTS, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast, 1956); G. PARKER, The
Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1988).
3 The military revolution theory has been discussed in later works; see J. BLACK, A military
revolution? Military change and European society, 1550-1800 (London, 1991); The Military
Revolution: Readings on the military transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. R.J. CLIFFORD
(Oxford, 1995); European Warfare, 1350-1750, ed. F. TALLET and D. TRIM (Cambridge, 2010).
Many historians, especially Anglo-Americans, have traced the beginning of this process to the
final centuries of the Middle Ages; see R.J. CLIFFORD, “The military revolutions of the Hundred
Years War”, The Journal of Military History 57.2 (1993), pp. 258-275; The Medieval Military
Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. A.
AYTON (London and New York, 1995); K. DEVRIES, Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-
1500 (Aldershot, 2002).
4 Specifically in the Sezioni riunite of the Archivio di Stato di Torino (hereafter AST/SR).
On the Savoyard documentary evidence, see B. ANDENMATTEN and G. CASTELNUOVO, “Produ-
zione documentaria e conservazione archivistica nel principato sabaudo, XIIIo-XVo secolo”, Bollet-
tino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo 110.1 (2008), pp. 279-348.
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direct taxation, which from the beginning of the fifteenth century is centred on
the collection of annual subsides throughout the territory and chiefly motivated
by the war effort.5
This article builds upon my earlier work on the trésorerie générale and the
trésorerie des guerres of Savoy6 with an investigation of the castellany ac-
counts, that is, the more ‘regional’ offices of the state. The principality of
Savoy has been defined as an “aggregation of locals identities and communi-
ties” and it was organised at the beginning of the fourteenth century into six
bailiwicks, each of them comprising a variable number of castellanies, the units
which constituted the backbone of the Savoyard financial and administrative
system.7
The role of the castellan, and even more so that of the bailli (the head of
the castellany where the seat of the bailiwick was located), was from the begin-
ning an essentially military one. As well as attending to the maintenance of the
5 R. BIOLZI, “J’ay grand envie de veoir assaillir”: Guerre, guerriers et finances dans les
États de Savoie à la fin du Moyen Age, XIVe-XVe s. (unpublished doctoral thesis, Université de
Lausanne, 2016), pp. 297-370. This work is forthcoming as a monograph from Presses
Universitaires de Rennes. On this topic, see also Nicolas Carrier’s chapter in this volume.
6 AST/SR, CS, inv. 16 (trésorerie générale), inv. 29 (trésorerie des guerres). The trésorerie
générale (‘general treasury’) as well as the chambre des comptes of Savoy were established in
1351 by the statutes promulgated by Amadeus VI. See Ch. GUILLERÉ and G. CASTELNUOVO, “De
la comptabilité domaniale à la comptabilité d’Etat: Les comptes de châtellenies savoyards”, in:
Écrire, compter, mesurer: Vers une histoire des rationalités pratiques, ed. N. COQUERY (Paris,
2006), pp. 213-230, at pp. 216-217; B. DEMOTZ, “Une clé de la réussite d’une principauté aux
XIIIe et XIVe siècles: Naissance et développement de la Chambre des comptes en Savoie”, in: La
France des principautés: La chambre des comptes, XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Ph. CONTAMINE (Paris,
1996), pp. 17-26. The office of the trésorerie des guerres (‘war treasury’) appears in the Savoy
principality at the beginning of the rule of prince Amadeus VII (c. 1383) and is consecrated
through Amadeus VII’s Statuta Sabaudiae (1430); see R. BIOLZI, “Les guerres d’Amédée VII:
Coûts et administration militaire”, in: Le pouvoir par les armes, le pouvoir par les idées – Power
through Weapons, Power through Ideas, ed. J. DUMONT and Ch. MASSON, special issue of Le
Moyen Age 121.1 (2015): pp. 127-143, esp. pp. 129-131; R. BIOLZI and D. JAQUET, “De l’office
du maréchal et du trésorier de guerre: L’administration militaire du duché de Savoie comparée
aux ordonnances françaises et bourguignonnes”, in: La loi du prince, ed. F. MORENZONI and
Mathieu CAESAR, 2 vols. (Turin, 2018), 1, Les statuts de Savoie d’Amédée VIII de 1430: Une
œuvre législative majeure, pp. 269-290, esp. pp. 270-275.
7 For the origins and organisation of the Savoyard castellanies, see B. DEMOTZ, “La
géographie administrative médiévale, l’exemple du comté de Savoie”, Le Moyen Age 80 (1974),
pp. 261-297; J.-L. GAULIN and Ch. GUILLERÉ, “Des rouleaux et des hommes: Premières re-
cherches sur les comptes de châtellenies savoyards”, Etudes Savoisiennes 1 (1992), pp. 51-109;
G. CASTELNUOVO and Ch. GUILLERÉ, “Les finances et l’administration du comté de Savoie au
XIIIe siècle”, in: Pierre II de Savoie: ‘Le Petit Charlemagne’, ed. B. ANDENMATTEN et al. (Lau-
sanne, 2000), pp. 33-125.
50 ROBERTO  BIOLZI
castle, castellans had a double military function: the military and financial
management of war on a regional level and the recruitment of the necessary
troops.8 The military service demanded by the prince from the local communi-
ties was not only a means of procuring the fighters needed but also an impor-
tant source of money, since the men who did not show up when summoned to
an expedition had to pay a fine. From the end of the thirteenth century, the
amounts of these fines are clearly indicated in the banna (fines) section of the
castellany accounts, which recorded the income from the administration of
justice by the castellan (see Aude Wirth-Jaillard’s chapter in this volume). The
aim of this chapter is to analyse these fines in order to quantify the human and
financial effort of the Savoyard castellanies during a period characterised by a
general increase in military operations.
From a geographical point of view, I have selected two very different
Savoyard castellanies. The first one, Pinerolo, did not belong directly to the
Savoys, for it was the capital of the princes of Achaea, the dynasty’s cadet
branch. Created in 1285 by Amadeus V, the principality of Achaea was a
Savoyard appanage comprising the lands of Piedmont with the exception of the
Susa valley.9 The second castellany considered here is Chillon, the capital of
the bailiwick of Chablais, north of the Alps, a region which enjoyed a remark-
able economic independence during the period considered here, especially as
regards the funding of warfare.10 Because of their position at the frontier of the
Savoyard state, these two castellanies were particularly exposed to military
strikes. The comparative analysis of two different territories will enable us to
highlight the regional characteristics due to the cultural duality of the Savoyard
principality, a French-Italian superregional state.
From a chronological point of view, I will focus on the period between the
last quarter of the thirteenth century – that of the earliest castellany accounts –
and the mid-fourteenth century, when the castellan’s military role is supposed
to have declined in favour of military officials specially created for the war
8 For the military role of Savoyard castellans, see E. DULLIN, Les châtelains dans les
domaines de la Maison de Savoie en deçà des Alpes (Grenoble, 1911), pp. 52-56; B. DEMOTZ,
“Le châtelain et la guerre dans la Savoie des XIIIe et XIVe siècles”, in: “De part et d’autres des
Alpes”: Les châtelains des princes à la fin du Moyen Age, ed. G. CASTELNUOVO and O.
MATTÉONI (Paris, 2006), pp. 155-167.
9 These lands were re-annexed in 1418 by Amadeus VIII.
10 B. ANDENMATTEN, “Le comte de Savoie Amédée V et le nerf de la guerre: Organisation
financière et dépenses militaires en Chablais durant la première moitié du XIVe siècle”, Etudes
Savoisiennes 4 (1995), p. 19-31.
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effort, such as the war treasurer and the marshal.11 It is well known that in this
period the princes started massively to exploit the pretext of the defence of the
commonwealth in order to enforce their requests for money and soldiers, as
well as to give legitimacy to the establishment of a system of direct taxation.12
The Recruitment System in Savoy and the Principality of Achaea
Before presenting the research and its results, it is important to introduce
the recruitment system in operation in Savoy at the end of the Middle Ages. As
we know, the medieval armies were constituted in general by two kinds of
fighters, and Savoy is no exception. First, there was the cavalry, which was
generally the elite of the army. This is essentially provided by the armed aris-
tocracy of the county. From the beginning of the fourteenth century, it looks
like the servitium debitum – the noblemen’s obligation to serve in the army of
the prince – was no longer in place in Savoy.13 However, the accounting
sources show that the Savoyard aristocracy responded to the calls to arms of
the counts in a rather positive way. In 1308, during the Ambronay campaign,
35 knights banneret – a term which denotes a privileged rank vis-à-vis other
knights – lead into battle some 100 noble knights and 1,200 squires.14 The
armies of Amadeus VI (1343-1383) were essentially composed of noblemen
who regularly participated in the count’s campaigns, especially those under-
taken outside the borders of the principality.15 In Savoy as in France, during the
first half of the fourteenth century it seems that the duty to serve the prince
11 BIOLZI, “J’ay grande envie”, pp. 395-400; DEMOTZ, “Le châtelain et la guerre”, pp. 165-
166.
12 For the principality of Savoy-Achaea, this issue has been investigated in P. BUFFO,
“Guerra e costruzione del publicum nel principato di Savoia-Acaia (1295-1360)”, Mélanges de
l’Ecole française de Rome: Moyen Age 127.1 (2015), pp. 1-45. For the kingdom of France, see
for example X. HÉLARY, “Révolution militaire, révolution fiscale? Le poids de la guerre dans les
finances royales sous le règne de Philippe le Bel”, in: Monnaie, fiscalité et finances au temps de
Philippe le Bel: Journée d’études du 14 mai 2004, ed. Ph. CONTAMINE et al. (Paris, 2007), pp.
229-254.
13 B. ANDENMATTEN, La Maison de Savoie et la noblesse vaudoise (XIIIe-XIVe s.): Supériorité
féodale et autorité princière (Lausanne, 2005), pp. 280-282.
14 AST/SR, CS, inv. 29, no. 1 (1308), ff. 9-10.
15 F. CHAMOREL, “Ad partes infidelium”: La croisade d’Amédée VI de Savoie, juin 1366-
juillet 1367 (Lausanne, 2016), pp. 82-99.
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applied to all noblemen and not just to the direct vassals of the prince, who
were therefore progressively exempted from the recruitment tasks.16
The second pillar of the Savoy armies was the infantry. The foot soldiers,
called clientes in Savoy, clearly of lower social rank, were generally recruited
in the castellanies.17 The castellan had a list available of all the people fit to
bear arms; once the castellan called for the cavalcata, he could match the list
with those who actually answered the call to inflict a monetary fine on those
who stayed at home. The number of people which each community had to
provide to the prince’s army was also usually negotiated at the moment of the
writing of the franchises charters. In case of war, their service to the prince had
to be funded, in general, by the communities, for periods ranging from 3 to 15
days.18 After this period and for the remainder of the expedition, their wages
were paid by the prince; after 1355 the wages were calculated on a monthly
basis like those of the knights. During the first half of the fourteenth century,
the Savoyard castellanies contributed considerable numbers to the Savoy ar-
mies. The most remarkable case occurred during the long war against Dau-
phiné, in 1308, when around 15,000 clientes joined Amadeus V’s army quar-
tered at Ambronay.19 The infantry recruitment system adopted by the Savoyard
castellans seems to have been effective and attuned to the political ambitions
of the princes, who in this period finally defeated the Dauphins, the historic
enemy on Savoy’s western front, and permanently annexed important territo-
ries such as Gex and Faucigny, thus conferring territorial cohesion to their
principality.20
16 For the French situation, see X. HÉLARY, L’armée du roi de France: La guerre de Saint
Louis à Philippe le Bel (Paris, 2012), pp. 147-172. This characteristic seems to occur earlier in
England: M. PRESTWICH, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New
Haven, 1996), pp. 71-81; D. SIMPKIN, “Knights banneret, military recruitment and social status,
c. 1270-c. 1420: A view from the reign of Edward I”, in: Military Communities in Late Medieval
England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton, ed. G.P. BAKER et al. (Woodbridge, 2018), pp. 51-
75.
17 B. DEMOTZ, “A propos des clientes du comte de Savoie aux XIIIe-XVe siècles”, in: Le com-
battant au Moyen Age (Paris, 1991), pp. 197-205.
18 R. MARIOTTE-LÖBER, Ville et seigneurie: Les chartes de franchises des comtes de Savoie,
fin XIIe siècle-1343 (Annecy and Genève, 1973), pp. 54, 61-63.
19 This is a considerable number, comparable to the number of infantrymen recruited by
more affluent and populated realms, such as France and England: BIOLZI, “J’ay grande envie”,
pp. 106-108.
20 For an overview of the wars conducted by the Savoys against the Dauphinée in this
period, see A. KERSUZAN, Défendre la Bresse et le Bugey: Les châteaux savoyards dans la guerre
contre le Dauphiné, 1282-1355 (Lyon, 2005), pp. 39-108.
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During the second half of the fourteenth century, the infantry lost much of
its numerical importance in Savoy’s armies. While in 1355 around 10,000
infantrymen were recruited for the conquest of Faucigny – when basically all
castellanies north of the Alps provided contingents of clientes – in 1380 only
98 infantrymen were recruited, all of them crossbowmen.21 The same conclu-
sion can be drawn in 1384, on the occasion of the war in Valais. Amadeus VII’s
imposing army, composed of around 1,300 men-at-arms, was accompanied by
only 75 infantrymen who, in addition, do not seem to have been recruited in the
Savoyard castellanies.22 This diminished importance can be explained in two
ways. First, in this period Amadeus VI’s military politics were ever more pro-
jected beyond the state borders. In this situation, the local communities were
not bound to provide contingents of foot soldiers, since the franchise charters
did limit service to only a few weeks and usually in a rather limited geograph-
ical area. Secondly, a further change was the arrival of the so-called ‘foot cav-
alry’, which appears more often in Savoyard narratives and which was cer-
tainly an effective tactical replacement of the infantrymen.23
In Piedmont the situation was somewhat different from that in Savoy.
Northern Italian society was markedly more urban and less ‘aristocracy-based’.
The legal sources of Piedmont suggest that in practice the castellans of the
territories “beyond the Alps” had to provide a certain number of foot soldiers
and knights to the prince: “equites or milites pro communi”.24 The urban com-
munities in Piedmont also provided knights, because of the presence in the
towns of an aristocracy used to warfare, whereas in Savoy it was rather the
nobility who provided the essence of the cavalry, after having recruited them
21 On this occasion, only the castellanies of Chambéry, Montmélian, La Rochette,
Aiguebelle, Pont-de-Vaux and Saint-Génix sent contingents of infantrymen; AST/SR, CS, inv. 29,
no. 18 (1378-1380), ff. 55r-57v.
22 More precisely, two companies of crossbow men, respectively 25 and 50 men strong;
AST/SR, CS, inv. 29, no. 23/2 (1383-1415), f. 2.
23 On this subject, see R. BIOLZI, “De l’écuyer au Prince: Les chevaux de guerre en Savoie
à la fin du Moyen Age”, in: Le cheval dans la culture médiévale, ed. B. ANDENMATTEN et al.
(Florence, 2015), pp. 89-117, at pp. 110-111; Ch. MASSON, Des guerres d’Italie avant les
Guerres d’Italie: Les enterprises militaires françaises dans la peninsula à l’époque du Grand
Schisme d’Occident (Rome, 2014), p. 90; B.S. HALL, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance
Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics (Baltimore, 2006), pp. 17-19; J.F. VERBRUGGEN,
The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eighth Century to 1340
(Woodbridge, 1954; repr. 2002), pp. 111-164; K. DEVRIES, Infantry Warfare in the Early
Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics and Technology (Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 191-197.
24 BUFFO, “Guerra e costruzione”, p. 9.
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from their seigneuries.25 In the first decades of the fourteenth century, in Pied-
mont the number of fighters requested by the count from the local communities
increases progressively. Thanks to the statutes of the city of Pinerolo, we
gather that while at the end of the thirteenth century the community was re-
quested to provide to the prince only one cliens, around 1320 Philip of Achaea
tried to obtain the service of all the men able to bear arms: “quotquot essent in
uno hospitio qui possent arma ferre”. Moreover, if around the end of the thir-
teenth century the fighters from Pinerolo had to serve in arms for 8 days,
twenty years later they would have had to “tenere exercitum, cavalcatam et
assaltum” for 40 days throughout the principality of Achaea and within a
twenty-mile radius outside its borders. The ever more pressing requests by
Philip were always motivated “ad deffensionem seu recuperationem terre sue”,
therefore for the protection of the publicum, but it is plausible to believe that
these new military needs enabled the count to justify a new direct tax. In any
case, from a general point of view, from 1313 the castellanies in Piedmont pay
around 200 to 300 livres each year into the coffers of the prince’s treasurer for
the militia so as to exempt their inhabitants from military service on horseback.
The militia was in effect a direct tax which the totality of the castellans in
Piedmont paid yearly to the count for the exemption from the service of the
armed knights. Some communities, however, in general the big urban centres
such as Moncalieri, Turin, Carignano and Pinerolo, kept sending knights to the
prince. This is explained by the fact that in these communities the urban aris-
tocracy had a stronger military tradition than elsewhere.26
So far, we have discussed the recruitment system in operation in Savoy and
in the principality of Achaea in the fourteenth century. While north of the Alps
the aristocracy was generally more inclined to providing arms and horses to the
prince, in Piedmont the armed service on horseback was progressively replaced
by a tax. But what of the service of foot soldiers? In which way, and to what
degree, was it replaced by a financial contribution?
25 In Savoy, knights were rarely provided by the castellanies and numerically represented
a small share of the army: see BIOLZI, “J’ay grande envie”, pp. 444-446.
26 See BUFFO, “Guerra e costruzione”, pp. 9-20. For the statutes of Pinerolo, see Gli statuti
di Pinerolo, ed. D. SEGATI, in: Historiae patriae Monumenta: Leges municipales 4 (Turin, 1955).
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The banna for Draft Evasion and Their Economic Impact: The Case of
Pinerolo
To answer this question, I have analysed the accounts of the castellany of
Pinerolo in the period 1292-1360, especially with respect to the banna, which
enable us to assess the importance, both social and economic, of the military
obligations imposed by the prince onto his subjects. The present analysis traces
the evolution of this type of fine, which could be imposed either because an
individual did not turn up when summoned to the cavalcata, or because he
showed up with incomplete equipment.
First, the no-shows (or, put differently, the evasion of the military draft):
the first reference to a bannum of this kind dates from 1297, when the accoun-
tant (clavarius) Simondo de Canalis receives 5 sous from Aymario Naronania,
who was not part of the first army assembled by Philip of Savoy-Achaea in
Canavese.27 As in the case of Aymario, fines were usually nominal, mentioning
only one person. However, there are cases in which the fine was issued to a
group of people. In 1307, Umberto de Flore paid 100 sous for himself and his
19 socii or associates who did not show up to fight under the prince’s banner
during the siege of Cavour.28 In the same year, the fine issued to Drueto Castel-
lari and eight more inhabitants of Macello, a village in the Pinerolo district,
appears only in one accounting book.29 In such cases, the sources often men-
tion, in addition to the exact number of people fined, the family connections
between them.30
From the beginning of the fourteenth century, following the intensified
conflicts with the marquis of Saluzzo and Monferrat, the maximum amount of
27 “De V solidis receptis de Aymario Naromania quia non fuit in primo exercitu vallis Sancti
Martini”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 2 (1297-1304), f. 1. The sums in the
books of the castellanies of Pinerolo are usually noted in sous de Viennois (1 livre being equal
to 20 sous, and 1 sous being equal to 12 deniers). I have taken the conversions from the exchange
rates reported in the books, which in almost all the cases correspond to the rates proposed by P.
SPUFFORD, Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London, 1986), pp. 128-129.
28 “De C solidis receptis de Humberto de Flore et sociis suis videlicet decemnovem quia non
fuerunt sequti eorum confalonum dum erant apud Caburrum, condempnatis quilibet in V s.”,
AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3 (1304-1309), f. 5.
29 “De XXXXV solidis receptis de Droeto Castellari et octo aliis hominibus cum eo
condempnatis quia non iverunt ad quandam cridaforam apud Macaellum”, AST/SR, Camerale
Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3 (1304-1309), f. 5.
30 See, e.g.: “De L solidis receptis de Francisco Fantini, Bonifacio eius fratre, Oddone
Peagerio et filiis Nasseti, qui cum esset in exercitum apud Caburrum non exiverunt ad quandam
cridam extra terram”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3 (1304-1309), f. 5.
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the fines tends to increase, up to 100 sous per person, while the average fine is
stable at around 20-40 sous per person.31 Some reductions are explicitly issued
by the principality’s authorities. In 1309, Bertoloto and Pilato, two potential
soldiers “poor and young” pay only 5 sous per person for their absence from
the army ranks.32 The same tariff is applied to a certain Drono Rolio, who did
not participate in the war against the marquis of Montferrat on the grounds that
he was less than fourteen years old.33 Columbeto Barberio obtains the halving
of his fine because he is poor, despite not participating in as many as three
cavalcate commanded by the prince.34 For the same reason, the local authori-
ties of Pinerolo grant a reduction of the fine to twenty inhabitants of his dis-
trict.35 A certain Marinono Peoler, who did not enlist in the army of 1311 in
Canavese, is fined for only 4 sous on the ground that he is “very old” and there-
fore unfit for war.36 The castellan of Pinerolo grants Giovanni d’Oliva an ex-
emption from military service since “he swore he is seventy years old”.37 The
analysis of the sources suggests that judicial and military authorities in Pinero-
lo generally arranged reduced fines for those soldiers who were poor, too
young or too old, or to those who for some reasons were not in the Pinerolo
castellany at the time of the call to arms. Unfortunately, potential combatants
of higher social status are not mentioned in the accounting records. These
sometimes record the profession of the soldier: stonemasons, blacksmiths, and
painters, and even notaries are often mentioned, as well as foreigners, probably
merchants, mostly from the nearby cities of Milan and Geneva. It is likely that
31 This average is higher than in the castellanies of Vigone and Carignano, where the no-
show fines are around 15 sous: BUFFO, “Guerra e costruzione del pubblico”, p. 40, n. 119.
32 “De V solidis receptis de Bertoloto e Pilato quia iuvenis et pauper”, AST/SR, Camerale
Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3 (1304-1309), f. 20.
33 “De V solidis receptis de Drono Rolio pro eodem concordato pro tanto quia minor XIIII
annorum”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3 (1304-1309), f. 20.
34 “De XXXVII solidis, VI denariis receptis de Columbeto Barberio quia non fuit in exercitum
mense iunii versus Braydam, Cayrascum et Savilianum, condempnatus in LXXV solidis, de quibus
remisit sibi dominus medietatem de gratia quia pauper”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60,
mazzo 2, no. 7-8 (1319-1320), f. 7.
35 “De XXXVI solidis receptis a quampluribus pauperibus hominibus numero viginti vel circa
qui non remanserunt in dicto exercitu propter eorum paupertatem cum licencia iudicis”, AST/SR,
Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3 (1304-1309), f. 2.
36 “De III solidis receptis de Marinono Peoler quia non fuit in exercitum Canapicii, facta
sibi gratia quia pauper valde senex et crepatus”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1,
no. 4 (1309-1313), f. 7.
37 “De XL solidis receptis de Iohanne de Oliva quia absolutus fuit ne vadat in exercitibus
quoniam est septuaginarius ut iuravit”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 3
(1304-1309), f. 5.
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the largest fines up to 100 sous were issued to the richest combatants, for ex-
ample those serving on horseback.38
After 1334, following the death of Philip of Achaea, the sources reveal
some changes in the accountancy, which becomes more precise and the control
becomes stricter. Fines are no longer set in general with respect to the social
status of the fighter, but rather with respect to the period of absence from the
army. In 1336, Luigi de Tartona paid 25 sous for his five-day absence without
leave.39 In 1338, Bertulino de Ciglate is fined 38 sous for an absence of 20 days
from the army.40 The castellan’s tendency to check the headcount more regu-
larly increases from the 1340s, when the accounts clearly specify, in almost
each case, the exact number of days the man was absent.
The military-service fines concern not only the absentees but also those
who answered the call to arms with incomplete equipment.41 However, this
crime was considered as less serious than failure to show up when summoned
for an expedition. While the fine for desertion might increase up to 90 sous
when the prince’s necessitas is more pressing (for instance in 1300-1320), the
fines for incomplete equipment were never higher than 2 sous per fighter, and
did not increase in the period under consideration. In general, the castellans
punished those subjects without proper ‘offensive’ weapons. In 1311, three
men had to pay 3 sous because they lack a “long spear”, in all likelihood a
pike, the foot soldier’s weapon of choice.42 In 1319, during a cavalcata in
Savigliano 58 men were fined 115 sous for the same reason.43 Other banna
concerned substandard defensive equipment with respect to the castellan’s
specifications.44 These fines disappear from the records after 1330. This could
38 At Carignano, the banna for no shows could be as high as 120 sous: BUFFO, “Guerra e
costruzione del pubblico”, p. 41, note 120.
39 “De XXV solidis receptis de Ludovico de Tartona quia non fuit in dicto exercitu quinque
diebus”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 3, no. 15 (1336-1337), f. 2.
40 “Recepit a Bertulino de Ciglate quia non fuit in dicto exercitu per viginti dies condepna-
tus in solidis centumquindecim, quitatus pro tanto per litteras domini: XXXVIII s., VIII d.”, AST/SR,
Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 3, no. 17 (1338-1339), f. 5.
41 In Savoy, the clientes’ minimal required equipment was sword, spear, helmet and shield:
DEMOTZ, “A propos des clientes”, p. 258.
42 “De III solidis receptis de tribus personis quia non portaverant lanceas longas in exercitu
Septimi”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 4 (1309-1313), f. 8.
43 “De CXV solidis receptis de quinquagintaocto hominibus qui non portaverunt lanceas in
dicto exercitu”, AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 1, no. 6 (1335-1319), f. 26.
44 “De XVI solidis receptis de VIII hominibus quia non portaverunt lanceas seu alias
armaturas eis impositas in dicto exercitu, condempnatus quilibet in II solidis”, AST/SR, Camerale
Piemonte, inv. 60, mazzo 2, no. 7-8 (1319-1320), f. 5.
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Graph 1: the number of fines for
army no-shows in the castellany of
Pinerolo (1297-1357).
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Graph 2: revenues from the banna
for army no-shows in the castel-
lany of Pinerolo, sous of Viennois
(1297-1357).
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either mean a greater tolerance regarding this issue by the Savoy-Achaea au-
thorities or rather a progressive standardisation of the Piedmont army around
the mid-fourteenth century.45
The qualitative analysis of the accounting records has led to some prelimi-
nary conclusions. During the period investigated here, the population of
Pinerolo between the age of 14 and 65 was bound to military service to the
prince, an obligation strictly controlled by the castellan. Besides overseeing the
military operations, the castellan was charged with the regular inspection of the
soldiers as well as of the quality of their equipment. From the middle of the
fourteenth century, more frequent inspection and stricter military discipline can
be linked to the institutional, military and demographic crisis faced by the
principality of Achaea, caused by the start of the war against Amadeus VI and,
especially, by the large plague epidemics of 1348, which diminished the num-
bers of troops and therefore prompted the authorities to recruit foot soldiers in
a stricter and more controlled way. Additionally, we can assume that more
regular and frequent inspections produced more income for the prince who, in
turn, could have had more money to spend on mercenaries, as a replacement
for the army’s poorly motivated and especially ill-equipped citizen-soldiers.46
Now, the question is how to quantify these revenues and relate them to the
military expenditures one finds in the accounts. The investigation of the ac-
counts has enabled us to create two graphs which show the evolution of the
individual fines as well as the financial gain due to the military obligations
(Graphs 1 and 2). The two graphs show the trajectory of the military policies
of the princes of Savoy-Achaea, who, during the first half of the fourteenth
century, were militarily engaged on several fronts: especially those against the
Dauphiné, Montferrat and Saluzzo. In the first decades of the fourteenth cen-
tury, in Piedmont the number of fighters demanded by the count from the local
communities increases considerably. The administrative sources also reveal the
territorial politics of the princes of Achaea, who, during the first half of the
fourteenth century, put together 33 armies for a grand total of 54 cavalcate.
The situation is that of a perennial state of warfare for the principality, which
basically never received military support from its stronger cousin, engaged in
45 A.A. Settia, Comuni in guerra: Armi ed eserciti nell’Italia delle città (Bologna, 1993),
pp. 140-142. 
46 This characteristic is confirmed for example in Montferrat, see A.A. SETTIA, “Sont
inobediens et refusent servir: Il principe e l’esercito nel Monferrato dell’età avignonese”, in:
Piemonte medievale: Forme del potere e della società: Studi per Giovanni Tabacco (Turin,
1985), pp. 121-141.
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its own right in a long conflict with the Dauphiné and in the first battles of the
Hundred Years’ War.47
The three peaks in the graphs correspond first to the war against the Dau-
phiné and Montferrat of the first decade of the fourteenth century, which led to
the conquest of the Rocca Canavese, elevated to the status of a Savoyard cas-
tellany in 1309; secondly, to the conflicts against the House of Anjou (1311-
1320), allied to the Marquis of Saluzzo; and thirdly, to the start of the hostili-
ties with their Savoyard cousins, especially Amadeus VI who marched into
Piedmont in the 1360s, thus de facto ending the independence of the cadet
branch. The low points from the 1330s on correspond to the military and finan-
cial crisis which affected the principality, especially after the death of Philip in
1334, which would lead to the defeat at the hand of the Anjou-led coalition.48
The comparative assessment of the revenues due to the banna and of the
military expenditures of the castellany of Pinerolo suggests that draft evasion
by the inhabitants of Piedmont was financially important. Between 1297 and
1359, the castellany of Pinerolo cashed in 39,800 sous (1,990 livres). In the
same period, the military expenditures – which include the fighters’ wages, the
costs of siege engines and the purchase of weaponry – increased to 24,443 sous
(1,222 livres). An overview of the revenues from the banna for no-shows and
the military expenditures in the castellany of Pinerolo is provided in the table
below; the relation between the two is expressed in percentage points.
Table 1: Revenues from banna for no-shows and military expenditures, castellany of







1297-1309 7,409 625 84
1310-1334 20,655 18,663 903
1335-1357 11,736 5,155 439
total 39,8 24,443 614
47 On this subject, see J. CORDEY, Les comtes de Savoie et les rois de France pendant la
guerre de Cent Ans (Paris, 1911).
48 For an overview of the military operations by Savoy-Achaea in the first half of the
fourteenth century, see F. GABOTTO, Storia del Piemonte nella prima metà del secolo XIVo, 1292-
1359 (Turin and Florence, 1894); P.L. DATTA, Storia dei principi d’Acaja, signori del Piemonte,
dal MCCIV al MCCCCXVIII, 2 vols. (Turin, 1832).
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The fines for no-shows enabled the princes of Achaea to pay for the totality of
the military costs, as well as contributing a net revenue to the principality’s
coffers: the military costs represent 61% of the revenue from the banna for no-
shows.49 We can also compare this amount with the expenditure for another
military operation undertaken by the princes of Achaea: for the conquest of
Cavallermaggiore the notary Rubeo Maoeri spent 829 livres (16,580 sous) on
the wages of 420 infantrymen recruited from 18 April to 30 August 1312.50 The
remaining 39% of the total revenue from the locals’ no-show fines in the cas-
tellany of Pinerolo is a little less than the cost of a siege of four months and a
half. Considering that the accounting records show real cash flows, it is possi-
ble to conclude that the fines collected from the inhabitants of Pinerolo for
failure to perform military service represented an effective financial resource
through which the prince might cover a large part of the costs of his military
strategy.
The banna for Military-Service No-Shows in Savoy: The Counterexample
of Chillon
For the purposes of comparative study, I have used the same methodology
in the investigation of the castellany of Chillon, the capital of the bailiwick of
Chablais, a territory roughly comprising the area of the Rhone valley situated
between the bottom of the Grand Saint Bernand route and the Lake Geneva.
During the thirteenth century, the Savoys asserted their unchallenged suprem-
acy in this region, around their strongholds of Chillon and Saint-Maurice,
which had been under their control in different ways for a long time.51 In the
first half of the fourteenth century, Chablais saw its largest territorial extension
thanks to the skilful territorial strategy of Amadeus V, and was the largest baili-
wick in the whole of Savoy.52
As the main stronghold in the region and strategically placed, the castle of
Chillon was the seat of the bailli of Chablais since the mid-thirteenth century.53
49 I have not included in this calculation the castle upkeep and repair costs (“opera castri”).
50 AST/SR, Camerale Piemonte, inv. 24, Cavallermaggiore, mazzo 1, no. 1 (1312-1313).
51 M. CONSTANT, “L’établissement de la Maison de Savoie au sud du Léman: La châtellanie
d’Allinges-Thonon (XIIe siècle-1536)”, Mémoires et Documents publiés par l’Académie
Chablaisienne 60 (1972), pp. 1-366, at pp. 18-19.
52 DEMOTZ, “La géographie administrative”, p. 279.
53 Savoyard castellans are confirmed in Chillon since 1214: D. CARUTTI, Regesta comitum
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The oldest Savoyard rolls of accounts date from 1257 and refer precisely to this
castellany which, just as Pinerolo, was surrounded by a territory favourable to
the recruitment of soldiers, considering the frequent calls to arms sent out by
the bailli to the local communities. Chablais was at the beginning of the four-
teenth century right at the centre of the main conflicts opposing Savoy and its
neighbours: the bishops of Sion, the Habsburg to the north, the Dauphins who
controlled the Faucigny region, and the counts of Geneva to the south and the
west.54
The banna for no-shows when summoned to an expedition appear earlier
at Chillon than at Pinerolo. In 1282, at the outbreak of the war against the Dau-
phins of Viennois, Guillaume Carbon and Giraud de Crebery each paid 5 sous
of Lausanne to the bailli of Chillon “pro banno cavalcate”.55 Only twelve years
later, this specific type of revenue seems to have become common practice in
the banna section of the accounts. In 1295, fifteen men, including two carpen-
ters, paid between 2 and 5 sous for not having participated to the expedition led
by the count of Savoy to Nyon.56 During the first decades of the fourteenth
century, the total sum of the fines tends to increase considerably. Whereas
during the final decades of the thirteenth century the typical fine was between
2 and 5 sous, after 1310 those found guilty pay a fine of 4 to 20 sous. The
accounting records do not report the criteria for determining the fines imposed
by the bailli. The social and professional condition of the potential soldier is
even less clear than in the sources from Pinerolo. The list of names, which
include many sobriquets, points to people of rather modest condition who in
the Savoyard armies were expected to fight as infantrymen. Their equipment is
never mentioned, a fact which might suggest a lower equipment standard in
Chablais as compared to northern Italy. However, the baillis of Chillon seem
to have had more practice in military justice, issuing fines to soldiers guilty of
crimes on the battlefield. In this respect, in 1304 some men from Saint-Nicolas
de Vers were hit with a 20-sous fine for stealing some “metal tools” after their
Sabaudiae marchionum in Italia ab ultima stirpis orgine ad an. MDCCLIII (Turin, 1889), pp. 163-
164, no. CDXLII.
54 ANDENMATTEN, “Amédée V et le nerf de la guerre”, p. 22. The wars against the bishops
of Sion have been studied through the accounts of the castellany of Chillon by V. VAN BERCHEM,
“Les dernières campagnes de Pierre II comte de Savoie en Valais et en Suisse”, Revue historique
vaudoise 9 (1907), pp. 354-365.
55
AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo I, no. 8 (1283-1286), ff. 2 and 10.
56 AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo II, no. 11 (1292-1296), f. 1.
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return from an expedition to Lullin.57 In 1322, the same amount was cashed in
by the castellan Jean Reinhard because a soldier summoned at the siege of the
castle of La Corbière, in the Pays de Gex, had stolen a head cover.58 Fines
issued to soldiers for leaving the army before the end of the operations are rare,
but each time the amount is quite high, certainly superior to that paid by those
who simply did not respond to the call to arms.59
Unlike at Pinerolo, in the castellany of Chillon the military banna were for
the most part issued to a group of people, linked to a village, parish, or local
lord. In 1296, the men of the abbot of St-Maurice were fined 106 sous and 8 d.
for their absence from the cavalcata.60 A group of “Valaisains” paid to the
castellan of Chillon the sum of 30 livres because they did not participate to the
rescue operation of Allinges-Neuf, besieged in 1308 by the Dauphin’s army.61
In 1313, the men of the parish of Allinges were fined 5 livres since they did not
show up for a cavalcata against Lausanne commanded by the bailli Jean Bag-
nol.62 In 1324, several communities under the jurisdiction of the bailli of Chil-
lon were fined for their absence from an expedition to Morat: 40 sous were
paid to the bailli by the men of lord Pierre de Blonay, 40 sous by the men of
Grés, 25 sous by the men of Ollon, 20 sous by the men of Allinges and 15 sous
by the men of Leysin and Vouvry.63 Over the sixty years investigated here,
some communities such as Bex and Ollon stand out for their absence from the
ranks of Savoyard armies, ignoring the expedition ordered by the count seven
and five times respectively.
The situation in Chablais can be compared to that in Valais, where the
most impressive wave of protests recorded in the castellany accounts was
prompted precisely by the military service demanded by the count of Savoy.
During the fourteenth century, the castellans of this region acted at least sixty
57 AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo II, no.16 (1302-1304), f. 2.
58 “Recepit a Pierre Lyellen qui eundo in cavalcatam Corbierie cepit capucius alienum: XX
s.”, AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo III, no. 23 (1320-1322), f. 17.
59 In 1307, three men who deserted the Savoy army before the end of the operations “sine
licencia” were fined 12 livres, AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo II, no. 17 (1306-
1308), f. 15.
60 “De cui s. VIII d. recepit de hominibus abbacie Sancti Mauricio pro banno cavalcata”,
AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo II, no. 11 (1292-1296), f. 11.
61 “De XXX l. recepit de hominibus partiis Valesii pro eo qui non fuerunt in succursum
Alingii novi quando obsessum erat”, AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo II, no. 18
(1308-1310), f. 1.
62
AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo III, no. 20 (1313-1316), f. 3. 
63 AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo IV, no. 25 (1322-1325), f. 17.
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times against individuals, groups, and communities who refused to participate
to the cavalcata. In 1316-1317, the people of Bagnes, Sembrancher, Vollèges
and Liddes paid the considerable fine of 11 livres. In 1334-1135, between them
the communities of Bourg-Saint-Pierre and Orsières paid to the castellan 57
livres and 7 sous. Examples of this kind have been found by Pierre Dubuis in
castellany accounts until the end of the fourteenth century. According to Du-
buis, the reason why the Valaisains were regularly absent from the count’s
expeditions stems from these communities’ understandable lack of interest in
a prince who was never seen in the region and who fought a far-away enemy
unknown to them.64
Can these reasons be considered equally plausible for the men subject to
military service in the nearby bailiwick of Chablais? Hardly so, since unlike in
the Valais the inhabitants of this region were more accustomed to the presence
of Savoyard princes in their lands. Suffice it to say that Chillon was one of the
main administrative centres of the principality as well as one of the favourite
seats of the counts during the period investigated here. Moreover, Chillon was
a strategically fundamental base for the Savoys in the east of their territories,
from which they would routinely attack their neighbours. As the official re-
sponsible for the defence of the vast bailiwick of Chablais, the bailli of Chillon
seems to have had regularly at his command, from the start of the fourteenth
century, a locally-recruited small army a few hundred men strong, as well as a
fully equipped lake fleet.65
At Chillon, the highest rates of no-shows for cavalcate were reported be-
tween 1308 and 1310, during the war against Dauphiné for the defence of
Ambronay; in 1322, when as many as 30 men did not respond to the call to
arms; and in 1326, when as many as 28 deserters were fined by the castellan.66
With the exception of the latter two cases, I could not calculate the exact num-
ber of men fined because, unlike in Pinerolo, the banna of the castellany of
Chillon often apply to a whole group of men, and the accounts never specify
the numbers. However, the quantitative analysis of the sources has led to the
64 For these data, see P. DUBUIS, Une économie alpine à la fin du Moyen Age. Orsières,
l’Entremont et les régions voisines, 1250-1500, 2 vols. (Sion, 1990), 1, pp. 166-167. In Chillon
only one bannum refers to the protests of those who claimed they were not bound to join the
cavalcata of the count of Savoy: “Recepit ab eisdem liberis filiis Perreto de Rua qui non fuerant
in cavalcata mandata pluribus asserentes se non teneri ire in cavalcatatis domini: XL s.”.
65 See A. NAEF, La flotille de guerre de Chillon aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles (Lausanne, 1904).
66
AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo III, no. 23 (1320-1322), f. 14-17, no. 26
(1325-1328), f. 11.
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Graph 3: revenues from
the banna for army no-
shows in the castellany of
Chillon, sous of Lausanne
(1282-1356).
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following Graph 3, which displays the revenues from military justice which, as
in Piedmont, reflects the evolving imperatives of the Savoyard military strategy
in the region. This shows that, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the
baillis of Chablais filled their coffers thanks to the revenues of military justice
especially between 1310 and 1314, chiefly because of the intensified conflict
against the Dauphins and their allies, especially the counts of Geneva, whose
territorial ambitions were in this period crashed by the financial and military
superiority of the Savoys.67 The years 1321-1322 correspond to the most im-
portant siege operation ever undertaken by Amadeus V against the counts of
Geneva: the siege of the castle of La Corbière, for which the count of Savoy
recruited an army of around 400 knights and 3,700 infantrymen, who operated
around twenty siege engines for forty-two days.68 The 30 men reported as miss-
ing on this occasion in the banna of the castellany of Chillon do not seem re-
markable when compared to the overall number of troops present at the siege,
recruited for the most part from Chablais itself.
The peace treaty signed in 1334 at Chapareillan by Aymon of Savoy and
the Dauphin Humbert II, as well as the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War,
slowed down the military operations for around ten years and, as a con-
sequence, the drafting of soldiers.69 In the 1350s, the aggressive strategy of the
young Amadeus VI, who in only three years (1352-1355) conducted three large-
scale military campaigns (Calais, Pays of Gex and Faucigny), was the cause of
a massive recruitment of soldiers throughout Savoy. It is noteworthy that for
the war in Faucigny alone, only seven years after the great Black Death epi-
demics, the Savoyard army numbered around 1,500 knights and more than
15,000 clientes, 1,500 of them coming from Chillon and Villeneuve.70 On this
occasion as well, the few dozen men fined by the bailli of Chablais represent
only a very small percentage of the vast army led by Amadeus VI in 1355. For
67 P. DUPARC, Le comté de Genève, IXe-XVe siècle (Geneva, 1978), pp. 269-292.
68 The siege ended on 28 December 1321, see L. MÉNABRÉA, “De l’organisation militaire
au Moyen Age d’après des documents inédits”, Mémoires de l’Académie royale de Savoie 2.1
(1851), pp. 179-224; M. DE LA CORBIÈRE, L’invention et la défense des frontières dans le diocèse
de Genève: Études des principautés et de l’habitat fortifié, XIIe-XIVe siècle (Annecy, 2003), pp.
116-117; D. DE RAEMY, Châteaux, donjons et grandes tours dans les Etats de Savoie (1230-
1330): Un modèle: le château d’Yverdon, 2 vols. (Lausanne, 2004), 1, pp. 82-84; ANDENMATTEN,
La Maison de Savoie, p. 291-293.
69 KERSUZAN, Défendre la Bresse, pp. 79-82; CORDEY, Les comtes de Savoie, pp. 49-63.
70 BIOLZI, “J’ay grande envie”, pp. 123-128; also see N. CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en
Faucigny à la fin du Moyen Age: Économie et société, fin XIIIe - début XVIe siècle (Paris, 2001),
pp. 46-52.
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this war, Amadeus VI successfully demanded from his castellans an unprece-
dented support in terms of numbers, since his war strategy aimed at surround-
ing and occupying the whole of the Arve valley.71 The iron fist used by the
Savoy authorities, chiefly the prince, to enforce the military draft in Chablais
reflects the kind of Savoyard war effort at the end of the thirteenth century and
in the middle of the fourteenth century. At the death of count Amadeus V, the
Fasciculus temporis, the only fourteenth-century chronicle which deals with
the region of Lake Geneva, reports that the count ruled for 38 years and led 32
sieges “cum ingeniis et machinis”.72 A successful siege required skilled work-
ers as well as infantrymen to protect the siege engines and patrol the area to
warn of the arrival of an enemy rescue army.
From a financial perspective, at Chillon the military banna do not seem to
constitute a revenue high enough to cover the war costs. In the period investi-
gated here, the castellans cashed in around 6,000 sous of Lausanne, equal to
300 livres. The military expenses faced by the Savoys in this period were far
greater. To give a few examples: the campaign of Ambronay (1308) cost
around 4,000 livres Viennois; the siege of the castle of La Corbière (1321) cost
9,500 livres Tournois; the conquest of the Pays of Gex (1352-1353) and of
Faucigny (1355) cost more than 150,000 gold florins.73 It is not necessary to
convert these values to realise that the military banna revenues are quite insig-
nificant with respect to the financial resources deployed in those years by the
principality to fund its conquests. Even on a regional level, the military banna
revenues in Chillon are small money compared to the expenses of the castellan.
Suffice it to say that only the military expenses of the castellans Jean Bagnol
and Hugues de la Rochette reported in the accounts under the heading
“cavalcate” for the years 1310-1317 amounted to more than 500 livres of Lau-
sanne.74
Therefore, Graph 3 shows a completely different situation in Chillon from
that which we have seen in Pinerolo. In Chillon, only at the three moments
mentioned above (1308-1310, 1322-1323 and 1325-1328) was the castellan
successful in cashing in more than 400 sous of Lausanne. In Piedmont, we have
71 The castellanies of Vevey, Evian, and Thonon sent 1,600, 1,200 and 1,300 infantrymen
each; AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 29, no. 14 (1355), ff. 8-9.
72 La plus ancienne chronique de Genève, 1303-1335 (Fasciculus temporis) et pièces
justificatives, ed. E. MALLET (Geneva, 1855), p. 306, no. 44.
73 BIOLZI,”J’ay grande envie”, pp. 300-305.
74 From precisely 1310 on, specific accounts for military expenses (cavalcate) appear at the
castellany of Chillon: AST/SR, Camerale Savoia, inv. 69, folio 5, mazzo III, no. 19 (1310-1313).
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seen, for example, that during the first two decades of the fourteenth century
Philip of Achaea cashed in almost every year more than 1,000 sous because of
his subjects’ failure to show up for expeditions, on two occasions reaching as
much as 5,000 sous, that is, almost twelve times as much as his counterpart in
Chablais. The sous of Lausanne was actually slightly more valuable than the
sous Viennois – even so the disproportion between the two cases is evident.
Regarding this last point, however, it is worth noting that the administrative
structure, let alone a centralised office that would redistribute the financial
resources of the bailiwick, was much less advanced in Chablais than in Pied-
mont. Think for example of the important responsibilities taken up in the early
fourteenth century by the pedaggiatore (‘toll collector’) of Villeneuve, who
had a central role in the financial organisation of the bailiwick.75 The bailli of
Chillon therefore was not the sole person responsible for financing and manag-
ing the war effort: think of Guillaume of Châtillon, receveur of Chablais and
castellan of Evian and Fêternes, who alone bore the responsibility for the fi-
nances of the siege of the castle of La Corbière in 1321.76
Conclusions
In conclusion, I would first like to draw attention to the issue of the differ-
ent systems adopted by the Savoys in dealing with the ever-increasing costs of
their territorial designs, and secondly, to the evolution of the military function
of the castellan and the nature of the castellany accounts, particularly their
section on the banna. This will evince the links between this chapter and the
larger narrative investigated in this volume, including the relation between
financial accountancy and the administrative accountability of the territorial
officers.
In Piedmont, the princes of Achaea set up a mixed fiscal system to meet
their military recruitment needs, based on both regular tax collections called
militia and extraordinary revenues, especially the banna for expedition no-
shows.77 The increase in military duties imposed by Philip of Achaea turned
75 ANDENMATTEN, “Amédée V et le nerf de la guerre”, p. 22. For a recent study on the
organisation and financial importance of the toll of Villeneuve under the Savoys, see F. MOREN-
ZONI, Marchand et marchandises au péage de Villeneuve de Chillon, première moitié du XVe
siècle (Lausanne, 2016).
76 BIOLZI,”J’ay grande envie”, pp. 228-29.
77 BUFFO, “Guerra e costruzione del pubblico”, p. 43.
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out to be less of a genuine effort to enlist fighting men and more of a tactic for
filling the treasury’s coffers – a tactic that worked out very well. This was
similar to some degree north of the Alps, but there a crucial role was played by
direct taxation after 1313, with subsidia exacted throughout the Savoyard lands
with increasing regularity by an office known from around the middle of the
fourteenth century as the trésorerie générale.78 In both cases, the analysis of
the accounting records highlights the fact that, with the appropriation of the
right to call the locals to arms, the Savoys could present themselves as the only
defenders of the public good, therefore setting in motion the institutional pro-
cess that led to Amadeus VIII’s “territorial and public” principality.79
From a quantitative perspective, the present analysis has brought to light a
marked difference in the revenues of the two castellanies. How can we explain
this important difference? The first part of the answer lies in demographics. It
is evident that Piedmont castellanies represented larger urban centres, espe-
cially Pinerolo, which at the time had a population as large as Turin.80 From a
military perspective, the principality of Savoy-Achaea had a reservoir of sol-
diers larger than the Chablais, an area less populated and without the military
tradition of the northern Italian comuni. The second part lies in the nature of
the institutions. Unlike the House of Savoy’s castellans north of the Alps, at
Pinerolo the castellan was entrusted with judicial and military, but not finan-
cial powers. The accounts were kept by the clavarius, the officer in charge of
the financial management of the castellany. This aspect certainly reinforced the
military function of the castellan: without the responsibility of the financial
management of the territory, his tasks of controlling the population subject to
military service, exercising military justice, and inspecting the soldiers’ equip-
ment were in all likelihood facilitated. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that
in Piedmont castellans were often recruited from the local aristocracy (espe-
cially the Provana and Piossasco families), whereas at Chillon the castellan
was often an aristocrat who came from the Savoyard heartlands, the bailiwick
78 The Romfhart of Henry VII had a decisive impact in establishing the general subsidies,
often consisting of loans, either spontaneous or imposed onto local communities: A. TALLONE,
Parlamento Sabaudo, 13 vols. (Bologna, 1928-1946), 1, p. CCX, n. 2.
79 G. CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali e gentiluomini: La società politica sabauda nel tardo
Medioevo (Milan, 1994), p. 33.
80 See Storia di Torino, 2, Il basso medioevo e la prima età moderna (1280-1536), ed. R.
COMBA (Turin, 1997), pp. 423-440. For a more systematic and specific study of late medieval
demography in Piedmont, see R. COMBA, La popolazione in Piemonte sul finire del Medioevo:
Ricerche di demografia storica (Turin, 1977).
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of Savoy (Montmanyeur, Conflans, and so on). Might this difference in the
patterns of recruitment of local officers account for the larger numbers of Cha-
blais soldiers in the Savoyard armies? The plausible answer is yes, although a
larger-scale prosopographical investigation is required to support this conclu-
sion fully.
This fresh research on the military service owed by the castellanies’ deni-
zens has shed light on the essential role of the castellan in the recruitment of
the armies demanded by the territorial strategies of the Savoyard dynasty. In
addition to commanding local operations, the castellan was directly responsible
for recruitment and, consequently, for issuing fines to those who did not show
up at the expedition’s meeting time and place. As we have seen, in Piedmont
this judicial role went hand in hand with the intensification of military opera-
tions. What of the trajectory of the castellans’ functions in a longer chronologi-
cal perspective? For the principality of Savoy-Achaea, the answer is particu-
larly difficult because after the 1360s the princes were increasingly subject and
tied to their ‘cousins’ north of the Alps, which would eventually annex their
entire Piedmont lands in 1418. It has been observed that in Savoy the castel-
lan’s military function decreased progressively from the second half of the
fourteenth century, in exchange for a greater administrative and financial
role.81 The study of fifteenth-century Savoyard accountancy suggests that this
view can only be accepted with some qualification. For example, the castellans
of Bresse played a fundamental logistical role during the raids of the Ecor-
cheurs (1438-1344); similarly, the bailli of Moudon, Guillaume of Geneva,
played an important part in the defence of the Pays de Vaud at the outbreak of
the conflict with the city of Fribourg (1447-1448).82 On the question of the
castellan’s role in military recruitment, it is worth noting that Amadeus VIII’s
1430 Statuta specify that the castellan has the duty to produce every five years
a list of both local noblemen and commoners fit for military service.83 Notwith
81 DEMOTZ, “Le châtelain et la guerre”, pp. 165-66.
82 See L. BADOUX, “Pour la garde de ses pays contres les Roctiers”: La Bresse face aux
Ecorcheurs, 1438-1444 (unpublished MA thesis, University of Lausanne, 2019); R. BIOLZI,
“Avec le fer et la flamme”: La guerre entre la Savoie et Fribourg, 1447/1448 (Lausanne, 2009),
pp. 20-26.
83 “Et ut premissa melius sciri et fieri valeant, hoc edicto statuimus et iubemus omnibus et
singulis castellanis nostris ac eorum locatenentibus, sub pena trium marcharum argenti puri per
quenlibet eorum negligentem committenda et fisco nostro applicanda, quathenus quilibet ipsorum
castellanorum de quinquiennio in quinquiennium nobis seu marescallis nostris pro tempore
existentibus mittat vel apportet per verum registrum nomina et cognomina subditorum sue
castellanie nobilium et innobilium ad arma dispositorum et habilium, equitum et peditum ac
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standing that mercenaries became very important from Amadeus VI onwards,
in the fifteenth century the castellan and especially the bailli did not com-
pletely lose their functions of recruitment and command in favour of the mar-
shals and capitani of the Savoyard companies.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that particularly in the case of Pinerolo, the
seat of both the city’s justice and of the principality of Achaea, further research
on the financial penalties for failure to answer the summons to military expedi-
tions will need to complement the analysis of the banna from castellany ac-
counts – which represent only the final step of a much longer judiciary proce-
dure84 – with an examination of the judicial accounts of the curia.
sagittariorum et cuiuslibet eorum facultatem”; La loi du Prince, 2, p. 237.
84 See P. BUFFO, “I registri della giustizia criminale nel sistema documentario del principato
sabaudo (Piemonte, secoli XIIIo-XIVo)”, in: Les registres de la justice pénale (libri maleficiorum)
et les sociétés de l’Italie communale, XIIe-XVe siècle (Rome, 2020) (in the press).
Accountability in Building Projects in Piedmont
under Philip of Savoy-Achaea: Administrative
Experimentation and Political Consolidation
VITTORIA BUFANIO
T
he construction of public buildings has been a favourite subject of re-
search across a range of fields. Among medievalists, castles in particular
have attracted a great deal of attention. Scholars have investigated the
relationship between power and architecture,1 by highlighting how the con-
struction of castles and public buildings answered not only defensive impera-
tives,2 but also the needs of princes to strengthen their territorial presence.3 
1 Among many works that could be cited, see P. BOUCHERON, Le pouvoir de bâtir: Urba-
nisme et politique édilitaire à Milan (XIVe-XVe siècles) (Rome, 1998); Pouvoir et édilité: Les
grands chantiers dans l’Italie communale et seigneuriale, ed. É. CROUZET-PAVAN (Rome, 2003).
2 D. DE RAEMY, Châteaux, donjons et grandes tours dans les États de Savoie (1230-1330), 2
vols. (Lausanne, 2004); A. KERSUZAN, Défendre la Bresse et le Bugey: Les châteaux savoyards dans
la guerre contre le Dauphiné (1282-1355) (Lyon, 2005).
3 A.A. SETTIA, Proteggere e dominare: Fortificazioni e popolamento nell’Italia medievale
(Rome, 1999), pp. 162-163.
......................................................................................................................................
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political
Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2020), pp. 73-89.
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With the exception of a few essays,4 however, medievalists have focussed more
rarely on a precise analysis of the descriptive documentation produced in con-
nection with the management of these important architectural works. The ac-
counting records produced for the financial management of public works afford
an excellent entry-point into this topic, in addition to archaeological sources
and architectural evidence.
This paper aims to investigate the link between the development of the
management of building sites and the evolution of the accounts produced for
this purpose, by examining the case of Piedmont in the first half of the four-
teenth century. This period is of particular interest because, as Paolo Grillo
remarked, it was “an age of transition ... between the autonomy of cities and
their inclusion in a supra-municipal or ‘regional’ domain”.5 This was the time
when a number of Piedmontese communities found themselves under the con-
trol of a cadet branch of the Savoyard dynasty, whose first ruler was Philip of
Savoy-Achaea.6
As frequently pointed out in the historiography, the beginning of the four-
teenth century, and especially its first two decades, was a time of political,
financial, judicial, and territorial consolidation of the appanage of Savoy-
Achaea.7 The attempts at consolidation by the dynasty of Savoy-Achaea fo-
4 Most recent contributions: Ph. BERNARDI, “L’enregistrement des dépenses pontificales:
Calculs et pratiques à Avignon au XIVe siècle”, Comptabilités 7 (2015), <http://journals.
openedition.org/comptabilites/1705>, consulted 20 April 2019; V. THEIS, “Décrire le chantier ou
écrire le chantier? Titres et offices dans les comptes de construction pontificaux de la première
moitié du XIV siècle”, in: Offices, écrit et papauté (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles), ed. A. JAMME and O.
PONCET (Rome, 2007), pp. 643-666; S. VICTOR, ‘Quantifier, compter, se tromper: Le quotidien
comptable des fabriques en Catalogne à la fin du Moyen Âge’, Comptabilités 7 (2015), <http://
journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/1720>, consulted 20 April 2019.
5 “Un’età di transizione […] fra l’autonomia municipale e l’inclusione in un dominio
sovracittadino o ‘regionale’”; P. GRILLO, “Un nuovo principe, una nuova disciplina: L’ordine
pubblico nel Piemonte di Filippo d’Acaia (1300-1334)”, in: L’ordine della città: Controllo del
territorio e repressione del crimine nell’Italia comunale (secoli XIII-XIV), ed. P. GRILLO (Rome,
2017), pp. 107-118, at p. 108. For a general overview of the balance of power in Italy, see L’orga-
nizzazione del territorio in Italia e in Germania: secoli XIII-XIV, ed. G. CHITTOLINI and D.
WILLOWEIT (Bologna, 1984).
6 The homonymous principality was created in 1294. On the Achaea, see F. GABOT-
TO, Storia del Piemonte nella prima metà del sec. XIV (1292-1349) (Turin, 1894); P.L. DAT-
TA, Storia dei principi di Savoia del ramo d’Acaia, signori del Piemonte, dal MCCXCIV al
MCCCXVIII, 2 vols. (Turin, 1832), and most recently A. BARBERO, “The feudal principalities: The
west (Monferrato, Saluzzo, Savoy and Savoy-Acaia)”, in: The Italian Renaissance State, ed. A.
GAMBERINI and I. LAZZARINI (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 177-196.
7 Storia di Fossano e del suo territorio, ed. R. COMBA, 4 vols. (Turin, 2009-12), 2, Il secolo
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cussed on the crystallisation of internal hierarchical structures and the stabilisa-
tion of relations with the local elites. This process also included what we might
call the ‘monumental politics’ undertaken by Philip I from the second decade
of the fourteenth century. Philip of Savoy was afforded the opportunity to
invest significantly in the construction sector because of several circumstances,
notably the end of the military conflict with Robert of Anjou (1313) and the
improvement of his finances.8 With the construction of castles and palaces the
dynasty would achieve two objectives in one stroke, gaining both an effective
means of enforcing its control over the territory and a visible representation of
its power. This strategy sought to consolidate the dynasty’s legitimacy as rulers
of Piedmont.
An increase in building sites occurred between 1314 and 1334, when sev-
eral works were undertaken, both for the maintenance of existing buildings and
the construction of new edifices. The present study will specifically focus on
the construction of the Palatine Chapel in the castle of Pinerolo, the reconstruc-
tion of the castle of Turin, the fortifications of Moretta, Fossano, and Monca-
lieri, and, finally, the construction of the covered market of Bricherasio. Al-
though these projects were initiated in succession, the chronology of work on
these sites overlapped at times.9 These intensive and continuous endeavours
entailed a huge financial, economic, and technical effort.10 Philip’s administra-
tion elaborated ad hoc accounts for this type of extraordinary expenses,11
which evolved along with changes in the building site management system.
This paper will explore the political-administrative consolidation processes as
they emerge from the accounting sources concerning buildings. The analysis of
the evolution of the administrative tools through which a building project was
degli Acaia (2010) (in particular the essays by P. Grillo and R. Rao); R. COMBA, “Rifondazioni
di villaggi e borghi nuovi nel Piemonte sabaudo: Le villenove di Filippo d’Acaia”, in: Piemonte
medievale: Forme del potere e della società: Studi per Giovanni Tabacco (Turin, 1985), pp. 123-
141 (reprinted in ID., Contadini, signori e mercanti nel Piemonte medievale (Rome, 1989), pp.
40-50).
8 Gli Angiò nell’Italia nord-occidentale (1259-1382), ed. R. COMBA (Milan, 2006).
9 A. LONGHI, “Contabilità e gestione del cantiere nel Trecento sabaudo”, in: Il cantiere sto-
rico: Organizzazione, mestieri, tecniche costruttive, ed. M. Volpiano (Savigliano, 2012), pp. 105-
123.
10 R. COMBA, “Il costo della difesa: Investimenti nella costruzione e manutenzione di castelli
nel territorio di Fossano fra il 1315 e il 1335”, in: Castelli: storia e archeologia, ed. R. COMBA
and A.A. SETTIA (Turin, 1984), pp. 229-239; B. DEL BO, Il valore di un castello: Il controllo del
territorio in Valle d’Aosta fra XIII e XV secolo (Milan, 2016), pp. 153-172.
11 P. BUFFO, La documentazione dei principi di Savoia-Acaia: Prassi e fisionomia di una
burocrazia notarile in costruzione (Turin, 2017), pp. 275-279.
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planned and developed opens a fresh perspective in the study of the impact of
social factors on writing and accounting practices. Equally, it affords a micro-
historical, ‘from the grassroots’ point of view on Philip’s political strategies.
Registers and Rolls for Managing the Building Sites
This paper cannot deal with the entire administrative documentation pro-
duced by the principality of Piedmont;12 rather, to explore the production of
accounting records it will focus on the specific documentation concerning
building works.13 Ordinary maintenance interventions on princely castles were
recorded in the general account rolls concerning the income and the expendi-
ture incurred in the management of each castellany.14 This accounting is in the
form of rolls composed of several membranes of parchment sewn together and
rolled up. It is characterised by a mise en page divided into three parts: a cen-
tral section containing the reason for expenditures and two side margins. The
amounts paid were noted on the right margin, while the left margin listed the
categories into which the auditor of accounts divided the expenses.15 The build-
ing expenses were listed, in the form of a rather synthetic summary, in one of
these categories, frequently called opera castri (castle works). This section is
12 See BUFFO, La documentazione dei principi di Savoia-Acaia; P. BUFFO, “Prassi
documentarie e gestione delle finanze nei comuni del principato di Savoia-Acaia (Moncalieri,
Pinerolo, Torino, fine secolo XIII-prima metà secolo XIV)”, Scrineum Rivista 11 (2014), pp. 217-
259.
13 For the Piedmont, see LONGHI, “Contabilità e gestione del cantiere”.
14 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Sezioni Riunite, Camera dei Conti di Piemonte, Conti delle
castellanie (hereafter ASTo, SR, CC), art. 1-85.
15 This reflected standard Savoyard practice, on which see G. CASTELNUOVO and Ch.
GUILLERÉ, “Les finances et l’administration de la maison de Savoie au XIIIe siècle”, in: Pierre II
de Savoie ‘le petit Charlemagne († 1268), ed. B. ANDENMATTEN, A. PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, and
E. PIBIRI (Lausanne, 2000), pp. 33-125; J.-L. GAULIN and Ch. GUILLERÉ, “Des rouleaux et des
hommes: Premières recherches sur les comptes de châtellenies savoyards”, Etudes Savoisiennes
1 (1992), pp. 51-108. In the oldest rolls there was only a left margin for the tituli (‘subheadings’);
there was no right margin and the central column of text extended all the way to the right. The
division into three parts was the result of a documentary evolution that took place during the
fourteenth century in several European areas; O. MATTÉONI, “Discipline du chiffre et fabrique
d’une norme comptable à la fin du Moyen Âge: Introduction”, in: Classer, dire, compter.
Discipline du chiffre et fabrique d’une norme comptable à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris, 2015), pp.
9-27; E. ANHEIM, “La normalisation des procédures d’enregistrement comptable sous Jean XXII
et Benoît XII (1316-1342)”, Mélanges de l’École française de Rome - Moyen Âge 118.2 (2006),
pp. 183-201.
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the only evidence that we have of ordinary maintenance works; however, it
appears to be only the last step in the registration of the most significant ex-
penses, which usually concerned major renovations of architectural elements
or ex novo constructions. So, what were the previous accounting steps?
The first drafting of the expenses incurred was made in special books, held
and drafted by the administrative manager of the building site, who appears in
the sources under the name of massarius operis. These ‘building books’ repre-
sent an accurate record of daily expenses. They were the result of an attentive
transcription of contracts and payments written on single papers (known as
cedule) which have generally been lost. The only extant example of building
books for the area concerns Turin castle.16 The construction book of the Turin
castle site is structured into many sections, the so-called tituli expensae (‘expen-
ditures titles’), which relate to the various activities and follow a chronological
order. Evidence of these first registrations of expenditures for other building
sites can be identified in accountancy that frequently refers to expenditures
recorded in particulis or in libris et papiris (‘books and papers’) of buildings
managers. Once the building was completed, these financial records were
brought to Pinerolo, the capital of the principality, where a specific roll was
produced, audited, and approved by an official (clericus) of the prince. These
extraordinary accounts – in the sense that they were not common because of
the exceptionality of the works in relation to which they were drafted – fol-
lowed the structure of the castellany accounts produced for ordinary expenses.
They consisted of a list of the sums allocated for the works, followed by the
expenditures. These ‘building rolls’ represented summaries – which could be
more or less detailed – of the ‘building books’ and had a more organised and
rational structure. The expenses were reported in a more systematic, albeit not
chronological, way in the ‘building rolls’, thus revealing a preference for ac-
counting functionality to the detriment of the real picture of the site’s evolu-
tion.17 To use Philippe Bernardi’s words: “For the accountants, the value of the
16 Archivio storico del comune di Pinerolo (hereafter ASCPi), cat. 49, f. 3, n. 1, edited in F.
MONETTI and F. RESSA, La costruzione del castello di Torino: Oggi palazzo Madama (Turin,
1982). On Turin castle see: SETTIA, Proteggere e dominare, Chapter 2, pp. 169-194.
17 Three steps of registration were common in the building sites accountancy of the late
Middle Ages; for examples focussing on Italy and England respectively, see THEIS, Décrire le
chantier ou écrire le chantier?; BOUCHERON, Le pouvoir de bâtir, pp. 289-333; VICTOR,
Quantifier, compter, se tromper; D. KNOOP and G. P. JONES, The Medieval Masons: An economic
history of English stone building in the later middle ages and early modern times (Manchester,
1933), pp. 15-27.
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building was a matter of ratio; any construction followed the same financial
rules, any work was evaluated on a pro rata basis depending on the dimension
of the surface built”.18 However, investigating the different internal structures
and understanding the reasons for the diversity of these sources can yield new
insights into the social relations which played out in the context of building
sites, as well as into the evolution of the written documentation which devel-
oped in connection to them.
Who Manages the Accounts? Techniques and Bonds of Trust
On the subject of political-administrative management, it must be kept in
mind that the castellan always acted with the support of a number of officials,
especially the clavarius, who was in charge of keeping both the general ac-
counts as well as those concerning construction works.19
The construction of the Palatine Chapel in Pinerolo, begun in 1314, is
believed to be the earliest projelibrisct in which Philip was involved; the re-
lated building roll is the earliest surviving document of its kind for the region.20
The administrative manager of the site was the clavarius Ardicionus de Albrie-
to (also massarius operis for the construction). He was required to appear
before the prince’s clerks in charge of auditing accounts equipped with the
“libri et papiri” he had produced while overseeing the financial aspects of the
construction sites. The surviving roll was drawn up by the officer Simondus de
Casalis, who later approved it along with his colleague Johannes Rubeus.21
Unlike the general preference in construction site rolls for a thematic organisa-
tion of the material, the Palatine Chapel roll reveals a chronological order,
which allows us to investigate closely Ardicionus’s role in the management of
the site.
18 “Pour le comptables, la valeur du bâtir est affaire de ratio, toute construction répondant
aux mêmes règles financières, toute réalisations s’évaluant au pro rata des surfaces de
maçonnerie exécutée”; Ph. BERNARDI, “Le maître des œuvres du Pape: officier ou entrepreneur?”,
in Offices, écrit et papauté (XIIIe - XVIIe siècles), ed. A. JAMME and O. PONCET (Rome, 2007), pp.
407-419 (p. 419).
19 A. BARBERO, Il ducato di Savoia: Amministrazione e corte di uno stato franco-italiano
(Rome-Bari, 2002), pp. 3-47.
20 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 2, roll 1 (January 1314 - December 1315).
21  “Receptis apud Pinayroli in presentia domini per Symondus et Rubeus clericos ipsius
de mandato et voluntate eisdem principis”, ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par.2, roll 1, f. a.
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An analysis of this document shows that his brief did not exclusively con-
cern administrative and accounting matters, but also included tasks more close-
ly related to the organisation of the construction yard. For example, we know
that Ardicionus went to the mountains of Pinerolo and nearby Luserna San
Giovanni “ad perquirendum bonam petram ad faciendum calcinam”22 (“to find
stones suitable for making lime”), and that he negotiated workers’ remunera-
tion, ensuring supplies and procuring carts and carriers for transport.23 In other
words, his role was not strictly financial but also logistical. Ardicionus was
required to be familiar with the territory, as well as with some dynamics strict-
ly related to his activity in construction. It was on the basis of this knowledge
that he fixed the daily wages for workers, negotiated the price of specific archi-
tectural elements and evaluated the quantity, quality, and price of raw materi-
als. The sources provide evidence of his direct engagement with other social
actors, such as trustworthy masters. In Pinerolo’s case, the massarius acted not
only as an extension of the accountancy but as a real maître d’œuvre.24 Later
Pinerolo sites were no longer managed by Ardicionus. The growing responsi-
bilities with which he was invested in the following years led him to delegate
construction work to others. During those years he also began to be recognised
as a princely clerk, tasked with verifying and approving the accounts of other
castellans.25 This indicates that there was no hard and fast distinction between
central and local officers; it also points to the evolution of Achaean record-
keeping practices, recently highlighted by Paolo Buffo.26
The historiography has shed light on the fourteenth century as a moment of
progressive specialisation and ‘quantification’ in Savoyard administrative
practices,27 and this is confirmed by the study of the evolution of the manage-
22 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 2, roll 1, f. o.
23 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 2, roll 1, f. p.
24 On the castellan’s role on building sites, see J.-M. POISSON, “La maîtrise d’œuvre dans
les chantiers de construction des châteaux de comté de Savoie au XIVe siècle”, in Du projet au
chantier: Maîtres d’ouvrage et maître d’œuvre aux XIVe-XVIe siècles, ed. O. CHAPELOT (Paris,
2001), pp. 163-175; M. CORTELLAZZO, “Dinamiche di cantiere, tecniche costruttive e possesso
territoriale nell’edificazione delle torri valdostane tra XI e XIII secolo”, in Tecniche murarie e
cantieri del romanico nell’Italia settentrionale, Archeologia dell’Architettura 17, ed. G. P.
BROGIOLO and G. GENTILINI (Firenze, 2012), pp. 9-31 (p. 29).
25 ASTo, SR, CC, Torino, art. 75, par. 1, roll 4 (June 1313- June 1318); Fossano, art. 38, par.
1, roll 4 (June 1322 - April 1328), Moretta, art. 51, par.1, roll 4 (December 1323-December
1324).
26 BUFFO, La documentazione dei principi di Savoia-Acaia.
27 The arguments for the birth of a modern bureaucracy are discussed in G. CASTELNUOVO,
Ufficiali e gentiluomini: la società politica sabauda nel tardo medioevo (Milano, 1994).
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ment of building sites. A telling example of this trend is represented by later
construction sites in Pinerolo, which were assigned to other officials, already
part of the princely entourage. From 1318 to 1319, the works on Pinerolo castle
were entrusted to Obertus de Ruata, who was described as cappellanus
domini.28 The account he produced is substantially different from that of previ-
ous years, in particular in that it did not follow a daily and accurate record of
the activities surrounding the castle. The expenditures are recorded in a very
descriptive and vague manner – for example, “De aliis expensis que facte fue-
runt occasione dicte calcene capiende” (“others expenditures made for the
supply of lime”)29 – resulting in the roll being more systematic and much
shorter. On the one hand, this visible change was due to the fact that building
activities had been decreasing after the first major initiatives; on the other
hand, it probably also reflected a process of rationalisation, if not at the level
of management, at least in terms of accounting practice. For example, although
the massarius Obertus still supervised every phase of the work, personnel in
charge of running workshops for the supply of raw materials (nunci) and other
forms of specialisation began to emerge.
The employment of specialists in certain operational tasks was also charac-
teristic of the contemporary Fossano site, which began in 1324.30 On this occa-
sion, the assessment of the dimensions of architectural elements was a task
entrusted to experienced agrimensori (‘land surveyors’) as well as to some of
the most preeminent local families. In 1331, Bartolomeo di Santa Giulia and
Giovannino Marenco supervised the work of mensurator Marcello Grasso from
Fossano, who was in charge of checking the quality of the walls built on site.31
The Santa Giulia and Marenco families were particularly known for their close
relations with the prince.32 Both were involved in commerce and had been
creditors of the prince for a long time. The Marencos’ business “probably
relied on a strong economic basis resulting from a genuine commercial attitude,
in particular in the building sector”.33 More specifically, sources reveal that
28 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 2, roll 2 (April 1318-December 1319).
29 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 2, roll 2.
30 ASTo, SR, CC, Fossano, art. 38, par. 2, edited in: G. FALCO, Sulla costruzione del castello
di Fossano (1324-1332) (Torino, 1936).
31 FALCO, Sulla costruzione, pp. 89, 110.
32 B. DEL BO, La spada e la grazia: Vite di aristocratici nel Trecento subalpino (Torino,
2011), pp. 60-98; B. DEL BO, “Il principe, i Marenco, i Santa Giulia: stili di vita e percorsi di
affermazione familiare nella Fossano degli Acaia”, in Storia di Fossano, pp. 205-238.
33 “poggiava su solide basi economiche derivanti, con tutta probabilità, da una schietta
vocazione commerciale, in particolare rivolta al settore dell’edilizia”; DEL BO, La spada e la
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Giovannino Marenco provided several supplies of lime and wood for the works
of the Fossano castle.34 However, it should be added that the employment of
Bartolomeo di Santa Giulia and Giovannino Marenco as site supervisors was
probably not only political, as has been emphasised in previous studies.35 The
purpose of architectural inspections was to ensure that master bricklayers had
built the walls as agreed in the contract, that is, to verify that the payments
already made to masters corresponded to the work that was actually carried
out.36 It is therefore not surprising that two families who were familiar with
trade, mathematical and accounting practices were employed to accomplish
such a task.
The prince and his direct collaborators began to develop a more complex
administrative and supervising expertise. These skills were only in the process
of being developed at the first Pinerolo building site, where measurement oper-
ations were carried out by unskilled labourers (manovales) on behalf of
Ardicionus.37 These newly developed skills were also linked to the ability to
employ the appropriate people in the correct position. The already mentioned
Obertus is attested to have given advice in the context of works on the castle of
Moretta in 1324-1327,38 as well as in support of the work for the new market
of Bricherasio later in 1327, when he went “diversis vicibus apud Lucernam
circa incidendi et emendi assides et alia fusta necessaria” (“several times to
Luserna to cut and buy wooden planks and other necessary timber”).39 The
selection and training of specialised agents who were qualified in certain spe-
cific phases of construction works allowed the prince to delegate more of his
responsibilities. This process is also reflected in the shortness of surviving
accounts and in their increasingly descriptive rather than chronological organi-
sation, elements which allow us to investigate the process of castle building
better.
grazia, p. 64.
34 FALCO, Sulla costruzione, pp. 106-108.
35 LONGHI, “Contabilità e gestione del cantiere”, p. 113.
36 BERNARDI, “Le maître des œuvres du Pape”, pp. 409-415.
37 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 2, roll 1, f. o (1315).
38
ASTo, SR, CC, Moretta, art. 51, par. 2 (March 1324, February 1325).
39 ASTo, SR, CC, Bricherasio, art. 12, par. 2 (July 1327 - April 1330).
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Towards a Distinction between Administrative and Technical Functions
The previous section has examined how administrative practices evolved
and impacted the style of compiling construction site accounts, by linking them
to the emergence of experts in the execution of specific and crucial tasks. How-
ever, these transformations were also the result of an evolution in the way work
was organised at the building sites, a process which led to an increasingly
marked distinction between technical and administrative roles.
The chronological structure of the building accounts (referred to in the
previous section of this article) provides detailed information about the daily
remuneration of skilled and unskilled workers, as well as their roles and spe-
cialisations. In other words, it gives us the possibility to follow day after day
the activities at the site, but also outside, at the quarries, the production centres,
and all the locations whence raw materials were supplied. The chronological
structure was also due to the chosen form of contract: almost all workers, both
skilled and unskilled, were employed through contracts that envisaged daily
remuneration. This was the reflection of an extremely centralised management
through which the prince ensured his control on all phases of construction
works. The massarius Ardicionus had a direct relationship with all the work-
ers, whom he would personally recruit and remunerate. Also, he could certainly
rely on the technical skills of some specialised workers who directed the work
of small teams. However, both the master masons and their subordinates re-
ceived a daily wage directly paid by the massarius, the amount of which ap-
peared in the princely accounts as a single item of expenditure. The most im-
portant technical roles were played by Boninus and Albertus, master masons,
the carpenter Ruffinus, and magister Jacometus. “Omnia opera necessaria”
(“all works needed”) were contracted out to master Boninus and the carpenter
Ruffinus. Master Boninus was put in charge of completing the construction of
the chapel and subsequently other works, including the kitchen and porticoes
of the palace, whereas Ruffinus was entrusted with the execution of all wooden
elements of the roof in November 1314. Master Jacometus managed several
masonry works between April 1314 and September 1314. Compared to the
others, these contracts testify to the attempt to delegate some tasks to third
parties. In practice, the amount paid to the masters corresponded only to the
cost of their labour. In other words, the masters were neither required to antici-
pate the cost of raw materials nor to secure supplies or the workforce. This
implies that there was not a technical director from an organisational and plan-
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ning point of view. The above-mentioned Ardicionus, the prince’s massarius,
was in charge of both administrative and technical-logistical aspects.
The first developments in terms of workforce management occurred on the
site of Turin castle, which was active from 1317 to 1319, and for which we
have an extant account, written by the massarius Panissera, as noted above.
Panissera’s account (‘building book’) is divided into tituli expensae and fur-
thermore presents more specific sections, such as: “Titulus expense ferri pro
balconis dicti castri”, “Expense lignaminis et solariorum turrium novarum”,
“Titulus expense sabloni”, “Titulus expense carrorum et bovum domini abatis
Case Nove”.40 Many blank and removed sheets suggest that the register first
had been divided into sections that were subsequently filled in. This produced
an orderly and systematic report which followed a chronological order within
each section. The account was probably drawn up during the activities rather
than at a later stage. It was probably used as a tool for facilitating the manage-
ment of finances rather than exclusively for systematising the accounts. To
implement this accounting practice, the officer responsible for the account had
to plan the administrative project which he would have to undertake and famil-
iarise himself with the management of the construction works.
Estimating the various items of expenditure was also facilitated by entrust-
ing almost all the organisational tasks at the site to a single master mason, thus
allowing the ‘customer’ to have to organise only the supply of raw materials.
This division of tasks was clearly established by the ‘Capitulatio’-agreement
signed by master Germanus from Casale Monferrato (70 kilometres east of
Turin, in the marquisate of Monferrato) with Prince Philip in January 1317:
[...] Primo quidem dictus magister Germanus promitit dicto domino principi quod
ipse faciet et murabit omnes muros utiles et necessarios, et eciam voluntarios, quos
ipse dominus princeps ibi facere fieri voluerit a fundo.[...] Dictus vero dominus
princeps debet ac promitit dicto magistro dare et solvere pro laborerio seu opere
predicto faciendo pro quolibet trabuco dictorum murorum dicte grossitudinis
silicet trabuco mensure Montis Calerii vel Cherii sol. 60 asten. parvorum monete
currentis sive usualis. [...] Item debet ipse dominus princeps facere apportari ibi
prope ubi melius et comodius esse et poni poterit in dicto castro vel prope totum
arraytum necessarium, silicet lapides grossos et parvos, lateres seu maonos, cal-
cem coctam et sablonum. [...] Item debet ipse dominus princeps dare dicto magis-
tro lib. 10 vian. in auxilio emptionis lignaminis et aliorum opportunorum dicto
magistro pro pontibus et aliis in predictis. [...] Item debet ipse dominus princeps
40 MONETTI and RESSA, La costruzione, pp. 183-184.
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facere et curare quod dictus magister habeat aquam, que discurrit per Portam
Fibellonam, ita quod sibi numquam defficere possit nec auferri qui semper ibi sit
in lecto per quem discurrit satis pro dicto opere.41 
The agreement, detailed in the construction account, described the obligations
of both partners and set out the reference measures. Germanus was obliged to
work exclusively at the Turin site for the entire duration of the construction
site; he was also required to build all the necessary walls envisaged by the
prince. The prince, on the other hand, promised to bring to the castle, in the
best and most convenient place possible for the master, everything he needed,
namely large and small stones, bricks, already cooked lime, and sand. Other
passages concerned the precise dimensions of the walls and the remuneration
for the master mason. The latter was calculated on the basis of the volume of
the wall built. Each trabucco (unit of measurement), which was calculated on
the basis of the standards of measurement of Moncalieri (2.96 metres) and
Chieri (2.94 metres), would be worth a fee of 60 sous of Asti, a figure which
could be increased if the wall built was thicker.
At the building yard, master Germanus from Casale managed a large group
of masters and labourers from Casale as well as other workers from different
origins and fields of specialisation. He mediated between these workers and the
massarius Panissera, processing the payment of compensations and dealing
with exceptional requests for clothing, food, and tools. For this reason, most of
the on-site works were described in the building book’s section which reported
the weekly payments made to the master and which was titled “Titulus solucio-
num magistri Germani” (“The heading of payments to master Germanus”).42
Most of the expenditure recorded was therefore addressed to a single person,
Germanus, and this contributed to streamlining the account and the information
therein provided, for instance:
Item die dominico secundo mensis setembris dedi magistro Germano in solutione
manualium et magister Germanus retinuit a quolibet unum fortem solidum a quoli-
bet; Item dicta die solvi dicto magistro Germano in solutione muratorum de tem-
pore preterito.
41 Ibid., pp. 59-61 (c. 11r-12r).
42 Ibid., pp. 139-145 (c. 109r-113v).
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Sunday, 2 September, I gave master Germanus for the remuneration of the labour-
ers, and master Germanus deducted one sous fort from each labourer. On the same
day I paid master Germanus for the remuneration of the masons for the work they
had done.43 
These historical sources allow us to qualify Germanus from Casale as a master
mason; however, his heterogeneous roles go beyond the mere function of con-
struction specialist. Germanus was in fact able to find economic solutions to
technical problems, as well as to evaluate the quantities of building material
needed and assess workers’ skills. At times of extraordinary necessity, he was
directly involved in the recovery of raw materials and the reparation of equip-
ment. On the one hand, he had direct responsibilities for recruiting the workers,
assigning them tasks and paying their salaries. On the other hand, he was an
active participant in the construction process. Although his contract exempted
him from “facere aliquam taglam maonorum vel lapidum vel aliquam aliam
dicto opere” (“making any cuts to bricks, stones or anything else”), he was
often employed in such tasks.44 He had the technical knowledge and the mana-
gerial authority; more than a general supervisor, he was a real site manager.
In the following construction sites, the use of contracts that required a
major delegation of responsibilities, i.e. piecework and procurement, was in-
creasingly frequent. The terms of the contracts also reveal a clearer idea of the
project and show a strong tendency to delegate tasks to the masters. The con-
struction of Fossano castle kept the prince assiduously busy from May 1324
until December 1327 and represents the most significant work he undertook.45
The account regarding this specific construction site reaches the year 1332,
when works began to slow down noticeably. Unlike the account regarding the
first year of the Pinerolo building site, the Fossano building roll is not organ-
ised in chronological order. Additionally, even though the internal structure of
the Fossano account appears to be similar to that of the Turin account, the
sections of the Fossano computus have a more logical structure. Except for the
first phases of construction, for which the daily remuneration of many un-
skilled workers is reported, the other sections took the form of brief summaries
of particular expenses. For example, payments for buying bricks are reported
from 25 June 1324 to 19 November 1327, while the purchase of deliveries
from furnaces and of the materials sourced from the demolition of houses are
43 Ibid., p. 142 (c. 111v), p. 139 (c. 109v).
44 Ibid., p. 60 (c. 11v).
45 See FALCO, Sulla costruzione del castello di Fossano.
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recorded form 26 May 1324 to 10 December 1326. The last part of this docu-
ment presents the ad taschiam-contract of magister Bonardinus de Savilliano,46
who was the technical referent for the first two years of the construction site.
His contract amounted to 4,904 livres, a very large salary, which, however, also
included compensation for the workers employed by him, who had no relation-
ship with the prince or his officers.47 In other words, Bonardinus, in his capac-
ity of master mason, was the only official in charge of, and responsible for, the
development of the building site.
On the construction sites of Philip of Achaea, towards the third decade of
the fourteenth century some master masons turned from mere technical experts
into real building site supervisors, much closer to the modern idea of the archi-
tect and engineer.48 As has been seen from the cases of Germanus of Casale
and Bonardinus of Savignano, master masons were entrusted with the manage-
ment of significant sums of money, which they could administer with a certain
degree of autonomy. The key condition for this development lies in the rela-
tionship of trust which the master masons developed with the prince. This
dynamic eventually resulted in the presence of architects among the prince’s
close entourage of officers:49 a most notable example of such transformation is
Jean de Liège, called “architector Sabaudiae”.50 This tendency intensified
during construction works in Bricherasio. The prince’s decision to build a
market in Bricherasio in 1327 prompted the production of a specific accounting
report, commissioned to the site supervisor Nicoletus Signore by two clerks of
the prince, Ardizzonus and Rubeus.51 The account is quite succinct, with the
recepte (‘incomes’) and librate (‘expenditures’) consisting of only four sheets
of parchment covering three years of work. We should bear in mind that the
46 The contracts called in the Piedmontese sources “ad taschiam” “in taschiis” “in taschia”
foresaw a fixed and all-inclusive fee for the work to be performed; DEL BO, Il valore di un
castello, p. 109. They could also be called “a forfait” or “a rischio” in other areas of Italy; G.
PINTO, “L’organizzazione del lavoro nei cantieri edili (Italia centro-settentrionale, secoli XIII-
XV)”, in ID., Il lavoro, la povertà, l’assistenza (Roma, 2008), pp. 31-60 (p. 47).
47 FALCO, Sulla costruzione, pp. 89-90.
48 BOUCHERON, Le pouvoir de bâtir, p. 315. On the development of the master mason in
building site manager, see O. CHAPELOT (ed.), Du projet au chantier: Maîtres d’ouvrage et maître
d’œuvre aux XIVe-XVIe siècles (Paris, 2001).
49 M. WARNKE, The court artist. On the ancestry of modern artist (1985) (trad. Cambridge,
1993), pp. 175-188.
50 D. DE RAEMY, “Aymonet Corniaux, maître des œuvres de la Maison de Savoie, son
activité en Pays de Vaud et en Chablais”, in Amédée VIII-Félix V, premier duc de Savoie et pape
(1383-1451), ed. B. ANDENMATTEN, A. PARAVICINI BAGLIANI (Lausanne, 1992), pp. 327-335.
51 ASTo, SR, CC, Bricherasio, art. 12, par. 2 (July 1327-April 1330).
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Bricherasio market building is not comparable to the Turin and Fossano sites,
not only in terms of dimensions but also because in the case of Bricherasio
total payments amounted only to 357 livres. This is also the reason why the
management of the building site, as it emerges from the account report, was
relatively simple. For example, with regard to the composition of the work-
force, construction works relied heavily on the employment of locals. Despite
the limited dimensions of the Bricherasio site, it is useful to note, for the pur-
pose of comparative analysis, that the remuneration of the master mason,
Iohannes de Bergondia, amounted to 30% of total payments, and that he man-
aged all the phases of the work.52
Conclusion
The evolution of administrative and accounting practices concerning the
management of Philip of Achaea’s construction sites must be contextualised
within the process of the political consolidation of the Savoyard dynasty in
Piedmont, described in the opening pages of this article. Castles and public
buildings in general were an essential part of Philip’s political project. How-
ever, what allowed the prince to undertake new investments in construction
was precisely the consolidation of his authority and the creation of new net-
works of trust. The development of more systematic tax collection under
Philip, as well as a more rigorous and heavy-handed enforcement of justice,
were instrumental in financing building projects from 1314 onwards.53 The
accounts of each castellany contained a section on the banna, which recorded
the fines for crimes committed within the castellan’s jurisdiction. The sums
reported under this category increased substantially with the start of the con-
struction activities. Specific studies for the area are still needed; however, from
the examination of some cases,54 it seems clear that the need for liquidity due
52 A similar scenario characterises works on the Moretta building site, managed by the
carpenter Iohannes de Arpeasco and the mason Jacobus. The prince required Iohannes “ut veniret
pro operibus dicti palacii faciendis” (“to come and do the work in the castle”). The related
construction roll is composed by only seven parchments and there are a lot of integrations in
ordinary account, obviously in the section opera castri; ASTo, SR, CC, Moretta, art. 51, par.2
(March 1324-February 1325). On Moretta building site, see A. LONGHI, “Il cantiere sabaudo del
castello di Moretta (1295-1335)”, Bollettino della società di studi storici, archeologici ed artistici
della provincia di Cuneo 137 (2007), pp. 7-23.
53 GRILLO, “Un nuovo principe”, pp. 117-118.
54 ASTo, SR, CC, Pinerolo, art. 60, par. 1, roll 4 (May 1309-November 1314); Torino, art. 75,
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to the exceptional financial effort that these projects required also contributed
to a more strict enforcement of law and order (on which see the chapters by
Aude Wirth-Jaillard and Roberto Biolzi in this volume). The heavy fiscal bur-
den meant it was the local communities that mostly funded construction
works.55 Unfortunately, due to the lack of municipal sources for the period, it
is impossible to study this dynamic closely. However, later sources reveal how
this practice, if not already underway, started to take shape in the first half of
the fourteenth century. For example, in a document dating from 1379, we find
a reference to the promulgation by the Pinerolo castellan of an extraordinary
tax that was imposed on the citizens, the habitatores (‘recent immigrants’), and
owners of property, explicitly “pro fortaliciis faciendis” (“to build the fortifica-
tions”).56 This mention is important because it makes the case for a compara-
tive approach to the study of building sites, notwithstanding the fact that each
site often represents a microhistory in its own right.57 This perspective is also
useful to understand the extent to which social factors impacted those forms of
written production which concerned construction sites.
Thus, the present analysis of the accounts produced for Philip of Achaea’s
building sites has evinced a shift in management methods. Thanks to the expe-
rience accumulated during the years of the Pinerolo site, Philip was able to
delegate to his agents management and supervision tasks that would otherwise
have fallen on him. In particular, this development led to an increasing division
between strictly administrative, technical, and management tasks at the con-
struction site, a process which included the production and application of tech-
nical and administrative forms of knowledge.58 The delegation of responsibili-
ties to a skilled workforce was also made possible by the development of a
trustworthy and increasingly specialised administration, whose officers were
willing to offer their expertise in the context of various building sites. Overall,
construction site management moved from centralised control to an increasing
level of specialisation, therefore allowing for the delegation of responsibilities
par. 1 roll 4 (June 1313 - June1318).
55 A more strict enforcement of law and a heavier fiscal burden in order to finance con-
struction works can also be found in some areas of central Italy; A. LUONGO, Gubbio nel
Trecento. Il commune popolare e la mutazione signorile (1300-1404) (Roma, 2016), pp. 53-54.
56 ASCPi, cat. 29, fasc. 9, n.1.
57 C. TOSCO, ‘Gli architetti e le maestranze’, in Arti e storia nel Medioevo, II. Del costruire:
tecniche, artisti, artigiani, committenti, ed. E. CASTELNUOVO and G. SERGI (Torino, 2003), pp.
43-68 (p. 64).
58 LONGHI, “Contabilità e gestione del cantiere”, p.123.
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to different agents. This dynamic also led to a change in the format of the ac-
counts produced, which sacrificed detail in favour of better systematisation and
description.
Evidence of Philip’s involvement can be found on the Pinerolo construc-
tion site which, although managed by the princely officer Ardicionus, was also
the object of frequent princely visits and inspections. The difficulty in delegat-
ing is also found in the type of contracts used to engage the workforce. The
preponderance of the daily remuneration implied that the workers had a direct
labour relationship with the prince, and that the accounts were more substantial
and less systematic. The case of magister Germanus, employed at the Turin
building site, is particularly significant because it was the first attempt to en-
trust the management of the whole site. However, sources also suggest that
Germanus’s tasks were broken down into well-defined schemes and employ-
ment relations, an aspect which would hint at a process of increasing speciali-
sation. The clear sections in which Fossano’s roll was divided were the result
of a consolidated practice, and it is from then onwards that the rolls became
more simplified. Fossano was by far the biggest building site (both in economic
and managerial terms) which Philip undertook. Nonetheless, the way expenses
were recorded was clear and effective; furthermore, significant tasks were
entrusted to the construction site’s workforce and procurement contracts –
which had been only rarely used before then – began to become more common.
The ability to quantify labour and estimate costs thus became an essential fac-
tor in the development of, and activities carried out at, building sites, as well as
in their administrative supervision.
In sum, the development of more efficient financial records by the central
administration paralleled the prince’s reorientation in the management of build-
ing sites from the centralised organisation that characterised the early years to
an outsourcing system. It is furthermore important to underline that these
changes in the organisation and accountancy of public works took place at the
same time as the structuring of the political space of the Savoy-Achaea princi-
pality in Piedmont. As such, this study draws attention to the hitherto neglected
role played by travelling engineers, architects, and other professionals, such as
Ardicionus de Albrieto and Obertus de Ruata, in consolidating Philip of Sa-
voy’s political position as ruler of Piedmont.

Part Two








uring the late Middle Ages, the Crown of Aragon gradually integrated
different Mediterranean territories into its domains, each retaining a
high degree of autonomy. This autonomy was balanced by the estab-
lishment of institutions that consolidated the central administration and rein-
* This article was made possible by two postdoctoral research contracts at the University
of Valencia (UV) and, previously, at the Escuela Española de Historia y Arqueologia en Roma
(Spanish National Research Council, CSIC). My work was carried out within the framework of the
research group Renda feudal i fiscalitat a la Catalunya baixmedieval (Feudal Income and
Taxation in Late Medieval Catalonia (ref. 2014 SGR 1154), and Desigualdad económica y
movilidad social en la Europa Mediterránea, siglos XIII-XVI (ref. Prometeo2019/072) and also
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forced the power of the monarchy. Specifically, the late medieval period wit-
nessed the emergence of a royal administration that was articulated around four
major officials: the mayordomo, the camarlengo, the canciller and the maestre
racional.1
It is well known that the Crown of Aragon’s territorial expansion necessi-
tated sound finances, in terms of both optimising the available resources and
creating financial mechanisms capable of providing the monarchy with liquid
assets. In this respect, the fourteenth century was a crucial time for the consoli-
dation of the fiscal and financial system. From the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury, the monarchy had insufficient resources at its disposal, especially given
the frequent wars it engaged in. This explains why many taxes were established
on the Crown’s subjects from the different realms and various credit mecha-
nisms were developed.2 Understandably, this context made it necessary to
create a management system that would allow effective control of the royal
treasury. This desire for control was echoed in public administrative practice,
giving rise to new documentary forms and archiving practices. In other words,
developing the administrative machinery of the Aragonese state required both
the implementation of various procedures that would allow efficient manage-
ment of the royal estate and the recruitment of public officials capable of over-
seeing it.3
1 F. M. GIMENO, D. GOZALBO and J. TRENCHS, Ordinacions de la Casa i Cort de Pere el
Ceremonios (Valencia, 2009), p. 9. For a general introduction on the subject, see T. DE
MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “Els funcionaris i l’administració reial a Catalunya (segles XIII-XIV)”,
Acta Historica et archaeologica mediaevalia 1 (1983), pp. 137-150; A. BEAUCHAMP and M.
NARBONA CÁRCELES, “Des bureaucraties au service des cours: Administrateurs et gestion des
affaires curiales dans la Péninsule ibérique aux dernies siècles du Moyen Âge. Presentation”, e-
Spania 20 (2015); A. BEAUCHAMP, “La composition de la casa i cort du roi d’Aragon: Normes
et pratiques au début du règne de Pierre Le Cérémonieux”, Erasmo. Revista de Historia
Bajomedieval y Moderna 1 (2014), pp. 21-42.
2 Let us recall that, as in other Western monarchies, this new taxation consisted in
expanding the scope of fiscal sources beyond the boundaries of real estate to cover all royal
subjects: M.A. LADERO QUESADA, “Lo antiguo y lo nuevo de la investigación sobre fiscalidad y
poder político en la Baja Edad Media hispánica”, in Estados y mercados financieros en el
Occidente cristiano (siglos XIII-XVI): Actas de la XLI Semana de Estudios Medievales de Estella
(Pamplona, 2015), pp. 13-55; A. FURIÓ, M. SÁNCHEZ and J.A. SESMA, “Old and new forms of
taxation in the Crown of Aragon”, in La fiscalità nell’economia europea (sec. XIII-XVIII), 39
Settimana di Studi dell’Istituto Internazional di Storia Economica ‘Francesco Datini’ di Prato
(Firenze, 2008), pp. 99-130.
3 A similar process is documented in other European chanceries. For a general
contextualisation of these developments during the late Middle Ages, see, among others: T.
PÉCOUT (ed.), De l’autel à l’écritoire: Genèse des comptabilités princières en Occident XII-XIV
95Auditing of Accounts as an Instrument of Royal Power
The aim of this article is to study how this complex administrative appara-
tus functioned, focussing more specifically on the work of the official chiefly
responsible for auditing the accounts, the maestre racional (i.e. the head of the
Exchequer). To achieve this we have one of the richest medieval archives in
the West available to us, the Crown of Aragon’s Archive, which contains a
long list of accounting documents produced for auditing purposes.4 In the first
part of the article, we describe the structure of the royal archive and demon-
strate the prominent place occupied within it by the office of the maestre racio-
nal. We then examine the accounting records audited by the racional and the
particular instruments it used to carry out its auditing work. Finally, we refer
to the auditing and accounting control process, taking as an example an impor-
tant ecclesiastical revenue paid to the monarch, the pontifical tithe.
The Creation of the Royal Archive and the Administration of the Maestre
Racional 
From the thirteenth century onwards, the monarchs of the Crown of Ara-
gon had an organised chancery and a range of officials in charge of administer-
ing royal affairs. This administration had a clear Sicilian influence from the
beginning.5 In 1318, Jaime II created the royal archive to preserve the docu-
siècle (Paris, 2017), pp. 415-440; P. BERTRAND (ed.), Les écritures ordinaires, sociologie d’un
temps de révolution documentaire (Paris, 2015); O. MATTÉONI and P. BECK (eds.), Classer, dire,
compter: Discipline du chiffre et fabrique d’une norme comptable à la fin du Moyen Âge, ed. O.
MATTÉONI and P. BECK (Paris, 2015); De part et d’autre des Alpes, 2, Chancelleries et
chanceliers des princes à la fin du Moyen Âge, ed. G. CASTELNUOVO and O. MATTÉONI
(Chambéry, 2011); Les Chambres des comptes en France aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Ph.
CONTAMINE and O. MATTÉONI (Paris, 1998).
4 For a general reference, see C. LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Una perspectiva europea para el
Archivo de la Corona de Aragón con ocasión de sus siete siglos de existencia (1318-2018)”,
Boletín de Anabad 67 (2017), pp. 33-54; C. LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Orígenes del archivo de la
Corona de Aragón (en tiempos, Archivo Real de Barcelona)”, Hispania: Revista Española de
Historia 7 (2007), pp. 413-454; R. CONDE Y DELGADO, Reyes y archivos en la Corona de
Aragón: Siete siglos de reglamentación y praxis archivística (siglos XII- XIX) (Zaragoza, 2008);
T. DE MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Mestre Racional a la Corona d’Aragó (1283-1419), 2 vols.
(Barcelona, 1987); F. UDINA MARTORELL, Guía histórica y descriptiva del Archivo de la Corona
de Aragón (Madrid, 1986).
5 For example, from the mid-thirteenth century onwards, Angevin Sicily had a collegial
body of Maestri racionali, which had ranging economic powers and enjoyed autonomy with
respect to the Magna Regia Curia (P. CORRAO, “Costruzione di un corpo di fonti per la storia
politica siciliana del tardo medioevo: Le Cartas Reales dell’archivio della Corona d’Aragona”,
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ments related to the person of the king, regardless of which territory of the
Crown they belonged to.6 The monarch ordered the construction of a vaulted
chamber in the royal palace, on the first floor of which were to be deposited tax
concession documents and other writings of the chancery and the court; an
intermediate floor housed the royal treasury and jewels; and a third floor was
used for the storage of the accounts and deeds belonging to the racional.7 Thus,
from its inception, we find two clearly separated sections within the royal
archive: the royal chancery and the royal estate. The two were independent and
never became part of a single administration.8 At the head of the royal scribe’s
office was the protonotario, while the racional was the official responsible for
economic supervision of the royal estate.9
Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo 105 (2003), pp. 267-303). It is not
unusual, therefore, that Catalan dominion in the island during the reigns of Peter III (1276-1285),
Alfonso III (1286-1291), and Jaime II (1291-1327) was later echoed in the establishment of the
Aragonese Casa i Cort (royal court and household), and that this would influence the creation of
an office like the maestre racional; H. BRESC, “Sicilia del tardo Medioevo: Parallelismi e
divergenze”, in: Alle origini del dualismo italiano: Regno di Sicilia e Italia centro-settentrionale,
ed. G. GALASSO et al. (Soveria Mannelli, 2014), pp. 177-190. For an overview of the topic, see
the studies by A. SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione del regno di Sicilia: Cancelleria, apparati
finanziari e strumenti di governo nel tardo medioevo (Rome, 2018) and ID., “Archives of the
Mediterranean Governance and record-keeping in the Crown of Aragon in the long fifteenth
century”, European History Quarterly 46.3 (2016), pp. 435-457, as well as his contribution in
the present volume.
6 LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Orígenes del archivo”; J. RIERA I SANS, Archivo de la Corona de
Aragón: Catálogo de Memoriales e Inventarios: Siglos XIV-XIX (Madrid, 1999), etc. It should be
noted that the royal archive of Aragon first appeared in theory in 1348, although it would not be
created until at least 1461. For its part, it was established in the kingdom of Valencia in 1419:
LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Orígenes del archivo”, p. 415; E. CRUSELLES, El maestre racional: Función
política y desarrollo administrativo del oficio público en el siglo XV (València, 1989).
7 CONDE Y DELGADO, Reyes y archivos, p. 35, doc. 179 and 189 (ACA, RP, reg. 637, ff.
137v-138r); LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Orígenes del archivo”, p. 451. In April 1316, Jaime II had
already tried to begin work on the palace to guard the documentation kept by the racional “en la
qual casa fossen estoiats e conservats los comptes e les altres scriptures del offici del mestre
racional de la sua cort” (CONDE Y DELGADO, Reyes y archivos, doc. 179; ACA, C, reg. 251, f.
112r. Tarragona. 06/04/1316).
8 F. SEVILLANO COLOM, “Apuntes para el estudio de la cancillería de Pedro IV el Ceremo-
nioso”, Anuario de Historia del derecho español 20 (1950), pp. 137-241.
9 CONDE Y DELGADO, Reyes y archivos, p. 38. In this sense, it is interesting to compare the
model of the royal archive with that of other similar archives. Conde y Delgado shows how in the
Sicilian model the administration of the archive was linked to the chancery, whereas in the
kingdom of Naples the archive was more closely linked to the financial institutions. This latter
case can also be observed in Sardinia, where the racional acquired a power far superior to the
other royal officers as a result of the complex way in which the kingdom was governed c. 1365-
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The Maestre Racional
The archive of the royal estate stored the documents of the Crown’s chief
economic officers: the maestre racional and the baile general.10 In the words
of T. de Montagut, the maestre racional was the Crown’s main authority in
matters of financial administration.11 All royal officials, including both ordi-
nary officers and commissioners in charge of collecting and managing the royal
rents, had to present their accounts to him. The maestre racional also acted as
the administrator of payments.12
It is in Aragon that the presence of a general auditor of accounts is docu-
mented for the first time in 1283, although this position was consolidated fol-
lowing the ordinances of 1290-1291 upon the restructuring of the royal fi-
nances.13 According to Pedro IV’s Ordinaciones de Casa i Cort of 1344, the
figure of the maestre racional was at the head of 
l’aministració de nostre patrimoni e de qualque altre procuració de profit peccu-
niari et quant a sol·licitar aquells qui serán aytals coses a procurar, a tots será
mayor e ell davant ésser a els declaram.14
Subsequently, new provisions were promulgated about this office. For exam-
ple, in 1358, the maestre racional Berenguer de Codinach (1348-1375) estab-
lished the manner in which royal officials and commissioners were to present
1400; Ibid., p. 77. See also SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione del regno, pp. 51-86, and L. D’ARIEN-
ZO, “Gli scrivani della Cancelleria aragonese all’epoca di Pietro il Cerimonioso (1336-1387)”,
in: Studi di paleografia e diplomática, ed. F. CASULLA et al. (Cagliari, 1974), pp. 137-198.
10 On these royal officers and their institutions, see MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Mestre
Racional, and I. SÁNCHEZ DE MOVELLÁN, La Diputació del General de Catalunya (1413-1419)
(Barcelona, 2004).
11 For his part, the baile general was responsible for managing the royal household’s estate:
L. BLANCO DOMINGO, El baile general de Aragón durante el reinado de Pedro IV el Ceremonioso
(Zaragoza, 2009); T. DE MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “El Baile General de Cataluña (notas para su
estudio)”, Hacienda Pública Española 87 (1984), pp. 73-84.
12 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Mestre Racional, 1, p. 392. Although we do not address it
directly here, the maestre racional acknowledged amounts due to the royal coffers and debts
owed to the monarch and recorded the payment of interest; ibid., 1, pp. 350-383. See also G.
FELIU, “El Maestro Racional de la Corona de Aragón y la revisión de cuentas de la Taula de
Canvi de Pere Des Caus y Andreu d’Olivella”, in: La información económico-financiera como
instrumento de transparencia empresarial en la Unión Europea (Salamanca, 1997), pp. 936-953.
13 The first official put in continuous charge of auditing the accounts was Guillem Colrat
(1286-1288): MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Mestre Racional, 1, pp. 109-110.
14 GIMENO, GOZALBO and TRENCHS, Ordinacions, p. 52.
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their accounts and how these should be audited. In addition, he also determined
that all of the administration’s clerks should inspect the accounting books and
provide support to the racional and his deputy.15
In spite of this regulation, it became increasingly difficult for the maestre
racional to maintain control over royal officials and commissioners. This was
mainly due to the progressive shrinking of the royal estate during the four-
teenth century owing to a decrease in revenues, which resulted in the accounts
being presented to the maestre racional less frequently. Furthermore, during
the fifteenth century the maestre racional lost part of his powers due to the
creation of individual maestres racionales in the various kingdoms belonging
to the Crown. This is documented in the kingdom of Valencia in 1419 and in
Aragon a few years later.16 Finally, it should be noted that Juan II passed a
decree in 1459 reforming the administration of the maestre racional to improve
efficiency in the auditing of accounts and provide greater transparency in how
officials conducted their business. In this decree, special mention was made of
how extraordinary resources should be administered, which for a long time had
become the main source of revenue of the royal treasury.17
Income from the royal estate
The archives of the maestre racional preserve more than 3,800 registers
and 8,600 scrolls written between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries.
These registers are primarily audited accounts books and other records used to
examine and verify the work done by royal officials. In line with the structure
of the royal estate at the time, the account books are divided into many series,
classified according to the officials (treasurers, clerks, and officials of the royal
mint, for example), the types of taxes (tithes, monedajes, lezdas), and the items
audited (such as public works and fleets).18 In our case and for practical pur-
poses, to better understand the work carried out by the maestre racional and
15 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Mestre Racional, 1, pp. 180-192: 2, doc. 17.
16 T. DE MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “Notes per a l’estudi del Mestre racional de la Cort, al
segle XV”, Pedralbes: Revista d’història moderna 13 (1993), pp. 45-54. For Valencia: CRU-
SELLES, El maestre racional. And for Aragón: B. CANELLAS, “Del oficio del Maestre Racional de
la Cort en el Reino de Aragón (1420-1458)”, Aragón en la Edad Media 16 (2000), pp. 145-162.
17 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “Notes per a l’estudi”, pp. 45-54. See also: ACA, RP, reg. 814.
18 This division is apparent when consulting the inventories of the Crown of Aragon
Archive, partly accessible on the Portal de Archivos Españoles (PARES): <http://pares.mcu.es>. 
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the auditing procedures of the time, we propose a division of the accounting
records into two broad categories. On the one hand, there are accounting books
presented more or less regularly by ordinary royal officials who administered
the different sections comprising the royal treasury, and on the other hand,
there were the accounting records from the collection of revenues, both ordi-
nary and extraordinary, by the royal commissioners.
Of all the registers preserved in the maestre racional’s administration, the
ones that stand out are undoubtedly those presented by the royal officers.19 The
treasurer occupied a prominent place among these officers, since he was re-
sponsible for the revenues and expenses of the royal household. In effect, he
received a large part of the revenues and taxes collected by other royal officers,
as well as proceeds from some extraordinary revenues and loans. The treasurer
was also in charge of making numerous ordinary and extraordinary payments,
in addition to paying the allowances ordered by the monarch. It should come as
no surprise, therefore, that the accounts of the treasurer were subjected to strict
control by the maestre racional, who reviewed and audited them every six
months.20 This strict control is also explained by the need of the maestre racio-
nal to collect information, which subsequently served to clarify various issues
affecting the Crown.21 This is the chief reason why the treasury series is one of
the archive’s most complete for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As
shown in Table 1, another important series consists of the accounts of the baile
general of Catalonia, who usually presented them to the maestre racional once
a year, as did the representatives of Rosellón and Sardinia. For his part, the
escribano de ración, a royal scribe who managed the expenses of the court,
also had to present accounts to the maestre racional regularly. Finally, the
officers of the Perpignan mint and commissioners who collected other royal
duties did the same every one or two years, although the records of this admin-
istration are not preserved in such series.
19 For an introduction to this subject, see, among others: MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “Els
funcionaris i l’administració reial”, pp. 144-147.
20 It is also worth recalling that each entry in the treasury books for more than 100 sous had
to be accompanied by a document justifying the income or payment signed by the mastre
racional. 
21 LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Orígenes del archivo”, p. 448. On many occasions royal officers used
the treasury registers to document reports justifying tax demands or other issues: RIERA I SANS,
Archivo de la Corona, pp. 59-60; M. SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “La participación de la Iglesia de
Cataluña en las fianzas regias (siglos XIII-XIV)”, in: El dinero de Dios: Iglesia y fiscalidad en el
Occidente Medieval (siglos XIII-XV), ed. D. MENJOT and M. SÁNCHEZ (Madrid, 2011), pp. 133-
167.
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Table 1. Types of account books presented to the Maestre Racional (an attempt)
Royal officers Commissioners
Royal patrimony Patrimony income Extraordinary taxes
Treasuries Customs of Sardinia Coronajes and maridajes
Royal mint Derecho del sello Parliament
Scribes de ración Gabela de la Sal Fogajes (Hearth taxes)
General Bailiwicks Monedajes Dret del General
Local Bailiwicks Peaje de Calatayud
Veguerías Derecho de cena
Merino Lleuda de Tortosa
Royal Court of Aragón
(procurations)
Quema
Royal Court of Mallorca
(procurations)
Royal Court of Cataluña
(procurations)




* Both the municipal income books and other accounts that appear in this section are
exceptional in nature.
As for the second group of accounts, those generated from collecting reve-
nues, these were presented to the maestre racional by the commissioners when
the collection process for which they had been commissioned (or part of it) had
finished. Among the most numerous are those compiled by the commissioners
in charge of receiving a general or specific subsidy, and also by the agents who
collected ecclesiastical revenues on behalf of the monarch. Although on a more
sporadic basis, the maestre racional could also oversee accounts from the
collection of sisas, mostafias, local courts, etc. Generally, these accounts were
presented to the maestre racional due to some problem that arose during
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Ecclesiastical revenue Municipal revenue Other*
Tithes Sisas Works
Primicies Mostasafias Confiscations
Usury Dret d’ancoratge Coses vedades





ordinary collection. Finally, there is also a set of more heterogeneous account-
ing books corresponding to more exceptional incomes or activities (confisca-
tions of goods, the trading of banned goods or works) that, for one reason or
another, were also overseen by the maestre racional.
Due to their diverse nature, the accounts of commissioners responsible for
collecting various revenues in the different territories deserve separate men-
tion. They were usually royal officers (called porteros) who were entrusted
with different tasks for a certain period of time. Generally, these officers
moved through a region charging arrears on previous commissions that were
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still pending collection. Although it might seem that these commissioners’
accounting records have not been properly preserved, we know from the
albaranes (books kept by the maestre racional for taxation and auditing pur-
poses) that the final accounts were audited together, and thus records of indi-
vidual tasks were not usually kept.22
Accounting Instruments Used by the Maestre Racional during the Four-
teenth Century
Pedro IV’s Ordinations of 1344, taken in turn from the Leges Palatinae
promulgated by Jaime III of Mallorca in 1337, established that in order to con-
duct his auditing duties, the maestre racional had to keep three fundamental
types of book for his administration: albaranes, notaments comuns, and the
maestre racional’s ordinary or secret book.23 Although less important, he also
used different other accounting instruments.24
We still have available the series of books produced by the maestre racio-
nal in the process of auditing accounts, that is, the albaranes testimoniales,
from 1293 to 1702. We also have the series of annotated records (notaments)
22 Generally, the king granted these commissioners the capacity to collect several revenues
during a concrete period and in a more or less specified region. At the end of their assignment,
these commissioners appeared before the maestre racional to audit their set of booklets, noting
the total income: MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre Racional, 1, pp. 328-349. 
23 See the ordinations by Peter IV the Ceremonious concerning the maestre racional in
GIMENO, GOZALBO and TRENCHS, Ordinacions, pp. 147-152, esp. pp. 150-151: “Manam encara
que·l maestre racional haja e tenga tres libres ordinaris, dels quals la I sia appellat libre de
notaments comuns, en lo qual not e escrita totes coses les quals regonexerà haver reebudes lo
tesaurer e els altres officials nostres a fin que en los comptes ab ells faedors veer pusca el
maestre racional aquelles coses les quals donen a ell per reebudes (…).Tenga encara segon libre
qui sia appellat Libre d’albarans dels comptes, en lo qual not e escrisca totes les reebudes e
dades e pagues per aquells qui retran los comptes lurs. E encara escrisca les finances de tots los
comptes; retenga encara ab si aquell libre o escriptura ab lo qual lo compte reten haurà comptat
ab ell, e encara retenga àpoches e albarans ab los quals faran a ell fe de les dades e pagues
aquells qui retran lurs comptes. Haja encara lo terç libre qui sia appellat Libre ordinari, en lo
qual escrisca tota la suma de les reebudes nostres e de les dades de tots los comptes que difinirà,
lo qual libre tenga lo mestre racional o son lochtinent secretament dejús clau (…)”. 
24 See, for example, the instruments used by another royal official, the escribano de ración,
who was in charge of overseeing and paying salaries in the royal household: A. BEAUCHAMP and
J. SÁIZ SERRANO, “En ració de cort: La corte del rey de Aragón desde las fuentes y actividad del
escrivà de ració (siglos XIV-XV)”, Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 45.2 (2015), pp. 51-68.
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Diagram 1: Organisational structure of the maestre racional’s administration in the
fourteenth century
or books in which various types of information required for subsequent account
inspections were recorded. This second series, in turn, is divided into several
subseries, preserved from 1303 to 1586.25 For its part, the ordinary or secret
book likely served to record the balance of the various accounts inspected by
the administration. However, this is a mere assumption based on the use of
other homonymous books at the time. In our case, this source is only men-
tioned in the Ordinacions of Peter IV and, according to T. de Montagut, it may
never have existed.26
25 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre Racional; J. LALINDE ABADÍA, “Contabilidad e
intervención en el reino aragonés”, in: Estudios de Hacienda Pública: Itinerario Histórico de la
Intervención General del Estado (Madrid, 1976), pp. 39-55, at p. 53.
26
 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre Racional, 1, pp. 385-386. The secret books are
extensively documented in the private business of merchants and bankers. They are a valuable
primary source in studies on the great Italian companies: S. TOGNETTI, “Gli uomini d’affari
toscani nella Penisola Iberica, metà XIV secolo – inizio XVI secolo”, eHumanista: Journal of
Iberian Studies 38 (2018), pp. 83-89, at p. 86; E. SOLDANI, Uomini d’affari e mercanti toscani
nella Barcelona del Quattrocento (Barcelona, 2010), pp. 359-363. We also have proof of their
existence in other companies operating in Aragon, such as those of the Tarascó or Torralba
families or the Descaus-Olivella companies: M. E. VARELA RODRÍGUEZ, El control de los bienes:
los libros de cuentas de los mercaderes Tarascó: 1329-1348 (unpublished thesis, University of
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Records of albaranes testimoniales
The albarán testimonial was a document issued by the maestre racional to
certify that the accounts presented before him had been inspected. The proce-
dure was simple: after reviewing an official’s or commissioner’s accounts
books and closing the audit, an exonerative document was issued and recorded
in the register of albaranes. Each albarán issued and copied in the register
would be four to five sheets in length (although there are longer and shorter
ones). The albaranes inform us about the outcome of the work done by the
royal and commissioned officers in the different territories of the Crown. As
M. Sánchez points out, the albaranes are an extremely useful source, espe-
cially in cases where the administration’s accounting books and notebooks
have not been preserved.27 Thus, even if we do not have the original accounts,
thanks to the albaranes we can easily determine the amounts paid, the main
expenses, and, occasionally, the problems that occurred during the auditing. In
addition, in the collection of revenues we can also document who was in
charge of collection, for how long, and the date on which the collection process
began and ended.
As has already been pointed out, a large number of records of albaranes
dating from the end of the thirteenth century onwards are available to us. In
total, we have almost 60 registers from 1300-1707,28 while 17 books of albara-
nes are preserved from the reign of Pedro IV the Ceremonious (1336-1387)
alone, most of them from the second part of his reign.29 This abundance of
documents should not surprise us, since it coincides with the period immedi-
Barcelona, 1996); M. VIU FANDOS, Una gran empresa en el Mediterráneo medieval: la compañía
mercantil de Joan de Torralba y Juan de Manariello (Barcelona-Zaragoza, 1430-1437)
(unpublished thesis, University of Zaragoza, 2019).
27 As M. Sánchez has demonstrated in many works, by consulting the albaranes testimo-
niales we can conduct very relevant studies for royal taxation: M. SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Algunas
obras en el palacio real mayor de Barcelona (1359-1380) a la luz de los albaranes del Maestro
Racional”, Retrotabulum maoir, 1, Miscel·lània homenatge a Maria Rosa Manote i Clivilles 1
(2015), pp. 89-103 (where the author uses the albaranes to explain the works done at the royal
palace in Barcelona during the second half of the fourteenth century) and ID., “Cataluña en la
financiación de la guerra de Castilla: Los fogajes de 1358”, in: L’Histoire à la source: Acter,
compter, enregistrer (Catalogne, Savoie, Italie, XIIe-XVe siècle): Mélanges offerts à Christian
Guilleré, ed. G. CASTELNUOVO and V. SANDRINE (Chambery, 2017), pp. 173-198 (where he
reconstructs the process of collecting the biennial tax of 1358 in the Principality). Obviously, we
could cite innumerable other examples from these works. 
28
ACA, RP, MR, reg. 620-679.
29 ACA, RP, MR, reg. 635-652.
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ately following the promulgation of the royal ordinances of 1344, regulating
the operation of the maestre racional’s administration.30 On the other hand,
only two records of albaranes are preserved from 1397-1408,31 and no such
records are preserved from the following years (up to 1447). One of the reasons
for this decline is probably the decrease in the ordinary and extraordinary reve-
nues of the Crown during the reign of Juan I (1387-1396), with the consequent
decrease in the number of accounts presented to the maestre racional. More-
over, this dynamic continued during subsequent reigns, despite attempts to
recover revenue from the royal estate.32 Another reason that cannot be ignored,
as we have said, is the appearance of a maestre racional in the kingdom of
Valencia, who from 1419 would go on to audit the accounts of officers acting
in this territory.33
Books of Records
The book of records was another instrument used by the office of the maes-
tre racional. These can be defined as records containing various pieces of
information related to the administrators (compte-retent) of royal income and
expenses. These notaments were used by the maestre racional to ascertain the
veracity of the accounts submitted to him, since the compte-retent was not fully
aware of exactly which information the maestre racional had available to
him.34 The books were in the name of the person they referred to, generally the
receiver of one of the payments, and they remained active until a clerk from the
maestre racional office cancelled them, either because the debt had been set-
tled or moved to a later book. Due to its nature and state of preservation, the
information provided by this source about royal finances is fairly accurate with
30 Another fundamental date for understanding this increase in documentation was 1384.
In that year, king Peter IV promulgated the Ordinances of Tamarite de Litera, which made a
special mention of the role played by the royal scribes in charge of guarding and maintaining the
royal archives: CONDE Y DELGADO, Reyes y archivos, p. 46.
31 ACA, RP, MR, reg. 656-657. 
32 Probably for this purpose, public calls were published in Barcelona in 1394 and in
Zaragoza in 1398, by means of which the king addressed all royal officers who had not presented
accounts to the maestre racional and ordered them to do so within a short period of time:
MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre Racional, 2, docs. 154, 156, and 157.
33 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “Notes per a l’estudi”, p. 48; MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El
Maestre Racional, 1, p. 196.
34 Ibid., 1, pp. 184, 241, and 385-387.
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regard to dates, and it almost always complements the data of the account
books and albaranes.35
Most books of records are composed of so-called llibres de notaments
comuns, which are registers that cover variable periods of two, three, or five
years, and have not been preserved for the whole period continuously. As al-
ready intimated, they are one of the main instruments used in the work done by
the maestre racional, his deputy, and the royal scribes, since these records
allowed the comparison of information during the auditing process.
Preserved among these other books are records referring exclusively to the
treasurers’ accounts. In this case, we only have four registers from the medi-
eval period. The purpose of the notaments a tresorer was to facilitate the pro-
cess of auditing the said official’s accounts (they were submitted every six
months) – hence the need to keep specific records.36 Finally, a third type of
record used by the maestre racional’s administration were the books of records
kept by the protonotario in the royal scribe’s office.37 A peculiar feature of
these notaments is that they contain economic information from the registers of
the royal chancery, which the maestre racional wanted to have evidence of.
We refer here to tax exemptions, letters requesting subsidies, pecuniary docu-
ments, purchases and sales of the royal estate, etc. During the fourteenth cen-
tury, most of these records came from the registers of the Curie and Pecunnie
series, although, according to T. de Montagut, during other periods the maestre
35 Ibid., 1, pp. 385-387. With regard to the municipal sphere, where the registers of records
have been studied in greater depth and provide more relevant information for municipal
accounting and management, see P. VERDÉS PIJUAN, “Le contôle de la gestión financière des
villes catalanes au Bas Moyen Âge: La comptabilité du racional”, in: Le pouvoir de compter et
décompter: Formes et logiques des comptabilités d’État entre XIIe et XVIe siècle, ed. A. JAMME
(forthcoming); P. VERDÉS PIJUAN, “Les sources fiscales et financières des municipalités catalanes
aux XIVe et XVe siècles: Le cas de Cervera”, in: La Fiscalitè des villes au Moyen Âge (Occident
méditerranéen), 1, Étude des sources, ed. D. MENJOT and M. SÁNCHEZ (Toulouse, 1996), pp.
168-170; P. ORTI GOST, “Les premières sources fiscales de la municipalité de Barcelone (1300-
1350)”, in: La fiscalitè des villes au Moyen Âge (Occident méditerranéen), 1, pp. 91-95.
36 MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre Racional, 1, p. 388. For the medieval period we have
isolated records between 1339-1386 and 1514; ACA, MR, RP, reg. 807-812. 
37 This position does not appear in the ordinations of the royal house, but would correspond
to ‘the head of the royal scribes’, one of his functions being to affix the royal seal on documents.
T. de Montagut notes that these particular records were a consequence of diverse royal accounts
existing within the royal treasury, and that the one used by the protonotario was for collecting
stamp duty and paying the salaries of the royal scribes, among others; MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS,
El Maestre Racional, 1, pp. 334, 388.
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racional also collected information from the Solutiorum, Oficialium, Gratia-
rum, and Demandarum registers.38
Although not strictly notaments, the registers of the maestre racional’s
notification letters, certifications, and orders, served a similar function. These
records provide us with information regarding the officers and commissioners
who were required to appear before the maestre racional in order to present
their accounts in the event of a delay or unexpected situation.39
Controlling the Accounts of Ecclesiastical Revenues: The Pontifical
Tithes
Having described the instruments that the maestre racional used to inspect
and audit the accounts, it will be useful to illustrate what his work consisted of
through the examination of a specific tax, the so-called pontifical tithe. This
example allows us to reconstruct the entire administrative process, from the
compiling of the book of accounts by the ecclesiastical collector to the auditing
of accounts and issuance of the albarán testimonial by the maestre racional,
via references in the treasury books and the different records used to compare
accounts.40
The pontifical tithe was an extraordinary tax demanded by the pope. It was
introduced at the end of the twelfth century with the purpose of financing the
crusades to the Holy Land, but soon it was also diverted to the coffers of the
secular princes under the pretext of defending Christianity or protecting the
territories held in fief from the Holy See.41 During the second half of the four-
teenth century, the tax was established in the Crown of Aragon to quell the
endemic revolts in Sardinia and return peace to the island, which, it should be
recalled, was nominally a fief of the Holy See. As a fruit of this circumstance
38 ACA, RP, MR, reg. 932, f. 1r; MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre Racional, 1, p. 390.
39 Unfortunately, these registers, like the books of records, have not been studied in depth
and are not the subject of our analysis.
40 The bulk of the documentation cited here is taken from E. TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, Pro
defensione regni: Iglesia, monarquía y fiscalidad durante el reinado de Pedro IV (1349-1387)
(Madrid and Rome, 2020).
41 For a general definition, see, among others, C. SAMARAN and G. MOLLAT, La Fiscalité
Pontificale en France au XIVe siècle (Avignon et Grand Schisme d’Occident) (Paris, 1905; reprint
1968), pp. 12-22; W.E. LUNT, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages (New York, 1943; reprint
1965), pp. 71-76; J. FAVIER, Les finances pontificales à l’époque du gran schisme d’Occident
(1378-1409) (Paris, 1966), pp. 208-217.
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it became a habitual levy during the second half of the reign of Peter the Cere-
monious, the monarch becoming the full or partial beneficiary of the tax.42
Thus, the sources of the royal estate offer us privileged information regarding
how the tithe was administered and, in turn, allow us to explore the administra-
tive structure created around this levy, as well as the final destination of the
money thus raised.
The Ecclesiastical Sub-Collectors and the Accounts
The pontifical tithe being a levy that was transferred totally or partially to
the monarch, the books of accounts relating to collection of the tithe had to be
presented to the maestre racional by the sub-collectors in each bishopric.
These sub-collectors were clergymen belonging to the corresponding bishopric
and were appointed by a superior to carry out the collection during the years in
which the tithe was in force.
The audited registers are the result of this work, recording the income and
expenses from the collections made in the different bishoprics. The data we
can extract from these account books are very heterogeneous. Thus, the income
records provide us with information regarding the collection of the tithe and
the amount each benefice should pay (the tax paid to sustain the clergy). As for
the expenses section, it allows us to determine how the collection was con-
ducted and the destinations of the amounts collected.
With regard to how expenses were managed, the account books provide us
with precious information regarding both ordinary and extraordinary expenses
42 To observe how the tithe became a tax habitually allocated to the monarchs of the Crown
of Aragon during the second half of the fourteenth and up to the first quarter of the fifteenth
centuries, see J. MORELLÓ BAGET, “En torno a la disyuntiva décima / subsidio en Castilla y la
Corona de Aragón durante la Baja Edad Media”, Hispania 77, 257 (2017), pp. 643-671; J.
MORELLÓ BAGET, “La contribución de la Iglesia a las arcas del rey: A propósito de la recaudación
de las décimas en la Corona de Aragón a finales del siglo XIV y principios del XV”, in: El dinero
de Dios, pp. 167-190; M. SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Fiscalidad pontificia y finanzas reales en Cata-
luña a mediados del s. XIV: Las décimas de 1349, 1351 y 1354”, Estudis Castellonencs 6 (1994-
1995), pp. 1279-1296; P. BERTRÁN, “El poder de l’Església medieval: Organització administrativa
i sistema fiscal en el segle XIV”, L’Avenç 139 (1990), pp. 66-69. For more on how the tithe was
managed and allocated, see J. MORELLÓ BAGET and E. TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, “Los cambistas Dusai-
Gualbes como gestores de la décima de 1371: Estudio del modus operandi y de la red clientelar
en la corona de Aragón”, in: El sistema financer al final de l’Edat Mitjana: Instruments i
Mètodes, ed. P. ORTI and P. VERDÉS (Valencia, 2020), pp. 189-224, and TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, Pro
Defensione regni.
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arising from the collection of the tax, such as salaries, material expenses, mes-
sengers, and so on. However, the most important information we find in the
expenses section pertains to capital transferred to third parties, mostly finan-
ciers and members of the court who had lent money to the monarch. The pro-
gressive indebtedness of the monarchy and need for liquidity meant that during
the fourteenth century it increasingly turned to bankers and other private
agents, who were assigned royal revenues to settle the debts incurred. The
amount of these allocations increased from the 1360s onwards, when a perma-
nent royal taxation was established throughout the Crown as a result of the
Castilian War. The great financiers of the time actively participated in these
operations, either as lenders or as receivers of revenue, and the tithe became a
common resource in this respect.43
This is the case with the tithe of 1375, which was collected in all the terri-
tories of the Aragonese Crown between 1375 and 1377. According to the book
of accounts, its collection in the bishopric of Barcelona amounted to 102,900
s. 4 d.b., two thirds of which went to the monarchy, that is, approximately
68,613 s.b. The theoretical destination of this money, as we have suggested,
would have been Sardinia. However, all evidence points to the fact that more
than 90% of the tax collected was used to settle debts the monarchy had con-
tracted with important financiers to finance various campaigns. Specifically, as
this account book reveals, most of the tithe was transferred to the bankers Pere
Descaus and Andreu Olivella and their agents. This is also stated in the other
accounting books from the other bishoprics of the Crown.44 This observation
43 For a general context: FURIÓ, SÁNCHEZ and SESMA, “Old and new forms”. On the role of
financiers as the main lenders of the court, see for the case of Catalonia: G. FELIU, “Finances,
moneda i fiscalitat als segles XIV i XV”, Catalan Historical Review 9 (2016), pp. 129-146; A.
REIXACH and E. TELLO, “Catalan bankers in the 14th century: A first census”, SVMMA: Revista de
cultures medievals 7 (2016), pp. 40-71. For Aragón: S. DE LA TORRE, “Elites financieras y
mercantiles de Zaragoza en el primer tercio del siglo XIV (1380-1430)”, in: Una economía
integrada: Comercio, instituciones y mercados en Aragón: 1300-1500, ed. C. LALIENA and M.
LAFUENTE (Zaragoza, 2012), pp. 409-435, and Una economía integrada, ed. LALIENA and
LAFUENTE. For Valencia, see V. BAYDAL, “Canvistes valencians en l’incipient negoci fiscal del
segle XIV”, in: El sistema financer, pp. 397-424; D. IGUAL LUIS, “Los grupos mercantiles y la
expansión política de la Corona de Aragón: Nuevas perspectivas”, in: Il govero dell’economia:
Italia e Penisola Iberica nel basso Medioevo, ed. L. TANZINI and S. TOGNETTI (Rome, 2014), pp.
9-33. 
44 For the bishopric of Barcelona, the account books are to be found in ACA, RP, MR, reg. 1827
and 1828. See also E. TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, “La contribución eclesiástica a las demandas reales en la
Corona de Aragón: La décima de 1375”, in: Hacer Historia desde el Medievalismo: Tendencias –
Reflexiones – Debates, ed. E. AZNAR and V. MUÑOZ (La Laguna, 2016), pp. 167-191.
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is reinforced by the treasury records of the period, in which some income from
the tithe is consigned directly to the bankers.45
Albaranes Testimoniales and Books of Records
In addition to the account books, which provide us with direct information
on the collection and destination of the tax, the tithe is also found in the re-
cords of albaranes testimoniales. It has already been suggested that thanks to
the albaranes we can easily determine the amounts paid, the main expenses,
and even some problems that occurred during collection. For all these reasons,
their use is essential if we are to obtain a more complete picture of the different
contributions made to meet royal demands in general, and the tithes in particu-
lar. This is the case, for example, with the albaranes testimoniales in the ac-
counts of the tithe of 1375 in the bishopric of Barcelona. We know that the
account book was presented to the maestre racional following its collection,
and that he audited it in September 1379, when the corresponding albarán
testimonial was recorded. The albarán in question contains a summary of the
accounts from its collection in the bishopric of Barcelona, conducted by the
sub-collector Arnau Carbassi. It also indicates the promulgation date of the
papal bull, the conditions in which it was granted, the names of the collectors,
the date on which the sub-collectors were appointed, the total income from the
tithe, problems with collection, and the main destinations of the tax. In this
specific case, it clearly refers to the tithe being assigned to the bankers Pere
Descaus and Andreu d’Olivella, stating that a large part of the revenue 
responguès entegrament a·n P. Descaus, cambiador de Barcelona, reebedor gen-
eral per lo dit senyor assignat de totes les monedes provenidores de les dècimes
damunditas, a aquell o aquelles a qui lo dit cambiador volria.46 
Finally, the more marginal information provided by the books of records
serves to expand on the information that can be obtained from the account
45 For this more specific question, see E. TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, “La contribución de la Iglesia
durante la época de Pedro el Ceremonioso a la luz de los registros de tesorería real (1350-1387)”,
in: Renda feudal i fiscalitat a la Catalunya baixmedieval: Estudis dedicats a M. Sánchez, ed. J.
MORELLÓ, P.ORTI, and P. VERDÉS (Barcelona, 2018), pp. 143-176.
46
ACA, RP, MR, reg. 649, ff. 207v-209v (Barcelona, 05/09/1379). The quotation is taken
from f. 208v.
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books and the albaranes, while also illustrating the control mechanisms used
by the maestre racional. Thus, one of the main beneficiaries of the tithe of
1349 in the Catalan bishoprics was Jaume Cavaller. This financier had lent
large sums to the monarch, which is why he was assigned payments from this
tax. We know that at one point Cavaller received 5,000 s.b. from the collection
of the tithe in the bishopric of Vic. The notaments comuns indicate that this
sum was deposited in his “taula de canvi” (“private bank”) by the royal procu-
rator Pere Desprats with the authorisation of the bishopric’s sub-collector.47
The notaments also state that the procurator deposited these 5,000 s.b. in
Cavaller’s taula by order of the king and the treasurer, and that this allocation
corresponded to a debt contracted by the monarch.48
Occasionally, the books of records also reflect instances when the maestre
racional and his officers closely monitored a payment order due to some ad-
ministrative problem or procedural error. Thus, Joan Desvall, royal scribe of
the maestre racional, also received 430 s.b. of the biennial tithe of 1349 from
the bishopric of Vic, “daçó qui li era degut per la cort del senyor rey”, that is,
by virtue of his salary as an official (“quitació i vestit”).49 From the entries in
the books of records we know that this was a large sum amounting to 3,000
s.b., and that Desvall was encountering problems receiving the amount, owing
to the fact that he had not presented the receipts or proof (“cautelas”) cor-
rectly.50
One final example is provided by the tithe of 1389 in the bishopric of Léri-
da. During this collection, Joan de Muntrós was paid over 5,200 s.j.51 (In May
1385 Muntrós had been appointed one of the general recipients of the tithe,
together with other lenders at the time.) Thanks to the books of records, we
know that another prominent Barcelona merchant, Bernat Oliver, also benefit-
ted from the collection. Like Muntrós, Oliver had a taula de canvi and acted as
an intermediary in the financial operations of the monarchy.52
47 ACA, PR, reg. 1782, f. 105r.
48 ACA, PR, MR, reg. 780, f. 260r.
49 ACA, RP, MR, reg. 1782, f. 108v
50 ACA, RP, MR, reg. 780, ff. 188r and 260v.
51
ACA, RP, reg. 1846, 2.
52
ACA, PR, MR, reg. 790, ff. 28r-v
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Conclusions
Having reviewed the work done by the maestre racional and the instru-
ments used for inspecting and auditing the accounts, several aspects are worth
highlighting. First, the clear usefulness of reconstructing the trail of documents
and the procedures followed by this official; in this respect, the work of T. de
Montagut remains the essential reference. However, this approach must be
complemented by the study of the functioning of the royal house and the man-
agement of royal revenues, which recent scholarship has highlighted. This is
crucial for the reconstruction of the complex structure of the royal estate ar-
chive and our understanding of the control mechanisms that were implemented
to optimise the resources of the royal treasury during the fourteenth century.53
In this sense, we must also highlight the enormous possibilities the sources
presented here offer for the study of taxation. Although we have only focussed
on management and collection of the pontifical tithe, the same approach can be
applied to any other revenue and ordinary or extraordinary levy. And, as vari-
ous authors have already demonstrated, the documentation issued by the maes-
tre racional is essential if we are to understand one of the main instruments of
power of the Aragonese monarchy at the end of the Middle Ages. The same
can be said of the financial framework created around the royal estate.54 As
already intimated, such research is possible thanks both to the increase in the
number of accounting records from the end of the thirteenth century and to the
royal administration’s policy of preserving this documentation. All this was
ultimately aimed at providing the maestre racional with the necessary tools to
perform his duty.55 It is therefore necessary to continue studying the place
occupied by the maestre racional within the royal administration, at the head
of the royal estate archive. As we have seen, the ordinances that regulated the
structure of the royal administration remain fundamental for the study of the
53 As we have said, this process is also common to other territories of Western Europe: see,
e.g. J. FAVIER, Finance et fiscalité au Bas Moyen Age (Paris, 1971), p. 288. 
54 For example, one of the most interesting topics relates to the activities of financiers.
Studying the collection books, and especially the treasury records and the archives of the royal
chancery, allows us to see how the big bankers of the time received – in addition to the tithes –
other royal revenues, which suggests multiple financial networks. 
55 Many authors also relate this phenomenon of inspecting and reviewing accounts to the
progressive process of compiling the state’s ‘memory’: e.g. Ph. CONTAMINE, “La mémoire de
l’État: Les archives de la Chambre des comptes du roi de France à Paris, au XVe siècle”, in: Les
pouvoirs en France, 1300-1500, ed. Ph. CONTAMINE (Paris, 1992), pp. 237-250; O. MATTÉONI,
Institutions et pouvoirs en France: XIVe-XVe siècles (Paris, 2010).
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topic, but the information provided by this general normative framework must
be complemented through the study of other, less known, royal provisions.56
Finally, future research will doubtless find it useful to study the maestre
racional and his subordinates from a prosopographical point of view, paying
special attention to the continued relationship that many of them maintained
with the Crown. The professional career and cursus honorum of those who
worked in the administration of the maestre racional is a fundamental aspect
that must be taken into account when studying the work they performed. These
were highly specialised personnel, well versed in the complicated economic
and financial intricacies of the royal accounts.
56 From 1338 to 1408 there were more than 25 provisions and ordinations regulating
different aspects of the maestre racional and his office; MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, El Maestre
Racional, p. 179.






n 1414, king Ferdinand I of Aragon (1412-1416) of the new Castilian dy-
nasty of the Trastámaras informed his ambassadors (ambaxiatores, later
called viceroys) in Sicily – who ruled the island on his behalf – as well as
his Sicilian officers and subjects, of the appointment of Juan Sanches de
Salvarierra in the new role of conservator maior regis patrimonii (henceforth:
conservator), with the main task of preserving and defending the royal patri-
mony of the island.1 The decision to appoint Salvatierra was not accidental, for
1 On the office of conservator of the kingdom of Sicily, see A. BAVIERA ALBANESE,
“L’istituzione dell’ufficio di conservatore del real patrimonio e gli organi finanziari del regno di
Sicilia nel sec. XV”, in: ID., Scritti Minori (Soveria Mannelli, 1958; reprint), pp. 1-107; P.
CORRAO, Governare un regno: Potere, società e istituzioni in Sicilia fra trecento e quattrocento
(Naples, 1991), pp. 364-380; A. SILVESTRI, “Ruling from afar: Government and information
management in late medieval Sicily”, Journal of Medieval History 42.3 (2016), pp. 357-381; ID.,
L’amministrazione del regno di Sicilia: Cancelleria, apparati finanziari e strumenti di governo
nel tardo medioevo (Rome, 2018), pp. 171-196 and 349-392. Among the many letters attesting
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he had already operated in the kingdom of Castile as a contador mayor de
hacienda, the officer on which the new Sicilian conservator was modelled, to
the extent that the king himself ordered Salvatierra to organise the finances of
the kingdom of Sicily “a la manera de Castella”.2 Salvatierra’s widely ac-
knowledged technical and practical skills in managing finances and accounts
were not, however, the only reasons that led to his appointment as conservator.
Ferdinand I of Aragon held in high regard the accountability Juan Sanches de
Salvarierra had shown in his previous services. The devastating conditions that
had affected the royal patrimony of Sicily as a result of an interregnum and a
two-year civil war (1410-1412) demanded the appointment of a trustworthy
man fully capable of managing finances and reviewing accounts – in essence,
an officer unrelated to the local political society and willing to do anything to
reorganise and defend the royal patrimony of a distant, disobedient dominion
such as Sicily, and therefore ideal for enforcing the monarchs’ orders and deci-
sions for the government of the island.3
In this regard, the letter Juan Sanches de Salvatierra sent to king Ferdinand
in relation to his appointment as a conservator of Sicily is exemplary, as it
vividly attests the personal relationship of trust between the king and his
Castilian officer. Despite Salvatierra’s intention of going back to Castile after
the siege of the city of Balaguer against the rebel Jaime de Urgel – the latter
had opposed the election of Ferdinand as king of Aragon – he wrote to the
monarch that:
to that [request], my lord, I could not say no, letting you know that […] although
I am wealthy enough to support myself, for your service I would have gone not
only to Sicily, but to the end of the world and, to serve you, I would have left be-
hind my wife and offspring and everything I have […] And my lord, I came here
with my wife, leaving all that was mine: homeland, offspring, relatives, and goods,
spending great amounts of money and travelling by land and sea […] leaving the
the appointment of Salvatierra, see those transcribed in Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó (henceforth:
ACA), Real Cancillería (henceforth: RC), Registros (henceforth: Reg.), n. 2428, ff. 27v-31v, which
are all dated 6 May 1414. 
2 CORRAO, Governare, p. 365: “in the manner of Castile” (all the translations into English
are mine, unless otherwise stated).
3 On officers’ accountability, with particular reference to financial administration, see J.
SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability in Medieval England (1170-1300) (Oxford, 2014) as
well as – for the early modern world – J. SOLL, The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the
Making and Breaking of Nations (London, 2014).
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dowry I received with my wife so that her relatives allow me to bring her here [in
Sicily].
a lo qual, senyor, yo nole pude disir de no, fasiendole entender [...] que yo avia
bien de que me mantener, pero que non tansolament aquí en Siçilia, mas en cabo
del mundo yria por su serviçio e dexaria muger e fyos e quanto avia por lo server
[...] E senyor, yo por su serviçio pase aça con la dicha ma muger, dexada toda
naturalesa de terra e fyos e parientes e bienes e con grandes despenses e trabajos
asi por terra como por mar [...] dexado el dote que me avia a dar con la dicha
muger por que consentisen sus parientes dexarmela traer aça.4 
In substance, the letter shows that Juan Sanches de Salvatierra had sacrificed
everything he possessed, including his homeland and family, in order to serve
his sovereign. On the other hand, in the eyes of king Ferdinand, the financial
accountability and expertise of Salvatierra – who was broadly known for “sa
leyaltat en aquestes coses”5 – were the decisive qualities an officer needed to
deal with a thorny affair such as the surveillance over the Sicilian royal patri-
mony. Whereas in the other territories of the Crown the Aragonese monarchs
only exercised a limited direct jurisdiction – in the fourteenth century, for
instance, they directly controlled roughly 13% of Catalonia and 22% of its
population6 – in Sicily their royal demesne included approximately 60% of the
population and the main cities of the island.7 In substance, the Sicilian royal
demesne was the larger and most profitable demesne among the Aragonese
territories, to the extent that it would later prove crucial for sustaining the for-
eign policy of Alfonso V of Aragon (1416-1458), known as the Magnanimous.
As I will discuss in this essay, Juan Sanches de Salvatierra was not merely
appointed to the new position of conservator, but was tasked with the responsi-
bility of establishing a brand new magistracy in Sicily. This magistracy needed
to be adjusted to the century-old institutional apparatus of the kingdom, operat-
ing in collaboration with the local financial office known as magna curia ratio-
num (the ‘great court of accounts’, also known as curia magistrorum rationa-
lum: the ‘court of the accounting masters’), and dealing with the demanding
4 CORRAO, Governare, p. 362.
5 SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, p. 178: “his loyalty in those things”.
6 F. SABATÉ I CURULL, “Discurs i estratègies del poder reial a Catalunya al segle XIV”,
Anuario de estudios medievales 25.2 (1995), pp. 617-646, at p. 633. In this regard, see also the
reflections by S.R. EPSTEIN, An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in
Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 383-387.
7 On the composition of the Sicilian royal demesne, see EPSTEIN, An Island, Chapter 2.
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local elites of the realm. On the other hand, the establishment of the conserva-
tor also resulted in the development of new technologies of information man-
agement, which allowed the office’s staff to supervise attentively the financial
administration of the island and its accounts, as well as to produce a budget of
the anticipated revenues and expenses. Thanks to the interaction of record-
keeping and bookkeeping methods, the many series of books of the conservator
became the practical tool through which this officer, to defend the royal patri-
mony, exercised in practice his control over the growing amount of accounts
and records produced by the various ‘monetary officers’ (officiales pecuniarii)
of the island. By comparing the bookkeeping and auditing procedures used by
the conservator and the magistri rationales, I will show that these two magis-
tracies operated at different but intertwined levels of governance, respectively
the financial planning and the accounts’ auditing of the kingdom of Sicily.
A Precarious Political Balance
In 1410, Martin I of Aragon (1396-1410) died without leaving legitimate
heirs or giving any clear indication about his will. After a two-year interreg-
num, in 1412 the delegates of the Iberian dominions of the Crown (the king-
doms of Aragon and Valencia, and the county of Barcelona) met in Caspe and,
having considered various possible candidates, elected Ferdinand de Antequera
as the new king of Aragon. Grandson of Peter IV of Aragon (1336-1387),
Ferdinand was a prominent member of the Castilian family of the Trastámaras
and uncle of king John II of Castile (1406-1454), of whom he had been regent
for some years.8 Once the new monarch defeated his opponents and finally
took hold of power, he immediately moved his attention to the kingdom of
Sicily, which in 1409 his predecessor Martin I of Aragon had inherited from
his namesake son and heir Martin I of Sicily (1392-1409), who had suddenly
died during a campaign in Sardinia. Although the latter’s wife, queen Blanche
of Navarre, had legally acted as vicar of Sicily since 1408, a civil war between
la reyna – as Blanche used to subscribe documents – and a faction headed by
the magister iustitiarius Bernat Cabrera, the higher officer of the island, soon
broke out; it lasted for about two years (1410-1412).9 The final success of the
8 On the so-called compromise of Caspe, see T. BISSON, The Medieval Crown of Aragon:
A Short History (Oxford, 1986), pp. 134-136.
9 On the interregnum in Sicily, see CORRAO, Governare, pp. 133-156. 
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queen came at a heavy price. To obtain the support of the aristocracy, Blanche
had granted local barons large parts of the royal demesne and had renounced
important royal prerogatives – such as the administration of justice in the major
fiefdoms – and significant revenues pertaining to the Sicilian Crown, thus
worsening the already precarious conditions of the royal patrimony.10 At the
same time, the central government of the realm had collapsed, to the extent that
its officers aligned with one or another of the two factions.11 To govern the
island, Blanche had increasingly relied on the small but trustworthy network of
officers that already administered the queen’s chamber (camera reginalis), a
large territory in the south-eastern part of the island under the direct control of
the queen, with Syracuse as its main city.12
The precarious political balance and administrative chaos in which the
island was immersed during the civil war seriously affected Sicilian finances,
as significantly demonstrated by the case of the wealthy secretia of Palermo,
to which both contenders sent orders to secure funding, as one can see by read-
ing the secretia’s records concerning the years 1410-1412.13 Whereas in June
1410, after stating that Blanche had lost her position, Bernat Cabrera ordered
Nicolaus de Subtilis, secretus of Palermo (i.e. the head of the secretia) and all
the other officers in charge of collecting revenues to assign their profits to
Nardus de Calava, a clerk of the great court of accounts, in order to support his
army,14 in October 1411, la reyna instructed Iohannes de Calatagirone, who
had replaced the previous secretus, to transfer
tucti li introyti, renditi et proventi di quissa secretia […] a nissuna pirsuna oy
officiali, si non a Manueli di Cassi, locutenenti di la nostra thesauraria, familiari
et fideli nostru, comu officiali ordinatu supra zò.15 
10 BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, p. 5, and CORRAO, Governare, pp. 150-152.
11 SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, p. 99, n. 20.
12 On Syracuse and the queen’s chamber, see C. Orlando, Una città per le regine: Istituzioni
e società a Siracusa tra il XIII e il XV secolo (Caltanissetta and Rome, 2012).
13 The secretia dealt with the management of customs and duties in each town pertaining
to royal demesne. Whereas the main urban centres of the island (Catania, Messina, and Palermo)
had their autonomous secretie, the minor towns had instead their so-called vicesecretie, which
depended from a central officer known as magister secretus. 
14 Archivio di Stato di Palermo (henceforth: ASPa), Secrezia di Palermo (hencefort: SP), reg.
38, f. 48r-v, 24 Jun. 1410.
15 ASPa, SP, reg. 38, f. 63v, 20 Oct. 1411: “all the incomes, profits and revenues of that
secretia […] to no person or officer, but only to our familiar and faithful Manueli di Cassi,
lieutenant of our treasury, as the only officer in charge of that [task]”.
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As soon as the ambaxiatores of king Ferdinand I of Aragon arrived in
Sicily, they promoted the full restoration of the governmental apparatus of the
realm. At the same time, they encouraged a broad but complex plan aimed at
the revision of the various accounts produced by the central and territorial
administrations of the island in the previous years. As attested by a number of
records preserved today in the State Archives of Palermo, several monetary
officers were ordered to send their quaterni (i.e. the books in which they tran-
scribed their accounts), alongside all the other relevant supporting documents
to the magistri rationales, so that the latter could compare the quaterni “cum
eadem racione in archivo dicte magne curie racionum” and thus proceed with
their formal auditing. For example, in the Summer of 1413, all the officers
entrusted with the administration of the ports of the island were ordered to
bring their accounts to Catania as soon as possible, so that the magister
portulanus Gabriel Fanlo – who was responsible for all the ports of the realm
– could close the accounts of the third indictional year (1409-1410) and submit
them to the magistri rationales.16
Established in the course of the thirteenth century, the Sicilian magna
curia rationum had become a permanent institution since the later Swabian
age, being further developed under Angevin rule and during the fourteenth
century, when it acquired a broad range of tasks. These included a prominent
role in conducting the financial policy of the realm; the administration of jus-
tice whenever it concerned contestations between the royal patrimony and
private individuals; the sole authority in producing – through its own chancery
and specialised personnel – documents and letters concerning revenues and
expenses (such as payment mandates), which they transcribed in their own
series of registers (registra); and the responsibility in auditing the accounts
submitted by all those officers entrusted with the collection and expenditure of
royal revenues.17 Unlike in the Crown of Aragon, where for a long time the
16 SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, pp. 172-174: “with the accounts [preserved] in the
archives of the mentioned magne curie rationum”.
17 On the magna curia rationum, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, pp. 75-96; R. LI
DESTRI, Attività e documentazione della Magna Curia Rationum del Regno di Sicilia, nell’epoca
di Alfonso il Magnanimo: Forme, procedimenti e protagonisti (unpublished doctoral thesis,
Università degli Studi di Palermo, 2012); P. CORRAO, “I Maestri Razionali e le origini della
magistratura contabile (secc. XIII-XV)”, in: Storia e attualità della Corte dei conti: Atti del
convegno di studi, Palermo, 29 novembre 2012 (Palermo, 2013), pp. 31-46; A. SILVESTRI, “Too
much to account for: The Crown of Aragon and the collapse in the auditing system in late-
medieval Sicily”, Accounting History Review 30.2 (2020), online at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/
21552851.2020.1711528>. On the registri and the record-keeping system of the Sicilian
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royal treasury was by far the main magistracy in charge of spending money –
only a few agents, among them the protonotari and the escrivà de ració, could
dispose of their revenues independently18 – in Sicily all the officers collecting
royal revenues possessed the authority of spending their revenues on behalf of
the monarchs, according to the payment mandates prepared by the magistri
rationales.19 In addition to the revenues from royal collections, alienation of
demesne properties and rights, and other minor revenues, the Sicilian treasurer
thus only received the residual profits collected by the magister portulanus
(who administered the ports of the realm), the magister secretus (who managed
the vicesecretie), and the secreti of Catania, Messina, and Palermo, which
enjoyed autonomous status.20
As a result of this highly fragmented system for the collection and expendi-
ture of royal revenues, the verification of the accounts – which were usually
due immediately after the conclusion of the administrative year, which ran
from 1 September to 31 August – was a complicated affair for the magistri
rationales. They not only had to audit the accounts submitted by the central
magistracies, but also needed to conduct a number of checks on the revenues
and expenditures at the local level by a network of officers who often adminis-
tered superficially or even illegally the royal demesne and its resources.
The Establishment of the conservator maior regii patrimonii
Despite the existence of the magna curia rationum, an office specifically
entrusted with the auditing of accounts, in 1414 king Ferdinand I of Aragon
administration, see A. SILVESTRI, “‘That register is the most ancient and useful of the kingdom’:
Recording, organizing, and retrieving information in the fifteenth-century Sicilian chancery”,
Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 49.2 (2018), pp. 307-332.
18 T. MONTAGUT I ESTRAGUÉS, El mestre racional a la Corona d’Aragó (1283-1419), 2
vols. (Barcelona, 1987), 1, pp. 328-337.
19 On the financial administration of the Crown of Aragon, see W. KÜCHLER, Les finances
de la corona d’Aragó al segle XV: regnats d’Alfons V i Joan II (Valencia, 1983; reprint 1997), and
G. NAVARRO ESPINACH and D. IGUAL LUIS, La Tesorerìa general y los banqueros de Alfonso V
el Magnánimo (Castellón de la Plana, 2002), as well as bibliography cited therein. As broadly
discussed by those authors, from the 1420s onwards, the Aragonese monarchs also increasingly
relied on a territorially-based system of payments, thus restricting the transfer of incomes to the
central treasury.
20 On the financial administration of Sicily, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”;
CORRAO, Governare, pp. 341-380; and, with a focus on the fifteenth century, SILVESTRI,
L’amministrazione, pp. 171-300.
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opted for the establishment of the office of conservator, which was inspired by
the contaduria mayor de hacienda, the principal financial magistracy of the
kingdom of Castile.21 Sicilian scholarship misjudged that innovation, as they
considered the introduction of the conservatoria (i.e. the office of the conser-
vator) as just a needless and expensive intervention that led to the multiplica-
tion of the officers operating in the same administrative sphere.22 It is true that
during the first years of their cohabitation the conservator and the magistri
rationales had a number of conflicts of jurisdiction, originating both from the
intrusion of a foreign office in the century-old Sicilian institutional fabric and
from the faulty initial definition of the conservator’s tasks and administrative
boundaries. But it is also true that the creation of the conservatoria must be
regarded as the most evident aspect of the broader reformation of the Sicilian
governmental apparatus.23 That reorganisation – for which the Sicilian secre-
tary Tudela left us a lucid initial plan24 – was marked by sudden accelerations,
various administrative experiments, and unexpected U-turns, to the extent that,
two years after the creation of the conservator, the monarch himself asked his
second-born John, viceroy of Sicily, to verify “si lo dict offici de conservador
es necessari”.25 Viewed from this angle, the problematic administrative rela-
tionship between the conservator and the Sicilian magistri rationales appears
more as the consequence of a natural process of bureaucratic development
rather than as the result of the actual overlap of their activities. On the other
hand, as I will discuss below, in a few years both those offices carved out their
own specific spheres of intervention, thus becoming fully complementary, with
the conservator evolving in all respects into a Sicilian officer to the extent that
the office lasted and operated for the next four hundred years, being abolished
only in 1819.26
21 On the contaduria, see: M.Á. LADERO QUESADA, La Hacienda real de Castilla en el siglo
XV (La Laguna, 1973).
22 See, e.g. BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, pp. 3-31, and CORRAO, Governare, pp.
341-380. The latter, however, only focusses on the initial activity of the conservator.
23 On the Sicilian treasury in the fifteenth century, see SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, pp.
169-300.
24 On Juan Tudela and its proposal for the reformation of Sicilian administration, see P.
CORRAO, “‘De la Vostra Gran Senyoria Humil e Affectuos Servidor’: Corrispondenza di due
funzionari iberici in Sicilia con la corte d’Aragona (1415-1417)”, in: Cultura e istituzioni nella
Sicilia medievale e moderna, ed. A. ROMANO (Soveria Mannelli, 1992), pp. 111-163.
25 ASPa, Conservatoria di registro (henceforth: CR), vol. 846, unpaginated, [1416]: “if the
mentioned office of conservator is necessary”.
26 SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, p. 350.
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Through the reformation of the Sicilian administration and its financial
institutions in particular, the Aragonese aimed to balance the governmental
apparatus of Sicily and of the Crown of Aragon as the island, despite having
lost its independence and now being part of a dynastic union, had fully main-
tained its own territorial administration and central institutions. It thus benefit-
ted from a broader autonomy in comparison to the other constituent compo-
nents of the Crown of Aragon.27 Unlike Sicily, both the Iberian territories of
the union (Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia) and the kingdoms of Majorca and
Sardinia shared the same central institutions, which included, for example, a
royal chancery and a general treasury. The originally unique accounting office
known as mestre rational would be the subject of a process of administrative
devolution that, in the course of the fifteenth century, resulted in the creation
of independent accounting officers in the kingdom of Valencia (1419) and in
the other constituent components of the Crown.28 In absolute terms, the cre-
ation of the conservator in Sicily was therefore an institutional novelty for the
entire Crown of Aragon. A similar officer known as conservator generalis
regii patrimonii, equipped with jurisdiction over all the other Aragonese states
– with the by then thirty-year experience of the Sicilian office as the likely
model – would be established only in 1445, after the conquest of Naples (1442)
by Alfonso the Magnanimous, to monitor strategically the global management
of the Crown’s finances.29
Supported by a small group of officers including the Castilians Alfonso
Fernandes de la Ribera and Juan Trugillo, respectively as a lieutenant and a
27 For an overview on the bureaucracy of the Crown of Aragon, see the synthesis by F.
SABATÉ I CURULL, “Territory, power and institutions in the Crown of Aragon”, in: The Crown of
Aragon: A Singular Mediterranean Empire, ed. F. SABATÉ I CURULL (Leiden, 2017), pp. 172-200,
at pp. 193-200.
28 Deeply influenced by the Sicilian curia magistrorum rationalium, the office of mestre
racional was transplanted in Barcelona since the late thirteenth century, with a jurisdiction
including all the Iberian countries of the Crown of Aragon, and, following their conquests,
Majorca and Sardinia. In this regard, see MONTAGUT I ESTRAGUÉS, El mestre racional, as well
as, in this volume, E. TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, “Accounts auditing as an instrument of royal power in
Catalonia (1318-1419)”; on the maestre racional of Valencia (established in 1419), see E.
CRUSELLES GÓMEZ, El Mestre Racional de Valencia: Función política y desarrollo administra-
tivo del oficio público en el siglo XV (València, 1989).
29 M. DEL TREPPO, “Il re e il banchiere: Strumenti e processi di razionalizzazione dello stato
aragonese di Napoli”, in: Spazio, società, potere nell’Italia dei Comuni, ed. G. ROSSETTI (Naples,
1986), pp. 229-306, at p. 282. On the Neapolitan conservator, see also A.C. RYDER, The Kingdom
of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: The Making of a Modern State (Oxford, 1976.), pp.
206-210.
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clerk (notarius), as well as the Sicilian Leonardus de Bankerio as an additional
clerk, in 1414 the conservator Juan Sanches de Salvatierra was entrusted with
the main task of recovering and safeguarding the royal patrimony of the king-
dom of Sicily – a strategy that Martin I of Aragon had similarly followed in the
Catalan-Aragonese area30 – and of keeping the monarch informed in detail
about the various revenues and expenses (e.g. grants, economic rights, and so
on) pertaining to the island. As a result, the Sicilian treasurer and all the other
main officers in charge of collecting and spending royal revenues, as well as
those managing the gabelle (the royal tolls and customs) at the local level were
ordered to send regularly to the conservator all the information about their
transactions, whether they concerned money or goods.31 In this regard, the
mission with which the above-mentioned Leonardus de Bankerio was entrusted
is exemplary. He travelled across Sicily to meet in person the secreti, vicese-
creti and viceportulani (i.e. the territorial officers respectively responsible for
secretie, vicesecretie and the ports of the demesne towns) and to read and
explain to them the new ordinances pertaining to the management of their
offices and their relationship with the conservator. The latter’s approval was
mandatory before proceeding with any kind of payment. Indeed, those ordi-
nances also explained in detail how and when secreti, vicesecreti, and
viceportulani were to send to the conservatoria information regarding their
revenues and expenses, as well as, for the ports, about imports and exports of
wheat and other goods.32
The decision to instruct attentively the peripheral branches of the adminis-
tration is not surprising, as they were traditionally marked by maladminis-
tration and significant dispersal of resources. Those complications did not
merely originate from the illegalities perpetrated by unfaithful officers, but
stemmed from the excessive fragmentation of the Sicilian institutional system
and the faulty control over the operation of the peripheral branches of the fi-
nancial administration. The broad supervision orchestrated by the conservator
would have instead allowed the authorities to obtain detailed information about
revenues and expenditures at the local level. In order to accelerate the retrieval
30 In this regard, see M.T. FERRER I MALLOL, “El patrimoni reial i la recuperació dels
senyorius jurisdiccionals en els Estats catalano-aragonesos a la fi del segle XIV”, Anuario de
Estudios Medievales 7 (1970-1971), pp. 351-491.
31 BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, Appendice, doc. 1, 6 May 1414, pp. 102-104, as
well as ACA, RC, Reg., n. 2801, ff. 33v-34r, 22 Jul. 1416, and ACA, RC, Reg., n. 2890, f. 6v, 10
Apr. 1436.
32 ASPa, CR, vol. 4, f. 5v, and f. 20r, 19 Oct. 1416.
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of information, rather than wait for the delivering of accounts and other papers
from monetary officers, the conservator often relied on the action of a network
of trustworthy officers who visited the territorial branches of the magister
portulanus and of the magister secretus. For example, a 1417 decree entrusted
the porterius Consalvus de Xibilia with the mission of visiting all the secretie,
vicesecretie, and ports of the island to collect detailed information about their
revenues and expenditures and also about the amounts of money transferred to
the treasury.33
As one can easily discern, the activity of the conservator surpassed the
mere financial sphere and had important political implications, to the extent
that this highly important officer de facto counterbalanced the viceroys’ power
in Sicily. To be valid, all viceregal privileges and letters affecting the royal
patrimony needed the approval of the conservator, which took place by coun-
tersigning and transcribing them in the many series of books (libri) under the
conservator’s management.34 To avoid any illicit payment, for example, the
treasurer himself was forbidden from proceeding with any remittance save if
the payment mandate had already been checked and recorded by the conserva-
tor.35 This apparently merely bureaucratic practice allowed the conservator to
pursue his continuous supervision over the effective profits and payments
pertaining to royal demesne. According to the conservatoria’s procedure, in
the course of the year its personnel systematically compared the amounts effec-
tively collected and spent at the central and local level with the figures they
had meticulously made a note in their libri for preparing the annual budget (see
below for the bookkeeping methods of the conservator).
Through the action of the conservator, king Ferdinand I of Aragon in prac-
tice imposed a strict control over the management of the Sicilian royal patri-
mony and the distribution of royal favour, stopping at the same time the waste
of economic resources and the usurpation of demesne lands, properties, and
rights perpetrated by the aristocracy in the previous decades.
33 ASPa, SP, reg. 38, ff. 134v-135r, 25 Jan. 1417. 
34 BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, pp. 15-16.
35 ASPa, CR, vol. 846, unpaginated, [1416]. It should be noted that, as attested by the various
letters king Ferdinand sent to his “loved counsellor and conservator maior of our patrimony in
the kingdom of Sicily mossèn Iohan Sanches de Salvaterra”, in all the circumstances in which the
monarchs needed the rapid approval of a payment, they ordered the conservator to accept
immediately the payment mandate and to transcribe it in his books (see for instance: ACA, RC,
Reg., n. 2802, f. 36v, 18 Dec. 1416).
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Serving the King
The accuracy and zeal with which Juan Sanches de Salvatierra – of whom
the monarch himself had stressed the “leyaltat e discreció”36 – conducted the
conservatoria produced, however, some unexpected consequences. They origi-
nated from the implicit political connotation of the office. The pervasive action
of the conservator risked critically jeopardising the balance between the new
dynasty and local political society, including both the Sicilians and those Iberi-
ans who had moved to Sicily hoping for sudden enrichment. For example, as a
result of the opposition of the conservator to the adelantado Diego Gomez
Sandoval with regard to some revenues of the kingdom, the latter threatened
Salvatierra, who therefore left Palermo and took shelter at the nearby monas-
tery of San Martino delle Scale, from where – according to the surviving
sources – “non gosava salir a sol puesto”.37 If this episode concerned the con-
flict between Salvatierra and one individual, the verification of the legitimacy
of feudal possessions, revenues, and other various grants of which the conser-
vator was entrusted at that time caused discontent on a larger scale. In essence,
the Sicilian subjects were ordered to show urgently to the conservatoria the
original privileges and patent letters attesting that they had legally obtained the
fiefdoms and grants they possessed. Once they had received documentation,
the conservatoria’s clerks checked the accuracy of the privileges and letters
presented at their office before confirming their authenticity (i.e. that they were
not forgeries). In some circumstances, to check the documents’ truthfulness
they also translated them into Latin: this is the case of the privilege “scriptum
in littera greca” and dating back to 1123, which Geraldus the Sicamino pre-
sented to the conservatoria for obtaining the confirmation of the possession of
the Sicamino family’s fief.38 If the supplicant had lost the original title, it was
up to him to ask for a copy or a summary of the privilege, or of the letter attest-
ing his possession, which was later submitted to the conservatoria. For exam-
ple, given that Onofrius de Alixandrino “non tiene el previllegio oreginal por
quanto lo perdió” – as reported by the conservatoria’s staff – the supplicant
presented a copy that confirmed his commercial rights on the ports of Brucoli
and Catania.39 The actual confirmation of all the grants took place through a
36 BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, Appendice, doc. 1, 6 May 1414, p. 103: “loyalty and
discretion”.
37 CORRAO, Governare, p. 366: “did not dare to go to sunlight”.
38
ASPa, CR, vol. 4, ff. 274r-275v, 17 Mar. 1417: “written in Greek letters”.
39
ASPa, CR, vol. 5, f. 52r, 13 Nov. 1416: “does not possess the original privilege, for he lost it”.
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record-keeping practice, that consisted of the material transcription of all privi-
leges and letters in the conservator’s book series called “Libro de previlleias,
feudas et de otras cosas”.40
Because of the difficulty of retrieving the documents attesting their grants
and possessions (which in many circumstances had been lost), this overall
control provoked the general opposition of the aristocracy and, more broadly,
of the local political society. Their representatives in fact ignored or postponed
the presentation of the documents required, despite the authorities’ threats of
annulling grants and concessions – threats that evidently the Sicilians consid-
ered empty. Despite the initial urgency, these complications prolonged the
inquiry for several years. Unsurprisingly, in the following decades control of
the legitimacy of fiefs became more of a simple administrative procedure rather
than a political tool through which the Aragonese exercised pressure on the
local subjects.41 Moreover, as a result of the assumption of the throne by Alfon-
so the Magnanimous, the political circumstances were profoundly changing in
Sicily. In a few years, the new monarch put aside the strict control over fi-
nances which had been promoted by his father Ferdinand, and initiated instead
a policy that increasingly relied on the massive alienation of royal properties
and rights to gain support for his Mediterranean campaigns and particularly for
the conquest of Naples.
The change in policy regarding the management of Sicilian public finances
did not reduce the extensive inquisitive tasks of the conservatoria, which main-
tained its leading role in the financial administration of the kingdom. If the
control over the legitimacy of fiefdoms and grants, because of its intrinsically
political implication, is probably to be considered as the most evident and
confrontational aspect of the conservatoria’s duties, the other tasks carried out
by its officers were no less invasive. They ranged from monitoring the salaries
of the Sicilian central officers and verifying the legitimacy of various grants
and privileges, via supervising credits and debts of the Crown and the adminis-
tration of the demesne castles of the kingdom, to checking expenses and reve-
nues of the central and territorial offices managing the royal demesne and
resources. The continuity of the conservatoria’s operations under Alfonso the
Magnanimous is explicitly demonstrated by the confirmation of Juan Sanches
40 ASPa, CR, vol. 4, frontispiece: “Book of the privileges, fiefs, and other thing”. On the
conservator’s books, see the following section of this essay.
41 SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, pp. 181-183.
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de Salvatierra in his position (1416), as well as by the subsequent promotion of
his lieutenant Alfonso Fernandes de la Ribera as a conservator (1421).42
Since 1416, however, further interventions and specific institutional regu-
lations promoted more integration between the activities of the conservatoria
and of the curia magistrorum rationalium, thereby significantly mitigating
their administrative conflicts. On the one hand, in the context of the central
bureaucracy’s concentration at the viceregal palace of Palermo known as the
Hosterium (or Steri), since the 1420s the Sicilian authorities promoted the
transformation of the former chapel of Sant’Antonio Abate (which was at-
tached to the Hosterium) as the official seat of the financial administration.
Both the conservator and the magistri rationales were to work and convene in
the same place, where they would also preserve their records, which, however,
remained separate for each office and were stored in distinct trunks.43 On the
other hand, by following a process of further administrative specialisation,
whereas the curia magistorum rationalium was confirmed as the main office
for conducting the accounting review at the end of each year, the conservator
was instead more clearly tasked with the ongoing control over the accuracy of
revenues and the legitimacy of expenses, of which the conservatoria’s person-
nel had to be monthly informed in order to transcribe those data in their
books.44
At the same time it needs emphasising that the development of a late medi-
eval bureaucracy in the direction of the kind of governmental specialisation
that we now see as typical of later centuries, did not result in the emergence of
rigid, strictly defined administrative boundaries between the central institu-
tions, in particular if the magistracies of the magistri rationales and the conser-
vator in Sicily, operated in the same sphere of administration. Despite the
clearer definition of their tasks, a grey area in which their competences inter-
sected and overlapped persisted. This meant that, whenever it was needed, the
distant Aragonese monarchs could rely on the intervention of a trustworthy
officer such as the conservator, even when affairs legitimately concerned the
great court of accounts. On the occasion of a series of frauds committed in the
42 See respectively: ACA, RC, Reg., n. 2801, ff. 31v-32r, 22 Jul. 1416 and ASPa, CR, vol. 9,
ff. 688r-689v, 1 Jun. 1421. After Salvatierra’s death in 1418, Alfonso the Magnanimous had
granted the role of conservator to the Catalan fidelis Pere Nicholay (1418-1421), a prominent
member of the royal entourage who had previously held the position of king’s secretary (ACA, RC,
Reg., n. 2802, f. 186v, 25 Jun. 1418).
43 SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, pp. 400-405.
44 In ACA, RC, Reg., n. 2801, f. 33r, 22 Jul. 1416. 
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ports of the island in the 1430s, for example, king Alfonso the Magnanimous
assigned the investigation not only to Adam de Asmundo, judge of the magna
curia rationum, but also to the conservator Antonio de Caramanna.45 The lat-
ter, the first Sicilian appointed in that position, had in effect clearly demon-
strated his accountability to the authorities by serving for a long time at the
treasury of the realm, where he had held various posts, ranging from mere clerk
to regent of the treasurer.46
To expand his control over the finances of the distant kingdom of Sicily,
since the late 1430s Alfonso the Magnanimous thus increasingly relied on a
group of Sicilian and Iberian officers entrusted with key positions in local
institutions and significant responsibilities. In the monarch’s opinion, they
were trustworthy and accountable officers for various and frequently inter-
twined reasons.47 Whereas some of them had proved their accountability by
tirelessly serving in the Sicilian administration and demonstrating their essen-
tial technical skills, others had instead followed the monarch during his mili-
tary campaigns, or had financially funded the Crown through significant loans.
The above-mentioned Leonardus de Bankerio, for example, not only acted as
a regent of the office of conservator (on behalf of the office holders) between
1431 and 1457 but, for his “meritis et serviciis”, as well as for his expertise “in
compotis et racionibus”, in 1437 was also awarded the new position of auditor
computorum, an officer meant to cooperate with the magistri rationales in the
auditing of accounts.48
The Catalan Gispert dez Far, uxer d’arms (i.e. member of the king’s per-
sonal guard), was instead a military professional who had joined in a number
of Aragonese campaigns in Africa, Italy, and Spain. After the defeat in the
naval battle of Ponza in 1435, he was taken prisoner alongside the king by the
Genoese. Furthermore, as attested by a number of records, he personally con-
45 On the trial following the investigation, see ASPa, Tribunale del Real Patrimonio, Atti, reg.
2, ff. 6r-7r, 3 Jul. 1439 and ACA, RC, Reg., n. 2837, f. 201v, 15 Sep. 1441. The appointment of
Antonius de Caramanna as a conservator is transcribed in ASPa, CR, vol. 16, f. 449r-v and f. 452r,
7 May 1436.
46 The appointment of Caramanna as a clerk of the treasury is recorded in ASPa, CR, vol. 8,
f. 294r, 3 Jun. 1420. His activity as a regent of the treasurer is attested by various records in ASPa,
CR, vol. 1062.
47 On the emergence of a Sicilian professionalised staff at the service of royal administration,
see SILVESTRI, “Ruling from afar”, pp. 371-377.
48 On Leonardo de Bankerio, see SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, p. 263, pp. 267-271, and
p. 310. See his appointment as auditor computorum of Sicily in ACA, RC, Reg., n. 2829, ff. 7v-8r,
28 Apr. 1437: “merits and services” and “accounts and calculations”.
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tributed to supporting Alfonso the Magnanimous’ wars in Italy. After holding
the positions of magister secretus (1426-1431) and briefly that of conservator
(1436), Gispert dez Far was granted the role of magister portulanus, with a
special jurisdiction intended to monitor attentively the Sicilian finances and,
above all, aimed at reallocating revenues and provisioning everything from the
ordinary administration of the island to funding the conquest of Naples.49 In
1439, for example, he was entrusted with the task of collecting a certain
amount of money from the magister secretus, as well as all the revenues origi-
nating from the ports, to meet the most urgent needs of the Crown and, in par-
ticular, to allow “la persecucioni di la sua felichi amprisia di quistu reami di
Napuli”.50
Finally, in 1440 Alfonso the Magnanimous appointed the Catalan Antoni
Sin as treasurer of the kingdom of Sicily. Under the administration of this
trustworthy officer, who kept the position of thesaurarius for roughly the fol-
lowing 35 years, the Sicilian treasury became a pivotal tool for funding the
Aragonese war effort in Italy. This is attested not only by the unprecedented
amount of revenues the treasurer collected during those years, but also by the
fact that, after 1435, Sicily became the principal contributor to the Neapolitan
campaign.51
Information Management
Given Sicily’s proximity to Italy, Sicilian finances became crucial for
supporting Alfonso the Magnanimous’s foreign policy in the peninsula. As a
result, the leading role of the conservator in supervising revenues and expendi-
tures concerning the realm was further strengthened. To manage the growing
daily business, in 1436 the conservator was allowed to appoint two new clerks
(Antonius de Bertono and Guillelmus de Bracco) in addition to the two clerks
already employed in his service.52 Their support was decisive for the regular
49 On Gispert dez Far, see Silvestri, L’amministrazione, pp. 258-264.
50 ASPa, CR, vol. 844, f. 37r-v, 10 Sep. 1439: “the continuation of [the king’s] happy
endeavour of this kingdom of Naples”.
51 More details on the contribution of Sicily to the Neapolitan war in SILVESTRI, L’ammini-
strazione, pp. 271-290.
52 ASPa, RC, reg. 71, ff. 134v-135r, 10 Apr. 1436. See the appointment of the two above-
mentioned officers, respectively in ASPa, CR, vol. 16, f. 470r-v, 1 May 1436, and ASPa, CR, vol.
16, f. 472r-v, 1 May 1436.
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compilation of the many series of books of the office, in which its personnel
transcribed thousands of letters and privileges pertaining to all the administra-
tive areas of the realm, and inscribed a number of relevant annotations and
comments. The office of conservator has so far mostly been analysed in theory,
through the study of the royal ordinances and regulations. Its practical activity
has been ignored by scholarship on late medieval Sicily. To understand the
practice, and specifically how the conservatoria’s officers and clerks led their
inquisitive tasks and calculated the annual budget, we need to shift our atten-
tion from the theoretical regulations to the written tools developed by the ad-
ministrators to accomplish their tasks successfully. We therefore need to ana-
lyse the strategies the conservatoria’s officers adopted – by fundamentally
innovating record-keeping and bookkeeping methods – for managing an un-
precedented amount of information, which they organised through a complex
system of books.
The archival series of the conservator, today called conservatoria di regis-
tro, includes about 2,500 volumes, ranging from 1414 to 1819.53 Given the
negligent preservation of the office’s archive across the centuries and the in-
trinsic fragility of these books, a number of volumes were lost, and today c.
333 libri of the Trastámaras age (1414-1516) survive, which roughly corre-
spond to 40% of the total amount of the conservator’s books produced during
those years.54 In my research on the surviving records, I calculated that in the
fifteenth century the conservatoria managed ten different series of libri. In
synthesis, the office’s staff usually produced one book a year for seven of those
book series: ‘books of grants’ (libri mercedum), ‘books of salaries’ (‘libri
quitacionum’), ‘books of accounts’ (‘libri computorum’), ‘books of commis-
sions’ (libri commissionum), ‘books of castles’ (‘libri castrorum’), ‘books of
debts’ (‘libri debitorum’), and ‘books of affairs’ (‘libri negociorum’). The
aforementioned ‘books of fiefs’ (libri feudorum) and the books called ‘libri
decime et tareni’ (i.e. pertaining to feudal taxation) instead covered several
years.55 Finally, the ‘libro de sueldos’ (‘book of money’), concerning the
53 In addition to the brief description of the conservatoria di registro series in P. BURGA-
RELLA and G. FALLICO, “Archivio di Stato di Palermo”, in: Guida generale degli Archivi di stato
italiani, 4 vols. (Roma, 1981-1994), 1 (1986), pp. 287-360, at pp. 303-304, see BAVIERA ALBA-
NESE, “L’istituzione”, pp. 21-27, and SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, pp. 349-392.
54 As a result of the reordering of the conservator’s archive between 1737 and 1740, a
number of already compromised volumes were probably discarded, whilst many others were
equipped with new covers and bindings (BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, pp. 21-22, n. 38).
55 According to the conservatoria di registro’s inventory, the archival holdings for the age
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troops’ payment, was an exceptional book compiled only in those rare circum-
stances when the Aragonese monarch was in Sicily with his army.56 The
conservatoria’s series were organised in various subseries according to their
specific subjects. For example, whereas the books of grants include subseries
relating to the type and extension of grants (‘permanent’, ‘yearly’, ‘for life’, ‘at
[the king’s] discretion’, ‘charity grants’, and ‘support’), the books of castles’
subseries are organised according to the reason for the expenses (‘salaries of
castles’, ‘restorations of castles’, and ‘provisions’).
Within the books’ series and subseries, the organisational unit was the
‘heading’ (rubrica), a section concerning individuals (including members of
the royal family), urban centres, entities, officers, castles, and so on. Under
these headings, the conservatoria’s staff transcribed one or more relevant doc-
uments, which included not only payment mandates, letters, and privileges
produced by the magna curia rationum, but also documentation issued by the
Sicilian secretaries and by the prothonotarius’s office, as well as by the Arago-
nese king’s secretaries (the local royal chancery only acted as a record-keeping
office).57
The administrative logic underlying the conservatoria’s books can only be
understood in connection with their intrinsic material organisation and peculiar
binding methods, which resulted in the development of a mobile book structure
that allowed the office’s scribes to organise and reorganise information accord-
of Trastámaras, in ASPa, CR, are: Mercedes (including both the books of grants and books of
salaries), vols. 1-104; Conti, vols. 841-888; Commissioni, vols. 927-948; Fortilizi, vols. 1007-
1047, 1061; Debiti (including both the books of debts and the books of affairs), vols. 1061 bis-
1076; Indice alfabetico d’investiture (corresponding to the books of fiefs), vols. 2471-2473, as
well as some volumes within  other book series (vols. 4, 21, 33, 1129, 1130, 1196, 1197, 1198);
Decima e tarì, vol. 1085. It is worth noting that the archivists who reordered the conservatoria
di registro series and compiled the inventory often ascribed books to incorrect series, and even
created miscellaneous volumes through binding various sections of different conservator’s books.
In SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, pp. 182-183, n. 46, and pp. 361-391, n. 91, 115, 155, 157, 169,
175, 179, I have partially reconstructed (for the period 1414-1458) the original archival series,
but a full revision of the conservatoria di registro’s inventory and of its holdings is still needed.
Note that, in some circumstances, the conservatoria’s staff compiled libri including several
indictional years. This is the case, e.g. of ASPa, CR, vol. 16, which includes the indictions from
the tenth (1431-1432) to the fourteenth (1435-1436) of the libri mercedum and quitacionum; or
ASPa, CR, vol. 1013, including the indictions from the tenth (1431-1432) to the thirteenth (1434-
1435) of the libri castrorum. 
56 The only surviving records of the libro de sueldos are preserved in the miscellaneous
volume ASPa, CR, vol. 841, ff. 180r-233v (twelfth indiction, 1418-1419) and ff. 725r-820v
(thirteenth indiction, 1419-1420).
57 SILVESTRI, “That register”, pp. 312-316.
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ing to the changes in revenues and expenditures that took place during the year.
Unlike the quire-based registers (registra) in use by the other Sicilian record-
keeping offices, the conservatoria’s books were composed of single sheets or
of small gatherings including no more than 2-3 sheets. For each liber, the of-
fice’s scribes marked the books’ folios by adding the series’ or sub-series’
titles, as well as the proper indictional year (corresponding to the administra-
tive year: 1 September-31 August) in the upper-left corner. For those book
series relating to expenses, such as the books of castles or the books of grants,
the conservatoria’s scribes added in advance more specific information per-
taining to each of the matters discussed, including the above-mentioned head-
ings and a summary describing the contents under each rubrica, also indicating
the precise amount due to individuals or entities on the right margins. By pre-
compiling the folios before transcribing letters and privileges, and even before
binding them into books, the conservatoria’s staff was able to produce reliable
budgets of the envisaged revenues and expenditures in various fields of govern-
ment. For example, the books of salaries and the books of castles amounted to
information tools through which the conservator’s staff could precisely calcu-
late the expected cost of the central apparatus officers (from viceroys down to
scribes and minor staff) and the maintenance of the Sicilian demesne castles
and their personnel respectively.58 This procedure is also demonstrated by the
development of specific charts listing the salaries and grants to be paid out of
the demesne revenues, such as those transcribed in the conservatoria’s books
of the grants relating to the fourteenth and fifteenth indictions, illustrating the
exact amounts to be paid for salaries and grants out of the profits of the secre-
tie.59
The registration of the payment mandates – of which the magna curia
rationum or, more rarely, the Sicilian secretaries were in charge – took place
only after the conservator had checked and countersigned them. According to
their topics, the conservatoria’s scribes transcribed those payment mandates
into one of the book series or subseries, and under the relevant rubrica, along-
side all the other documents (privileges, letters, orders, royal decrees, and so
on) they considered of some interest for that particular affair (see Illustration
1). This means that in the books of salaries, for example, they recorded any
58 On the material aspects of the conservator’s books, see: A. GIALDINI and A. SILVESTRI,
“Administrative knowledge and material practices in the archive: Binding and rebinding in late
medieval and early modern Sicily”, Melanges de l’Ecole française de Rome: Moyen Âge 131.1
(2019), pp. 169-187.
59 ASPa, CR, vol. 9, f. 3r-v, and ff. 4r-7r.
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privilege granting new positions, or modifying the tasks of officers, or giving
further specifications on the salaries’ payments, in addition to the annual pay-
ment mandate. For instance, within the rubrica dedicated to the Sicilian trea-
surer, the liber quitacionum of the fourteenth and fifteenth indictions includes
the following records: (i) the royal privilege granting the position of treasurer
in favour of Iohannes de Gorrecta as a replacement for Nicolaus de Speciale;
(ii) the viceregal letter including information about the treasurer’s salaries and
rights; (iii) the viceregal dispensation from renouncing the grants of which he
benefitted despite being treasurer of Sicily; (iv) finally, under a separate rubri-
ca, the special commission with which Iohannes de Gorrecta was entrusted by
the king to sell portions of royal demesne.60
In substance, thanks to the mobile structure of the libri, the conservatoria’s
staff could easily insert new folios into the unbound volume. This procedure
allowed them to gather all documents relating to the same affair without alter-
ing the previous organisation of records. In this regard, a neglected material
aspect such as the cut hole of about 2 centimetres in diameter which character-
ises the conservatoria’s books, was in fact a key aspect of the bookkeeping
methods of the office (see Illustration 1). The office’s clerks prepared the cut
holes before compiling the pages – not by chance, the script is drafted around
the holes – so that the folios could be kept together, possibly by piling them
around a peg. If maintaining the order of records by subject was crucial for
navigating the volumes – the volumes did not have any indices or page num-
bers – preserving the arrangement of folios was also fundamental for the con-
servator to carry out correctly his monitoring activity in the course of the year.
The practice allowed him to add folios concerning new payments, commis-
sions, appointments, and so on, to the books whenever this was needed.61
To understand how the conservator led his ongoing verification over the
financial administration of Sicily in practice, it is necessary to analyse the
various annotations the conservatoria’s staff inscribed in the left margins of
the pages of the libri. These annotations show that the conservator did not
merely conduct a formal inspection, but monitored instead in detail a broad
range of various matters. For example, in the book of castles of the fifth indic-
tion (1441-1442), under the rubrica dedicated to the tower of Troina, a scribe
60 See those documents in ASPa, CR, vol. 9, f. 711r-v (16 Dec. 1421); f. 712r (8 Apr. 1422);
f. 712v (10 Apr. 1422); and ff. 713r-714r (14 Dec. 1421). Within the books of salaries, examples
of this kind are countless.
61 GIALDINI and SILVESTRI, “Administrative knowledge”, p. 175.
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Fig. 1 Layout of the book of salaries, twelfth indiction (1448-1449). First page of the
rubrica dedicated to Petrus Farahone, clerk of the magna curia rationum (AS-
Pa, CR, vol. 30, f. 213r).
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made a note that a new castellan was appointed as a replacement of Iohannes
de Murella, who had previously passed away; in the book of grants of the third
indiction (1454-1455), a clerk inscribed an annotation explaining that Antonius
de Fardella had been authorised to transfer to one of his sons the annual
amount of 24 uncie which he received out of the revenues of the gabella
biscotti of Palermo.62
If the marginal annotations inscribed in some book series and subseries
seem sparse and occasional, those in the books of salaries are instead numerous
and regular, as they were the result of the detailed control the conservator
performed on the effective service of the Sicilian central officers. As one can
easily see in any surviving liber quitacionum, for obtaining their salaries the
officers ineluctably needed the so-called ‘certifications’ (certificationes)
granted every four months by the conservator, indicating if the officers had
fully served or instead had been absent from their service and, if so, for what
reasons. This means that, for instance during the ninth indiction (1430-1431),
whereas the conservator attested that Philuppus de Abbate, lieutenant of the
secretary office, had to receive his full payment of 12 uncie, the conservator
also revealed that the judge of the royal court Ieronimus de Agocto had only
served from 27 November 1430 to 24 July 1431, and thus was only entitled to
18 uncie and 6 tareni instead of the full salary of 24 uncie.63 In substance,
thanks to the information collected, the conservatoria’s staff could calculate
the exact amount due each year to the central administration’s officers.64
As shown by the cords occasionally running through the marginal annota-
tions, the conservatoria’s clerks proceeded with binding th libri only when a
volume was no longer useful for current business. In practice, they pierced the
parchment cover and text-block at the top and at the bottom of the right mar-
gins with two cords, which were knotted at the end. Relying on that semi-per-
manent binding technique, they could not only open completely the books for
reading or even inscribing later annotations, but on occasion even add new
folios to the volumes, preserving at the same time the organisation of records.65
62 See respectively the marginal annotations inscribed in ASPa, CR, vol. 1015, f. 28r, undated
and ASPa, CR, vol. 37, f. 50r.
63 This is the case of the marginal annotations of ASPa, CR, vol. 15, ff.  513v (18 Dec. 1430
and 30 Sep. 1431), and 559v (24 Jul. 1430). Note that the thousands of annotations inscribed in
the volumes of the conservator are marked by a striking variety.
64 As discussed in SILVESTRI, “Ruling from afar”, pp. 369-371, the Sicilian central personnel
had to submit those certifications to the officers entrusted with the payment of their salaries.
65 GIALDINI and SILVESTRI, “Administrative knowledge”, pp. 178-183.
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Therefore, the development of a binding method aimed to manipulate the
books’ arrangement, originated from the continuous supervising activity of the
conservatoria’s staff over the financial administration of the kingdom of Sicily.
Among the various series of libri, as I will discuss next, the so-called books of
accounts emerge as the most crucial tools for monitoring the effective manage-
ment of revenues and resources concerning the royal patrimony of the realm.
Bookkeeping and Auditing Methods Compared
In essence, the libri computorum were a kind of ledgers that allowed the
conservator to control effectively the management of the royal patrimony and
the accuracy of the accounts annually produced by the monetary officers of the
realm.66 Similarly to the other book series of the office, the account books also
consisted of various sections, which were dedicated to the treasurer (see Illus-
tration 2), the magister portulanus, the magister secretus, the secreti of Cata-
nia, Messina and Palermo, and the collector of feudal taxation. In the course of
the fifteenth century, the conservator added new headings to his books, such as
those devoted to the officers responsible for the new secretie of Nicosia, Malta,
and Termini (which became temporarily autonomous from the magister secre-
tus), or those created for occasional collections of money.67 Within each sec-
tion, two different rubrice or headings listed revenues and expenditures respec-
tively. It is however worth noting that, given the complexity of the treasury’s
activity, the conservator devised for that organ a few more headings. For in-
stance, one can sees headings dedicated to all those transactions relating to
hearth taxes and other money collections (collecte), headings devoted to ‘compo-
sitions’ (compositiones, i.e. those sums individuals or urban communities paid
66 On the books of accounts, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione”, pp. 28-29, and
SILVESTRI, L’amministrazione, 381-387. As discussed supra, n. 51, the surviving books of
accounts for the period 1414-1516 include ASPa, CR, vols. 841-888, to which, however, should
be added other libri mistakenly bound to other book series, such as those included in ASPa, CR,
vol. 11, ff. 581r-658r (sixth indiction, 1427-1428); vol. 14, ff. 540r-602r (fifth indiction, 1426-
1427); vol. 15, ff. 593r-647r, and ff. 705r-715r (seventh indiction, 1428-1429); vol. 1061 bis, ff.
38r-148v (thirteenth indiction, 1419-1420 and fourteenth indiction, 1420-1421).
67 See, e.g. ASPa, CR, vol. 853, i.e. the liber computorum of the third indictional year (1454-
1455), or ASPa, CR, vol. 855, corresponding to the book of accounts of the fifteenth indictional
year (1466-1467). ASPa, CR, vol. 858 (ninth indictional year, 1460-1461), e.g. includes a
significant number of sections committed to all the vicesecretie of the realm, that is the territorial
branches of the magister secretus.
138 ALESSANDRO SILVESTRI
to the Crown for avoiding that judicial cases went to trial), and headings spe-
cifically focussed on the management of the gabelle.68 Interestingly, for the
most accurate analysis of the financial administration of Sicily, the conservato-
ria’s staff also registered in the relevant sections of the books the appointments
of monetary officers including details about their jurisdiction, decrees pertain-
ing to the administration of the various revenues and expenditures, and special
commissions dedicated to money collections.69
According to the record-keeping procedure followed by the conservato-
ria’s clerks (see Fig. 2), as soon as the conservator approved the payment
mandates and the various other financial documents relating to revenues and
expenses, as well as to imports and exports of goods, they made summaries of
those transactions under the relevant headings by following a chronological
order. In addition to the exact amounts of money or goods the royal court had
to pay or receive – which were listed in Roman numerals on the right margins
– each entry gave details on the circumstances of those transactions, the names
of the people involved, the source of revenues or the reasons for payments. The
conservatoria’s clerks also indicated the exact archival references to the other
books in which they had transcribed letters, mandates and privileges in their
entirety.70 Given that all that information was annotated before payments or
receipts of sums and goods actually took place, this bureaucratic procedure
resulted in the development of a reliable budget of Sicilian finances, a budget
that included those transactions with which the various monetary officers of
the realm were entrusted.
By using the information accumulated in his books and in the quaterni
submitted to the magistri rationales as points of comparison, the conservator
could attentively verify if the entries listed in the books of accounts corres-
ponded to the actual revenues and expenses of the realm. Through the book of
68 On the systems of headings pertaining to the treasurer, see, e.g. the aforementioned ASPa,
CR, vol. 853.
69 In ASPa, CR, vol. 853, ff. 30r-31v, 6 Sep. 1454, e.g. at the beginning of the section
focussed on the magister portulanus, the conservator transcribed “the new ordinance on the
administration of the ports of the kingdom of Sicily”, which obliged all the officers administering
Sicilian ports to submit their accounts to the magna curia rationum. In ASPa, CR, vol. 855, ff.
131r-133r, 29 Jun. 1467, the conservator reproduced instead the temporary transfer of the secretia
of Termini to the brothers Iohannes Petrus de Rigio and Iohannes de Rigio. It is worth noting that
the transcription in the books of accounts of the entire quaterni produced by the treasurer and the
other monetary officers during the years 1435-1438 seems the result of an occasional event (see:
ASPa, CR, vol. 843).
70 See, e.g. the archival references in ASPa, CR, vol. 858 (ninth indiction, 1460-1461).
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accounts of the third indiction (1439-1430), for example, the conservator could
check if the treasurer had actually received from the governor of the queen’s
chamber the donation of 100 uncie offered by the Jewish community, or if the
same treasurer had paid off the debt of 214 ducats in favour of the creditor
Aloysius Soler.71 In so doing, the conservatoria’s clerks used the left margins
of each page for inscribing brief statements of approval of the transactions
listed within each rubrica, also indicating the precise archival reference (in-
cluding the year, office, quaternus, and folios), interconnecting the entry under
review with the accounts produced by the Sicilian monetary officers.72 On the
other hand, the procedure concerning the control of expenditures appears to
have been an easy task. The conservator just needed to check if the actual sums
spent by the monetary officers had essentially put into practice the payment
mandates transcribed in his volumes. In all those circumstances in which the
entries listed in the books of accounts did not match the information contained
in the other conservatoria’s books or in the quaterni of the monetary officers,
the conservator reported on the left margins any anomalies. The latter were to
be compared with those evidenced by the magistri rationales in the course of
the so-called ‘comparison’ (collatio) between the inspections operated by the
two magistracies. It was mandatory for the officers under review to clarify all
doubts that emerged during the auditing process for obtaining the scriptum
quietancie, a formal receipt attesting the accuracy of the accounts they had
submitted. This bureaucratic procedure regarded all monetary officers under
scrutiny, as attested, for instance by the scriptum quietancie granted to Alferius
de Leofante, lieutenant of the Sicilian treasury who (as a substitute of the trea-
surer Anthonius Morosini) completed and submitted to the magna curia ratio-
num the accounts of the second (1423-1424) and third (1424-1425) indic-
tions.73
While carrying out his control of the royal patrimony, the conservator
mostly relied on his books of accounts and on the extraordinary amount of
information amassed and organised in his many series of books; conversely, he
used the quaterni produced by the monetary officers for integrating into the
already significant administrative knowledge he possessed. The control carried
out by the conservator was in substance not just the outcome of his final verifi-
71 ASPa, CR, vol. 844, unpaginated.
72 The inscription of statements and comments was a common procedure that can be
observed in any book of accounts.
73
ASPa, RC, reg. 60, ff. 144v-146r, 11 Mar. 1428.
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cation of the accounts, but the result of his ongoing activity, which took place
throughout the year. On the other hand, the accounts’ review operated by the
magistri rationales followed a different administrative logic, strictly connected
to the century-old bureaucratic tradition and procedures of the kingdom of
Sicily. In essence, the formal auditing took place only at the end of the admin-
istrative year and was mostly based on the analysis of the quaterni and the
various supporting documents submitted by the Sicilian monetary officers to
the magna curia rationum. If it is true that the magistri rationales were regu-
larly briefed about the financial transactions relating to Sicilian royal patri-
mony through the so-called ‘informations’ (informationes), it is also true that
these were just short lists of these transactions. The informationes, alongside
other records preserved in the great court of accounts’ archives, served as
benchmarks for conducting the final audit.
Significantly fine-tuned in the course of the fifteenth century, the auditing
procedure started in the months following the end of the indictional year (i.e.
from September onwards) with the submission of the accounts in the form of
quaterni, alongside various supporting documents attesting the accuracy of
transactions to the magna curia rationum. The quaternus consisted of two
separate sections, dedicated to revenues (introitus) and expenses (exitus) re-
spectively. In turn, each section included various headings or rubrice, within
which the various transactions were listed in the form of entries of various
lengths. Although the organisational structure of the quaterni was common to
all monetary offices, each quaternus was marked by its own characteristics,
which mirrored the particular activity of the office that had produced it. For
instance, if one looks at the section focussed on revenues, whereas the head-
ings of the magister portulanus’s quaternus are dedicated to the demesne ports
of the island, the headings relating to the magister secretus’s quaternus include
the vicesecretie. Given that both these two magistracies could spend on behalf
of the Crown, the expenditures’ sections of their quaterni are nevertheless
marked by significant heterogeneity (salaries, grants, transfers to the treasury,
and so on). For instance, it is worth noting that, whereas the magister secretus
was in charge of maintaining the demesne castles, all the transactions relating
to imports and exports of wheat and other products concerned the activity of
the magister portulanus. The accounts of the treasurer, as mirrored by his qua-
ternus, show even more disparate revenues and expenditures, attesting at the
same time an increasing role of the treasury in funding war during the fifteenth
century. 
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Fig. 2 Layout of the book of accounts, section: Treasury’s revenues, third indiction
(1439-1440) (ASPa, CR, vol. 844, f. 15r).
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The accounting revision of the magistri rationales clearly emerges by
working through the annotations and calculations they placed on the left and
bottom margins of the various quaterni.74 Similar to those of the conservator,
the annotations of the magistri rationales indicated if the accuracy of an entry
was confirmed or if more proof for attesting its truthfulness was needed, in-
cluding comparisons with the accounts produced at the local level (for instance
between the quaternus of the magister secretus and that of a vicesecretia). To
obtain further information on financial transactions, the magistri rationales
could summon the officers under scrutiny to their court to interrogate them and
allow them to produce clarification and evidence. Otherwise, if the ‘doubts’
(dubia) persisted, the magna regia curia’s judge initiated a formal trial.
Conclusion
In late medieval Sicily, the conservator and the magistri rationales con-
ducted two separate but intertwined reviews of the accounts annually produced
by the various monetary officers operating in the fragmented financial adminis-
tration of the island. Whereas the control exercised by the magna curia ratio-
num followed the traditional procedure based on the audit of the accounts at
the end of the administrative year, the conservator introduced an innovative
revision practice that continued into the modern era. Through thorough inspec-
tion of the financial records, the conservatoria’s staff were able to verify if the
actual revenues and expenditures of the various officers in charge of collecting
and delivering moneys and goods on behalf of the Crown were consistent with
the budget that had been produced at the beginning of the year. The monitoring
activity of the conservator was possible thanks to the development since 1414
of an ingenious information management technology that combined bookkeep-
ing and record-keeping methods. The material result of this intellectual devel-
opment was the creation of a system through which the conservatoria’s staff
could organise an unprecedented amount of information, including any privi-
lege, letter, decree, or any other documentation concerning the royal patrimony
74 On the auditing procedure of the magna curia rationum, see LI DESTRI, Attività e
documentazione della Magna Curia Rationum, pp. 108-136, and SILVESTRI, “Too much to
account for”. For a comparison, see, in this volume, TELLO HERNÁNDEZ, “Accounts auditing”,
who describes the accounting procedure led by the mestre racional of the Crown of Aragon.
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of the kingdom of Sicily into a book system of series and subseries dedicated
to various specific financial matters.
Among the various book series of the conservator, the so-called books of
the accounts stand out as its most significant tools of administrative and finan-
cial knowledge. In essence, these books allowed the conservatoria’s staff to
produce annual accounts parallel to those officially prepared by the treasurer
and the other principal financial officers of the realm. This system of informa-
tion management gave the authorities – the Aragonese monarchs and the Sicil-
ian viceroys on their behalf – the unique opportunity to collect detailed knowl-
edge of the financial condition of the kingdom, even before the magistri ratio-
nales conducted their formal auditing after the conclusion of the administrative
year. In a composite polity such as the late medieval Crown of Aragon, whose
territories were scattered across the Western Mediterranean, the many series of
books of the conservator thus resulted in a formidable governmental tool
through which the monarchs could exercise their authority from afar on one of
their dominions: the kingdom of Sicily. This vast financial and bureaucratic
knowledge proved crucial for allocating the revenues and expenditures of the
island according to the monarchs’ needs, in essence for supporting the expen-
sive campaign for the conquest of Naples and the later Aragonese wars in Italy
and in the Mediterranean basin.

From Administrative Control to Fighting Corruption?
The Procedural Steps of Accounts Auditing in the
Papal State (Thirteenth to Sixteenth Century)*
ARMAND JAMME
T
he papal state – sometimes referred to in the plural as if to reveal the
fragility of its authority, although all medieval kingdoms were an aggre-
gation of provinces – might be said to have come of age during the pon-
tificate of Innocent III. In 1250, on the death of its arch-enemy, emperor Fred-
erick II, the papal state consisted of four provinces: Campagna, the Patrimony
of Saint Peter, the Duchy of Spoleto, and the March of Ancona.1 With the
annexation of its largest province in 1521, following negotiations with the king
of France, the papal state reached its territorial peak, but the province was
subsequently given by pope Paul III to his favourite son, who was created duke
of Parma and Piacenza.2 The study of administrative accounting practices
* I would like to thank Robert Levitt for his attentive proofreading and corrections.
1 See the map in D. WALEY, The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century (London, 1961).
2 G. BRUNELLI and P.L. FARNESE, in: Dizionario biografico degli Italiani 83 (2015). But
accounting kept a Piacentine and Parmense identity for a few years. It was not until 1535 that
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Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2020), pp. 145-164.
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begins with a necessary discussion of the unique workings of papal governance
and then deals with the development of the provinces into a state.
Each province was governed by a rector, a kind of alter ego pape, who
retained all power for himself and was not in any systematic way accountable
to those whom he governed. Like the pope, the rector worked with a camera-
rius who established the financial accounts, but sometimes, particularly when
the rector was a close relation of the current pope, he would retain all authority
and, because there was little oversight, he was under no obligation to present
his accounting registers to the pope’s camerarius. However, from 1272, the
rector was assigned a treasurer appointed by the pope. The creation of this new
papal office was apparently intended to reduce the power of the rectors, who
sometimes were negligent even in paying officers their regular wages. The
treasurer, therefore, served as a check on the rector’s actions. The fact that this
new system was implemented, however, is suggested by the conservation of a
single set of accounting registers. Other evidence, particularly from the begin-
ning of the fourteenth century, when vast quantities of documents were con-
served, indicates that the rectors continued to operate under the former regime,
that is without supervision. This seems even more the case when the rector was
a relation of the current pope.3
The Apostolic Chamber oversaw the rights of the curia romana throughout
Christendom and was responsible for auditing the various registers it received.
It sent collectors into the periphery to collect the sums due, and these officers
carried their own set of accounting registers, but also reviewed the accounts of
various other officers. The Chamber was responsible for overseeing the court
officers assigned to diplomatic and military missions (sergeants-at-arms,
squires, and nuncii), the bankers with whom the pope maintained current ac-
counts, and finally the rectors and treasurers of the papal state. There was not
then an established method or process for auditing the accounting registers
received from the provincial authorities. The calculations and procedures tend-
global accounts for the two territories have been preserved, for the province then named Gallia
Cispadana; Rome, Archivio di Stato di Roma (hereafter ASR), Camerale III, busta 1595.
3 See the list of treasurers and the chronological distribution of provincial accounts in A.
JAMME, “De la banque à la Chambre? Les mutations d’une culture comptable dans les provinces
de l’État pontifical (1270 - 1430)”, in: Offices, Écrit et Papauté (XIIIe-XVIIe siècle), ed. A. JAMME
and O. PONCET (Rome, 2007: Collection de l’École française de Rome 386), pp. 97-251, at pp.
120-121, 162-251.
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ed to be the same as those used by the clerks of the Chamber for any type of
accounts auditing.4
To better understand the underlying logic of the Chamber’s auditing, one
must first challenge any preconceived notions. The audits were not designed to
verify the movements of cash in and out of papal accounts, nor to assess
whether they accurately reflected financial realities. The Duecento and Tre-
cento were the time when Italian banks were at the pinnacle of their influence
and held the supremacy on international financial operations, with branches
throughout Christendom. Their banking network included both large multina-
tional institutions (such as the one owned by the Buonsignori of Siena, whom
Mario Chiaudano named the “Rothschilds of the Duecento”), and small family-
owned financial firms, particularly after the bankruptcy of the Bardi and the
Peruzzi. By financing the crusades and papal political initiatives, as well as
receiving the product of tithes throughout Christendom, they created the co-
dependency between Italian bankers and the Church. Among other services, the
papacy used the Italian banks to transfer money and financial assets from the
periphery to the curia, and subsequently disburse these funds to various lords
and institutions which the pope sought to gratify.5
Often the Italian bankers, sometimes referred to as factors, were them-
selves intimately involved in church finances. They could serve in two roles at
the same time in the same province: provincial treasurers and bankers. Two
unpublished documents from the communal archive of Montelupone, a small
town in the March of Ancona, provide a window onto the operation of the
system. On 12 May 1294 in Montolmo, where the provincial rector was head-
quartered, Orlandino Paganelli, acting as the papal treasurer of the March, sent
to the procurator of Montelupone a receipt for the city’s tax assessment of 500
florins. Then, on 17 September, again in Montolmo, Paganelli provided to
another procurator a receipt for 100 lb.; this time, however, he identified him-
self as an agent of the Ricciardi Bank.6 From these receipts, it also appears that
4 For the methods developed in the fourteenth century, see C. SAMARAN and G. MOLLAT,
La fiscalité pontificale en France au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1905), and for the fifteenth century, see
A. GOTTLOB, Aus der Camera apostolica des 15. Jahrhunderts: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des
päpstlichen Finanzwesens und des endenden Mittelalters (Innsbruck, 1889).
5 A. JAMME, “De Rome à Florence: Les banquiers et la curie (XIIe-XIIIe siècles)”, in: Die
römische Kurie und das Geld: Von der Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts bis zum frühen 14.
Jahrhundert, ed. W. MALECZEK (Ostfildern, 2018: Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche
Geschichte, Vorträge und Forschungen 85), pp. 167-205.
6 JAMME, “De la banque à la Chambre?”, p. 171, No. 14.
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the provincial treasurer was serving the Tuscan bank not only for small local
and personal loans, but also for substantial contracts in connection with eccle-
siastical taxation and other frequent financial transactions, all of which pro-
duced profits for the bank and led to a virtual monopoly over banking transac-
tions within the province.
The papal financial system, designed together by papal officers and their
bankers, consisted of a mixture of accounting practices. They combined pro-
cesses used by Tuscan bankers for commercial entities with practices used by
political institutions. We can see this more clearly if we examine closely the
accounting registers preserved for the thirteenth century. Written in the Tuscan
dialect and following the commercial standards for preparing accounting regis-
ters, the single original document we have is divided between Deve avere and
Deve dare.7 This register might even be considered evidence of the ultimate
abandonment of the Church’s financial accounting to corporate financial ac-
counting. Yet, as previously mentioned, with the exception of this sole register,
none of the original accounting documentation from the thirteenth century has
been conserved. It would be foolish to deduce from a single document an all-
encompassing interpretation of the accounting and auditing practices of the
period. Nonetheless, this lack of evidence did not stop some historians from
making sweeping generalisations, the most widespread being that the develop-
ment of administrative accounting primarily occurred during the Avignon Pa-
pacy. But let us examine the sources: an inventory of the ‘Treasury’ of the
Apostolic See, which was initially deposited in Perugia in 1305 and subse-
quently moved to Assisi, was completed in 1327. It shows a list of 73 chests,
of which sixteen contained just accounting documentation. Hence there once
existed in the archive of the Chamber a large number of accounting registers
from the thirteenth century – especially if we compare these sixteen chests with
the mere three chests containing the much more famous registers of papal let-
ters.8 These accounting registers were likely significantly different in form
from those produced during the fourteenth century, although this is far from
certain: although only partially copied and dating from after 1350, there is one
meticulous accounting register written in Latin by a ‘banker-treasurer’ of the
March in 1284, which demonstrates that even if the treasurer was also a banker
7 Archivum Apostolicum Vaticanum [hereafter AAV], Intr. et Ex. No. 1; ed. G. PALMIERI,
Introiti ed Esiti di papa Niccolò III (1279-1280) (Rome, 1889).
8 A. JAMME, “Mémoire vive et mémoire morte: Identité et archives pontificales aux XIIIe-
XIVe siècles”, in: Écritures grises: Les instruments de travail des administrations (XIIe-XVIIe
siècle), ed. A. FOSSIER, J. PETITJEAN, and C. REVEST (Paris and Rome, 2019), pp. 375-399. 
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– in this case Rinaldo Campana, agent of the Spiliati-Spini – he might still
provide a reliable and accurate accounting of the financial administration.9 In
short, with the Italian bankers-treasurers, we are not looking at a theoretical
instance of double-entry bookkeeping, but a clear example of double account-
ing with one side for the state and the other for the bank.
Consequently, from the thirteenth century onwards historians should draw
a clear distinction between what was a more or less persuasive presentation of
accounts and the actual movements of cash. Examining the registers from col-
lectors in Lombardy for the sexenale decima of 1274, one realises that not
infrequently officers asking for payments from bishops and abbots actually
received more than mere promises: they received the cash amounts due. When
that was the case, the proceeds were deposited with small banks and merchants.
Once the mission was complete, the collectors would submit their registers to
the Chamber. Their register was then used as an after-action report, by which
I mean that the Apostolic Chamber had then to arrange for the collection of the
deposits, scattered in this instance among 60 different institutional depositories
(bishop’s palaces, convents, and small bankers).10 This led the pope’s camera-
rius to use the collection services provided by one, two, or three bank compa-
nies in which the Chamber or the pope had a current account.11 A papal collec-
tor returning his accounting registers not only allowed for auditing, but also
allowed the Chamber, as the primary financial management organ of the Apos-
tolic See, to verify and reconcile the fiscal records presented by the bankers.
These provincial and ecclesiastical tax registers were therefore not only instru-
ments for the checks and balances of their administration, but also an essential
management tool for the financial organisation of the global Church. They
provided a way of auditing the bankers and enabled the camerarius to act as
the minister of papal finance.
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the process of recruiting pro-
vincial treasurers was evolving. For various reasons, the Italian bankers (some-
9 A. JAMME, “Una delle fonti della Descriptio Marchiae? L’ignoto registro del tesoriere
fiorentino Rinaldo Campana (1283-1284)”, in: Incorrupta monumenta Ecclesiam defendunt:
Studi offerti a mons. S. Pagano, prefetto dell’ASV, ed. A. GROTTSMANN, P. PIATTI, and A. REH-
BERG, 4 vols. (Rome, 2018: Collectanea Archivi Vaticani 106-109), 2, pp. 479-501.
10 M.-H. LAURENT, “La décime de 1274-1280 dans l’Italie septentrionale”, in: Miscellanea
Pio Paschini: Studi di storia ecclesiastica, 2 vols. (Rome, 1948-49), 1, pp. 349-404.
11 They were alternately called ‘merchants of the Camera’ or ‘merchants of the pope’; see
the old but still useful work of É. JORDAN, De mercatoribus Camerae apostolicae saeculo XIII
(Rennes, 1909).
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times referred to as merchants) were removed, sometimes violently, from their
offices of provincial treasurers; in their place, young clerics and notaries were
ushered in. After 1306 it is impossible to find even one provincial treasurer
who served simultaneously as a banker. This development was important for
the movements of cash, but less so for the recording of accounts. The factores
of the bank companies were all trained as notaries. By the end of the thirteenth
century, bookkeeping was no longer performed by bankers alone, but by a
small staff of provincial notaries. Thus, even if clerics and bankers had differ-
ent experiences with calculating and preparing accounting records, it would not
have had much of an impact on the accounts, now produced by a provincial
teams of notaries, who for the most part were appointed for life. They became
the principal guardians of an institutional culture of accountancy.
The primary reason for changing the accounting process was due to the
changing circumstances of the papacy, which during the first few decades in
Avignon was far removed from its Italian territories and archives. The Holy
See was also eager to receive an impartial picture of the capabilities and work-
ings of its officers. Focussing on the establishment of legal and institutional
accounting processes was particularly important during the pontificates of John
XXII and Benedict XII. The number of sections in each accounting register
increased, on average from 10 to 25 in the Patrimony of Saint Peter between
1320 and 1360, for both the receipts and the expenses. Gradually, real descrip-
tive summaries of the chapters were included and the narration allowed the
account registers to record both qualitative and quantitative information. The
number of pages of an annual exercise alone makes this new depth and sub-
stance quite obvious.12 And yet, the notaries sometimes went overboard, even
citing verbatim the insults for which culprits had been brought to justice.13
Historians might ponder whether all of these details were really necessary
at that time. Did the Chamber really need to know that one of the provincial
notaries, accusing his colleague of embezzlement, had called him a “pazzo
sanguinente”? Did the Chamber’s clerks really need a justification running to 
12 A. JAMME, “Du journal de caisse au monument comptable: L’évolution de l’enregistre-
ment dans le Patrimoine de Saint-Pierre (fin XIIIe - XIVe siècle)”, in: Les comptabilités pontificales:
Mélanges de l’École française de Rome: Moyen Âge 118.2 (2006), pp. 247-268.
13 A. JAMME, “Comptabilité provinciale, écriture du crime et modèles de ‘disciplinement’
dans les Terres de l’Église (XIIIe-XVe siècle)”, in: Monuments ou documents? Les comptabilités,
sources pour l’histoire du contrôle social, ed. A. WIRTH-JAILLARD et al. (Brussels, 2015: Ar-
chives générales du royaume: Studia 154), pp. 45-79, at p. 60.
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Map: The papal state in the fourteenth century.
33 lines of manuscript to approve a payment to a few dozen foot soldiers de-
fending an outpost on Lake Bolsena (1352)?14 It is probable that the provincial
14 See JAMME, “Du journal de caisse au monument comptable”, p. 261, for the facsimile of
the folio in question.
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notaries created such detailed accounting registers not only to reflect the bal-
ance of revenues and expenses, but also to put in place an official record that
clearly stated the roles each of them was performing – the creation of an insti-
tutional memory, so to speak. Such a register offered a sort of chronology of
events; the provincial notaries thus wrote the official annals of the government,
which could be more useful for the provincial institution they served than
meeting the requirements of the Apostolic Chamber.
After the disorders of the Great Schism, the provincial accounting gradu-
ally became standardised. By the second half of the fifteenth century, proce-
dures were established for the calculation and layout of both receipts and ordi-
nary expenses. One example for this institutionalisation of the process is the
register of Boezio de Azonibus of Visso. It was produced in 1457-1458 by
several different individuals who each worked on the same document using the
same methods; an alphabetical table lists the provincial communities.15 The
better to demonstrate the receipts of the principle tax (the subsidium), the pro-
vincial Treasury, during the mandate of Pietro Luzzardi of Piacenza in 1469-
1471, put side by side the amounts owed by each community on the left page
and the receipts on the right.16 The expenses were kept to a minimum, as the
government of the provinces was now controlled from Rome and thus no lon-
ger the rectors’ concern. It was no longer necessary to explain at length the
extraordinary expenses because they had been designated by the curia. The
idea of what an accounting register should consist of had been completely
altered: the point was no longer to satisfy the needs of the provincial authori-
ties; rather, the registers had assumed a Roman accounting perspective inas-
much as they were being prepared according to the requirements of the Apos-
tolic Chamber.
It is worth emphasising that the changes in accounting reflected current
events. A series of dislocations took place owing to the political and cultural
shocks entailed by the Schism and the increasing absolutism of papal authority
after the conciliarist crisis. In the thirteenth century, the revenues from church
lands were far inferior to the expenses required by the papacy to keep the peace
in its territories;17 to a certain extent this remained the case during the first half
of the fourteenth century. Once funding came from Avignon to engage in war-
15 ASR, Cam. III, Tesoreria della Marca, busta 10, reg. 30.
16 I first spotted it in this province for these years; ASR, Cam. III, busta 12, reg. 35, f. 1 and
following.
17 For a revealing case from December 1291, see A. THEINER, Codex diplomaticus dominii
temporalis S. Sedis, 3 vols. (Rome, 1861-1862), 1, No. 491, p. 321.
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fare and conquer the cities, the provinces were reorganised and ultimately
integrated into a true state. This resulted in an increasing number of papal
officers and central financial control. Profits, nonetheless, were still nonexis-
tent: conflicts forced the pope into further lengthy and expensive military cam-
paigns, first against the Visconti of Milan and later against Florence. The pa-
pacy’s revenues were quickly drained in an effort to achieve the pope’s ambi-
tious policies.18 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the rise of the
European nation states and their support for their own Churches, there was a
further decline in papal global revenues; consequently, the papal state became
the source of almost half the pope’s resources.19 This fact became the main
impetus for changing the accounting practices prior to the mid-fifteenth cen-
tury.
Thus, comparing accounting data from one century to the next remains a
challenge. Many adjustments must be made before the data can be compared.
For example, the 12,723 and 18,279 ducats that Innocent VIII received from the
March of Ancona in 1485 and 1486 were not recorded on the income statement
as revenues but as expenses.20 And if they do not appear as the product of a
well-managed government, it is because the provincial treasurer, acting as a
current account manager, was only trying to produce a balanced report, with
revenues equalling expenses. This is absolutely clear in the first registers con-
served for Piacenza and Parma – when the city was still governed for the pope
by Francesco Guicciardini (until 1522) – which are divided into “Deve avere”
and “Deve dare”, here strictly facing each other, to keep the balance.21 The
register was a snapshot of selected tax proceeds received and expenditures
disbursed by the treasurer. In order to provide the precision required of histori-
cal analysis, a number of adjustments and recalculations need to be made.
18 For various budgets of the papal state around 1370, see A. JAMME, “Instructions et avis
du cardinal Pierre d’Estaing sur le gouvernement des Terres de l’Église (1371)”, in: Hommes
cultures et sociétés à la fin du Moyen Âge: Liber discipulorum en l’honneur de Philippe
Contamine, ed. P. GILLI and J. PAVIOT (Paris, 2012), pp. 69-105, at pp. 76-81.   
19 See M. MONACO, La situazione della Reverenda Camera Apostolica nell’anno 1525:
Ricerche d’archivio (un contributo alla storia delle finanze pontificie) (Rome, 1960); A. GARDI,
“La fiscalità pontificia tra Medioevo e età moderna”, Società e storia 9 (1986), pp. 509-557; F.
FILIOLI URANIO, “El Estado Pontificio como Fiscal-Military State: Consideraciones económicas,
financieras y sociales sobre el armamento de galeras en los siglos XVI y XVII”, Tiempos modernos
33.2 (2016), pp. 346-376.
20 A. JAMME, “Logiques administratives, fraude et népotisme: L’examen des comptes d’un
trésorier pontifical de la Marche d’Ancône en 1486”, in: Cultures fiscales offertes à D. Menjot,
ed. F. GARNIER et al. (Toulouse, 2019), pp. 165-194, at pp. 179 and 189.
21 ASR, Cam. III, busta 1595, vol. I, libro No. 1 and libro No. 3 (1526-1530).
154 ARMAND JAMME
Moreover, it was never a necessity for treasurers to provide consolidated
accounting of the missions they pursued. Providing worksheets containing the
fiscal details of revenues and expenses of a province was not the priority of the
provincial administration between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The
first accounting register we have for the March (1278) could never provide an
accurate picture of provincial finances, because the provincial treasurer did not
even have the authority to raise all the taxes that the communities were re-
quired to pay. The rector maintained the right to levy and collect the “tallia
militum” he needed to wage war and designated certain collections to his own
camerarius.22 In the fifteenth century, the papacy created separate funds admin-
istered by special officers for the management of pastures or the “tallia mili-
tum”, which escaped the oversight of the provincial treasurer as they reported
directly to Rome.23
To examine the specifics of papal accountability we shall focus on three
case studies, the first preceding the Avignon papacy, the second from the pe-
riod of the Avignon papacy, and the third illustrating the perplexing and com-
plex relationship between nepotism and administrative rules in the Renais-
sance.
I. On 22 April 1306, Raymond Brun of Gramont, sovereign lord of Bidache
and newly arrived in the Patrimony of Saint Peter, “violently” placed the papal
provincial treasurer, Bartolo di Cepparello, under arrest. Bartolo had appar-
ently refused to pay wages to both the superior and regular provincial offi-
cers.24 Raymond, the Gascon vicar of the official rector Amanieu VII of Albret,
who remained in the service of king Edward I,25 doubtlessly interpreted this
failure as the consequence of embezzlement. The treasurer Bartolo, who had
been appointed by Benedict XI, was an agent of the Cerchi Company and re-
mained in prison for 71 days. During his time in custody, he was tasked with
22 As was still the case in the March for the rector Ameil de Lautrec promoted by John XXII;
A. JAMME, “De la banque à la Chambre?”, pp. 175-176.
23 See the series of accounts conserved at the Archivio di Stato di Roma, partially available
online: <http://www.cflr.beniculturali.it/Tesorerie/tesorerie.php?lar=1680&alt=1050>. See the
still useful introduction by L. FUMI, Inventario e spoglio dei registri della tesoreria apostolica
di Perugia e Umbria dal R. Archivio di Stato in Roma (Rome, 1901).
24 D. WALEY, “An account-book of the Patrimony of Saint Peter in Tuscany 1304-1306”,
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 6 (1955), pp. 18-25, at p. 23.
25 J.-B. MARQUETTE, Les Albret: L’ascension d’un lignage gascon (XIe s.-1360) (Bordeaux,
2010), pp. 215-226, and J.-P. TRABUT-CUSSAC, L’administration anglaise en Gascogne sous
Henry III et Édouard I de 1254 à 1307 (Geneva, 1972).
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preparing an account to justify his management and essentially prove that he
had not misappropriated funds. The records begin on 24 August 1303, the day
the previous treasurer, Lapo di Marzo, submitted his final register to the
camerarius,26 and ended on the day Bartolo was released, at the beginning of
July 1306.
This volume is a treasure trove full of surprises and raises many questions.
Bartolo must have been in quite an unusual jail if he was able to continue to
serve as provincial treasurer while in confinement. Most probably he did this
in coordination with notaries working for the provincial administration.27 From
the register, we learn that Bartolo had been audited by the pope’s camerarius
in Perugia, where he spent 27 days in June 1305; subsequently, Bartolo never
returned the register of accounts of his predecessor, Lapo di Marzo. This was
clearly the reason why the accounting exercise that Raymond Brun, the vicar
of the rector, demanded Bartolo to prepare, concerned such an exceptionally
long period, from 24 August 1304 to July 1306 – more than 22 months, where-
as in the thirteenth century accounting registers typically covered a period of
only 10 months.28 The example shows that it was possible to manage the fi-
nances of a province without ever providing substantiating receipts of the
transactions. We must deduce that the examination of the treasurer’s manage-
ment conducted in June 1305 was thus carried out only with preparatory regis-
ters, writs, and receipts. And yet it was deemed sufficient, which could only
have occurred if the treasurer was a bank agent under contract with the Camera
(if he were not, this would probably not have been possible).
Prepared under such unusual conditions, Bartolo’s register gave proof that
the non-payment of salaries was due not to embezzlement but to a mismatch in
cash flows. During October 1304, the provincial judges had threatened to quit
the service of the pope if the rector and the treasurer, then the Venetian Gia-
como Quirini and the Florentine Lapo di Marzo, did not pay them their sala-
ries. In January, February and April of the following year, the rector and trea-
surer repeatedly warned the pope’s camerarius – who faced ever greater chal-
lenges as Lapo di Marzo also accused Giacomo Quirini of misappropriating
funds! – that they did not have sufficient cash in hand to pay the guards who
had been threatening to desert the walls of a castle, which they actually did on
26 AAV, Collect. 241, f. 31.
27 “Alibertus de Monghona et Arnosanius (sic for Arnau Sanch?) vocato Veschovo”,
relatives of Raymond Brun, were in charge of his personal guard in the rocca of Montefiascone;
Ibid., f. 39v. 
28 See my remarks in JAMME, “De la banque à la Chambre?”, p. 147. 
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18 June.29 There was a delay between the receipt of tax revenues and other
ordinary income and the obligation to pay ordinary expenses. The threats fol-
lowed by the actual desertions of officers were therefore the outcome of poor
financial management by the officials appointed by pope Benedict XI.
Nevertheless, Raymond Brun remained unbending, perhaps because he was
influenced by the actions king Edward I had taken against the Ricciardi.30 If our
treasurer was eventually released from prison, it might well have been because
he provided an accounting register to show that his failure to pay the expenses
was due to a lack of sufficient cash. However, it is also possible that the Cerchi
eventually agreed to finance the unpaid salaries from their own pockets.31
Accusations of embezzlement were frequent at the time. But here it was
not caused by any actual misappropriations but by a dysfunction in the design
of the financial system, coupled with the Cerchi’s failure to finance the out-
standing debts. This example illustrates how audits were conducted and, if an
account book was presented, the great peculiarity of the auditing process when
it was prepared by bankers. In the end, if the Cerchi did agree to finance the
outstanding debts in order to bring about the release of their agent, it was prob-
ably because they expected a quick return in future negotiation of the global
business they conducted with the Apostolic See.
II. On 25 October 1324 the papal nuncio Bertrand Carit and his notary
Hugues Fabre arrived in Macerata, at the time the provincial headquarters of
the March of Ancona. Carit presented to the rector (one of the sons of the vis-
count of Lautrec) a pontifical letter ordering him to audit the provincial ac-
counts. He then presented the same letter to the provincial treasurer Hugo Bos,
who came from the same diocese as pope John XXII.32 Carit’s arrival was clear-
ly expected, because only one week later the provincial treasurer with three of
his notaries began “ponere et reddere racionem de gestis, receptis, expensis et
administratis per eundem”, from 24 January 1321 until 1 November 1324. The
audit process used in this case can be reconstructed owing to the fortunate
survival of the account books produced by the provincial administration and
29 AAV, Collect. 241, ff. 31v-34v. 
30 R. KAEUPER, Bankers to the Crown: The Riccardi of Lucca and Edward I (Princeton,
1973), and more recently A. CASTELLANI and I. DEL PUNTA, Lettere dei Ricciardi di Lucca ai
loro compagni in Inghilterra (1295-1303) (Rome, 2005).
31 WALEY, “An account-book”, p. 23; AAV, Collect. 241, ff. 43v, 47.
32 Ibid., ff. 33-34.
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the auditing report prepared by Carit and Fabre (a 150-folio volume complete
with their concluding remarks).33
The provincial treasurer provided all his accounting-registers to Carit,34 the
“registros antiquos” of the Treasury and the tables describing the rights of the
Church in the province. In addition, he included the protocols of the notaries of
the rector and the provincial judges, together with their public instruments. In
total, Hugo Bos provided all of the documentation regarding the governance of
the province. Evidently, it was because of this large amount of recorded infor-
mation that needed examining that the audit was not performed at the Apostolic
Chamber in Avignon.
Carit began his examination of the revenues, not surprisingly, by first look-
ing at the taxes paid in recognition of the papal lordship, the census and affic-
tus. He compared current revenues listed in the account of Hugo Bos with the
historical data given in the tables and the “registros antiquos”. The notary,
Hugues Fabre, then drew up a list of the municipalities that were overdrawn.
Next, Carit skipped ahead to examine the revenues listed in the next volume,
and then in the third, before returning to the initial volume. In so doing Carit
was effectively following his own method of organising the receipts, a different
method from that used by the treasurer. The audit of revenues was completed
in twelve days, and on 14 November he began a similar process with the ex-
penses.35
In the treasurer’s accounting, the expenses began with the salaries of the
provincial officers in descending order.36 In a province where rebellion was
considered endemic,37 Carit decided to first review the salaries of those author-
ised to pass judicial sentences, followed by those responsible for executing the
condemnations. He passed over the register containing the ordinary wages paid
to judges and moved to scrutinise the volume containing military expenditures.
In the military register of Hugo Bos, the expenses did not appear in chronologi-
cal order. Instead, they were listed in individual current accounts, sorted by
33 AAV, Introitus et Exitus 62.
34 The present registers Intr. et Ex. 46 (for the receipts), Intr. et Ex. 50 (for the expenses),
Intr. et Ex. 45 (for military expenditures) and Collect. 10 (for the decima, a volume containing
initially the chapters De subcidiis clericorum, De compositionis exercituum, De compositionis
lige antique, De pecunia portata de curia romana, nowadays lost).  
35 AAV, Intr. et Ex. 62, from f. 105.
36 See the Intr. et Ex. 50, from the beginning.
37 S. PARENT, Dans les abysses de l’infidélité: Les procès contre les ennemis de l’Église en
Italie au temps de Jean XXII (1316-1334) (Rome, 2014: Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises
d’Athènes et de Rome 361). 
158 ARMAND JAMME
captain.38 Carit consolidated these individual accounts in his report: each cap-
tain’s account was also summarised in a narrative. But he removed the individ-
ual reference to the death of horses, which Hugo Bos included in the individual
captains’ accounts, and created instead a separate consolidated chapter that he
called “Reimbursement for killed horses” (in contradistinction with Hugo
Bos’s register, in which this type of expense did not receive its own separate
heading).39 This effort was tedious, and no doubt Hugues Fabre, the notary,
would have been overwhelmed by the sheer volume of names and data which
had to be consolidated; certainly many errors could have occurred in producing
the report.40 Carit then returned to the first register where he examined the
allocations made to messengers (10-12 per year), spies, and ambassadors.
Other expenses were reviewed summarily, particularly the wages paid to the
rector and the treasurer, whom he apparently did not suspect of malfeasance.
Because of Carit’s use of a vast trove of documents, in the final report of
the audit the auditor and his notary were able to reconstruct the management
process and produce a general accounting of the March’s government. They
organised their report into chapters, some chapters reflecting the decisions of
the provincial treasurer and others reflecting Carit’s own ideas of how to pres-
ent the financial situation in the March. But the audit process also consisted of
many procedures and calculations. On each of Bos’s registers, Carit would
calculate the totals at the bottom of each page, and he would then summarise
the totals for each chapter and each exercise. This process was repeated for
each of the registers provided by the treasurer. In Carit’s final report, which
reconstructed all of the provincial financial flows, each page was also summa-
rised, as well as each chapter and then the entire exercise. This process allows
us to compare the figures calculated by Carit with those produced in the regis-
38 In his report, Carit provided for each year a list of wages paid to cavalrymen, refunds for
killed horses, wages paid to pedestrians, and the spending of materiel pro guerra, totalling more
than 84,000 florins in four years; AAV, Intr. et Ex. 45.
39 For the first year, for example, 47 horses were killed in the service of the Church. The
amount, “audita racione et visa extimatione cuiuslibet equi prout in libris extimationum dictorum
equorum continetur”, fully justifies Carit’s choice: 1,212 florins; Ibid., f. 118.
40 “Raymengardus, Raymundus de Solargio, Rostagnus de Rilliano, Raymundus Fomecte,
Bernardus Ferrerie, Johannes de Sancta Maria et Johannes Clavelli” in the military register
(Ibid., f. 5v and following) became “Aymengardus, Raymundus de Salanhio, Rostanhus de
Rilhano, Raymundus Farneto, Bernardus Ferrier, Johannes de Sancta Maria et Johannes
Claverii” in the report (AAV, Intr. et Ex. 62, f. 110); moreover, they were constantly said to be “de
banderia domini marescalli Marchie, domini Guillelmi de Causaco”, a detail which does not
appear in Hugo’s accounts.
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ters of the treasurer. It is then clear that in addition to its auditing function –
verifying the accuracy of what was submitted by the province – the report was
also useful as a guide to preparing future provincial accounting.41
The audit revealed a deficit of more than 5,258 florins over three years,
and Hugo Bos was called in to explain the discrepancies. He tried to justify
them by asserting that he was anticipating the receipt of assets due from certain
bankers in Macerata, apparently the proceeds of a loan he solicited to pay the
men-at-arms: “tamen solutiones ipsorum in libro perfecto posuit”; in other
words, his was a mere oversight. The amount of the loan was 2,352 florins.
“Maybe” replied Bertrand Carit courteously, “but then, how did you manage to
pay the other 2,906 florins that appear in your expenses?” Here the treasurer
was probably taken by surprise. We might even envision his complexion turn-
ing pale before finally producing the most improbable explanation. He indi-
rectly accused his predecessors of less than proper conduct in office, claiming
that he used the gifts from various communities and lords to fill the gaps in the
cash flow.42
Carit did not add any personal conclusions in the report, leaving them to
the judgement of the Apostolic Chamber. He likely left Macerata a few days
later, at the beginning of December, taking with him the registers produced by
Hugo’s team (a copy had to remain in the provincial Treasury), and probably
provided his report to the camerarius around Christmas. We do not know what
occurred after that. But as the treasurer remained in office, we can assume that
the Apostolic Chamber granted a full exoneration to this ‘magician’, who
somehow was able to pay out much more than the revenues permitted – and,
moreover, was not able to explain it!
III. On 22 October 1486, acting in the name of Bartolomeo della Rovere,
Urbano Vegerio handed to the Apostolic Chamber in Rome two accounting
books, again from the March of Ancona. Only the first, covering the period
from 1 October 1484 to 30 September 1485 has been preserved. We do, how-
ever, have the report produced by the clerks of the Camera before the audit.
The fact that these two documents became separated in the archives might
41 In the margin, he criticized the ranking: “ista recepta debet esse in ordine post alios
affictus supra secundo folio”, or elsewhere “ista recepta non debuit poni sub rubrica ista de
condempnationibus stipendiariorum, sed sub illa de confiscatis bonis mobilibus rebellium et ideo
non computetur hic” (AAV, Intr. et Ex. 46, ff. 40v-41); sometimes he even blamed inadequate
presentation: “volumus quod alias ordinetur”; Ibid., f. 110.  
42
AAV, Intr. et Ex. 62.
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explain why the historical connection between the two was never made.43
Elected in September 1484, pope Innocent VIII was heavily influenced by cardi-
nal Giuliano della Rovere and might even be considered the cardinal’s ‘pup-
pet’. Hence it is not surprising to discover that the office of treasurer of the
March was held by none other than the brother-in-law of the powerful cardinal.
Two clerks of the Camera, Andrea de’ Spiriti and Sinolfo di Castell’Ot-
tieri, were assigned as auditors. Following well-established procedures, their
report begins with a series of disclaimers regarding both the registers and their
audit report. They are listed before a series of calculations for revenues, ex-
penses, balances, and the questions to be addressed to the treasurer of the
March. The author of the report, Andrea de’ Spiriti, then commented at length
regarding the standards in force for the taxation of salaries, delivery of trade
and exporting licenses, and the distribution of fines.44 He does not mention his
sources, but it seems clear that he was using the prior reports and possibly the
registers of Urbano’s predecessors. Next he inspected the receipts and ex-
penses in order of appearance, and then proceeded to the essential calculations.
Unlike the previous case we studied, in which the structure of the report had a
free format, this one follows clearly defined standards: the auditor does not
provide his own interpretation of the provincial accounting; the report rests on
the fixed classification chosen by the treasurer. As intimated above, the provin-
cial register was not perceived as an accurate description of every transaction
but more like a summarised bank statement in which the most important thing
was the final balance.
As to the details: in 1484-1485, the revenues exceeded 40,000 ducats and
after expenses the balance was positive for a little more than 200 ducats. The
following year, the revenues rose to 47,819 ducats and expenditures to 47,992.
In the first year, the pope withdrew for the curia romana 12,723 ducats and in
the second year more than 18,000 ducats. An additional 12,000 ducats was
given to the lord of Camerino. Any normal interpretation of the results would
have noted that the net product of the administration of the March, once the
ordinary expenses were subtracted, rose by approximately 50% in the first year
and 75% in the second, primarily due to a reduction in the size of the work-
43 ASR, Cam. III, busta 14, reg. 39, and AAV, Instrumenta Miscellanea 7306. 
44 He specified the rate of capisoldi perceived half by the treasurer, half by the solicitor. Two
baiocchi per ducat were to be deducted for the pay of the officers, and one baioccho in the case
of local lords. The wheat exported by sea must be taxed at one quarter of a ducat, but if exported
on land the rate was 6 baiocchi, reduced to 2 if transported inside the March, and so on.
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force:45 it was decided in Rome to cut administrative and military effectives to
increase the profits. The adoption of new standards for calculating these state-
ments of account, however, brought about fresh reflection with regard to ensur-
ing the balance between incomes and expenditures – something that had not
occurred before. Any concerns or comments listed in the report would then be
helpful in the audit of the treasurer’s registers.
Andrea de’ Spiriti began his audit report by making several positive obser-
vations, followed by a list of concerns. For example, there appeared to be mis-
takes in calculating the taxes on salaries, an absence of revenues on the minting
of coins, a lack of an inventory of goods sold, and so on.46 The audit provided
the Chamber with the opportunity to delve deeply into the administrative func-
tioning of the province, going far beyond verifying the computations made by
the treasurer. All the remarks in the report indicate that the clerk was conduct-
ing for the Camera a serious and diligent investigation of Urbano’s financial
situation.
Andrea was unable to verify every calculation, but he sought out any indi-
cations which might suggest that the Chamber had been deprived of its rights
or any miscalculation which might raise additional questions. If Camerino had
a deficit of more than 7,000 ducats for the subsidium, the treasurer would have
to explain how he intended to offset it. Since various bishops appeared to have
failed to pay their obligations on time, the treasurer would have to justify why
he had been unsuccessful in collecting their charges. The comparison of vari-
ous accounts would seem to indicate that Urbano had been assessing the sums
paid to the pope at one rate and then used a different rate for revenues raised
from fines. This led to the controller commenting: “it would be a big problem
for the Chamber if he put revenues at the rate of 11 carlini and expenses at the
rate of 11 carlini and 2 baiocchi”, and so on.47
But the outcome of the audit left little room for doubt as to the influence of
the cardinal’s brother-in-law. On 3 December 1486, 42 days after the account-
ing registers were submitted in Camera, it was announced with great solemnity,
under the chairmanship of Niccolò Cibo, nephew of Innocent VIII, and in the
presence of the vice-camerarius, the general treasurer, three of the clerks of the
Chamber, and two notaries, that Urbano Vegerio was cleared of any malfea-
sance and the case was considered closed. Andrea de’ Spiriti, on the other
45 AAV, Instr. Misc. 7306, ff. 12v-13, 25v-26.
46 Ibid., ff. 14-16v, 27-29.
47 Ibid., f. 15.
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hand, continued his pursuit of Urbano’s accounts, even after this solemn decla-
ration. He later discovered that on various sums listed in his accounts to the
tune of 5,783 ducats, Urbano had collected some 195 ducats in exchange rate,
but did not include this in the accounts. Whether this sum was stolen or other-
wise missing, the treasurer agreed to pay this amount to the Chamber and thus
avoid the reopening of the audit. But Andrea persisted and wrote that he also
learned that Urbano owed 191 florins, again “ex lagiis monetarum Marchiae”.
Any lingering doubts about Urbano’s probity vanished as this fact clearly indi-
cated that a well-organised scheme to defraud the papacy was taking place and
clear efforts were made to hide these illicit earnings. In sum, in the weeks
following the solemn declaration exonerating him, Urbano Vegerio was found
to be in deficit to the tune of 587 florins!
Having the support of a powerful backer, however, had its obvious advan-
tages. In the name of the pope, the general treasurer Falcone Sinibaldi donated
the last 191 florins as a gift, and Andrea de’ Spiriti was then able to offset the
debt. His final note indicated that the treasurer funded himself, on 20 Decem-
ber, the outstanding balance 396 florins. As a diligent and self-assured officer,
Andrea verified that the payment was indicated in the “the third book of the
general depositary on folio 30”, which finally allowed him to complete and
close the audit of Urbano, with all the discrepancies removed.48
* * *
In the papal state of the thirteenth century audits were quite numerous and
often took a special form owing to the fact that the office of provincial trea-
surer was granted to bankers. Resolving local government issues on a host of
financial matters could easily alter the relationship between the officer in
charge and the sovereign’s court. To increase the transparency of government,
Avignon put an end to appointing bankers to serve as provincial treasurers.
This ultimately led to the development of an administrative bureaucracy which
was entrusted with the key role in the relations between the central authorities
and the inhabitants of the papal state.
The auditing of the treasurer by now almost always took place onsite, and
this gave the auditor access to all the necessary documents. The audit would
include an assessment of the capabilities of the management, proposals for the
48 ASR, Cam. III, busta 14, reg. 39, f. 251v.
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reorganisation of the presentation of the individual accounts, and a quantitative
verification of the operations, which, as we have seen, occasionally yielded
unexpected results. For additional transparency in the audit, the treasurer was
not allowed to reconcile his own accounts. That role was performed by the
auditor, who would first reconcile the treasurer’s accounting registers and then
create his own audit report. However, it seems clear that evaluation of the trea-
surer’s management skills rested on his ability to follow procedures rather than
on his accounting skills. But the audit of Hugo Bos showed that the treasurer
maintained a parallel set of accounting registers which made it quite easy for
him to pocket some of the cash even as he presented ‘perfectly balanced ac-
counts’.
More than a century later, the conception of accounting changed again. The
accounting registers now followed a certain set structure, established over time
through practice, and the audit was therefore limited to simply assessing the
veracity of the transactions that had been recorded. The case of Urbano Vege-
rio is particularly interesting, because the treasurer belonged to the clan that
held power at the Roman court. The auditing process could also be conducted
in a way that avoided raising too many questions. In this way, accounting dis-
crepancies would be overlooked. One might wonder, then, if the clerks of the
Camera really had the resources to fight corruption. Nonetheless, their reports
were based on an accurate inspection of the treasurer’s management and a
strict audit of his compliance with current administrative rules. Yet it became
obvious that the audit’s conclusion, being a political affair, might simply leave
out the treasurer’s abuses. To return to the case of Della Rovere, the procedure
ensured that the honour and reputation of the powerful cardinal’s brother-in-
law remained unblemished. Arguably the most interesting aspect of the case is
that, although the administrative rules were clearly established, the Camera had
the discretion to settle any discrepancies raised by the audit in any way it saw
fit. And it seems that if the exposition was not satisfactory, the Chamber re-
fused to approve the accounts.49
A key conclusion from these three case studies is that one can neither argue
that rudimentary accounting methods are to blame for the way corruption was
covered up by late medieval administrations, nor that corruption could only
49 ASR, Cam. III, busta 1595, vol. I, no. 1. The accounts of Geronimo Tagliaferri for Parma
in 1522-1524 were first refused by the clerks of the Camera; they were only approved ten years
later. The mere list of payment orders with summarized receipts made it difficult to identify any
possible fraud.
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become apparent with technical progress in accounting and auditing in the
early modern period. Corrupt practices may have been permitted to some ex-
tent in the late Middle Ages for one specific reason: what the monarch sought
above all was to be well served. He sought men who would do their utmost to
extract the maximum from the local communities, and if from time to time
some accounting discrepancies occurred, they could be easily overlooked. It
did not seem necessary to remove trusted men from office on account of rela-
tively minor lapses. Thus, despite the inconsistencies and possibly embezzle-
ment of funds, Hugo Bos remained in his post as the treasurer of the March of
Ancona, in contrast to Bartolo di Cepparello, who was not considered suffi-
ciently effective in his tax-collection efforts and was consequently removed as
treasurer of the Patrimony of Saint Peter on the very day he submitted his ac-
counting registers!
These three examples also reveal how essential it was to have an auditor
onsite at the archives where the audit was to take place. It was only because
Andrea de’ Spiriti had access to all the documents in the Apostolic Chamber as
well as the accounting registers of Urbano’s predecessors, that he could have
reached such an accurate understanding of the accounting methods used. By
contrast, his predecessor Bertrand Carit did not have this advantage, because
the earlier accounts were then kept in Assisi, and he therefore knew nothing
about the earlier management of the March. He was forced to rely only on what
the treasurer had provided to him directly (as it happens, Hugo Bos was quite
generous in this respect). Earlier still, in the first case study discussed here, the
lord of Bidache could only extract a written explanation of his treasurer’s fi-
nancial accounting by having him imprisoned!
A Codicological Approach to the Auditing Process:
The Duke of Burgundy’s Household Accounts
during the Swiss Campaign (1476)
EKATERINA NOSOVA
T
he dukes of Burgundy of the Valois dynasty (1363-1477) earned the
fame of the richest and most powerful among “les princes des lys”. To-
day historians agree that Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy (1363-
1404), who as the younger son of king John II of France received the duchy of
Burgundy and founded a new ducal dynasty, was indeed the wealthiest of the
French princes.1 Venetian chroniclers put the income of the Burgundian state
as the first in Europe at the beginning of the fifteenth century and the second
in the middle of the century.2 The image of the richest “grand duc de l’Occi-
dent”,3 Philip the Good, was so ingrained in the minds of contemporaries that
1 B. SCHNERB, L’État bourguignon, 1363-1477 (Paris, 1999), p. 114.
2 F. BRAUDEL, Civilisation materiélle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, 3, Le
temps du monde (Paris, 1979), pp. 98-99; J.-Fr. LASSALMONIE, “Le plus riche prince d’Occi-
dent?”, in: La cour de Bourgogne et l’Europe: Le rayonnement et les limites d’un modèle
culturel, ed. W. PARAVICINI (Ostfildern, 2013), ð. 66.
3 According to Georges Chastelain, Muslims called Philip the Good “le grand duc du
......................................................................................................................................
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political
Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2020), pp. 165-181.
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it was inherited by historiography.4 The Burgundian court was one of the best
organised in medieval Europe, evoking images of wealth and luxury. Famous
banquets and solemn entrances in the cities, described by the Burgundian
chroniclers, created an image of splendour, which sometimes came close to bad
taste, according to Johan Huizinga.5
Obviously, behind this image of wealth lay not only the tax revenues from
the rich Flemish cities controlled by the dukes, but also well-organised book-
keeping. The Burgundian financial archives are known as the best preserved in
medieval Europe.6 Among this mass of documents are a series of accounts that
stand out from the rest of the Burgundian financial records.7 They were com-
piled a year after the death of Charles the Bold, the last duke of Burgundy from
the Valois dynasty, in the Battle of Nancy (5 January 1477). This is mentioned
in the note at the end of each account signed by a person named de La Roche:
Toutes les parties cy devant declairies sont vrayes et extraictes au vray sur les
escroes de la despense ordinaire du mois de juing anno LXXVI, et en signe de veri-
Ponant”; Jean Molinet used the expression “le très grand et renommé duc d’Occident”; see P.
BONENFANT, “L’origine des surnoms de Philippe le Bon”, Annales de Bourgogne 16 (1944), pp.
100-103, at pp. 101-102.
4 R. PROCHNO, “Mythos Burgund: Entstehung, Bedeutungen und Fortleben bis zur Gegen-
wart”, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 83 (2001), pp. 93-120; W. PARAVICINI, “Préface: La fin du
mythe bourguignon?”, in: La cour de Bourgogne et l’Europe, pp. 9-17, at pp. 11-12.
5 J. HUIZINGA, Le Déclin du Moyen-Âge (Paris, 1948), p. 230.
6 W. PARAVICINI, “L’Embarras de richesse: Comment rendre accessibles les archives
financières de la maison de Bourgogne-Valois”, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences
Morales et Politiques de l’Académie royale de Belgique, 6th series, 7 (1996), pp. 17-64, at p. 66;
B. SCHNERB, “Les archives des ducs de Bourgogne: tradition, inventaires, publications”, in: La
cour de Bourgogne et l’Europe, pp. 27-32; P. COCKSHAW, “Les archives bourguignonnes, les plus
riches d’Europe?”, in: La cour de Bourgogne et l’Europe, ðp. 43-54.
7 Archives départementales du Nord (henceforth ADN), Lille, B 3333, ff. 11r-100r; B 3377,
ff. 1r-22v; B 3377, matriculations 113552, 113555, 113556. Publication of these texts is in
progress, see E. NOSOVA, “Dvor Karla Smelogo v Shveytsarskoy kampanii: Finansovyye
dokumenty: Chast’ I: Scheta za mart 1476 g.” [The Court of Charles the Bold in the Burgundian
wars: Financial documents: Part I: Account of March 1476], Vox medii aevi 1 (2017), pp. 274-312
<http://voxmediiaevi.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Vox-medii-aevi.-Vol.-1-1-2017_
%D0%9D%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0_274-312.pdf> (accessed on 18
October 2019); E. NOSOVA, “Dvor Karla Smelogo v Shveytsarskoy kampanii: finansovyye
dokumenty: Chast’ II: Scheta za aprel 1476 g.” [The Court of Charles the Bold in the Burgundian
wars: financial documents. Part II. Account of April 1476], Vox medii aevi 2 (2018), pp. 286-317,
<http://voxmediiaevi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/VMA_2018_VOL2_286_317_
NOSOVA.pdf> (accessed on 18 October 2019).
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te, j’ay signé ce present extraict de mon saing manuel, cy mis le xxviii e jour de
janvier, l’an mil IIIIc LXXVII. G. de la Roiche.
The signature ‘G. de la Roiche’ probably hides Gerard de la Roche. A
member of the Burgundian household since 1451, he was appointed in 1474 to
the position of maître de la chambre aux deniers and continued to exercise this
function under Maximilian of Habsburg.8 As always with documents dated
between 1 January and mid-April, it is necessary to be careful when determin-
ing the date. In the chancery of the dukes of Burgundy the year began with
Easter, as in the French royal chancery.9 Maximilian of Habsburg, having re-
ceived the title and lands of the dukes of Burgundy, also used the French style,
in which Easter marked the beginning of the year.10 Even as emperor,
Maximilian did not abandon his habit of dating letters according to the French
style.11 So the date of 28 January 1477 given in document must correspond to
28 January 1478. Thus, these documents postdate the lifespan of the Burgun-
dian state (1363-1477). At the same time, they are organically connected with
the general corpus of court documentation, since they were compiled on the
basis of écrous for 1476, as follows from de La Roche’s remark.
In total, this series of financial records compiled in 1478 consists of nine
accounts: five accounts of purchases, covering the months of March to July
1476, and four accounts of wages, covering the months of April to July 1476
(in addition, there is one account in which the salary of the guards is recorded).
It is worth emphasising that these accounts stand out from the rest of the
Burgundian fiscal archives, specifically in that they record monthly expend-
itures, whereas the other Burgundian accounts are either daily or yearly. Given
the special nature of the documents, one cannot help but wonder about their
nature. Why were they established after the death of Charles the Bold? Why
are there no analogous records for other years? What is their place in the gen-
eral corpus of Burgundian financial documentation? It is the aim of this study
to search for answers to these questions, as a prerequisite for further work on
8 Prosopographia burgundica, <http://burgundicae.heraudica.org/fmi/iwp/cgi?-db= Proso
pographia %20Curiae%20Burgundicae&-loadframes>, ID 1878 (accessed on 18 October 2019).
9 A. GIRY, Manuel de diplomatique (Paris, 1925), pp. 114, 121.
10 Lettres inédites de Maximilien, Duc d’Autriche, Roi des Romains et Empereur sur les
affaires des Pays-Bas, pt. 1, 1478-1488, ed. L.-P. GACHARD, (Brussels, 1851), pp. 46, 58.
11 Correspondance de l’empereur Maximilien Ier et de Marguerite d’Autriche de 1507 à
1519, ed. A.J.G. LE GLAY, 2 vols. (Paris, 1835-1839), 1, pp. 52, 118, 251, 258, 389.
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these documents and for understanding how the data extracted from them can
be interpreted.
Between Economics and Codicology: New Approaches to Manuscripts
The accounts themselves do not indicate the purpose of their compilation
and their place in the financial system of the Burgundian court. We can judge
their purpose, first of all, on the basis of our general knowledge of the account-
ing process in the Burgundian state. Secondly, as recent research shows, impor-
tant inferences can be drawn from certain details of the manuscripts them-
selves. In this vein, the approach taken here is inspired by several fundamental
contributions.
The first group is represented by a series of French studies. Narrative
sources have long been the object of codicological research, in part because of
the attractiveness of the richly illuminated manuscripts; administrative records,
however, have been deposited in archives that were not explored by the pio-
neers of codicological research. In the last few decades this situation has
changed: archival documents have become more interesting to codicologists,
who turn to them more frequently.12 Here mention can be made of a research
approach to medieval scripturalité, summarised in an important article by J.
Morsel.13 This approach is related, but not identical, to English literacy studies
or the German studies of Schriftlichkeit. It encourages the researcher to reflect
not only on why he or she does not have a source at his or her disposal, but also
why he or she does. Furthermore, quantitative codicology has also inspired the
present study. In France this approach is best exemplified by E. Ornato and his
colleagues.14 It focusses on the study of the social context of a book or docu-
12 P. BERTRAND, “Une codicologie des documents d’archives existe-t-elle?”, Gazette du
livre médiéval 54.1 (2009), pp. 10-18; P. BECK, “Forme, organisation et ordonnancement des
comptabilités: Pour une approche codicologique –  archéologique – des documents de la pratique:
Rapport de synthèse”, in: Classer, dire, compter: Discipline du chiffre et fabrique d’une norme
comptable, ed. O. MATTÉONI and P. BECK (Paris, 2015), pp. 31-46; O. MATTÉONI, “Codicologie
des documents comptables (XIIIe-XVe siècles): Remarques introductives”, Comptabilités 2 (2011),
<https://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/382> (accessed on 19 January 2019). See also the
contribution by Alessandro Silvestri in the present volume.
13 J. MORSEL, “Ce qu’écrire veut dire au Moyen Âge … Observations préliminaires à une
étude de la scripturalité médiévale”, Memini: Travaux et documents de la Société d’études
médiévales du Québec 4 (2000), pp. 3-43.
14 We shall cite one of the first and most important works: C. BOZZOLO and E. ORNATO,
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ment, as a way of understanding the object itself – the written text and its mate-
riality. Research in this vein considers the codex as an archaeological object.15
In addition, in the last few years a research group has been formed to focus on
the analysis of various types of lists. The results of these studies, which we
hope will be published in the near future, can prove important for the study of
financial documentation, which is often presented in the form of lists.16
Secondly, I have drawn on insights from the school of Russian palaeogra-
phy and codicology,17 inspired by ideas formulated by Russian specialists at the
end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, who exam-
ined both historical and the contemporary documents and in approaches that
were, in effect, close to those of criminology. The fundamental insight is to
approach the manuscript as a system of traces, reflecting the various methods
of its production and the circumstances of its social life. Briefly, the ‘trace’ is
the socio-cultural action fixed in material form. By analysing traces, we can
restore the actions behind them.
All in all, these approaches have a sociological orientation. Through the
manuscript, the historian seeks to understand individuals’ conduct and medi-
eval society in general. In this case, we would like to link codicology not so
Pour une histoire du livre manuscrit au Moyen Âge: Trois essais de codicologie quantitative
(Paris, 1980).
15 A. GIOVANNINI, “Archéologie et restauration des livres et des documents médiévaux”,
Gazette du livre médiéval 17 (1990), pp. 7-19; J.A. SZIRMAI, The Archaeology of Medieval Book-
binding (Aldershot, 1999); P. BECK, Archéologie d’un document d’archives: Approche codicolo-
gique et diplomatique des cherches de feux bourguignonnes (Paris, 2006).
16 POLIMA: Le pouvoir des listes au Moyen Âge, <http://www.dypac.uvsq.fr/polima-le-
pouvoir-des-listes-au-moyen-age-351370.kjsp> (accessed on 18 October 2019).
17 D.O. TSYPKIN and O.V. VASILIYEVA, “Codicological analysis of manuscripts by means
of modern optico-electronic methods and some issues of restoration”, in: Care and Conservation
of Manuscripts, 2, Proceedings of the Second International Seminar on the Care and
Conservation of Manuscripts held at the University of Copenhagen 16th-17th October 1995
(Copenhagen, 1996), pp. 72-84; D.O. TSYPKIN, “Neskol’ko predvaritel’nykh zamechaniy o
yedinstve ekspertnoy nauki i o problemakh sovremennogo istochnikovedeniya” [Some
preliminary remarks on the unity of expert science and auxiliary disciplines], Fotografiya.
Izobrazheniye. Dokument [Photograph. Image. Document] 3 (2012), pp. 3-7; ID., “Optico-
electronic methods in the study of mediaeval paper in the manuscript division of the National
Library of Russia”, in: Le papier au Moyen Âge: histoire et techniques, ed. M. ZERDOUN BAT-
YEHOUDA (Turnhout, 1999: Bibliologia 19), pp. 243-253; ID., “Sledy na rukopisjah: I: Sledy
voska” [Traces on manuscripts: I: Wax], Fotografija: Izobrazhenie. Dokument 6 (2015), p. 34-74;
ID., “Nauka nabljudenija: Jekspertnyj podhod k izucheniju drevnerusskoj rukopisnoj knigi”
[Observation science: expert approach to the study of the Old Russian manuscript], Trudy otdela
drevnerusskoj literatury [Proceedings of the Department of Old Russian Literature] 65 (2017),
p. 151-180.
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much with sociology, but with economics and the auditing of accounts. There
is a widespread consensus that the advances of accounting have made a signifi-
cant contribution to financial and economic development; clearly, without the
careful auditing of accounts, it would be impossible to manage large financial
flows. We hope that the codicological approach will give an idea of how the
accounts from the Archives départementales du Nord can be interpreted, and
open a window onto the evolving process of maintaining, compiling, and veri-
fying accounts.
Financial Aspects
The documents under consideration were based on écrous or daily house-
hold accounts, as is clearly and unambiguously indicated by Gerard de La
Roche. This links them to the mainstream of financial records. The écrous are
the basic financial sources for the history of the Burgundian court. They were
written every day in the form of two rolls: expenses for food and other things
necessary for the court went into one of the rolls, and the salaries of the court-
iers into the other. Sometimes they were accompanied by separate écrous with
the salaries of the guards and extraordinary expenses. Next, the data of both
lists were summed up and entered into the annual accounts of the maître de la
chambre aux deniers, who was responsible for the court’s finances.18 Thus, our
accounts represent an intermediate link between daily accounts and annual
accounts. The account of the maître de la chambre aux deniers was kept in
parallel with the account of the controlleur, whose duties included maintaining
the second list of expenses of the court (contrerolle), which could be compared
with the account of the maître de la chambre aux deniers. The maître de la
chambre aux deniers got his money from the receveur général de toutes les
finances. The sums allocated to him usually appear as the first items in the
general accounts, the recettes générales de toutes les finances. The recettes
générales were made in two copies, one of which remained in the personal
archives of the treasurer, while the other was sent to the chambre des comptes
18 W. PARAVICINI, “Ordonnances de l’Hôtel und Escroes des gaiges: Wege zu einer
prosopographischen Erforschung des burgundischen Staats im funfzehnten Jahrhundert”, in:
Medieval Lives and the Historian: Studies in Medieval Prosopography, ed. N. BULST (Kalama-
zoo, 1986), pp. 243-266; H. KRUSE, Hof, Amt und Gagen: Die täglichen Gagenlisten des
burgundischen Hofes (1430-1467) und der erste Hofstaat Karls des Kühnen (1456) (Bonn, 1996),
p. 13-47.
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for auditing. This copy was checked by the maîtres de la chambre des comptes,
who could request confirmation of certain payments or even refuse to approve
them. All these processes are reflected in the recettes générales, which contain
many remarks, marginalia, and corrections – all heavily abbreviated. One can
think of the Burgundian household documentation as a pyramid with the écrous
as the lower tier and the recettes générales de toutes les finances as the upper
tier.
The household accounts of the dukes of Burgundy have not been preserved
in the best way. Most of the archive of the chambre aux deniers and the
controlleur has been lost, including most of the écrous for 1476, so that only
a few accounts of the maître de la chambre aux deniers and the controlleur
have been preserved.19 Écrous have survived for other years, but their number
is so small that they cannot be considered a representative corpus.20 Con-
versely, the recettes générales de toutes les finances were preserved almost
completely for the period from 1386 to 1477; they are now in the Archives
départementales de la Côte-d’Or (Dijon) and Archives départementales du
Nord (Lille). A small number of copies are stored in the Archives générales du
Royaume de Belgique in Brussels.21 This division corresponds to the economic
organisation of the Burgundian state. Initially the main role in the Burgundian
finances was played by the chambre des comptes in Dijon, but then the leading
role was taken over by the chambre des comptes in Lille; this was due to the
shift of the political and economic interests of the dukes of Burgundy towards
Flanders and the Netherlands after the murder of John the Fearless and the
severance of relations with France. In addition, chambres des comptes were
established in Brussels and, at the very end of the existence of the Burgundian
state, in The Hague.22
19 H. BAUTIER and J. SORNAY, Les sources de l’histoire économique et sociale du Moyen
Age: Les Etats de la Maison de Bourgogne, 1, Archives des principautés territoriales, part 2, Les
principautés du Nord (Paris, 1984), pp. 84-107.
20 W. PARAVICINI, “Ordonnances de l’Hôtel und Escroes des gaiges”, pp. 251-252. M.
SOMMÉ, Isabelle du Portugal: Une femme au pouvoir au XVe siècle (Villeneuve d’Ascq, 1997),
pp. 242-243; M. SOMMÉ, “Que représentait un gage journalier de 3 sous pour l’officier d’un hôtel
ducal à la cour de Bourgogne au XVe siècle?”, in: Les niveaux de vie au Moyen Âge: Mesures,
perceptions et représentations: Actes du colloque international de Spa 21-25 Octobre 1998, ed.
J.-P. SOSSON, C. THIRY, and T. VAN HEMELRYCK (Louvain, 1999), pp. 303-307.
21 For the list of the recettes générales, see M. MOLLAT, “Recherches sur les finances des
ducs Valois de Bourgogne”, Revue historique 219 (1958), pp. 285-321, at pð. 306-307, and
BAUTIER AND SORNAY, Sources de l’histoire économique et sociale, pp. 37-47.
22 SCHNERB, L’État bourguignon, pp. 98, 252-257.
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Because in contrast to the few preserved accounts of the maître de la
chambre aux deniers and the controlleur, the recettes générales de toutes les
finances form a rich corpus, it has been necessary to settle on a selective analy-
sis of the most representative specimens for those years which were marked by
deep economic changes. First of all, we have focussed on the mid-1470s, as our
main documents date from 1476-1478 (ADN, B 2108). Then we have chosen the
years around 1437 (ADN, B 1957, 1961, 1963), because in this year the finan-
cial system of the duchy of Burgundy was put to the test: financial strain was
provoked by the military campaign against England following the conclusion
of the Arras treaty in 1435.23 While this treaty put an end to the hostilities
between Burgundy and France, it drew Burgundy into a confrontation with its
traditional ally, England. An indirect consequence of this conflict was the
revolt in Flanders. Military actions on two fronts and the damage to the Flem-
ish economy owing to troubles with the import of wool provoked grave finan-
cial problems.24 What is more, the famine of 1436 forced the duke of Burgundy
to spend considerable sums on the purchase of grain and its distribution to
avoid the revolt. Michel Mollat’s quantitative analysis shows that the sum
spent by the duke in 1436 would be matched only in 1471.25
These two periods, crucial for the economy of the Burgundian state, can be
supplemented by several more intervals designed to play the role of bridges.
First of all, it was necessary to touch upon the initial stage of the recettes géné-
rales in the 1380s (Archives départementales de la Côte d’Or, B 1462). Then,
the end of the reign of Philip the Good was decisive (ADN, B 2058), because it
became a prelude to the coming to power of Charles the Bold, whose reign was
known as a time of reforms. In 1468 Charles the Bold changed the financial
system of his lands. If the receveur général had previously combined income
and expenditure, now these functions were divided between the receveur géné-
ral, who was responsible for income, and the argentier, who recorded expendi-
ture. Then Charles returned some functions to the receveur général, and the
argentier became only one of several financial officials, keeping track of pay-
ments made by the duke and of extraordinary wages and pensions.26
23 Die Hofordnungen der Herzöge von Burgund, 1, Herzog Philipp der Gute (1407-1467),
ed. H. KRUSE and W. PARAVICINI (Ostfildern, 2005), p. 135.
24 J.H. MUNRO, “An economic aspect of the collapse of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance,
1428-1442”, English Historical Review 85 (1970), pp. 225-244, at p. 240.
25 MOLLAT, “Recherches sur les finances”, pp. 306-307.
26 BAUTIER and SORNAY, Sources de l’histoire économique et sociale, pp. 29, 30, 42.
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Codicological Analysis
Form and Materials
Each monthly account from 1476 is presented in the form of a separate
quire, consisting of several bifolia sewn in the middle. For unknown reasons,
the quires have different shelf marks (B 3333 and B 3377); in the inventory
they were placed in different sections. Since this part of the archive collections
has not changed shelf marks since the middle of the nineteenth century, it can
be assumed that the quires were kept separately for a long time and the connec-
tion between them was lost. Although the quires are not sewn together, thanks
to the note made by Gerard de La Roche we know that they formed a whole.27
For all nine accounts the scribes used paper. Most of them are written on
paper with the watermark “écu au nom de Lile” (the closest variant is Briquet’s
No. 1886).28 To a lesser extent, paper with the “tête de bœuf” was also used
(the closest variant is Briquet No. 14236). Finally, the account for April is
written on paper with the letter ‘Y’ in the watermark (the closest variant is Bri-
quet, No. 9183). This paper was widespread in the north of France and the
Netherlands.
In contrast to the monthly accounts, all examined recettes générales and
accounts of the maître de la chambre aux deniers were made on parchment.29
It should be noted that high-quality parchment was used for them, characterised
by its light tone and velvety surface; tears are extremely rare and carefully
sewn, and hair bulbs are practically invisible. It is also worth mentioning that
Gregory’s rule is almost always respected in the recettes;30 this may indicate
that the manuscript has not been altered. As far as we can tell from the surviv-
27 The account of the wages of the court for December 1475 has also been preserved (ADN,
Lille, B 3377, matriculation 113554), but it is not authenticated by De la Roche, so it is not
included in the present analysis. A verification note by De la Roche was also found at the end of
the guard’s salary account; ADN, Lille, B 3333, fol. 1-8.
28 C.-M. BRIQUET, Les Filigranes: Dictionnaire historique des marques du papier, dès leur
apparition vers 1282 jusqu’en 1600, 4 vols. (Paris, 1907); online version: <http://www.ksbm.
oeaw.ac.at/_scripts/php/BR.php> (accessed on 18 October 2019).
29 We have chosen for analysis the following manuscripts: Dijon, Archives départementales
de la Côte-d’Or, B 1503bis; Courtrai, Archives de l’État, Fonds Goethals-Vercruysse, Ms. 326.
30 Gregory’s rule describes the medieval practice of matching parchment folios in quire
flesh-side opposite flesh-side and grain opposite grain; see C.R. GREGORY, “Les cahiers des
manuscrits grecs”, Comptes rendus de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1885), pp.
261-268.
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ing écrous, they were also made on parchment, but not of such high quality.
However, it is possible that the reason for their present condition stems from
their format: unlike a bound codex, a roll is more open to influences of the
environment. Of all documents analysed here, only the écrous were produced
as scrolls; all other accounts were bound.
In the middle of each quire of monthly accounts, close to the fold, there is
a perforation with a diameter of a few millimetres. Could it be that the quires
were once sewn together or that additional materials were attached through
sewing? It is possible; however, in the recettes générales and the accounts of
the maître de la chambre aux deniers we do not see any holes. The various
supplements to them (receipts, quittances, and so on), which were demanded
by the chambre des comptes, seem not to have been appended to the accounts.
Today these portefeuilles are kept in separate folders at the Archives
départementales du Nord, Lille. Écrous were often attached to each other, but
with double stitches. The holes observed on the monthly accounts were there-
fore probably made for some other purpose.
Page layout
The typical page of the recettes générales and the accounts of maître de la
chambre aux deniers is divided into three general parts. In the centre is the
main text, which describes the source of income in the case of the recettes, or
the purchases and different works, in case of the depenses. On the right margin
we can find the prices for each item. The total sum is mentioned at the end of
the section. The left margin is reserved for occasional remarks by the maître de
la chambre des comptes, who checked the account. Ample space for each col-
umn, rubric, and entry, is a characteristic feature of the recettes générales. In
general, such airy mise en page is thought to indicate the high status of the
person to whom the document belongs.31 However, this observation has been
made on the basis of single-sheet documents, such as charters, and is hardly
applicable to financial records. In this case, the wide margins were a necessity,
because they were used to insert remarks during the verification and audit
31 M.-J. GASSE-GRANDJEAN and B.-M. TOCK, “Peut-on mettre en relation la qualité de la
mise en page des actes avec le pouvoir de leur acteur?”, in: Les actes comme expression du
pouvoir au Haut Moyen Âge, ed. M.-J. GASSE-GRANDJEAN and B.-M. TOCK (Turnhout, 2003),
pp. 99-123.
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process. The complex layout of the text on the page is facilitated by regular
ruling, which is always present on all folia of the recettes générales. Normally
it was done with a lead stylus or ink. The same pattern is observed in the ac-
counts of the maître de la chambre aux deniers.
The monthly accounts are characterised by a completely different organisa-
tion of the space of the parchment manuscript sheet. In the accounts that record
expenses, the text is arranged in two columns, and in the account for July in
three. In accounts that indicate salaries, the text is written over the full width
of the sheet, and name and sum are linked with a long stroke, which is designed
to prevent the reader from making a mistake. At the end of each column of
each sheet we find the intermediate sum or subtotal, which was inserted to
make further calculations easier. Similar intermediate calculations are found at
the end of each item in the écrous, but not in the recettes générales, where
sums are given only at the end of large sections. There is no ruling; the scribe
was probably guided by the natural relief of the paper formed by vergés and
pontuseaux.
Handwriting and Number of Scribes
The main text of the recettes générales is usually written in one hand,
while the margins are full of all kinds of insertions and corrections. The ac-
count was prepared to be presented to the chambre des comptes for verifica-
tion. Wide margins are often so densely covered with comments that some-
times the structure of the text on the page is lost, requiring extra attention and
effort on the part of the reader.32 Nothing like this exists in the monthly ac-
counts. Corrections are made there also, but they are not as common as in the
recettes générales: most of them are related to adjustments of the amounts and
were probably the result of calculation errors. In the main text of the monthly
accounts it is possible to distinguish two different hands, plus the hand of Ge-
rard de La Roche. This fact, combined with the layout of the manuscript text,
suggests that these accounts were not originally intended for auditing, because
there would simply be no place where the auditors might insert their notes.
32 J.-B. SANTAMARIA, La Chambre des comptes de Lille de 1386 à 1419: Essor, organisa-
tion et fonctionnement d’une institution princière (Turnhout, 2012), pp. 169-181.
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Fig. 1: Dijon, Archives départementales de la Côte d’Or, B 1462, f. 1r.
Decoration
Finally, it is worth noting that the design of the monthly accounts is so
poor that one might say it is almost absent. In general, the financial records of
Burgundy were not particularly decorated; it is only on the first pages of the
accounts that we encounter artistic elements. These are initials in the form of
fish drawn with a pen (Fig. 1). However, these initials also disappeared very
quickly from the Burgundian accounting offices. The point of their disappear-
ance is, that the image of the fish was extremely widespread in the French
royal chancery; consequently, by refusing to use this symbol, the dukes of
Burgundy demonstrated their independence from the French Crown, which
marked a decisive moment in their policy. It should be noted that, having aban-
doned French royal symbolism, the Burgundian administration did not imple-
ment its own iconographic programme in the design of the accounts. The only
decorations in the recettes générales and in the accounts of the maître de la
chambre aux deniers were the large letters of chapter titles drawn with several
strokes of the pen.
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We can trace the relationship between the document, paper, and scribes in
the monthly accounts. First of all, it bears emphasis that there was no special
division of labour between the different scribes. A scribe that we shall identify
as ‘scribe No. 1’ made both types of entry, purchases and wages, and used
different kinds of paper. In general, it looks as if he started his work and then
his colleague stepped in to help him. Secondly, it seems that the text was writ-
ten almost continuously and simultaneously. Analysing the layout of the text
on the page of the recettes générales, we can try to establish the order in which
the different parts of the text were written. Sometimes it is clear that this or
that article was added after the entire page had been written down, because the
handwriting is smaller and overlapping with the previously written text. As for
the monthly accounts, they contain no additions, but only minor corrections.
The general characteristics of the quires of the monthly accounts are sum-
marised in the table below.
Table 1: General Characteristics of the quires of the monthly accounts
No. Shelf mark
(ADN)
Type Month Watermark Scribe Reinforced
1. B 3377 
im 113552





Purchases April écu au nom
de Lile
1 inside and outside
3. B 3333
ff. 67-74v
Purchases May écu au nom
de Lile
2 inside and outside
4. B 3333
ff. 79-84v










Wages April letter Y 1 outside
7. B 3333
ff. 45-66
Wages May tête de bœuf noz





Wages June tête de bœuf noz
relié à une sorte
de sourcils
1 inside and outside
9. B 3333
ff. 85-100
Wages July tête de bœuf noz




In general, the foregoing analysis leads us to believe that the documents in
question fall outside the standard accountability of the Burgundian state and
not only because of their date. They have a different form and were written on
paper, which was rarely used for accounts. Finally, unlike the other accounts,
they were clearly not intended for verification. Here it is worth going back to
the questions reviewed at the beginning of this essay: why do we not find simi-
lar or analogous accounts for other years? Why were these accounts established
after the death of Charles the Bold? And what was their place in the general
corpus of Burgundian financial records?
The Archives of Charles the Bold: Lacunae and their Interpretation
As already emphasised, the Burgundian archives are traditionally presented
as the richest in France. However, this impression was formed mainly on the
basis of a comparison with the French royal archives, which suffered great
losses in the fire of 1737.33 It should also be noted that the end of the reign of
Charles the Bold is documented worse than the earlier periods. It would make
sense to assume that the reason for this was Charles the Bold’s Swiss cam-
paign, which ended in defeat. The archives followed the duke, and so parts of
them could be lost in the aftermath of a battle. For example, at the battle of
Grandson, the seals of Charles the Bold and of his brother Antoine were lost.
The Swiss Peter Roth, captain of the Basel army, used Antoine’s seal to close
the battle report he sent to Basel.34 But the hypothesis of archival losses due to
defeats on the battle field was challenged by Werner Paravicini, who found
later copies of many Burgundian documents. This means that they could not
have been destroyed during the Swiss campaign; but perhaps they perished at
the beginning of the French Revolution.35 And, even this does not explain the
selective nature of the lacunae, which occur mainly in 1475-1477.
Pierre Cockshaw has suggested that the loss of the documents was due to
the intensive use of paper, which replaced parchment at the end of the reign of
Charles the Bold.36 But like the previous hypothesis, this does not explain why
the documents for 1477 were lost, and documents for the later period, pertain-
33 PARAVICINI, “L’Embarras de richesse”, p. 66.
34 Charles le Téméraire: Catalogue d’exposition (Bern, 2008), p. 334, Nos. 146, 147.
35 PARAVICINI, “Ordonnances de l’Hôtel”, p. 247.
36 COCKSHAW, “Les archives bourguignonnes”, p. 45.
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ing to Habsburg rule, have been preserved. Be this as it may, the daily accounts
of the household did not suffer losses during the Swiss campaign and the battle
of Nancy, for if they had, they could not have served as the basis for the compi-
lation of the monthly accounts.
Bureaucracy or Necessity?
So, why was it necessary after the death of Charles the Bold to create the
accounts discussed here? There are several hypotheses. First, the office might
simply have worked through inertia for a few more years after Charles the
Bold’s death. The process of drafting documents and their verification by the
chambre des comptes continued for years.37 But we do not have similar docu-
ments for the reign of Charles the Bold or for an earlier period,38 although we
cannot, of course, exclude that these texts have been lost. Secondly, the compi-
lation of these accounts may be the result of the Habsburg attempt to revise the
Burgundian accounts to solve the financial problems inherited along with the
Burgundian lands. This hypothesis would explain why there are no similar
documents for other periods. Another explanation is inspired by codicology:
perhaps these are, after all, randomly saved drafts. This explanation is sup-
ported by the use of paper, because in fifteenth-century Europe paper was still
a material used for recording information that was not intended for long-term
use.39 For documents intended for permanent storage, like the recettes généra-
les, parchment was commonly used,40 although there were exceptions.41 The
distrust of paper is confirmed by the fact that most of the notebooks are rein-
forced in the middle, and some of them on the outside, with strips of parch-
37 J.-B. SANTAMARIA, “Un maître prévaricateur à la Chambre des comptes de Lille sous
Philippe le Bon: Roland du Bois”, in: La face noire de la splendeur: Crimes, trahisons et scan-
dales à la cour de Bourgogne aux XIVe et XVe siècle, ed. W. PARAVICINI and B. SCHNERB (Ville-
neuve d’Ascq, 2009), p. 424.
38 BAUTIER AND SORNAY, Sources de l’histoire économique et sociale, pp. 84-111, 199-205.
39 Lire le manuscrit médiéval, ed. P. GÉHIN (Paris, 2013), p. 16.
40 S. BEPOIX, F. COUVEL, and M. LEGUIL, “Entre exercice imposé et particularismes locaux:
Étude codicologique des comptes de châtellenie des duché et comté de Bourgogne de 1384 à
1450”, Comptabilités 2 (2011), <http://comptabilites.revues.org/491> (accessed on 31 January
2017).
41 M.-A. MOULIN, “Un exemple de comptabilité hospitalière : Les comptes de l’hôtel-Dieu
Saint-Thomas d’Argentan (1402-1499)”, Tabularia “Études” 10 (2010), https://journals.open
edition.org/tabularia/1252> (accessed on 31 January 2017); COCKSHAW, “Les archives bour-
guignonnes”, p. 45.
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ment. This is a common phenomenon in the transition period from parchment
to paper.42 The differences from the other accounts also speak in favour of this
hypothesis.
Conclusions
As the research discussed in the introduction to this study shows, manu-
scripts can be usefully approached as material objects in all their diversity.
This kind of analysis of the manuscript is apt not only to restore the contents of
the text, but to lead to other important findings. In this case, it has helped us
understand how the process of writing and checking the accounts unfolded.
The analysis of the materials used in the manuscripts’ production, of the deco-
ration and other traces, has helped us assess the place of the manuscripts
among the mass of Burgundian financial sources. The significant particularities
displayed by the financial manuscripts analysed here confirm the initial as-
sumption that they were fundamentally different from the general series of
Burgundian accounts. The use of paper and the absence of minimal ornamenta-
tion is indirect evidence that the manuscripts were preparatory materials only
that were not intended for long-term storage. The combination of the two disci-
plines, economic history and codicology (at first glance quite remote from each
other), made it possible to draw conclusions that could not have been obtained
through a conventional reading of the text of the accounts. This approach
could, in principle, be replicated in other manuscript contexts.
The analysis of the recettes générales invites further reflection. Just as the
philolologist compares different variants of the same text to identify the origi-
nal version, we could not help but try to relate the Burgundian accounts to
similar contemporaneous records. The homogeneity of the content and form of
the recettes générales suggests that they probably had a common prototype.
Studies of other financial documents indicate that they have many similarities
with each other and with the Burgundian recettes générales.43 What could have
42 SZIRMAI, Archaeology of Medieval Bookbinding, ch. 9.3.
43 M. AUBRY, “Le comptable au travail : Les signes techniques en marge des comptabilités
lilloises (1291-1369)”, Comptabilités 4 (2012), <http://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/
1128> (accessed on 31 January 2017); D. ANGERS, “‘Ideo ordinetur’: Les comptes de la vicomté
de Caen au crible de l’analyse des ‘gens’ de la Chambre des comptes”, Comptabilités 4 (2012),
<http://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/1055> (accessed on 4 May 2019); M. LEGUIL, “Le
châtelain, le compte et le clerc: Les acteurs de la reddition des comptes de châtellenie en
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been their original model? Perhaps, as in other cases, it came from the institu-
tions of the French kingdom. Most of the audit chambers, including those at
Dijon and Lille, were founded on the model of the chambre des comptes of
Paris. It seems that the borrowings did not stop with the general structure of
Burgundian accountability, but may well have extended to its documentary
practices and auditing procedures.
Bourgogne aux xiv e et xv e siècles, d’après l’exemple du bailliage d’Auxois”, Comptabilités 7
(2015), <http://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/1740> (accessed on 10 May 2019).
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uring the long winter of 1396-1397, a grave dispute arose between the
mayors and deputies of the county’s capital, Chambéry, on the one
hand, and on the other hand some officers and commissioners of
Savoy’s chambre des comptes in the service of the young prince, Amadeus VIII.
What was at stake? Why were the plaintiffs so outraged, crying foul and putt-
ing up a bitter argument against a decision which was seen as very unusual,
“contra morem solitum et contra consuetudinem”? And what was this “cus-
tomary practice”?1
In the deputies’ words, the proposal aimed to transfer to some loca remota
the “computos reddituum patrimonii rerum et iurium vestrorum” hitherto kept
1 The two records at the heart of this dossier have been edited by P. COSTA DE BEAURE-
GARD, “Matériaux historiques et documents inédits extraits des Archives de la Ville de
Chambéry”, Mémoires de l’Académie de Savoie 11 (1843), pp. 166-174, at p. 170.
......................................................................................................................................
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in the castle of Chambéry. The mos solitum was that the principality’s archives
– effectively its ‘written memory’ – were not to be removed from Chambéry.
But now the officers of the chambre des comptes were seeking to relocate the
financial archives to Bourg-en-Bresse, a castellany farther north, thus creating
a new administrative centre for Savoy. Let us note straightaway that the docu-
ments involved in this archival dispute were the “computi seu libri et raciones
computorum”, that is the rolls and registers proceeding chiefly from the castel-
lanies’ and the general treasury’s accounts, which were then stored in a single
repository in the castle of Chambéry.2 The roots of this repository can be traced
back at least to the early decades of the fourteenth century: in 1351, the first
statutes of Savoy’s chambre des comptes directed the auditors to “registrer en
on papier touz les comptes qui se troueront lay ou on les tient deus xxx.ta anz
encza, por ce que nul ne sen puisse perdre”.3 This places the accounts’ archive
in Chambéry in the 1320s.4
Although the political dimension of the dispute of 1396-1397 falls outside
the scope of this study,5 the historical background can be reviewed briefly. At
the twilight of the fourteenth century, Amadeus VIII – the future first duke of
Savoy – was still a youngster and the policies of his principality were mainly
controlled by his French relatives, above all by the duke of Burgundy, whose
daughter Marie had married Amadeus, then aged ten, in Chalon-sur-Saône on
30 October 1393.6 The marriage goes some way towards explaining the project
of transferring the fiscal archive from Chambéry to Bourg. Capital of the baili-
2 COSTA DE BEAUREGARD, “Matériaux historiques”, pp. 168-69.
3 C. NANI, “I primi Statuti sopra la Camera dei Conti nella Monarchia di Savoia”, Memorie
della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino 34 (1881), pp. 161-215 (XVIII, p. 204).
4 See P. RÜCK, L’ordinamento degli archivi ducali di Savoia sotto Amedeo VIII (Rome,
1977), p. 49. On the beginning of fiscal archives in nearby principalities: J. RICHARD, “Les
archives et les archivistes des ducs de Bourgogne dans le ressort de la chambre des comptes de
Dijon”, Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 105 (1944), pp. 123-169; La France des Principau-
tés: Les Chambres des comptes, XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Ph. CONTAMINE and O. MATTÉONI (Paris,
1996); O. MATTÉONI, “L’étude des Chambres des comptes en France à la fin du Moyen Âge:
bilan, débats et enjeux”, in: Contrôler les finances sous l’Ancien Régime: Regards d’aujourd’hui
sur les Chambres des comptes, ed. D. LE PAGE (Paris, 2011); A. LEMONDE, “Le premier banc des
comptes delphinal: Composition, influence et pratiques (1307-1340)”, in: De l’autel à l’écritoire:
Aux origines des comptabilités princières en Occident (XIIe-XIVe siècle), ed. Th. PÉCOUT (Paris,
2017), pp. 249-268.
5 This is analysed in G. CASTELNUOVO, “Contra morem solitum: un conflit d’archives
savoyard en 1397”, Reti Medievali Rivista 9 (2008): 1-19, <http://www.rmojs.unina.it/index.php/
rm/article/view/urn%3Anbn%3Ait%3Aunina-3120>.
6 See F. COGNASSO, “L’influsso francese nello stato sabaudo durante la minorità di Amedeo
VIII”, Mémoires de l’École française de Rome 35 (1916), pp. 257-326.
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wick of Bresse, adjacent to the Burgundian territories (Chalon is only seventy
kilometres away), Bourg could become the new administrative and political
centre of the principality; ironically perhaps, in January 1397 the Chambéry
deputies delivered one of their letters of grievance into the hands of their count,
who was then residing precisely in Bourg.7 In the end, the archival journey
envisaged in 1397 did not take place. When he came of age at the dawn of the
fifteenth century, Amadeus freed himself from Burgundian guardianship. Fur-
thermore, in a few decades the castle of Chambéry became the institutional and
physical location of most of Savoy’s ‘written memory’, to the point that in the
middle of the century its ducal repository can be characterised as a good exam-
ple of a centralised double archive, containing both the charters and land deeds
of the trésor des chartes and the financial and administrative accounts.8
This paper focuses on the documents whose archival location was at stake
in 1396-1397. What is the significance of the episode in terms of documentary
policy, administrative strategy, and even ideological priorities? Who were the
main protagonists in a dispute that involved a range of officials, from the city’s
deputies to the prince’s officials? What can be said about the subsequent
historiographical use and understanding of these multifaceted accounting re-
cords, from the fifteenth century to present-day scholarship? The approach of
this case study in late medieval accounting and accountability is threefold: I
will consider issues associated with the storing, archiving, and inventorying of
the accounting records from the end of the fourteenth to the beginning of the
sixteenth century, for both central records (such as the treasury rolls and regis-
ters) and local accounts (mainly the castellanies’ rolls). Furthermore, I will
deal with the key players of this archival game, striving to assess their docu-
mentary knowledge as well as their professional and social status. Lastly, I will
endeavour to trace the possible links between the medieval archival history of
these accounts and the way modern historiography has dealt (or not dealt) with
them.
But first of all, let us sketch the documentary background of the 1396-1397
dispute and consider how it has been treated in archival and historiographical
works. How do we know what happened? This is important because it tells a
great deal about the documentary hierarchies which have emerged during the
7 COSTA DE BEAUREGARD, “Matériaux historiques”, p. 167.
8 B. ANDENMATTEN and G. CASTELNUOVO, “Produzione e conservazione documentarie nel
principato sabaudo”, Bullettino dell’Istituto italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano
110.1 (2008), pp. 279-348.
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last six centuries and which historians are facing today. The missives of Cham-
béry’s deputies which relate the conflict were ‘supporting records’ (pièces
d’appui) included in the libratae (expenses rolls) of the mayors’ registers.9
They present a double documentary disadvantage, which can help to account
for their neglect by historians. First of all, they form part of an urban documen-
tation, which in Savoy has never ever been under the same limelight as that
received by princely records;10 in the case of Chambéry, the count of Savoy
granted the burghers the right to elect the community’s mayors (two or three of
them) in the middle of the fourteenth century, and Chambéry’s first mayoral
roll dates from 1348.11 Secondly, they belong to what we might call a world of
accounts, dealing with financial and administrative records, a documentary
genre has not yet received the historiographical attention it deserves. Since
their publication by Costa de Beauregard in 1843, the letters concerning the
episode have not stirred much curiosity. Thus the marginalisation of the epi-
sode is double: documentary, in that they have been associated with a minor
type of administrative record, and historiographical, in that financial history
has until recently not been at the forefront of scholarship on late medieval
Savoy. It is a good example of the close relationship between the way docu-
ments were archived five hundred years ago and the challenges this poses to
twenty-first-century historians.
For these reasons I have decided to start with historiographical issues,
continue with the 1396-1397 protagonists, and end with an examination of the
significance of the accounting records in the political, administrative, and cul-
tural memory of a late medieval principality.
I. For centuries historians of medieval Savoy have not paid sufficient atten-
tion to the accounting documents of this principality – not surprisingly, consid-
ering eighteenth-century scholars’ focus on the political and particularly dynas-
9 COSTA DE BEAUREGARD, “Matériaux historiques”, pp. 166-167.
10 There are a few exceptions. Geneva is studied by M. CAESAR, Le pouvoir en ville: Gestion
urbaine et pratiques politiques à Genève, fin XIIIe -début XVIe siècle (Turnhout, 2011). For Turin,
see: Storia di Torino, 1, Dalla preistoria al comune medievale, ed. G. SERGI (Turin, 1997); Storia
di Torino, 2, Il basso Medioevo e la prima età moderna, 1280-1536, ed. R. COMBA (Turin, 1997).
For Lyon, see: J.-L. GAULIN, “La vigne et courtil d’Amédée V à Lyon: Note sur les comptes de
la maison de Savoie appelée Le Temple (1320-1326)”, in: L’Histoire à la source: Acter, compter,
enregistrer. Mélanges offerts à Christian Guilleré, ed. G. CASTELNUOVO and S. VICTOR (Cham-
béry, 2017), pp. 317-329.
11 R. BRONDY, Chambéry: Histoire d’une capitale (Lyon, 1988), p. 50.
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tic history of medieval Savoy.12 As we shall see below, the roots of this com-
mon indifference go back to the middle of the fifteenth century and the gradual
shift in archival strategies towards favouring Savoy’s inventories of land deeds
and charters over the accounting records. Some of the eighteenth-century
scholars were not insensitive to the appeal of late medieval accountability,
however. One thinks, for instance, of François Capré, who in 1662 as president
of Savoy’s chambre des comptes wrote the first historical Traité on his office.13
As noteworthy as it was, his essay dealt above all with the legislative and polit-
ical history of the institution whose head he was. Capré published and dis-
cussed the oldest statutes of the chambre des comptes, dating from 1389; he
also gave a first list of the medieval accounting officers, both auditors and
presidents of the chambre. But he did not consider it useful to write about the
accounting records themselves.
More significant still: if we move to the nineteenth century the picture does
not change significantly. The rare publications dealing with some accounting
rolls or registers quote or edit them (Costa de Beauregard’s case) only inciden-
tally. Even now, we have at our disposal very few editions dealing with
Savoy’s accounting records. Only one treasury roll, for the years 1377-1382,
has been published in full in a little-known book from the 1930s.14 Further-
more, the only critical edition of the mid-fourteenth-century chancery rolls
dates only from 2001.15 This makes studies of financial procedure particularly
timely.16 The same applies to the territorial accounts, whose critical editions
are similarly rare, with the exception of the groundbreaking studies of Mario
12 Samuel Guichenon’s studies are the most telling examples; see V. CASTRONOVO, Samuel
Guichenon e la storiografia del ‘600 (Turin, 1965) and G. CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali e gentiluo-
mini: La società politica sabauda nel tardo medioevo (Milan, 1994), pp. 42-53.
13 F. CAPRÉ, Traité de la Chambre des comptes de Savoie (Lyon, 1662).
14 J. JACCOD, La comptabilité d’Amédée VI dit le ‘Comte Vert’, 1377-1382 (Torino, 1939).
15 Documenti sull’attività della cancelleria sabauda a metà del secolo XIV, ed. A. BAR-
BAGLIA, A. CALZOLARI, and R. COSENTINO (Turin, 2001).
16 See G. CASTELNUOVO and Ch. GUILLERÉ, “Les finances et l’administration de l’État
savoyard au XIIIe siècle”, in: Pierre II de Savoie, ‘le petit Charlemagne’, ed. B. ANDENMATTEN
et al. (Lausanne, 2000), pp. 33-125; Ch. GUILLERÉ, “Culture financière et fiscale en Savoie du
XIII e au XVe siècle”, in: L’impôt dans les villes de l’Occident méditerranéen, XIIIe-XVe s., ed. D.
MENJOT et al. (Paris, 2005), pp. 469-484; ID., “Le financement de la Cour savoyarde du milieu
du XIIIe siècle au début du XVe: Essai de typologie des dépenses de cour”, in: Corti, poteri ed élites
fra Savoia e Piemonte dal Basso Medioevo alla prima età moderna, ed. L. GENTILE and P.
BIANCHI (Turin, 2006), pp. 145-162; ID., “Finances et politique: L’érection du duché de Savoie
sous Amédée VIII (1391-1416)”, Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, Belles Lettres et Arts de
Savoie 9.3 (2017-2018), pp. 294-322.
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Chiaudano (again, dating back to the early 1930s)17 or, closer to us, the valu-
able edition of the 1339 Faucigny’s papal inquest.18 As for the castellanies’
rolls, the project at the Universities of Lyon and Chambéry is one of the signif-
icant achievements of the last decade: the thirteenth-century castellany ac-
counts from French archives have been scanned and made available online;
some of them have also been edited using digital tools.19
Let us now focus on the recent historiography from a qualitative perspec-
tive. We can observe that the historians of medieval Savoy – and in this they
are certainly in good company! – have often reduced themselves to seizing
from the rolls and registers what they were interested in for their investigations
into the political, institutional, social, or cultural history of the principality.
This makes for a somewhat limited, ‘instrumental’ use of the accounting re-
cords, covering a variety of research topics from diplomatic history to the
growth of princely courts, from artists’ fees to the gifts offered to the courtly
entourage. Far be it for me to belittle the value and usefulness of these fields of
study. But such studies concern themselves only too rarely with the financial
and social world from which the accounting records emanate. And this prefer-
ence for a utilitarian reading entails other liabilities. The first hazard is to take
all the accounts’ data at face-value, as ‘objective’ data – hence the risk of ideal-
ising the princes’ exploits and the officers’ performance, as when Savoy was
suggested as the model of a blooming late medieval principality.20 Inattention
to the administrative and fiscal context in which these records were produced
raises problems when one begins to categorise and rank them, even
unreflexively. For instance, today most scholars do not challenge what is seen
as an almost customary classification of medieval Savoy’s documentary evi-
dence, whose roots go back to the middle of the fifteenth century. This means
that the trésor des chartes, with its princely charters and instrumenta, some-
17 M. CHIAUDANO, La finanza sabauda nel sec. XIII, 3 vol. (Turin, 1933-1937).
18 N. CARRIER and M. DE LA CORBIÈRE, Entre Genève et Mont-Blanc au XIVe siècle:
Enquête et contre-enquête dans le Faucigny delphinal de 1339 (Geneva, 2005).
19 <http://www.castellanie.net/>. See furthermore the ANR research project GEMMA (Genèse
médiévale d’une méthode administrative: Formes et pratiques des comptabilités princières –
Savoie, Dauphiné, Provence, Venaissin), co-ordinated by Armand Jamme: <http://ressources
comptables.huma-num.fr/>. See also the seminal paper by J.-L. GAULIN and Ch. GUILLERÉ, “Des
rouleaux et des hommes: Premières recherches sur les comptes de châtellenies savoyards”, Études
Savoisiennes 1 (1992), pp. 51-108; and M. BURGHART, “Account rolls of medieval Savoy:
Example of the castellany of Evian-Féternes in 1299”, Opuscula: Short Texts of the Middle Age
and Renaissance 2.3 (2012), pp. 1-30.
20 B. DEMOTZ, Le comté de Savoie du XIe au XVe siècle (Geneva, 2000).
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times associated with the dynastic chronicles or even with the protocols of the
notaries-secretaries, is still often seen as the core of the princely written
world.21 Within this general framework, the accounts’ evidence has, more often
than not, taken a back seat. Furthermore, a documentary hierarchy is also at
work within the accounting documentation itself. The records provided by the
central administration (treasury rolls, chancery rolls, and the like) have been
widely used, whereas the territorial accounts have been examined only in more
restricted contexts. The case of the computi seu libri computorum of 1397 is a
good example of a much more complex reality, if only we remember that the
deputies’ outcries (“de re tam miranda et insolita contra eos”) concern pre-
cisely the accounts’ rolls and registers, which were stored since time immemo-
rial (“tanti temporis spacio, quod de contrario memoria hominis non existit”)
in the castle of Chambéry.22 Therefore we can infer that, at the very end of the
fourteenth century, in the narrative, administrative, and political memory of the
Chambéry elites as much as in the eyes of the county’s officers, these records
represented a powerful archival symbol of the government’s image and power.
On that basis, I will now endeavour to investigate more closely both the nature
of the 1397 records and the central figures in this dispute.
II. Let us examine now the key players of this accounting and archival
game, because the twofold question of the access to documentary knowledge
and of the socio-professional status associated with the keeping of the princely
archives is central to the 1396-1397 conflict. While the rolls and registers have
provided us with hundreds of names of local and central officers, it is worth
mentioning that a large part of these officers – be they castellans or clerici,
treasurers, maîtres, or auditeurs des comptes – more often than not cumulated
central, territorial, and even courtly offices. At the same time, these officers
defined themselves, and were defined, as nobles, jurists, or urban notables.23
As a social group, the prince’s officers remind us somehow of Alice in
Wonderland’s Cheshire Cat.24 This applies also to Savoy’s accounting officers,
21 However, see the critical interpretations of a Turin head-archivist already in the nineteenth
century: G. FEA, Cenno storico sui regi archivi di Corte, 1850 (reprinted Turin, 2006).
22 COSTA DE BEAUREGARD, “Matériaux historiques”, pp. 170, 174.
23 CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, pp. 9-12, 345-358.
24 See G. CASTELNUOVO, “Comment représenter l’administration princière? Les officiers
savoyards entre législation, littérature et iconographie” in: Gouverner le royaume: le roi, la reine
et leurs officiers: Les terres angevines au regard de l’Europe (XIIIe-XVe s.), ed. Th. PÉCOUT
(forthcoming).
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described in the sumptuary laws included in the 1430 general statutes of the
duchy. The president of the chambre des comptes is entitled to dress according
to his own socio-professional status (“juxta gradum et qualitatem persone
sue”), such as a knight, doctor, bachelor, or squire: “milicie, doctoratus, licen-
cie, scutiferie”. As to the magistri computorum, their sumptuary rank will not
exceed that of graduates in law or medicine.25 Confronted with other social and
professional types well established in the sumptuary book of the 1430 Statuta,
such as the aristocracy (lords, knights, and squires) or the jurists, the prince’s
financial and accounting officers fade and almost vanish as a socio-profes-
sional category,26 in a way very similar to Alice’s cat: “‘Well! I’ve often seen
a cat without a grin, thought Alice; ‘but a grin without a cat! It’s the most curi-
ous thing I ever saw in all my life!’”.27
Thirty years prior to the sumptuary laws of 1430, the short dossier of 1397
heads in the same direction. It would be indeed oversimplified and misleading
to think that this archival dispute depicts a clear-cut conflict between, on the
one hand, some princely officers, here embodied by the two magistri computo-
rum Étienne Barbier and Pierre Magnin, and, on the other hand, the representa-
tives of Chambéry’s urban élites, represented by the two town deputies at the
head of the 1397 embassy in Bourg-en-Bresse, Guillermet de Challes and
Guillermet Chabod. Why is that? Without elaborating on the personal profile
and the family ties of these four characters, I would just like to underline their
affinities rather than their differences.
In the first place, Magnin, Barbier, Chabod, and Challes share some com-
mon features that point to a shared identity. All four are members of the urban
notability, in this case of the Chambéry elites, halfway between the local bour-
geois establishment and an urban aristocracy in the making (Guillermet de
Challes is a knight; the Chabod, one of the preeminent Chambéry families, are
just moving into the urban gentry).28 Besides, the four of them are professionals
25 See the recent critical edition of the 1430 Statutes: La loi du Prince – La norma del
Principe, 2 vols. ed. F. MORENZONI and M. CAESAR (Turin, 2019), 2, Compendium statutorum
generalis reformacionis Sabaudie, ed. C. AMMANN-DOUBLIEZ (Turin, 2019), V. 14, p. 337.
26 G. CASTELNUOVO, “Société, politique et administration dans une principauté du bas
Moyen-Âge: Les officiers savoyards et le Cheshire Cat”, in: Les noms que l’on se donne:
Processus identitaire, expeìrience commune, inscription publique, ed. E. SAVOIE (Paris, 2001),
pp. 121-136, and A. BARBERO, “Stratificazione e distinzione sociale negli Statuta Sabaudiae”, in:
La loi du Prince – La norma del Principe, 1, Les Statuts de Savoie d’Amédée VIII de 1430: Une
œuvre législative majeure, pp. 197-212.
27 Lewis CARROLL, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (London, 1896), chapter 7.
28 P. LAFARGUE, “Entre ancrage et déracinement: Les élites chambériennes et la fonction
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of the written word and world. Three have most probably trained as notaries,
which was the case of many other members of the city council of 1405. Later,
they all pursued careers as princely officers, first as secretaries (with expertise
in archival record-keeping) then as accounting officers, acting on behalf of
their city (Chabod and Challes in 1396-1397) or serving the prince in the
chambre des comptes as clerici and then magistri – the case of Barbier and
Magnin in 1396, and, later on, of Guillermet de Challes, magister computorum
of Amadeus VIII in 1416 alongside the very same Magnin.29 During the 1396-
1397 controversy, the urban deputies and the prince’s officers represent two
sides of the same coin. All served as leading experts in accountability and
record-keeping and were almost interchangeable. Their rivalry looks like a
contest between Savoy’s capital and its prince, or at least a functional (perhaps
even a personal) contest rather than a socio-professional antinomy. Barbier and
Chabod, Challes and Magnin, all came from the same background; they em-
body a blend of professional ability focussed on the written world of accounts,
of roots in the urban elites, and of upward social mobility tied to the prince’s
service.
Hence the importance of reducing the possible contradictions between
local elites and princely service, especially when looking at Savoy’s adminis-
trative centre, where urban notability, professional skills, and administrative
appointments often go hand in hand. The contours of the 1396-1397 dispute
invite the historians above all not to focus on the rise of the princely hold over
Savoyard political society. This development is undisputed, and it highlights
the formation of a specialised officers’ group (working for the prince’s govern-
ment but also, more modestly, for the urban authorities) able to associate finan-
cial, writing, and accounting competences. At the same time, we should not
overrate, at the end of the fourteenth century, the possibility of a prospective
showdown between a top-down polity in the making (from the prince to the
country via his officers) and the larger society searching for ways to resist the
new princely demands by endorsing the administrative career of some of its
members. In 1397 Chambéry’s deputies and Amadeus’s officers are actually
chatelaine”, in: Les châtelains des princes à la fin du Moyen Âge, ed. G. CASTELNUOVO and O.
MATTÉONI (Paris, 2006), pp. 189-219; P. LAFARGUE, “Les élites chambériennes et la cour de
Savoie (XVe siècle)”, in: Corti, poteri ed élites fra Savoia e Piemonte, pp. 177-192.
29 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Sezioni Riunite, Inv. 41, mazzo 11, reg. 42, f. 385. Similar
career, between town and prince, of Guigonet Maréchal, one of the Chambery deputies in 1405:
“Maréchal Guigonet”, in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 70 (2008), <http://www.treccani.it/
enciclopedia/guigonet-marechal_(Dizionario-Biografico)>.
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quite the same people; they do come from the same social and professional
background, even if they are portrayed in some of their different functions.
Equally noteworthy is the increase in opportunities for upward social mobility
tied to expertise in documentary practices. Access to knowledge in its written
form (and particularly knowledge tied to accounting) was associated with per-
sonal achievement – also benefitting one’s family and kin – in the service of
the prince or the city.
Research dealing with the development of the princely administration has
clearly played an important role in advancing our knowledge of Savoy’s transi-
tion to a modern state. Suffice it to say that scholarship has most often under-
lined the links between the growing numbers of princely officers, the increas-
ing volume of their written records, and the shift from seigniorial domains to
princely districts throughout Savoy.30 The consolidation of the prince’s spatial
domination and its various practices (justice, army, finance) also raises the
question of the links between centre and periphery – a vast research topic,
starting with the definition of what the periphery of a medieval state really
means.
If we limit ourselves to the central administration, considerable work has
been achieved by studying the connections between the accounting officers, the
development of their technical procedures, and the implementation of the
princely legislation on accountability beginning in the mid-fourteenth century.
The recent historiography also deals with the evolution of the legislative tools
used by the Savoyard princes and their administrative entourage to increase
their control of offices and officers. The institutionalisation of the chambre des
comptes is clearly underway during the second half of the fourteenth century
(its origins go back to the princely purchase of the castle of Chambéry in
1295):31 the first statutory orders are issued in Amadeus VI’s 1351 ordinances,
in which references are made to the clers and the mestres des comptes.32 The
secretaries’ office (officium secretarie) is mentioned in Amadeus VI’s 1379
statute,33 whereas the oldest accounting legislation solely devoted to “le
30 For a historiographical overview, see G. CASTELNUOVO, “Avanti Savoia! Medievistica
e principato sabaudo: Un percorso di ricerca (Italia, Francia, Svizzera, 1990-2016)”, in: Gli spazi
sabaudi: Percorsi e prospettive della storiografia, ed. B.A. RAVIOLA et al. (Rome, 2018), pp. 17-
31.
31 CASTELNUOVO and GUILLERÉ, “Les finances et l’administration”, pp. 33-125.
32 NANI, “I primi Statuti sopra la Camera”, XXXIII, p. 205. For a general presentation of the
medieval evolution of the chambre: RÜCK, L’ordinamento, pp. 43-57.
33 C. NANI, “Nuova edizione degli statuti di Amedeo VI dell’anno 1379”, Miscellanea di
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esdressement et bon gouvernement par le temps avenir de nos comptes”, which
names specifically Barbier and Magnin, was promulgated in 1389 by Savoy’s
regent, Bonne de Bourbon.34 This series of legislative documents gives us
precious information about the institutionalisation of the chambre des comptes,
whose staff is undergoing a process of professionalisation and hierarchical
organisation, attested, for instance by the socio-professional partition between
the simple clerks and the more eminent magistri. This process will be achieved
by the creation of the office of president of the chambre des comptes during the
first decades of the fifteenth century.35 Yet, we still lack an in-depth prosopog-
raphy of the fourteenth-century central accounting officers (clerks and audi-
tors),36 a thorough review of their prospective cursus honorum in the prince’s
service (for example, what of the place of the princely secretaries and archi-
vists?),37 and a fine-tuned analysis of their professional and familial networks.
We know, for instance, that the young Magnin acted in 1362 as clericus for
dame Catherine de Viry;38 this is just a trifling example, but it reminds us of
the historiographical need to pay due attention to the connections between
norms and local practices. It is worth reflecting anew on how administrative
decisions taken at the centre were received in the territories.
Today, we still need a thorough study of the princely chambre des comp-
tes, notwithstanding Peter Rück’s seminal work, focussing on the fifteenth-
century organisation of the archives of the chambre des comptes, but with
insights into fourteenth-century documentary practices and procedures. Many
topics still deserve closer study, ranging from the methods of auditing to the
issues they entailed. From a diplomatic, typological, and cultural point of view,
an extensive survey of the auditing process and of the ratio between originals
(of many kinds, from the pieces d’appui to the final, and theoretically faultless,
version drafted by the clerici) and their glosses and copies – how many of
them, by whom and at what moment of the accounting process were they
made? – is a fascinating research field, which is just beginning to be carefully
investigated, for example by Paolo Buffo.39 Similarly, from a codicological and
Storia Italiana 22 (1884), LXIV, p. 288.
34 NANI, “I primi Statuti sopra la Camera”, p. 206.
35 CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, pp. 113-116.
36 A partial attempt in CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, pp. 184-198.
37 For the archivists, see now RÜCK, L’ordinamento, pp. 57-70.
38 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Archivio di Corte, Protocolli ducali, 33, f. 21.
39 In the case of the appanage of the Savoy-Achaea cadet branch of the dynasty: P. BUFFO,
La documentazione dei principi di Savoia-Acaia: Fisionomia e prassi di una burocrazia notarile
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linguistic viewpoint, the gradual double shift, beginning with the very end of
the fourteenth century, from rolls to registers and from Latin to French or
Franco-Provençal, still deserves to be thoroughly investigated from an interdis-
ciplinary perspective, with the crucial support of diplomatists and linguists.
With all this in mind, can we think in terms of a real ‘legislative modernisa-
tion’, and, if so, to what extent and with which chronology? In practice, the
question can be put as follows: can we still retain the ‘classical’ analysis which
has considered that, in the first decades of the fifteenth century, Amadeus VIII’s
reign gave the princely offices and officers the tools – both legislative and
documentary – to convert a multipolar medieval principality into a better or-
ganised Renaissance state? A good deal of scholarly research now tends to
suggest that the political and institutional transition from a medieval principal-
ity to a Renaissance state is a much more complex question, for example inas-
much as it concerns officers’ standards of expertise and professional conduct.
At the same time, it is useful to inquire into the social and professional
identity of the officials in charge of the accounts. They were not necessarily
financial experts, as highlighted by the legislative distinction, the administra-
tive division of labour, and the different patterns of recruitment between the
general treasury and the chambre des comptes. We know that the general stat-
utes of 1430 required the president, lords, and auditors of the chambre to be “in
arte carculacionis et computandi […] perspicuous”.40 This representation of
the accounting experts seems quite straightforward, insisting on calculation and
financial skills. But it was far from unique: the urban elites serving in the other
branches of the central administration, such as the treasury, were similarly
described.
One of the most interesting issues that needs to be investigated further is
the professional education expected from the personnel of the chambre des
comptes. We have seen for instance, that many of its clerici and auditors had
been trained as notaries. Some remarkable investigations have already been
conducted on the role of notarial training and expertise for the Savoyard ad-
ministration.41 In the same vein, another compelling question concerns the offi-
in costruzione (Turin, 2017), pp. 245-295.
40 Compendium statutorum generalis reformacionis Sabaudie, II.33.1, p. 227.
41 P. CANCIAN, “Conradus imperialis aule notarius: Un notaio del XIII secolo nell’assesta-
mento politico della val di Susa”, Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino 80 (1982), pp. 5-34;
EAD., “Notai e cancellerie: circolazione di esperienze sui due versanti alpini dal secolo XII ad
Amedeo VIII”, in: La Frontière: Nécessité ou artifice? (Grenoble, 1987), pp. 43-51; P. CANCIAN
and G.G. FISSORE, “Mobilità e spazio nell’esercizio della professione notarile: L’esempio dei
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cers’ levels of literacy, a question which, in Savoy, has not yet been scrutinised
in depth. Furthermore, the part played by university training in a princely offi-
cer’s career (particularly in that of a financial officer) has not been thoroughly
studied. The impact of the founding of the University of Turin (beginning of
the fifteenth century) on the recruitment of financial officers remains to be
assessed.42
We have observed in the 1396-1397 dossier that on both sides the protago-
nists had the same socio-professional profile: urban deputies who were also the
prince’s officers; auditeurs des comptes who came from Chambéry but also
held important local or central offices. Hence we see what we might today call
a palpable mélange des genres, bringing together the princely request for pro-
fessional expertise,43 a plural administrative strategy from the officer’s point of
view, and a composite relational network. John Sabapathy’s brilliant mono-
graph points to the connections – and sometimes the tensions – between the
definition of officers’ responsibilities, the development of a culture of account-
ability, and the emergence of the ‘modern state’.44 This also applies in many
ways to Savoy’s administrative legislation, as we have just seen with the 1430
Statuta Sabaudiae. Yet, the same statutes require that the chamber’s president,
magistri, and auditors be selected among “viros prudentes, probos, fideles… et
in facultatibus ydoneos”.45 Loyalty to the prince remained important even as it
was coupled, since the fourteenth-century statutes, with an appreciation of
administrative culture and ‘memory’. The culture of administrative privilege
helps us understand some of the reasons why in 1397 Chambéry’s deputies
were so eager to retain control over the accounting rolls and registers of their
principality.46 This brings us to the third focus of this paper: what does the
notai torinesi (sec. XII-XIII)”, Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino 90 (1992), pp. 81-109. 
42 The scholarly cursus of the princely officers in the fourteenth century has not yet been
properly investigated, but see some recent research on the beginnings of the University of Turin:
E. BELLONE, Il Primo secolo di vita della Università di Torino (Turin, 1986); Alma felix uni-
versitas studii Taurinensiis: Lo Studio generale dalle origini al primo Cinquecento, ed. I. NASO
(Turin, 2004); P. ROSSO, ‘Rotulis legere debentium’: Professori e cattedre all’Università di
Torino nel Quattrocento (Turin, 2005); I. NASO, Magistri, scholares, doctores: Il mondo
universitario a Torino nel Quattrocento (Turin, 2016).
43 On expertise and its control: A. ABBOTT, The System of Professions: An Essay on the
Division of Expert Labour (Chicago, 1988), pp. 15, 172, 208, 323.
44 J. SABAPATHY, Officers and Accountability in Medieval England, 1170–1300 (Oxford,
2014).
45 Compendium statutorum generalis reformacionis Sabaudie, II.33.1, p. 227.
46 NANI, “I primi Statuti sopra la Camera”, XXVIII, p. 204 (1351) and XXXII, p. 209 (1389).
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1396-1397 controversy tell us about the records themselves, their archival
value, and their prospective documentary, cultural, and political categorisation?
III. Since the late thirteenth century, the development of Savoy’s pragma-
tische Schriftlichkeit can be summed up as a good case of expansion through
simplification, clarification, and classification. The local and central rolls and
registers multiplied, became more legible, were archived, and even inventoried.
The 1397 dispute calls attention to the place held by the accounting rolls and
registers in Savoyard administrative and political memory, as attested by the
uproar in reaction to the plans for their relocation from Chambéry to Bourg-en-
Bresse.
At the twilight of the fourteenth century, the princely archives were sorted
into two different sets of repositories. The incipient trésor des chartes still lay
scattered in several castles and deposits,47 whereas, as we have seen, the bulk
of the financial rolls was commonly stored, for many decades, solely at the
castle of Chambéry. The organisation of the chambre des comptes through the
1351 and 1389 statutes provided an important institutional framework for the
exponential growth of Savoy’s administrative accountability and record-keep-
ing.48 By that point, the distinction between the trésor and the accounting re-
cords was not informed by a hierarchical logic – quite the opposite. The differ-
ence between the two depositories was not qualitative but functional and strate-
gic. A 1396 patent letter received by Antoine Barbier makes precisely this
point. The prince will defray his auditor for two complementary reasons: in his
capacity of princely archivist, Barbier has to investigate the financial and ac-
counting rolls (“examinacio computorum”); conversely, with regard to the
archive of charters and land deeds, his role is one of conservation (“custodia
litterarum thesauri”).49 In Chambéry at the end of the fourteenth century, the
fiscal records had thus a documentary, archival, and memorial importance
equal to that of the emerging princely trésor des chartes.
47 ANDENMATTEN and CASTELNUOVO, “Produzione e conservazione”, pp. 313-320. See also
P. BUFFO, “Gérer la diversité: Les comptables des Savoie-Achaïe face aux comptabilités urbaines
et ecclésiastiques”, in: De l’autel à l’écritoire, pp. 393-413.
48 Compare with O. MATTÉONI, “Vérifier, corriger, juger: Les chambres des comptes et le
contrôle des officiers en France à la fin du Moyen Âge”, Revue Historique 641 (2007), pp. 31-69;
for the beginnings of the Dauphiné archives, see A. LEMONDE, “De l’inventaire de 1277 à celui
de 1346: L’évolution du statut de l’archive dans la principauté delphinale”, in: Les archives
princières, XIIe-XVe siècles, ed. X. HÉLARY et al. (Arras, 2016), pp. 225-238.
49 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Sezioni Riunite, camerale Savoia, inv. 16, vol. 42, fol. 211v;
see also RÜCK, L’ordinamento, pp. 58-59.
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Almost half a century later, the archival setting looks quite different. In the
1440s the princely archives appear split in two, both in a typological and hier-
archical way. In the first half of the fifteenth century two inventories were
produced (1405 and 1445). I will not analyse the first one here, which is the
work of the secretary and commissioner Jean Balay (started in 1405, it was
continued by many hands until 1437).50 I will rather focus on the second inven-
tory, known as the ‘Clairvaux inventory’ from the name of one of its authors,
Henri de Clairvaux, princely secretary and archivist: its organisation suggests
a palpable archival shift, helping us to appreciate better the way princely docu-
ments were preserved, classified and used in late medieval Savoy.
This inventory is the result of a direct princely order, dated March 1441,
regarding the reordering of the Chambéry archives.51 We might thus think of a
simple, and almost axiomatic, equivalence: one prince, one capital, one inven-
tory, one archive. The issue, however, is manifold. One prince: this is almost
accurate, even if in 1441 Amadeus VIII had turned into pope Felix V, elected at
the Basel council, while the Savoyard duchy was officially ruled by his son
Louis.52 One capital: again, this can seem factual enough, even if in Piedmont
Turin was just on the rise.53 One inventory – this is correct; but one archive –
this is quite improper. Let us further explore this pair: the archives and their
inventories.
What does the Clairvaux inventory contain? The answer seems quite sim-
ple: its twelve volumes deal only with the trésor des chartes of the Savoyard
princes. The volumes are organised in a twofold way that tends to equate two
different standards. The first six volumes deal with dynastic, political, and
diplomatic documents; they are followed by six other volumes which deal with
the administrative, seigniorial, and social documentation of the principality.
These last six volumes are all subdivided by bailiwick and castellany, thus
following a pattern which was already used in the princely registers drawn up
50 The organisation of Balay’s inventory has been thoroughly investigated in RÜCK,
L’ordinamento, pp. 75-102.
51 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Sezioni Riunite, camerale Savoia, inv. 71, fol. 2v-3v. See
RÜCK, L’ordinamento, pp. 68-69.
52 See A. BARBERO, Il ducato di Savoia, 1416-1536 (Rome and Bari, 2000), pp. 163-183.
On Amadeus-Felix, see Amédée VIII-Félix V, premier duc de Savoie et pape (1383-1451), ed. B.
ANDENMATTEN and A. PARAVICINI-BAGLIANI (Lausanne, 1992).
53 A. BARBERO, Un’oligarchia urbana: Politica ed economia a Torino fra Tre e Quattro-
cento (Rome, 1995); M. GRAVELA, Il corpo della città: Politica e parentela a Torino nel tardo
Medioevo (Rome, 2017).
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by the count’s notaires-secrétaires of the first half of the fourteenth century.54
The volumes reflect Savoy’s administrative structure; thus an ideal topographi-
cal order is encapsulated within the Clairvaux inventory.55
By contrast, all reference to the rolls and registers – the records at the heart
of the 1397 archival conflict – has vanished. By the mid-fifteenth century, the
distinction between the two central repositories, the financial rolls on the one
hand and the treasury on the other, seems quite clear. Their divergence is a
question as much of political and documentary hierarchy as of technical and
functional characteristics. Admittedly, both repositories are now centralised in
Chambéry castle, but they tend to encompass two different kinds of written
memory: the fiscal records take the shape of a memory of documentary conser-
vation, whereas the trésor des chartes favours a memory of documentary cre-
ation.
The first memory, which we might call a ‘new political memory’, is associ-
ated with the archive of charters; its defining features are late centralisation
and careful inventorying. The creation of an orderly trésor des chartes at
Chambéry castle dates from the first decades of the fifteenth century, just when
Savoy became an imperial duchy. Almost immediately the trésor des chartes
was carefully inventoried as part of the creation of a princely archive. A new
memory of the Savoyard written word was in the making, marked by better
accessibility through information management tools. Conversely, the internal
organisation of the Clairvaux inventory favoured a new classification system
which emphasised the unity of the repository being inventoried.
But why were the accounts of the fiscal archive not included in the Clair-
vaux inventory? The answers are as cultural and political as they are func-
tional. After having been examined and corrected upon being included in the
princely archives – at least in theory, for in practice the accounting’s review
might occur years later56 – the accounting records were left in storage in a
dedicated room in Chambéry; one could almost say that they were frozen.
There are many reasons for this, some practical and linked to the material and
functional characteristics of these records. On the one hand, the fiscal records
54 G. CASTELNUOVO, “Les protocoles des comtes de Savoie: Moyens et enjeux du pouvoir
princier sur l’écrit”, in: L’enquête en questions: De la réalité à la ‘vérité’ dans les modes de
gouvernement, ed. A. MAILLOUX and L. VERDON (Paris, 2014), pp. 185-193.
55 On the Clairvaux inventory: RÜCK, L’ordinamento, pp. 102-123; ANDENMATTEN and
CASTELNUOVO, “Produzione e conservazione”, pp. 334-39.
56 See A. RIGAUDIÈRE, “Le contrôle des comptes urbains dans les villes auvergnates et
vellaves aux XIVe et XVe siècles”, in: La France des Principautés, pp. 207-242. 
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were displayed, until at least the end of the fourteenth century, in the form of
heavy and conspicuous rolls which were stored in a series of numbered ar-
moires every official knew about. Here one must note both the importance of
the records’ materiality and the fact that the transition from rolls to registers
did not bring about major changes in the years 1370-1390. On the other hand,
the accounting records most often reflected mutable socio-economic data
which changed, if not every year, then every couple of decades. Inventorying
the rolls and registers of the past, especially the countless castellanies’ records,
would have been considered a time-consuming task without much practical
value. Yet, this reasoning is not fully satisfying, for otherwise we would not
understand the reason why the 1396-1397 dispute dealt precisely with these
accounting rolls and registers. In the same vein, albeit more than a century
later, the renewed statutes of duke Charles II (1533) still required the prince’s
officers to take a close interest in the archivium fiscalis so as to prevent its
incuria and the loss of many valuable documents. The duke formally asked his
advocati and procuratores fiscales to draw up a book with “a double alphabeti-
cal index” of the names and places of the duchy’s offenders and criminals.57
Once again, this might seem a trifling example, but it calls attention to at least
three major aspects. Even during the most difficult years of the French take-
over, the Savoyard fiscal archive was still in operation. Admittedly, its collec-
tions were not comprehensively inventoried or even annotated frequently, but
the fiscal repository did have some selected inventories, such as the criminals’
book of 1533. Furthermore, the fiscal archive was headed by the officers and
deputies of the chambre des comptes  who, more generally, controlled the
whole of the princely archival system since at least the end of the fourteenth
century – in Savoy as in many other principalities.58
We can therefore highlight the value of this second princely memory, an
archival and accounting memory which associates a technical recollection of
the prince’s powers (figures and lists, be they fiscal, financial, or judiciary)
with the drive to highlight his prestige. However, the moment we go back to
the first half of the fifteenth century, the bare fact that the trésor des chartes is
twice inventoried in less than forty years whereas the fiscal depository is not,
raises questions. Can we infer that an updated documentary hierarchy is then
57 P.G. PATRIARCA, La riforma legislativa di Carlo II di Savoia (Turin, 1988), pp. 33-34.
58 See ANDENMATTEN and CASTELNUOVO, “Produzione e conservazione”, pp. 320-342, and
the works cited supra, n. 4; see also A. TORRES FAUAZ, “Les archives ducales bourguignonnes:
Une étude à la lumière de leurs inventaires les plus anciens”, in: Les archives princières, pp. 159-
180.
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in the making? An administrative draft of the years 1435-1437, recorded in one
of the ducal secretaries’ registers, may help us answer this question.59 In list
form, an anonymous deputy presents a project of administrative reorganisation
based on a new salary grid concerning all the prince’s officers, both local and
central. At the very end of the catalogue we find the names of two princely
archivists, Aymon Lambert, and, significantly, Henri de Clairvaux. Both their
functions and salaries differ to some degree. Henri de Clairvaux receives a
double salary, 80 florins “pro crota”, that is for the archive of charters
(“archivorum crota”), and 10 florins “pro clavaria computorum”, that is the
fiscal repository. The same sum, 10 florins, is also approved for Aymon Lam-
bert for the keeping of the accounting records.60 From these entries we can
deduce at least three main points. First, in the 1435-1437 catalogue, the names
of the two secretaries-archivists complete the list of the central accounting
officers (president and auditors); this means that the professionals of both
princely archives, the trésor des chartes and the fiscal repository, were part of
the same central office, which happens to be the fiscal administration – some-
thing we already noticed when dealing with some of the protagonists of the
1396-1397 conflict. Consequently, the second point is that the pivotal role
played by the accounting offices as the principal monitoring body of the
princely archive was ultimately strengthened, in Savoy as in many other late
medieval kingdoms and principalities. Thirdly, the asymmetry in wages be-
tween the 80 florins paid to the treasury’s archivist (perhaps in view of the
prospective inventory of the trésor des chartes) and the 10 florins paid for the
fiscal records’ keepers can be read as an indication of a shift in the princely
documentary hierarchy, even if the presence of two professionals of the fiscal
repository reminds us of the quantitative weight of the fiscal rolls and registers
then stored in Chambéry’s castle.
Be that as it may, the immediate success of the Clairvaux inventory is
indisputable. But in the long run access to the fiscal archive proved problem-
atic, as the following episode illustrates. In the 1470s, the ducal secretary Per-
rinet Dupin, recently appointed first official historian (chronicarum composi-
tor) of the dynasty by duchess Yolande de France and seeking to write a biog-
raphy of Amadeus VIII,61 tried several times to gain access to the princely ar-
59 Translation and analysis in G. CASTELNUOVO, “Quels offices, quels officiers? L’admi-
nistration en Savoie au milieu du XVe siècle”, Études Savoisiennes 2 (1993), pp. 3-43.
60 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Archivio di Corte, Protocolli ducali, ff. 35 and 41v.
61 Perrinet Dupin, Chronicques de Savoie, ed. Emanuele BOLLATI DI SAINT-PIERRE, 2 vols.
(Turin, 1893); cf. I. COTTET, “La Chronique du Comte Rouge: Une chronique pour la duchesse
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chives. First of all, Perrinet prepared a striking Memorial des instruccions
neccessaires a Perrinet Dupin pour les Cronicquez de Savoye touchans les faiz
notre Saint Pere62 because, he writes, “several pairs of eyes see better than
one” (“car pluseurs yeulx voyent plus que ung”).63 Dupin had thus drawn up
more than fifty questions to the lord of Bannans, then president of the chambre
des comptes. In the memorandum, Perrinet reminds his counterpart that he was
promised an answer to another series of inquiries, an answer which he is still
waiting for; furthermore, the president of the chambre des comptes had assured
him that “the rest would have been searched for and found in the chambre des
comptes registers” (“et le résidu seroit trouver et serchier ex registres de la
Chambre des Comptes”).64 Yet Dupin’s troubles were not over: all his requests
went unheeded. The first official chronicler of Savoy’s dynasty mustered the
courage to write a tearful letter to his patron, the mighty duchess Yolande,
asking her to “help me collect the information for my memorial, because if you
do not help me, I’m sure that nobody will help me”.65
We do not know the end of this minor drama, except that no chronicle of
the first duke of Savoy has ever reached us. But here this is almost beside the
point. The major issues are different. Perrinet was himself an official, and not
a minor one: he was secretary to Duchess Yolande and duly remunerated by the
treasury and the chambre des comptes as the court’s chronicler. We might then
think he should clearly have had a free hand to look into the princely archives’
armoires, shelves, and boxes. Yet he was denied this opportunity by the offi-
cers in charge, who turned a deaf ear to all his requests. Furthermore, Dupin’s
memorandum informs us that in the second half of the fifteenth century Sa-
voy’s archives reported, from an administrative viewpoint, only to the chambre
des comptes, no matter the record and repository involved. Actually, Perrinet
gives details about some of the records he wanted to have a closer look at.
They all relate to documents belonging to the trésor des chartes and not to the
Yolande”, in: Écrire l’histoire et penser le pouvoir: États de Savoie, XVe- XVIe siècle, ed. L. RI-
PART (Chambéry, 2018), pp. 27-39. On Perrinet Dupin, see D. CHAUBET, “Une enquête historique
en Savoie au XVe siècle”, Journal des Savants (1984), pp. 93-125; A. BARBERO, Il ducato di
Savoia, pp. 184-196, and ID., “Perrinet Dupin: L’historiographie comme mémoire d’Etat”, in
Écrire l’histoire, pp. 19-26.
62 The most recent edition is the one by CHAUBET, “Une enquête historique”, pp. 104-122.
63 Ibid., LIIII, p. 121.
64 Ibid., LX, p. 121.
65 “vous me soyez eydante a avoir les instructiccions susdites, car se vous ne me eydez je
suis certain que nul ne me eydera”; L. CIBRARIO, Storia della monarchia di Savoia (Turin, 1840),
1, p. XXVIII.
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fiscal archive,66 and yet only the chambre’s officers could grant permission to
consult them.
It would be difficult to find a better example of the disjunction between the
documentary evolution leading to two separate archives, the fiscal repository
and the trésor des chartes, and the administrative structure whereby both ar-
chives were held in the same place (the castle of Chambéry) and under the
authority of the same officers, as if the chambre’s status as the embodiment of
accountability could justify its control of all official records. Dupin’s letter to
his duchess underlines a final basic point: one of the outstanding features of the
princely archives – whether the trésor des chartes or the financial registers –
was their culture of secrecy, preventing anyone, even the other ducal officers,
to open these closed doors. Yet, the issue of secrecy does not concern only the
archival records, whose control and keeping was, since the fourteenth century,
dependent on the holding of the two keys, which in almost magical fashion
unlocked the princely repositories – hence the name of the archivists: the
clavigeri. Indeed, Perrinet concludes his letter to Yolande by insisting on the
indispensable secrecy of his own chronicle. Hence, he promises the duchess to
operate according to the habits of the French and English courtly chroniclers,
namely “not to display his work to anybody” (“quilz ne monstrent leur oeuvre
a nul”) for fear of being misunderstood and its sensitive information ending up
in the wrong hands.67
This strategy of utmost secrecy applied equally to the fiscal accounts, the
trésor des chartes, and the princely chronicles. However different, all these
records shared a similar political, ideological, and memorial value, which is
combined with the administrative control exercised by the chambre des comp-
tes. From an anthropological viewpoint, it is a matter of utmost importance:
how to define and restrict all information sharing in order to reserve it for
authorised, official transmission?68 In the end, the archival conflict of 1396-
1397 must be understood in the context of this tripartite affirmation of the
state, through administrative consolidation, the development of an ethic of
service, and long-term political strategies.
66 Some examples in BARBERO, “Perrinet Dupin”, pp. 21-23.
67 CIBRARIO, Storia della monarchia, 1, p. XXVIII; see also the remarks of BARBERO,
“Perrinet Dupin”, pp. 20-21. For a much larger investigation on the place of secrecy in the
medieval cultural and political world, see now La necessità del segreto: Indagini sullo spazio
politico nell’Italia medievale ed oltre, ed. J. CHIFFOLEAU et al. (Rome, 2018).
68 M. GODELIER, Au fondement des sociétés humaines (Paris, 2007), p. 65.
Part Three
Financial Accounts and Local Communities

Local Communities and Fiscal Reform




ike many other princes of the period, the counts of Savoy began to levy
direct taxes on all or part of their subjects at the turn of the thirteenth to
fourteenth centuries. After some local experimentation, they imple-
mented taxation systematically from 1313. Their new, hearth-based tax, was
generally called subsidium, and less frequently donum, auxilium, or regalia.1
It was levied in addition to the dues that were properly seigniorial. The count
of Savoy exacted these ‘subsidies’ from all his subjects, not only those under
his direct lordship.
In Savoy, the seigneurs sought to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the
peasants to whom they gave land in tenure – a jurisdiction that included the
* This article has been translated from French by Jean-Paul Rehr, Université Lumière Lyon
2/CIHAM.
1 On these terms see the Glosario Crítico de Fiscalidad Medieval, <http://gcfm.imf.csic.
es>, with exhaustive bibliographies on Italy, southern France, and the Iberian Peninsula.
......................................................................................................................................
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political
Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2020), pp. 205-228.
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right of confiscation of lands in the case of insubordination or rebellion. From
the twelfth century such peasants were called the ‘men’ (homines) of their lord,
and in the thirteenth century they were variously known as homines proprii,
homines ligii, and homines talliabiles. The latter terms reflects the fact that in
the thirteenth century many lords were able to impose on their men the pay-
ment of a taille (‘tallage’); for some of the men the amount of the taille was
theoretically at the discretion of the lord, for they were said to be taxed ad
misericordiam. I have argued in a recent monograph that the homines talliabi-
les may be thought of as serfs.2 Others, on the other hand, were able to obtain
dispensation or relief from the taille, especially where their village or borough
benefited from a charter, and thus were referred to as the ‘bourgeois’ (burgen-
ses) of their lord, or his homines liberi. Moreover, the lords’ exclusive power
over their men, talliabiles or not, was eventually challenged by the count of
Savoy, who managed to extend his direct or appellate jurisdiction over the men
of his noble subjects.
In this context, the stakes of the new princely tax regime were as follows:
for the lords, it was an additional incursion of the count of Savoy into the ex-
clusivity of power over their men. For the peasants, on the other hand, beyond
the financial burden represented by the subsidies, the issue was whether they
were compatible with personal liberty. In contrast to the taille, the taxes which
a free man bore came in two forms. The first were customary, that is, not only
ancient but also considered legitimate.3 The second were fixed in an agree-
ment, perhaps tacit, between the lord and the peasants; for example, a peasant
might settle in a free town and thus have to pay communal charges. Certain
subsidies were demanded under customary pretexts such as crusade, marriage,
or the dubbing of the lord’s son, or even a visit or passage by the emperor.
Other subsidies, however, which grew ever more numerous, were demanded
for entirely new reasons: acquisition of rights and lands, expenses related to
diplomatic missions, clearing of debts, and of course military expeditions.
They therefore had no other justification except the ever-growing needs of the
lord. The sole difference between the subsidies and the taille was the consent
that the payers were assumed to have given to the taxes. It was thus important
2 N. CARRIER, Les usages de la servitude: Seigneurs et paysans dans le royaume de
Bourgogne, VIe-XVe siècle (Paris, 2012), esp. pp. 195–261.
3 On the standards of legitimacy in customary taxes, see E.A.R. BROWN, Customary Aids
and Royal Finance in Capetian France (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 35-69.
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that the subsidies be deemed as having been granted de gratia speciali, that is
to say ‘voluntarily’.
As elsewhere,4 the subjects of the count of Savoy were consulted at delib-
erative political assemblies which, at least from the fourteenth century, carried
the name ‘Estates’. The documentary material for a systematic history of the
Piedmontese and Savoyard assemblies was gathered in the exhaustive work of
Armando Tallone;5 however, a modern synthesis is still much needed. The
forms of these collective consultations were diverse. We know of assemblies
such as the General Estates of Savoy, where all the subjects were in theory
represented; the separate meetings of the so-called ultramontane et cismontane
estates, that is the inhabitants of Piedmont separate from those of the western
slopes of the Alps; and finally the regional assemblies, whose jurisdiction
extended over one or another of the many ‘homelands’ (patriae) which made
up the Savoyard principality. On the cismontane side, the most durable, power-
ful, and consequently best known Estates are those of Bresse and Vaud.6 Nev-
ertheless, the Savoyard political assemblies were not simply formed to respond
to the financial demands of the prince, which could be put directly to the local
communities. The subsidies pre-existed the Estates. In Vaud for example, we
know of their existence in 1328, while the Estates are not attested until 1361.
Even after this date, where the Estates responded very slowly or negatively, the
prince did not hesitate to bypass them and appeal directly to the towns.7
In sum, the negotiations and compromises between the administration and
the taxpayers were inseparable from the process of the levying of direct taxes
in the Savoy in the late Middle Ages, at all stages and at every level. The ob-
ject of this article is to study their forms at the lowest level – from the grass-
roots, as it were: how did the urban and rural communities and the local lords
react to the imposition of direct taxation? How did the administration adjust its
demands and its tax-collection procedures to the realities, and frequently the
resistance, encountered on the ground?
4 M. HÉBERT, Parlementer: Assemblées représentatives et échange politique en Europe
occidentale à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris, 2014).
5 Parlamento Sabaudo, ed. A. TALLONE, Parte Prima: Patria Pismontana, 6 vols. (Bo-
logna, 1928-1932), Parte seconda: Patria Oltramontana, 6 vols. (Bologna, 1935-1946).
6 A. TALLONE, “Les États de Bresse”, Annales de la Société d’Émulation et d’Agriculture
(Lettres, Sciences et Arts) de l’Ain 55 (1928), pp. 272–344; D. TAPPY, Les États de Vaud
(Lausanne, 1988).
7 TAPPY, Les États de Vaud, pp. 299-303.
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The chief source for this study are the ‘subsidy accounts’ which were pro-
duced by the Chambre des comptes of Savoy and were thereafter stored in its
archives. These are less known and studied than the castellany accounts to
which they are at times linked, but like them they record the receipts originat-
ing from within a castellany, or mandamentum, the basic administrative unit of
the Savoyard principality. They were produced on the premises of the Chambre
des comptes at Chambéry, on the basis of the accounts of receipts and expenses
rendered by the castellan, which were verified by the auditors (the ‘masters of
the accounts’). The formal enrollment was done by a clerk who drafted the
parchment rolls of the subsidy accounts. In contrast to the castellany accounts,
however, the subsidy accounts did not record seigniorial land revenues but just
the direct taxes. Following a preamble or incipit, containing the justification
for and details of the collection of the levies, the accounts essentially repeat
lists of hearths (foci), that is the habitation units subject to taxation. The defini-
tion of hearths, their breakdown, and eventually the exemptions were the main
object of negotiations between representatives of the count of Savoy and the
locals, both lords and local communities. My objective here is to explore what
this negotiation entailed by looking at a series of accounts taken from the part
of the Savoyard principality once referred to as cismontane, nowadays the
Alpine valleys of France and Switzerland.
The regalia of 1313: a Flat Tax
At the end of the thirteenth century, the count of Savoy demanded excep-
tional financial aid from certain of his subjects. In 1278 for example, he ex-
tracted from the inhabitants of the mandamentum of Allinges-Thonon, in
Chablais, an auxilium to purchase a castle: namely 15 livres from the free town
of Thonon and 10 livres from each of the rural districts (mistralie) of the cas-
tellany.8 The inhabitants of the free burgs, although exempt from the taille,
could not escape these exceptional taxes. At times they may even have been the
only ones subject to the tax, as in the case of the levy of a subsidium by Ama-
deus V in 1289 on the burgenses of Saint-Trivier (that is, only on the inhabit-
8 M. CONSTANT, L’établissement de la Maison de Savoie au sud du Léman: la châtellenie
d’Allinges-Thonon, XIIe siècle-1536 (Thonon-les-Bains, 1975), p. 208.
209Local Communities and Fiscal Reform
ants of the burg, not on all residents of this castellany) aimed at funding the
purchase of Revermont from duke Robert II of Burgundy.9
The oldest Savoyard subsidy accounts that have come down to us date
from 1313. This was a regalia levied by count Amadeus V to cover the ex-
penses of the voyage he had made to Rome the year before at the side of his
brother-in-law Henry VII of Luxembourg, who had travelled there to be
crowned emperor.10 Only a dozen accounts are extant, some linked to castel-
lany accounts, others preserved in independent rolls, and they are divided be-
tween the Valais, French Savoy, and Piedmont, leading one to believe that this
hearth tax was levied across all the Savoyard territories. According to the pre-
ambles of the extant accounts, all subjects of the count of Savoy within his
districtum, that is under his sovereignty, were to contribute, whether they were
his homines or the homines of another secular or ecclesiastical lord. The nobil-
ity were exempted, as well as the free towns and burgs.11 In reality, the latter
handed over negotiated contributions in subsequent years. In Chablais for ex-
ample, the town of Thonon agreed an arrangement of 40 s. gros tournois in
1314;12 in 1315, Saint-Maurice-en-Valais handed over 60 s. gros tournois. The
overall amounts were negotiated by four representatives of the burgenses;
however, it was the castellan himself who subdivided the allocations, at the
rate of 6 s. for those hearths deemed majores, 4 s. for mediocres, and 2 s. for
minores.13
The accounts list the names of villages for each of the parishes of the cas-
tellany – with the exception of those ‘free’ locations – with a list of taxpayers
for each. Each unfree subject of the count of Savoy is therefore indexed in the
list by village, parish, and castellany. Since the regalia of 1313 was a flat-rate
tax, the population was classified according to their taxpaying capacity. We
9 Castellany computus (hereafter CC) of Saint-Trivier-de-Courtes, Archives départementales
de Côte d’Or, Dijon, B 9941; and see Parlamento Sabaudo, I, 2, p. XLVII.
10 G. COUTAZ, ‘Die Reichsarchivalien in Turin und die Beziehungen des Hauses Savoyen
zu Heinrich VII’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 89 (1981),
pp. 241-267; B. ANDENMATTEN, ‘Le comte de Savoie Amédée V et le nerf de la guerre’, Études
savoisiennes 4 (1995), pp. 19-31.
11 “Levatur dicta regalia ab omnibus infra districtum domini comorantibus, cujuscumque
sint homines, exceptis tantummodo personis nobilium et habitatoribus in villis franchitis per
dominum”; CC Évian et Féternes (1313-1315), Archives départementales de la Savoie (hereafter
ADS), Chambéry, SA 15255. The issue of clergy is not raised here, but no taxpayer appears as
such. It would appear that their exemption went without saying.
12 CONSTANT, L’établissement de la Maison de Savoie au sud du Léman, p. 209.
13 J. GRÉMAUD, Documents relatifs à l’histoire du Vallais, 8 vols. (Lausanne, 1875-1898),
3, No. 1379.
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can thus distinguish between owners of a plough team (jugum bovis), of half a
plough team (dimidium jugum bovis), those possessing only a hearth (focus),
and agricultural labourers and farm-hands (affanatores, manuoperarii, servito-
res). Widows of whatever economic status benefitted from a tax relief. To take
one example, the taxpayers of the castellany of Évian and Féternes in Chablais
were as follows:14
Table 1: Taxpayers of Évian and Féternes, according to the regalia of 1313
 Number Percentage Amount
Owners of plough team 245 14.70% 18.0 d. genevois
Carpenters without a hearth 2 0.12% 14.0 d. genevois
Half-owners of plough team 174 10.44% 13.5 d. genevois
Hearths 1166 69.95% 9.0 d. genevois
Agricultural labourers 80 4.80% 6.0 d. genevois
Total 1667 100.00%
Note: widows were taxed at 6 d. genevois, whatever their economic status.
Viewed by way of tax administration, the rural society of the Savoy seems
to have been composed in the majority of independent peasants, each account-
ing for a focus or hearth. About a quarter stand out for a certain wealth that
allowed them to be owners or co-owners of a plough team. This certainly cor-
responds with the facts on the ground in the valley floors. For example, the
association of two or three farmers who pooled their draught animals and
ploughed together is well attested in Chablais and Genevois at the end of the
Middle Ages.15 Yet jugum bovis and dimidium jugum bovis were also tax cate-
gories which at times had an indirect relation to the real conditions. The Valais
castellany of Entremont apparently had a hearth rate of 20% cum jugo. This is
a reflection of a mountainous area where ploughs were very rare, as the hills
impeded their usage. The wealth of the presumed owners of plough teams must
have consisted rather of livestock and pasture.16 In the context of this regalia,
14 CC Évian et Féternes (1313-1315), ADS, Chambéry, SA 15255.
15 P. DUPARC, “Une communauté pastorale en Savoie, Chéravaux”, Bulletin philologique
et historique jusqu’à 1610 (1963), pp. 309-330, at pp. 316-317.
16 P. DUBUIS, Le jeu de la vie et de la mort: La population du Valais, XIVe-XVIe s. (Lausanne,
211Local Communities and Fiscal Reform
the ‘hearth’ is a designation of habitation as well as a farm. As such, two car-
penters from Évian, likely without lands, are counted as “non habente focum”,
while their tax amounts are among the highest of taxpayers. By the same token,
the agricultural workers, representing 5% of taxpayers, are not recorded as
possessing ‘hearths’. This situation does not necessarily suggest that they did
not have independent lodgings, rather their own lands did not allow them to
fully support themselves. They offered their services to others and were paid
by the day for their labour: so it is that in the castellany of Saint-Maurice they
were taxed at 3 d., “secundum quod locantur per diem, ad relationem castella-
ni”.17
With the exception of the free towns, negotiations do not seem to have
played a large role in the levy of the 1313 regalia. The motive was customary,
as it fell within the scope of the fodrum traditionally levied by the emperor
when he journeyed to Italy. It is possible that the average tax per hearth varied
from one castellany to another; the amounts are expressed in local currencies,
which makes comparison difficult. Were the poorest exempt? It is likely, but
they were not mentioned, save in the Piedmont castellany of Susa, where they
represented 9.5% of the inventoried hearths.18 Elsewhere, they are completely
absent: without a doubt, they were not considered to be in possession of a
hearth.
The Choice of Direct Taxation (1331-1372)
The count of Savoy once again demanded the financial aid of his subjects
at the end of the 1320s: a subsidy is attested for a scattering of castellanies in
1327. The accession of count Aymon in 1329 represented a turning point,
however. He had first considered establishing a tax on commercial transac-
tions, but due to the resistance encountered he finally settled for an alternative
that seemed easier to implement: a direct tax. In 1331 he extracted a hearth tax
accorded for five years from all or some of his castellanies, following visits in
the territory by his advisors.19 Another subsidy was obtained in 1347 for two
1994), p. 43, n. 16.
17 DUBUIS, Le jeu de la vie et de la mort, p. 43, n. 17.
18 Ibid., p. 44.
19 Their travel expenses are noted in the accounts cited by L. CIBRARIO, “Delle Finanze della
Monarchia di Savoia ne’ secoli XIII e XIV: Discorso secondo”, in: ID., Opuscoli del cavaliere Luigi
Cibrario (Torino, 1841), pp. 318-319.
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years, but the rolls of only a handful of castellanies have come down to us from
this period, rendering it difficult to ascertain the precise size of this particular
levy. The subsidy of 1356, granted for three years, is the first for which we
have the rolls of accounts largely preserved from across the Savoyard lands.
The exactions of 1368, levied in an attempt to cover the costs of Amadeus VI’s
ruinous crusade to Gallipoli, are also well documented.20
While in the preambles of the subsidy accounts of 1331 the population of
Savoy was grouped into three orders,21 as of 1347 it was grouped into two: the
homines domini who graciously conceded to the count a subsidy on their
hearths, and the ‘nobles and clergymen’ who gave him the right to tax the
hearths of their own men.22 But whereas the clerics were exempted from the
subsidy as such,23 this was not the case with the nobility: the only nobles to
escape taxation were those who had “homines in quantitate”.24 The minimal
number of men one should have to be exempt is never indicated;25 however, the
burgenses who had sufficient numbers of them were also exonerated from tax,
under the condition that their men pay the subsidy.26 In order to avoid paying
the tax themselves, the lords had to let the count impose it directly on their
men, but this notwithstanding, the fact that this concession was sought from
them points to the limits of princely sovereignty. Conversely, the homines
talliabiles of the count of Savoy were more heavily taxed than those of other
lords. In 1327, at Châtelard-en-Bauges they paid 12 d. per hearth, while the
20 The object of study by J.-J. BOUQUET, “Quelques remarques sur la population du comté
de Savoie au XIVe siècle, d’après les comptes de subsides”, Revue historique vaudoise (1963), pp.
49-80.
21 “De subsidio concesso domino […] per religiosos, nobiles et non nobiles ejusdem
castellanie”; subsidy account (hereafter CS) of Entremont (1331), ADS, Chambéry, SA 9090.
22 “De octo den. gros. tur. concessis domino per homines domini ejusdem castellanie […]
et de sex den. gros. tur. concessis domino per religiosos et nobiles super homines eorumdem dicte
castellanie”; CC Faverges (1347-1348), ADS, Chambéry, SA 11589.
23 “Nichil computat pro Johanodo et Perrodo de Desertis qui nominantur in registro
focorum, qui sunt clerici et ab ipsis nichil recepit”; CS Le Châtelard (1325-1327), ADS, Chambéry,
SA 8837.
24 “De subsidio concesso domino de gratia speciali per banneretos, religiosos et ceteros
nobiles ipsius castellanie ac per homines domini ejusdem castellanie […] videlicet pro qualibet
persona focum faciente in dicta castellanie IIII den. gros. tur. in principio anni durantibus dictis
tribus annis, exceptis focis nobilium et aliarum personarum habentium homines in quantitate,
qui nichil solvunt pro suis focis propriis”; CS Yvoire (1356), ADS, Chambéry, SA 15772.
25 The expression “homines in quantitate” first appeared in 1331; CS Entremont (1331), ADS,
Chambéry, SA 9090.
26 “Exceptis religiosis, nobilibus et burgensibus homines solventes habentibus”; CS La
Rochette (1368), ADS, Chambéry, SA 9901).
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homines of the nobles were taxed at 6 d.27 In 1347 at Faverges they were
charged 8 d. per year for two years, as opposed to 6 d. for the homines of the
nobles.28 In 1331 and 1356 on the other hand, the rate was the same for every-
one. This was also the case in 1368, except that the lords who joined the count
on crusade acquired the right to levy the tax themselves on their own homines
to offset their expenses.29
The free burgs and towns continued to pay a negotiated fixed amount;
however, the rate per hearth was as much as, and frequently more than, the
amounts paid by the inhabitants of the countryside. The same phenomenon is
found elsewhere,30 and is not surprising when one understands the precise
nature of the franchises accorded by the count of Savoy in the thirteenth cen-
tury: the burgenses were his free men. This means that although they were free
from the taille, this was only achieved by the granting of a privilege that ac-
knowledged their special relationship with the count. Their situation with re-
spect to taxes was therefore ambiguous: as free burgenses they were required
to give their agreement to taxation, yet at the same time they were bound by the
requirements of a loyalty more restrictive and thus more costly. In 1325, in the
castellany of Châtelard-en-Bauges, 44 taxpayers resided “infra franchesiam
ville Castellarii”. Among them were the homines comitis as well as the men of
other lords who came to be under the protection of the count of Savoy. To-
gether they paid a lump sum of 40 s., or a little less than 1 s. per head of hearth.
For the men of the count, this was equivalent to the tax burden of the inhabit-
ants of the countryside; however, for the men of other lords, who, beyond the
walls of the free burg of Châtelard were taxed 6 d., it was two times higher.31
In 1331, the costs for the burgenses were always heavier than for residents in
the countryside, that is 6 d. to 8 d. per hearth per year over five years – even 10
d. at Chambéry – as opposed to 4 d. for other taxpayers.32
27 CS Le Châtelard (1325-1327), ADS, Chambéry, SA 8837.
28 CC Faverges (1347-1348), ADS, Chambéry, SA 11589.
29 In Faucigny and Savoie Propre, where the extant accounts allow some calculations, this
affected about one in five hearths; BOUQUET, “Quelques remarques sur la population du comté
de Savoie au XIVe siècle”, pp. 60, 65.
30 During the same period, the English king Edward I taxed the inhabitants of his domains
and towns harder than other subjects; M. PRESTWICH, War, Politics, and Finance under Edward
I (London, 1972), p. 179.
31 CS Le Châtelard (1327), ADS, Chambéry, SA 8837.
32 Inhabitants of free towns in Valais paid 6 d.; P. DUBUIS, Une économie alpine à la fin du
Moyen Âge: Orsières, L’Entremont et les régions voisines, 1250-1500, 2 vols. (Sion, 1990), 2,
p. 66 n. 35. In the bailiwick of Savoy proper they were taxed at 8 d. (CS Conflans, Pont-de-
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The castellan and his subordinates appear to have been directly involved in
the inventorying of hearths. At Châtelard, there is a mention in 1325 of a regis-
ter (registrum) in which hearths were recorded which subsequently had to be
corrected.33 Where the subsidy was accorded for many years at a time, the
castellan had to update the list of taxpayers with each new payment. He also
added new arrivals34 and removed those who left the castellany, changed juris-
diction,35 fell into poverty, or died without inheritors. The subsidy accounts
extant from Faverges in 1347-1348 for example, allow one to measure the
effects of the Great Plague in this castellany. Between the first installment of
All Saints Day in 1347 and the second one a year later, more than 45% of
hearths had disappeared “quia decesserunt propter mortalitatem, nullis heredi-
bus sibi relictis”.36 With respect to the men of the lords, the castellans dele-
gated part of the work of taking the census and levying taxes. In 1356, the
agent of the cathedral chapter of Geneva levied the subsidy on 24 hearths
which the chapter possessed in the castellany of Monthoux.37 In 1368, it seems
that lords had to take a census of their own men: Jean de Blonay, a lord from
Vaud, was fined for not having furnished the names of his 91 hearths, which he
was required to contribute to the list at Chambéry.38
In 1331, the census-taking of hearths was a source of many conflicts. At
Ugine, the overzealous castellan unduly imposed a tax on the subjects of the
count of Geneva.39 Conversely, the castellan of La Rochette forgot to tax nearly
Beauvoisin, La Rochette, ADS, Chambéry, SA 9004, 9736, 9896) and 10 d. at Chambéry; E.
DULLIN, Les châtelains dans les domaines de la Maison de Savoie en deçà des Alpes (Chambéry,
1911), p. 129.
33 See supra n. 23 and infra n. 46.
34 E.g., in 1335 during the final phase of the subsidy, the castellan of Conflans added four
hearths “qui de novo venerunt ibidem hoc anno”; CS Conflans (1333-1335), ADS, Chambéry, SA
9004.
35 “De subsidio predicto de quo supra ad plenum computavit non recuperavit aliquid pro
[…] anno CCCXXXIII de VIXXXIIII focis hominum domini episcopi Mauriane qui antea erant
homines domini comitis et quorum juridictio venit ante terminum predictum ad manum dicti
domini episcopi ex aquirimento facto a domino […] comite”; CS Tournon (1331-1335), ADS,
Chambéry, SA 10443.
36
CC Faverges (1347-1348), ADS, Chambéry, SA 11589: the castellan counted 148 hearths
at All Saints in 1348, down from 270 exactly a year before. The effects of the Great Plague were
similar in Maurienne; M.H. GELTING, “The mountains and the plague: Maurienne 1348”,
Collegium Medievale 4 (1991), pp. 7-45.
37 CS Monthoux (1356), ADS, Chambéry, SA 13996.
38 BOUQUET, “Quelques remarques sur la population du comté de Savoie”, p. 72.
39 In the parish of Marlens were found some men of the count of Savoy and his vassals, as
well as peasants subject to the count of Geneva having nothing to do with the Savoy, and also
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one in five hearths.40 In the Entremont of Valais, the initial numbers were un-
dervalued by about 40%; as it happens, the values are in fact round numbers,
leading one to believe that the tax collectors had not even bothered to count the
population. In various castellanies arrears began to be claimed as of 1338.41
The undervaluation within certain castellanies might be explained by a certain
caution expressed by castellans who were facing resistance from the popula-
tion. The levy of a subsidy in 1331 led to a revolt at Saint-Michel de Maurien-
ne: after stirring up certain “consiliis de subsidio non solvendo”, a part of the
inhabitants decided to resist with arms. Defeated, they finally had to pay not
only the tax but also fines, and a review of hearths undertaken in 1336-1337
raised significant arrears.42
The hearth tax was applied against “persone focos facientes et tenentes”,
per the preambles of 1331. The subsidy was thus both a tax on habitation and
on landed wealth; nonetheless, widows, because they were deemed incapable
of cultivating their lands, were exonerated as of 1313 (as mentioned above),
and systematically exempted as of 1362.43 After 1313, hearths were no longer
classified into different categories by virtue of their capacity to contribute. The
preambles simply mention a flat amount demanded from each hearth, stating
that the subsidy would be levied “adjuvante divite pauperi”. This principle
appears first in the preambles of the subsidy of 1331 and was applied consis-
tently thereafter. The meaning is clear: if the contributions of the poorest were
lower than the average requirement, the wealthier inhabitants had to make up
for it. Certain castellans indicated in detail in their accounts the actual amounts
paid by each hearth, which enables us to see a great variation in contributions.
At Pont-de-Beauvoisin for example, the average contribution per hearth in the
some hearths claimed by these two princes at the same time. The castellan initially claimed a tax
over all the inhabitants of the parish, but in the end he had to deduct 11 hearths which were
undeniably part of county of Geneva, and then a further 25 “de quorum juridictione est questio
inter dominum et dominum comitem gebennensem”; CS Ugine (1331-1335), ADS, Chambéry, SA
12439.
40 The castellan counted 776 hearths in 1331; CS La Rochette (1331-1335), ADS, Chambéry,
SA 9896. An investigation entrusted to Etienne Alamand, commissioned for the purpose by the
Court of Accounts, uncovered 180 more taxable hearths;  La Rochette (1338), ADS, Chambéry,
SA 9897.
41 DUBUIS, Une économie alpine à la fin du Moyen Âge, 1, pp. 41–42.
42 M.H. GELTING, “La communauté rurale, rouage de l’administration fiscale: L’exemple
de la Maurienne (XIVe-XVe siècle)”, in: Le Alpi medievali nello sviluppo delle regione contermini,
ed. G.M. VARANINI (Naples, 2004), pp. 17-34, at pp. 22-25.
43 CS Yvoire (1362), ADS, Chambéry, SA 15774.
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subsidy of 1331was 4 d. gros per year over five years, but the actual remit-
tances ranged from half a denier to 32 d., that is to say by a factor of 1 to 64.44
In asserting the principle that the rich aid the poor, the Savoyard adminis-
tration passed the responsibility for the problem of fixing the tax base onto the
parish communities. The castellan of La Rochette states in his 1359 subsidy
account that certain parishes in his castellany wanted to establish variable
taxation, and others desired the same tax amount across all hearths. That mat-
tered little to him, so long as the amount remitted by each parish met that
which was agreed with the count.45 In other words, the official contribution
attributed to each hearth was no longer a share of the payable tax, but a simple
factor of distribution.
In this context one can understand how the issue of exemption for the
poorest became a bone of contention. It was in the interests of the tax adminis-
tration to put them on the books and then let the wealthy pay for them. The
latter, on the other hand, wanted those who were not able to contribute to the
tax crossed off the taxpayers lists. The first hearths that appear to have been
explicitly exempted were those of people who had been counted in error,46 or
fell into poverty after having remitted amounts in the first year(s) of a multi-
year subsidy. So it was at Monthoux in 1357 when a man whose house burned
down was given dispensation pro amore Dei for the last two installments of a
subsidy agreed the year before; he was even refunded the amounts he had al-
ready paid.47 In 1368 it seems that certain castellans at least attempted to force
the wealthiest to pay for the impoverished, such as those at Ugine, where 16
hearths were counted which were not, however, able to contribute to the sub-
sidy “propter eorum maximam pauperitatem”. The castellan requested that the
other inhabitants make up for their contributions, a request which was refused.
A number of them were fined and even imprisoned; however, “obedire
nullathenus voluerunt et de dicto aresto sine licentia recesserunt”.48 The tax-
44 CS Pont-de-Beauvoisin (1331-1333) ADS, Chambéry, SA 9736.
45 “Item reddit computum quod recepit a personis infrascriptis pro subsidio supradicto,
solventibus unus plus et alter minus in aliquibus parrochiis, qualibet persona unum florenum in
aliquibus aliis parrochiis et tamen concessus fuit domino unus florenus pro quolibet foco”; CS
La Rochette (1359), ADS, Chambéry, SA 9899.
46 “Nichil computat pro decemocto aliis foci non hominibus domini contentis in dicto
registro […] qui sunt ita pauperes quod ab ipsis nichil potuit recuperare et non habent
sustentationem suam”; CS Le Châtelard (1325-1327), ADS, Chambéry, SA 8837.
47 CS Monthoux (1356), ADS, Chambéry, SA 13996.
48
CS Ugine (1368), ADS, Chambéry, SA 12443, cited in BOUQUET, “Quelques remarques
sur la population du comté de Savoie”, p. 53.
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payers were still more ill-disposed to a show of tax solidarity with the poor
from outside their lands. In the same subsidy, the burgenses of Saint-Maurice
complained to the count of having to pay for certain migrants (advene), who
lived hand to mouth or by begging and possessed nothing, yet just the same
were counted as hearths. The comital administration opened an investigation
into the matter, but we do not know the outcome.49
The Reform of 1372
No other subsidies appear to have been levied in the Savoyard lands west
and north of the Alps until 1372. Possibly because of the resistance encoun-
tered four years earlier, the subsidy requested in that year – to finance Amade-
us VI’s campaigns in Piedmont – was levied according to much more restrictive
rules, which would subsequently hold sway over levies through the beginning
of the fifteenth century. The rules first of all affected the lords and their men.
For the first time, the minimal number of men a noble must have to be ex-
empted from personal taxation was specified; it was fixed at three. At the other
end of the noble hierarchy were the bannerets. A distinction was made accord-
ing to whether they exercised over their men jurisdictio omnimoda, that is both
low and high justice. The subsidy in effect was due
tam per homines proprios domini quam per homines banneretorum, nobilium et
religiosorum quorumcumque […] ad rationem II florenorum boni ponderis pro
quolibet foco, exceptis hominibus propriis banneretorum in quibus dicti bannereti
omnimodam habent juridictionem qui non solverunt nisi I florenum dumtaxat pro
quolibet foco […]. Ceteri vero homines banneretorum predictorum in quibus ipsi
bannereti omnimodam non habent juridictionem vel in alia juridictione existentes
solverunt prout homines domini.50 
For the first time, taxpayers were not classified according to whether they were
men of the count of Savoy or of other lords; in other words, traditional
seigniorial rights over men lost all their power. What mattered was the ability
to exercise high justice, including capital punishment; where a lord had high
justice rights, the count levied only half of the tax. Perhaps the other half fell
49 GRÉMAUD, Documents relatifs à l’histoire du Vallais, 5, No. 2126.
50 CS Samoëns (1372), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14533.
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upon the immediate lord, but the subsidy accounts are silent on this.51 The tax
levies that followed were applied equally to all the count’s subjects, both di-
rectly under him or under other nobles. The exercise of high justice would,
however, become an important legal threshold in the fifteenth century.
These clearer rules allow us to reconstruct more accurately the steps of the
process of levying the tax. The first step was of course preparing a census of
taxpayers. This task was entrusted to a special commissioner deputised by the
court of accounts. Thus in the bailliage of Faucigny, the census-taking was
done “per Johannem Pellynti, clericum et commissarium supra nominibus
focorum perquirendi in terra Foucignaci”.52 The resulting census of hearths
could then be contrasted with the accounts rendered by castellan, who then had
to justify the absence of any foci from his lists. However, he had first to correct
any errors in the census taking: in one such case the castellan of Montjoie had
to prove that the bastardus de Byonneys and the bastardus de Lou Requens
were one and the same taxpayer.53 In another instance, the castellan of Seyssel
obtained a deduction for the tax expected pro dicto Jomart, which was re-
corded elsewhere under the name Petrus Jomardi.54
One can deduce also the tax payments of the seigniorial agents who were
involved in the levying of the subsidy. Their labour afforded them an exemp-
tion from the tax. We see for example, that in 1372 the subsidy tax imposed on
the 388 hearths of the castellany of Montjoie required six agents.55 In Fau-
cigny, the census of the aforesaid year served as reference point for the subsi-
dies of 1373, 1378, and 1379. The list of hearths produced by Jean Pellynti
were copied and recopied from year to year in the accounts. The official tax per
hearth was applied, ending up in a theoretical income which in time became
more and more of a fiction. There followed a series of deductions which pro-
gressively brought the numbers in line with the real tax revenues. After seven
years the initial census was manifestly no longer an accurate guide to collec-
tions. When a family head recorded in 1372 died without a solvent inheritor,
the hearth was deducted. The list of the dead was thus recopied year after year,
growing in number each time. However, other families had a change of head,
and the real taxpayers were recorded under the name of a dead father or the
purchaser of their property. In 1379, it became difficult to make the link be-
51 Later texts suggest this; see TAPPY, Les États de Vaud, p. 314, n. 207.
52 CS Montjoie (1372), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14143.
53 CS Seyssel (1372), ADS, Chambéry, SA 15855.
54
CS Montjoie (1372), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14143.
55
CS Montjoie (1372), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14143.
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tween the reference list and the facts on the ground, as demonstrated by two
sets of corrections made by the castellan of Montjoie. One household head
believed to be alive had quit the world 25 years before, that is, well before
1372; two others died twelve years beforehand, six more ten years before, and
three others at least eight years before. Five had emigrated, and finally five
hearths, according to the castellan, had never even existed!56 Clearly, he was
having trouble clarifying the situation.
It was thus necessary to take new inventories of hearths. New lists were put
in place for the subsidies of 1384 and 1387, and they continued to be used for
a long time. At La Rochette for example, the verification of the subsidy ac-
counts of 1399, 1401, and 1402 was based on the lists which had been in ser-
vice since 1387. From the 459 hearths on the list of that year the castellan in
1399 removed 188 dead and 13 emigrants, a drop of more than a quarter, un-
doubtedly the result of the recurrent epidemics.57
Any deduction requested by the castellan was only accorded if he pre-
sented sworn, witnessed confirmations. This was normally handled by the
parish priest or vicar, attended by certain prud’hommes. Their testimony was
recorded by a notary who drafted a document that the castellan could submit to
the Chambre des comptes. This system of proof was deployed for the dead and
emigrants; however, it was first established for the census and exoneration of
heads of insolvent families. Implemented as of 1372, it is particularly well
described in the preamble to the subsidy accounts of 1379. This was a tax
agreed for two years at the rate of one florin per hearth each year. It was levied
taliter quod divites pauveres adjuvent, item quod summa plus solventium in quo-
libet terminorum quantitatem trium florenorum non excedat, item quod pauperes,
orphani, vidue et alie persone miserabiles nichil habentes nichil omnino solvant de
subsidio predicto nec aliis pro ipso. Item quod super et de dictis pauperibus,
orphanis, viduis et aliis personis miserabilibus nichil habentibus scetur et credatur
in singulis parrochiam [sic] testimonium et relationes cum juramentis curatorum
et quatuor proborum hominum.58 
Reading the details of the mechanisms of the tax levy found in this text, it
becomes clear they sought to appease certain dissatisfactions among the
wealthiest taxpayers – those who undoubtedly could make their voices heard
56 CS Montjoie (1379), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14146.
57
CS La Rochette (1387, 1399-1402), ADS, Chambéry, SA 9903-9904.
58 CS Montjoie (1379), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14146.
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best – notably through two concessions accorded to them. The first was that,
while the principle according to which the wealthy must help the poor was
reaffirmed, the sliding scale of taxation was limited: no one was to pay more
than three times the average tax per hearth. Second, those who were not able to
pay the tax even by a little were removed from the list of taxable hearths, along
with the dead and emigrants. The message is clear: this measure of tax leniency
was not addressed to the poor but rather to the wealthy, in that they were no
longer compelled to completely pay for the least fortunate. In 1372, the Savoy-
ard administration explicitly joined the roundly held conception that ‘making
a hearth’ was not merely about residence, but also about having property from
which one could earn a livelihood and pay taxes. A minimal tax rate was estab-
lished, one which set an effective legal definition of the poverty line. Such a
definition does not appear in the account preambles, but one can see, for exam-
ple in the accounts of Montjoie, that it was fixed at 3 s. genevois, or 22% of the
average tax; those who could not pay this amount were exonerated.59
The Savoyard administration attempted to back away from this concession
during the tax levied in 1387 to finance the repression of the Tuchins of the
Canavese (in Piedmont). It was implemented with particular harshness as it
weighed upon all hearths, both of the count and other lords, “nullo foco penitus
excusato, ita tamen quod divites pauperes adjuventur”.60 The impoverished
hearths were no longer excused, their amounts owed weighing on the solvent
taxpayers. The discounting of the poorest hearths was renewed as of the sub-
sidy of 1399, although with a certain largesse in the taxes levied around the
turn of the century to finance the defence of Piedmont against the condottiere
Facino Cane. Moreover, in 1402 the instructions were to exempt not only the
indigent, but also the modicum habentes.61 It was not only for economic rea-
sons that the sections of exemptions for the poor in the registries of hearths
changed. Table 2 assembles samples from four castellanies:
59 Thus Aymon Palliers was exempted “quia est pauper, egenus et nulla bona habens unde
III solidos solvere potuisset”; CS Montjoie (1379), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14146. The gold florin of
good weight was valued at 13.5 d. gros or as much in sous genevois.
60 For example CS La Rochette (1387), ADS, Chambéry, SA 9903.
61 CS Samoëns (1402), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14537.
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Table 2: Exempted poor hearths as percentage of total subsidy
 Entremont1 La Rochette2 Seyssel3 Montjoie4
1372  1.60% 0.10% 4.10%
1373 10.70%  26.20% 20.30%
1378 11.70%   4.40%
1379 13.10%   9.00%
1384 15.00% 12.80% 3.80%
1387   53.20%
1399 11.60% 11.20%  43.00%
1401 31.00%  38.90% 
(17.80%)
 
1402    49.10%
1 DUBUIS, Une économie alpine à la fin du Moyen Âge, 2, n. 106, p. 70.
2 CS La Rochette (1372-1402), Chambéry, ADS, SA 9902-9904.
3 CS Seyssel (1372-1401), ADS, Chambéry, SA 15855-15859.
4 CS Montjoie (1379), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14143-14152.
A brief jump in the subsidy of 1373 is observed in two castellanies; this must
almost certainly be correlated with the change we saw in the attestations of
insolvency given by the parish priests and prud’hommes. In the accounts which
preceded and followed, the attestations are made case by case. So it was at
Montjoie in 1379 that Mermod des Granges was a “pauper homo et egenus,
nulla bona habens unde se nec ejus familiam sustentare possit”; Guillaume
Beziers was “infirmus, jacens in lecto, impotens, pauper et egenus et non ha-
bens unde possit vivere nisi de piis elemosinis vicinorum suorum”; Pierre
Oysellent was “egrotus et lazarus et non habet unde vivere possit”.62 One can
easily cite other examples. With their vivid, realistic detail, the attestations
bring home the lived misery which represented less (indeed much less) than
10% of hearths. The attestations of 1373 were all equally given under oath and
before a notary, but they frequently lumped together the poor, the emigrants,
and the dead.63 This blurring is probably a reflection of the somewhat lower
requirements of the Savoyard administration, as this subsidy was not levied
62 CS Montjoie (1379), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14146.
63 Alike those exempted in the parish of Corbonod, in the castellany of Seyssel: “Quidam
ex ipsis sunt pauperes, miserabiles, nullum focum facientes, alii impotentes, claudi, ceci et alii
absentaverunt patriam taliter quod dictum subsidium solvere non potuerunt”; CS Seyssel (1373),
ADS, Chambéry, SA 15856.
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without difficulty. Targeted at financing a campaign by Amadeus VI in the
Milan region, it was not imposed on the men of the lords who made up the
comital army. In a period when the subjects of the count of Savoy were still not
accustomed to being taxed every year, the resulting taxpayers would have been
nothing short of upset at having to pay a tax of 1 fl. per hearth, which followed
on the heels of the 2 fl. extracted from them the previous year. In various
places the imposition of taxes elicited revolts. At Saint-Maurice for example,
the tax collector specially assigned to this levy and the lieutenant of the castel-
lan met with the resistance of the burgenses. When the former wanted to con-
fiscate the rebels’ houses and seal their doors, they were chased with rocks by
a crowd enraged “per mulieres conditionis abjecte et alias infimas personas”.
In a letter of remission issued the following August, Amadeus VI withdrew the
tax and forgave the revolt.64 All of this leads one to believe that the increase in
the number of exemptions seen in 1373 can be explained chiefly by taxpayer
antipathy meeting the forbearance of the administration.
The administration in effect knew when to bend if needed and negotiate
with the local communities, usually when they were powerful and institutional-
ised. Such was the case in the Maurienne where their reaction to the tax has
been solidly documented and studied by Michael Gelting. After repressing the
revolt of 1331, the Savoyard administration realised that they needed to pro-
ceed somewhat gently. So certain freedoms were granted to many parishes in
exchange for the subsidies of 1346 and 1364.65 In 1372, the subsidy was im-
posed in the Maurienne much as it was in other parts of the principality of
Savoy. The rigorous accounts of hearths from that year continued as elsewhere
to be the reference list for subsequent tax levies. Nevertheless, unlike in other
castellanies, no new census was taken in 1384. As of 1385, every métralie of
the great castellany of Maurienne paid a round amount or an amount otherwise
manifestly negotiated.66 We have some insight into the stakes of the negotia-
tions of 1391. In this year Amadeus VII conceded to a variety of localities of
Maurienne charters of freedoms which took as their chief objective the ending
of the abuse of seigniorial officers in matters of justice, including abusive
seizures and arbitrary incarceration, inter alia. In exchange, the local communi-
64 GRÉMAUD, Documents relatifs à l’histoire du Vallais, 5, no. 2155.
65 M.H. GELTING, “Les mutations du pouvoir comtal en Maurienne”, in Amédée VIII-Félix
V, premier duc de Savoie et pape (1383-1451): Actes du colloque international de Ripaille-
Lausanne, octobre 1990, ed. B. ANDENMATTEN and A. PARAVICINI-BAGLIANI  (Lausanne, 1992),
pp. 215-228, at pp. 223-224.
66 GELTING, “La communauté rurale”, p. 26, n. 38.
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ties conceded to the count a subsidy of seven years aimed at buying back local
administrative offices which had previously been farmed out.67 The consent of
the inhabitants of Maurienne to a public tax came in exchange for the promise
of fairer local governance.
At the turn of the fifteenth century, the proportion of exemptions among
the overall population multiplied everywhere. This is easily explained by the
trend towards tax moderation that we identified above, with exemptions not
solely for the poorest but also for modest taxpayers. In at least one castellany,
however, the increase is explained by a rather unique situation: a fire at Seyssel
destroyed over half of the burg around Pentecost in 1401; 107 of 141 of the
indigents registered in the subsidy accounts were victims of that conflagra-
tion.68 Save for this accident, the rate of indigents would have been around
18% as opposed to the 39% as recorded. The increase in real terms would have
been less significant. At Montjoie the growth in exemptions was both earlier
and greater, because by 1387 the number had stabilised at about one out of two
hearths. One should recall here, however, that in that particular year not one
hearth was supposed to have been exempted, and indeed a letter from countess
Bonne de Berry is affixed to the subsidy account for that particular mandamen-
tum which expressly exempted the poor.69 The economic conditions were diffi-
cult, with the crops of 1385 having been particularly meagre.70 Nevertheless,
no poor were exempted whatsoever in the neighbouring castellany of Sa-
moëns.71 The actual reasons for the explosion in the number of fiscalised indi-
gents can be found elsewhere. In the very year 1387, the count’s taille-paying
men from the castellany agreed to lend him 30 fl. for the financing of a military
expedition in Flanders.72 The exemptions were undoubtedly granted in return
for this exceptional financial aid, which we do not know whether it was ever
reimbursed.73 Later on, a special tax was demanded from certain men of the
67 GELTING, “Les mutations du pouvoir comtal”, pp. 224-226.
68 CS Seyssel (1401), ADS, Chambéry, SA 15859.
69 CS Montjoie (1387), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14149.
70 Nicolas CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en Faucigny à la fin du Moyen Âge: Économie et
société, fin XIIIe-début XVIe siècle (Paris, 2001), p. 143.
71 CS Samoëns (1387), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14536.
72 “Recepit ab hominibus talliabilibus domini dicte castellanie quos domine nostre Sabaudie
comitisse genitrici domini gratiose concesserunt in anno domini MOCCCOIIIIXXVII vel circa circa
festum Pasche ex dono eidem domine nostre occasione mutui facto quando dominus noster erat
in partibus Flandrie et de quibus obmiserat computare in computo suo : XXX flor. auri parvi
ponderis”; CC Montjoie (1388-1389), ADS, SA 14021.
73 There are other examples In 1431, Amadeus VIII ordered his castellan of Aye in the Bugey
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mandamentum, although further details are not known.74 At the same time 50%
of hearths continued to be exempted from taxation, although that percentage
was certainly not entirely composed of the indigent.75 In such a manner, the
prince gave with one hand that which he took with the other.
Subsidies in the Fifteenth Century
The relative tolerance of the Savoyard administration with respect to the
exemptions of the indigent came to a definitive end with the subsidy agreed in
1404 for the financing of the dowry of Bonne de Savoy, sister of Amadeus VIII.
The rules established in it would continue throughout the fifteenth century. In
each castellany, two settlements of 8 d. gros were to be paid
per homines et subdictos domini […] in et super quibus dominus habet omnimo-
dam usque ad ultimum supplicium juridictionem […], ita tamen quod pauperes per
divites adjuventur et quod ditior in quolibet termino […] ultra quantitatem duo-
rum florenorum parvi ponderis et pauperior in qualibet solutione predictorum
duorum terminorum ultra quantitatem duorum denariorum grossorum non solvat,
et decima pars valoris ipsius subsidii […] a summa totius recepte ratione paupe-
rum, viduarum et aliarum miserabilium personarum […] detrahatur.76 
The preambles frame the sliding scale of the tax by fixing the maximum rate
for the wealthiest and poorest of taxpayers. For this subsidy and those which
followed, the rates were fixed at 300% and 25% respectively of the average
tax. Moreover, the proportion of hearths exonerated for indigence was fixed
once and for all at one in ten. The court of accounts then granted a lump-sum
allowance of 10% of the expected receipts based on the number of hearths.
to exempt the community of Léaz from the subsidy as recompense for a loan they accorded him.
The request attached to ducal order refers to the poverty of the inhabitants; “Chartes municipales
des pays soumis à la Maison de Savoie en deçà des Alpes”, ed. A. DUFOUR and F. RABUT,
Mémoires et documents de la Société savoisienne d’histoire et d’archéologie 23 (1885), XLV, p.
206.
74 A donum of 75 fl. was accorded by certain men of the castellany in 1400 or 1401. The
castellan could not have achieved that without some difficulty; CC Montjoie (1400-1402), ADS,
Chambéry, SA 14031-14032, forisseta.
75 Among them one finds a man who leased the collection of tithes of the castellany;
CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en Faucigny, p. 460.
76 CS Clermont (1404-1405), ADS, SA 11355.
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Nevertheless, the exempted hearths were actual hearths, copied into the origi-
nal registries and then re-registered in the list of deductions. Never again would
the rate vary, a move which represented a fiscal turn of the screw compared
with the more lenient attitude that had characterised previous subsidies. At the
same time, the average tax per hearth increased. In Faucigny for example, for
the immediate dependents of the count of Savoy, the rate went up from an
average 1 fl. in the years 1355-1405 to 1.5 fl. in the fifteenth century. Since the
subsidies were usually conceded for several years at a time, they were paid out
on average every other year; after 1475, the subsidies were levied annually.77
Unlike in 1372, in 1404 the tax was not demanded from all the men of
Savoyard lords with rights of high justice, and this remained the case for the
following 20 years, with the exception of the regalia accorded in 1414 on the
occasion of the passage of Sigismund of Luxembourg, king of the Romans,
which traditionally justified tax contributions from all the count’s subjects,
“cujuscumque sit juridictionis”.78 In 1425, the men of Savoyard lords exercis-
ing high justice were taxed again, but at half the amount, much like they had
been taxed in 1372.79 This rule applied thereafter to the majority of the subsi-
dies levied during the fifteenth century: the prince taxed at a lesser rate those
subjects over whom he did not exercise full jurisdiction. No other distinction
would be made between taxpayers. Notably, residence in a free burg no longer
implied either special privileges or special charges.80
In this context of increasing taxes, those who were able to do so tried to
come to an arrangement (compositio) with the administration, that is to say
negotiated a discount, and took charge of collecting it from the taxpayers in
their jurisdiction. This practice is attested from time to time in the fourteenth
century and became widespread in the following century, so much so that the
Savoyard administration gained a certain simplification from it: from its per-
spective, subsidies handled in this manner became an aggregate tax to be ap-
portioned locally. The first to negotiate were secular and ecclesiastical lords
who generally exercised high justice. They and their men gained financially
77 CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en Faucigny, pp. 459-460.
78 CS Samoëns (1414), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14540.
79 CS Clermont (1425), ADS, Chambéry, SA 11362.
80 E.g., no distinction was made between the inhabitants of the free burg of Rumilly and
other taxpayers of the greater castellany: the tax was due “per homines, burgenses, incolas et
habitatores dicte ville Rumilliaci et ejus mandamenti, sive sint homines domini, ecclesiarum,
nobilium et aliorum quorumcumque in quibus dominus habet ultimum supplicium”; CS Rumilly
(1422), ADS, Chambéry, SA 10017.
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from this,81 but above all, through it they were able to preserve the principle
that the money was granted with their consent and not as a mandatory tax.
Certain urban communities came to compromises as well. The powerful free
towns of Vaud did this ever more systematically in the fifteenth century, not
only for themselves but also for the whole castellanies of which they were the
seats. After 1450, the Vaud Estates made arrangements for the entire lands of
the Vaud, taking on the apportioning and levying of the tax.82
In those places where the subsidia remained a flat tax, notably in the rural
castellanies from the Savoyard heartlands, we do not see such radical transfor-
mations. Nonetheless, a close reading of the hearth lists allows us to unearth
some remarkable changes. The evidence of the Valais, of the Faucigny, and the
Maurienne suggests that the 1430s were the crucial decade. In Maurienne, a
number of hearth lists were rewritten from the beginning of the fifteenth cen-
tury. They varied up to 1432 but then were copied without change year after
year. The number of hearths thereafter seemed to have been severely underesti-
mated with respect to the situation on the ground. In 1456 for example, the
burg of La Chambre was fiscally assessed at nine hearths, while there were in
fact about 60.83 In Faucigny, where one can compare the subsidies of the mid-
fifteenth century with the pastoral visits of the bishops of Geneva, we see less
underestimation, but it is still considerable at 10-25%.84
Pierre Dubuis has meticulously examined the lists of hearths in the parish
of Osières in the castellany of Entremont in the Valais. From one list to the
next, he identified families disappearing and new hearths being established. Up
to 1430, the overall change in the number of hearths seems natural; year by
year the loss of hearths is more or less compensated by replacements. But then
a significant change happens. The hearths continue to disappear, and they are
also still being justified by attestations before notaries: they were actual
hearths. However, the new appearances became fewer and fewer, and they
would never replace those which disappeared at the same rate. The balance was
81 As was the case in the castellany of Samoëns where the abbot of Sixt came to an
arrangement virtually systematically as of 1387; CS Samoëns (1387), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14536.
The hearths dependant of his abbey were last tallied in 1419 at 36. In 1446, he negotiated 58 fl.
while the total tax on his men should have amounted to 72 fl.; CS Samoëns (1446), ADS,
Chambéry, SA 14549. In 1457, his attempts to negotiate came to nothing, and he was taxed based
on the hearth list of 1419, resulting in a total tax that jumped back up to 79 fl. 9d.; CS Samoëns
(1457), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14554.
82 TAPPY, Les États de Vaud, pp. 309-317.
83 GELTING, “La communauté rurale”, p. 27.
84 CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en Faucigny, pp. 78-80.
227Local Communities and Fiscal Reform
consistently in the negative.85 Yet due to those wills which survive from the
1430s, we know that the population of the Alpine valleys had begun to increase
again, brought on by an increasing birthrate which proceeded in uninterrupted
fashion until at least the sixteenth century.86 The subsidy accounts obscure this
fact systematically: even in those cases where they continue to record real and
true hearths, they do not contain all actual hearths. Dubuis noted that at Orsi-
ères the hearths which were registered were above all those of the longest-
established and most well-off families. For a comparison, they represent one
third of the hearths recorded in 1356, and two thirds of those recorded in 1474.
Several explanatory factors can be suggested. First of all, as of 1404 the
lists of hearths were no longer drafted by an independent commissioner. The
parish priests and the probi homines no longer justify the disappearances;
rather, they established a list in aggregate, under the more or less attentive
observation of the castellan.87 It fell to them to decide what constituted a hearth
for the record. In the fifteenth century, the definition remained the same: a
family which lived with a fireplace and possessed the means to live and pay
taxes. If one or the other of these factors failed the test, the hearth was no lon-
ger officially qualified as a focus. The attestations which have come down to
us demonstrate this well enough. Take for example two women in the Gene-
vois, as it happens both named Mariette. One of them no longer kept a hearth
as she became a servant in the house of a notary; the other was no longer able
to provide a hearth as she had bequeathed her goods, which thus were no lon-
ger legally hers.88 Living in a house of which one was no longer the owner did
not constitute a hearth. This was the case with many recent homes established
in the mid-fifteenth century, the result of the demographic renewal underway
in the 1430s. Even if children lived under a separate roof, they remained under
the potestas of their parents, who would not share their goods in the legal
sense. For this reason, as stated in a text from the 1460s, they did not have the
custom of declaring their children as taxpayers.89 It becomes clear then why the
85 DUBUIS, Une économie alpine à la fin du Moyen Âge, 1, pp. 57-59.
86 DUBUIS, Le jeu de la vie et de la mort, pp. 278-298; CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en
Faucigny, pp. 96-99.
87 DUBUIS, Le jeu de la vie et de la mort, pp. 187-188, 205-206, 218-219.
88 “De subsidio Mariete filie quondam Philipi Faveri, non computat quia nullum fovet
focum sed moratur et jam diu moram traxit in domo Petri de Ponte Sancti-Andree, notarii”; CS
Clermont (1413), ADS, Chambéry,  SA 11358. “Item focum Mariete relicte Johannis Glery, que
nichil habet sed ejus bona tenet Hugo Coudrey et Girodus ejus filius in dotem filie dicte Mariete
uxoris ipsius Girodi”; CS Charousse (1435), ADS, Chambéry, SA 13195.
89 “Hugone de Ruina, de quo fuit alias computatum, decessit ab humanis sibi relictis seu
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typical head of a hearth in the subsidy accounts appears ever more often as a
wealthy patriarch. Moreover, this undivided inheritance, which could be main-
tained over generations, became a method of guarding against taxes as well as
defending against falling into servile mortmain.90 Helped along by inflation, the
financial burden that subsidies represented for taxpayers of the Savoy seems to
have greatly diminished during the fifteenth century: in the castellany of Mont-
joie, using the scale of an equivalent day’s pay, the subsidy rate in 1478 was
barely 40% of that a hundred years before.91
And so we can see how direct taxation, an exceptional practice in Savoy
during the first half of the fourteenth century, become a normalised, habitual
transaction in the fifteenth century, while at the same time progressively losing
its financial dividend. Its evolution over time reflects political and social trans-
formations in the Savoyard principality in the late Middle Ages: the end of
personal dependence as essentially a legal issue; the assertion of princely sov-
ereignty over Savoyard subjects regardless of their status; and the concessions
made to the great lords and certain towns by the sovereign. Originally a flat
tax, it developed into something of an allocation tax as the Savoyard adminis-
tration delegated its assessment to local communities. Even in regions which
were not protected by those Estates capable of standing up to the prince, the
local population demonstrated an ability to cope which eventually overcame
the tax administration’s efforts to keep accurate accounts of taxpayers. Finally,
in the sixteenth century, facing serious financial shortages, the dukes of Savoy
would try to overhaul an exhausted tax system. They based their new hopes on
the establishment of a salt tax before eventually returning to direct taxation.
pro ipso Petrus Champutans et Reymonda filia Vuilliermi de Ruina, quos maritavit in bonis suis,
quibus dedit ejus bona. Qui […] focum fecerunt in domo dicti Hugoneti sed tamen non fuerunt
positi pro foco faciendo quia Jacobus Champutans vivit et facit focum de quo computatur. Et
quia non est consuetum revellare pro foco qui sunt in potestate suorum parentum non revellavit”;
CS Montjoie (1467), ADS, Chambéry, SA 14553.
90 CARRIER, Les usages de la servitude, pp. 316–338.
91 CARRIER, La vie montagnarde en Faucigny, pp. 465-470.
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uring the second half of the thirteenth century, Savoy gradually
strengthened its authority over nearby territories such as Bresse. In
1272, Amadeus, heir to the county of Savoy, married Sybille of Bâgé;1
* The research leading to the results published here has received funding from the European
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme (grant agreement no. 638436). My warmest thanks to Ionuþ  Epurescu-Pascovici for
discussion of the research directions explored here, sharing with me his work in progress on the
instructions to castellans, and several very useful suggestions.
1 R. MARIOTTE-LÖBER, Les chartes de franchises des comtes de Savoie (fin XIIe siècle-
1343) (Annecy and Geneva, 1973), pp. 17, 156; B. DEMOTZ, “La frontière au Moyen Âge d’après
l’exemple du comté de Savoie (début XIIIe-début XVe siècles)”, in: Les principautés au Moyen
Âge: Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l’enseignement supérieur
public, 4e  congrès (Bordeaux, 1979), pp. 95-116, at p. 103; A. KERSUZAN, Défendre la Bresse
et le Bugey: Les châteaux savoyards dans la guerre contre le Dauphiné (1282-1355) (Lyon,
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from then on, Bresse belonged to Savoy until 1601, when the kingdom of
France acquired Bresse through the Treaty of Lyon. Among the several castel-
lanies of Savoyard Bresse, the castellany of Pont-de-Vaux, in the present-day
département of Ain, is of particular interest for the history of justice and its
administration in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, because its rolls of
accounts have been preserved for much of this period.2 The present study is
based mainly on the analysis of these rolls and of the franchise charters dating
from 1251/1252 and 1336.3 Before passing to the house of Savoy in 1272,
Pont-de-Vaux had belonged to the lords of Bâgé; the knight Guy de Bâgé and
his brother Renaud granted it a charter of franchise in 1251/1252.4 Under
Savoyard rule Pont-de-Vaux was turned into a castellany, the basic territorial-
administrative unit. Located on the left bank of the Saône, at a distance of
about 15 km from the city of Mâcon, the castellany of Pont-de-Vaux had a
population of about 2,500 inhabitants in 1368,5 when the total population of
Bresse was estimated at 35,000-40,000 people.
2005), p. 29. I was not able to find a copy of J. DROPET, La Châtellenie de Pont-de-Vaux d’après
les comptes des Châtelains et des syndics (1252-1521) (unpublished thesis of the École des
chartes, 1929).
2 Preserved at the Archives départementales de la Côte-d’Or (hereafter ADCO), Dijon, under
the reference B 9152 and following, representing 25 rolls until 1375. No date is mentioned in the
oldest one, and the beginning of the document is missing, but its content suggests that it dates
from 1274.
3 A. DUFOUR and F. RABUT, Chartes municipales des pays soumis à la maison de Savoie
en deçà des Alpes: Savoie, Maurienne, Tarentaise, Genevois, Chablais, Faucigni, Valais, Vaud,
Bresse et Bugey (Chambéry, 1885), pp. 47-53 and 86-92. Other kinds of sources have been
preserved for Pont-de-Vaux, but they are too recent to be useful for this research, which ends in
1375. Among these are the accounts of the syndics of Pont-de-Vaux (1381-1418), kept in the
communal archives. Unfortunately, no extente seem to have been preserved, even if mentions
prove several have been written: “item libravit magistro Pontio facienti extentas pro expensis ut
patet per litteram suam”, ADCO, Dijon, B 9152, membrane (hereafter m.) 1.
4 MARIOTTE-LÖBER, Les chartes de franchises, 156.
5 This estimation is based on the calculation mode developed by J.-J. BOUQUET, “Quelques
remarques sur la population du comté de Savoie au XIVe siècle d’après les comptes de subsides”,
Revue historique vaudoise 71 (1963), pp. 49-80, on the basis of five inhabitants per household
and on the subsidy of 856 guilders paid by the castellany in 1368; ibid., p. 62.
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Justice and its Administration in Pont-de-Vaux through the Study of the
Castellany Accounts
General Background
Appointed by the count, the castellan had a military role: he had to defend
the castle and maintain it in good condition. He also dealt with the financial
management of the castellany and, in this regard, with justice, in particular
with fines, of which a portion went directly to him. He was also in charge of
the expenses related to the execution of sentences, such as the construction of
the gibbet, the payment of the hangman, and so on. The receipts and records he
submitted to the central administration, augmented by his verbal statements at
the regular audit, were turned by the clerks into accounts of revenues and ex-
penses; subsequently several (by and large yearly) accounts were not infre-
quently stitched together to form a roll. It was habitual for the castellan to
remain in office longer than one year. At Pont-de-Vaux for example, Guigon
de Saint-Germain was castellan from 1302 to 1319 and Anterinet de Montfer-
rand from 1364 to 1376.
Two charters of franchise were granted to the inhabitants of Pont-de-Vaux,
one in 1251/1252 and the other in 1336.6 The latter deals mainly with the level
of taxes on trade and crafts and says nothing about justice; the former, on the
other hand, has articles about misdeeds and the penalties for them. Nothing is
said about the course of the procedure, or about the way fines had to be pre-
sented in accounting records, but the charter mentions the amount of the fine
for a range of transgressions. Punching someone one time is thus sanctioned
with a fine of three sous of Mâcon; repeated strikes were fined five sous. But
most of the crimes mentioned were more heavily sanctioned: hitting someone
with a stone or with a stick and wounding him, adultery, and using false mea-
sures or giving false testimony were punishable with a fine of 60 sous, the
largest fine the castellan could inflict – at least in theory, for it is not uncom-
mon to find cases in which this sum is exceeded, sometimes by a large margin.
For other, more serious offences, such as rape or injuries caused by knife or
sword, the count reserved to himself the right to punish the guilty party.
This franchise charter presents about fifteen types of cases. The variety
found in the rolls, however, is much larger. In the more than 2,000 fines consti-
tuting the corpus of this study, one can distinguish, on the one hand, matters
6 Edited by DUFOUR and RABUT, Chartes municipales, pp. 43-49, 86-92.
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relating to society and everyday life and, on the other hand, matters of greater
import. To the first category belong crimes against property, with thefts or
degradations (harvesting someone else’s wheat,7 stealing money,8 or killing
someone’s dog); attacks on people, such as blows, wounds, or sexual assaults
(for example drawing a knife against someone,9 bloodshed,10 and an attempted
assault on a woman11); attacks on one’s reputation through insults (for instance
calling a woman latronissam);12 crimes against the rules of morality (adul-
tery);13 and damages against common property (such as the occupation of the
public road).14 To the second category belong: challenging the authority of the
count or his representatives (of his functions, powers, or decisions), and the
usurpations of charges (such as disobedience of the mistral15 or usurpation of
his office);16 insults against members of the court;17 using a measure not signed
with the count’s mark;18 various transgressions of orders or prohibitions issued
by the authorities (failure to obey an order given by the castellan19 or failing to
show up when summoned to an expedition or cavalcata);20 and finally, what
may be called impeding the course of justice (broken custody,21 perjury, false
oath22 – for instance for having sworn that there were twelve cups of wheat in
one bag whereas in reality there were only eleven23 – or false denunciation).24
7
ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1289-90, m. 3.
8 ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, 1313-4, m. 24.
9 ADCO, Dijon, B 9160, 1306-7, m. 7.
10 ADCO, Dijon, B 9154, 1286-7, dorse.
11 ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, 1349-50, m. 4.
12
ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1296, m. 7.
13 ADCO, Dijon, B 9171, 1363-4, m. 32.
14 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1289-90, m. 3.
15 ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, 1356-7, m. 6. The métral was a minor official subordinated to the
castellan.
16
ADCO, Dijon, B 9175, 1373-4, m. 22.
17
ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, 1356-7, m. 5.
18 ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, 1356-7, m. 5.
19 ADCO, Dijon, B 9158, 1300, m. 1.
20 ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, 1317-8, m. 49. On this topic, see Roberto Biolzi’s chapter in this
volume.
21 ADCO, Dijon, B 9154, 1286-7, dorse.
22 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1288-9, dorse.
23 ADCO, Dijon, B 9159, 1304-5, m. 9.
24 ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, 1356-7, m. 5.
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The Drive towards More Precise Categorisation
How the clame Were Finally Emancipated from the banna
In the oldest accounts only two categories appear: first, the banna (the
‘fines’) and then the clame, the sums collected from those who brought a legal
plaint. The distinction is not very obvious,25 or at least it is not clearly made in
a systematic way: in the oldest account, the sections are different;26 afterwards,
the clame can be found in the section dedicated to banna,27 and then they have
their own different section once again,28 followed by another period when the
clame are once more in the same section with the banna,29 and finally there is
a return to two separate sections with separate sums,30 with nevertheless one
final exception.31 The trajectory of accounting for these two categories of reve-
nues, closely linked because of their relation with judicial procedure, was any-
thing but linear.
Details of the clame are sometimes given on the recto of the roll,32 and
sometimes on the dorse;33 during five consecutive years, between 1313 and
1318, they are given for the first two years on the back, and are integrated in
the text in the three following years. The integration of details on the clame in
the text corresponds to a desire for greater precision in the account (see below),
as evidenced also by the subdivision of the sections adopted from this yearly
account onward.34 This interest, however, was not long lasting: after the ac-
counting year 1317-1318 no further details on the names of those who had to
pay a clama are given any longer. It should be noted that twice it is mentioned
25 Even Mario Chiaudano comes short of a clear definition of the clame, which he does not
distinguish from the banna minora; M. CHIAUDANO, Le curie Sabaude nel secolo XIII: Saggio di
storia del diritto processuale con documenti inediti (Torino, 1927), p. 15.
26 ADCO, Dijon, B 9152, 1275?, m. 1.
27 ADCO, Dijon, B 9153, 1275-6, m. 1; B 9154, 1285, m. 1; B 9154, 1286-7, dorse; B 9154,
1287, m. 5.
28 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1289-90, m. 4.
29 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1290-1, m. 5, and the following rolls.
30 Starting from ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1295-6, m. 6.
31 The only clama (“pro una clama minuta”) mentioned in ADCO, Dijon, B 9158, 1300, m.
1, has indeed been integrated in the banna section, perhaps to avoid creating a section with only
one item.
32 ADCO, Dijon, B 9152, m. 1; B 9158, 1300, m. 1 (only one clama; see above); B 9161,
1315-6, m. 35, 1316-7, m. 41-42, 1317-8, m. 49.
33
ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1287-8, 1288, 1288-9; B 9161, 1313-4, 1314-5.
34 ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, 1315-6, m. 35.
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in the account that the castellan forgot to present the details of the clame; he is
then enjoined to provide details in the following account,35 but this injunction
remained without effect.
The Different Types of banna
As mentioned above, the year 1315-1316 is a turning point in the elabora-
tion of accounting records.36 From this year on, the single category of banna
disappears definitively and leaves room for several others, the banna
concordata and the banna condempnata to which is added, a few years later,
the banna de arragio. This distinction, noted by several authors,37 seems to
have been implemented in all the castellanies of Savoy;38 it is therefore cer-
tainly the result of the central administration’s drive for more precision in the
collection of revenues.
The banna de arragio, corresponding to the arrears of justice, do not ap-
pear in a systematic way. In some cases, the amount of the initial fine is re-
duced, for example by the judge in charge of appeals (judex appellationum) or
by one of the count’s advisors (consilarius domini).39 At the castellany of Pont-
de-Vaux, this section is first used in 1349-1350,40 which is also the year when
the order of banna concordata and banna condempnata changes (see below).
Another type of banna, which was much more common, the banna condemp-
35 “[…] de quibus non reddidit particulas quia dicebat eas dimisisse per oblivionem;
injunctum est sibi quod in alio computo reddat particulas, et secundum plus vel minus eidem
computentur” (ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1293-4, m. 2); “de LXX solidis receptis de clamis per idem
tempus obvenientibus quarum oblitus est particulas quas reddere debet et si plus contineant plus
computabit”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1294-5, m. 3.
36 ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, m. 35.
37 M. CONSTANT, “La justice dans une châtellenie savoyarde au Moyen Âge: Allinges-
Thonon”, Revue historique de droit français et étranger 50.3 (1972), pp. 374-397, at p. 392; N.
CARRIER, “Une justice pour rétablir la ‘concorde’: La justice de composition dans la Savoie de
la fin du Moyen Âge (fin XIIIe-début XVIe siècle)”, in: Le règlement des conflits au Moyen Âge:
Actes du XXXIe congrès de la SHMESP (Paris, 2001), pp. 237-257, at p. 241.
38 Monique Constant reports the same date for the castellany of Allinges-Thonon (Haute-
Savoie); CONSTANT, “La justice”, p. 392. At Montmélian the chronology is similar, 1310-15: J.-L.
GAULIN and Chr. GUILLERÉ, “Des rouleaux et des hommes: premières recherches sur les comptes
de châtellenies savoyards”, Études savoisiennes 1 (1992), pp. 51-108, at p. 80. The change is not
situated precisely in CARRIER, “Une justice”, p. 241.
39
ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, 1349-50, m. 5.
40 ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, m. 4.
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nata, corresponds to the fines imposed following a conviction;41 sometimes,
this heading or rubric is specifically called banna condempnata per judicem.42
As for the banna concordata, they were collected following negotiations be-
tween the judicial authorities and the litigant;43 they have been called “a com-
position which stops the march of justice before the case is sentenced”.44 While
at Pont-de-Vaux this section only appears in 1315-1316, the practice of negoti-
ating a sentence (specifically a fine) is attested at least since the end of the
thirteenth century, mainly with words belonging to the lexical family of con-
cordia,45 but also, more rarely, of compositio.46 When the section banna
concordata appears in 1315-1316,47 it is accompanied by the specified mention
“per castellanum”, but this is no longer specified afterwards. Can we conclude
that, during this period at least, this kind of transaction was only carried out by
the castellan? It should be noted that, starting with the financial year 1352-
1353,48 the section for banna concordata is subdivided into two subsections,
one introduced by the same title and the other by either “banna concordata
presente judice”49 – by far the most frequent case – “banna concordata per
judicem”,50 or “banna concordata coram judice”.51 This variation in wording
does not seem to indicate any substantial difference: the formula concordata
per judicem, attested only once, might suggest a greater personal involvement
of the judge (per judicem), in contradistinction to his sole presence (presente 
41 CARRIER, ‘Une justice’, pp. 241-3.
42 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1328-9, m. 27; B 9172, 1365-6, m. 16.
43 CARRIER, ‘Une justice’, p. 243.
44 Ibid.
45 “De XXXII solidis viennensibus receptis de quadam muliere domini de Sala pro concordia
de eo quod accusabatur de furto” (ADCO, Dijon, B 9154, 1286-7, dorse); “de XX solidis receptis
de Benion judeo de concordia facta cum eo de eo quod accusabatur promisisse cuidam denario
ad testificandum falsum” (ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1287-8, dorse); “item de quadraginta solidis
viennensibus receptis a Johanne Palmerii qui accusabatur pro eo quod filius suus ceperat furtive
quasdam ut dicebatur; concordatos per judicem et procuratorem” (ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1294-5,
dorse); “de XX solidis receptis a Peroneto Morelli pro eo quia ceperat quamdam vernam in
verneto Hugonis Contat per judicem concordatum”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9157, 1296-7, m. 1.
46 “De CVI solidis VIII denariis parisiensibus receptis de Stephano Corbeti de compositione
facta cum eo de eo quod Jacquemetus frater Guigoneti eum accusabat de furto”; ADCO, Dijon,
B 9156, 1293-4, m. 2.
47 ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, m. 35.
48 ADCO, Dijon, B 9166.
49 ADCO, Dijon, B 9166, 1352-3, m. 12; B 9167, 1355-6, m. 17.
50 ADCO, Dijon, B 9166, 1353-4, m. 20.
51 ADCO, Dijon, B 9170, 1360-1, m. 20; B 9171, 1361-2, m. 8.
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Fig. 1. Number of different types of banna: condempnata, concordata (per castella-
num) and concordata presente judice. Years without data are those for which
no account has survived.
judice), but it is more likely that it originated from contamination with the
common formula banna condempnata per judicem. This second kind of sub-
section designates compositions for which an agreement had been made for the
duration of the trial.52 There is only one sum for the two subsections. Finally,
contrary to what can be found in other Savoyard castellany accounts,53 there is
no mention of banna marciata, whose definition is uncertain but probably
close to the banna concordata.
Evolution of the Structure of the banna Sections in the Accounts
Until 1348-1349, the order of the banna sections in the accounts was al-
ways the same: the banna condempnata preceded the banna concordata.54
52 CARRIER, ‘Une justice’, pp. 248-9.
53 In particular Allinges-Thonon (starting in 1348; CONSTANT, “La justice”, p. 393),
Charousse (1409-11 for example: CARRIER, “Une justice”, p. 253) and Genève: Pierre DUPARC,
Le comté de Genève (IXe-XVe siècles), 2nd ed. (Geneva, 1978), p. 460. Some banna marciata also
appear in the Sierre castellany (see J. GREMAUD, Documents relatifs à l’histoire du Vallais, 4
(1331-1350) (Bridel, 1880), p. 136) which belonged to the bishopric of Sion; see J.-É. TAMINI,
Essai de monographie de Sierre (s.l., 1930; reprinted Sierre, 1996), p. 10.
54 ADCO, Dijon, B 9164, m. 3.
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Fig. 2. Proportion of the different types of banna: condempnata, concordata (per
castellanum) and concordata presente judice.
From 1349-1350 the order was reversed for good.55 This change reflects the
prioritising of composition over litigation. This tendency is concomitant with
an overall decline in the number of condempnata (Fig. 1) and a decrease in
their proportion compared to other types of banna (Fig. 2).
After 1348-1349, only one accounting year, 1359-1360,56 presents a large
number of banna condempnata, which contrasts with the preceding and subse-
quent years. The reasons for these many fines are both varied and common:
broken custody, insults, animals that have caused damage to property, and so
on. This large number cannot thus be interpreted as if it represented, for exam-
ple a will to radically suppress a collective revolt. Twenty of the 25 banna
condempnata were also lowered, either through a letter of remission (10), a
letter of an unspecified kind (8), a ‘letter of donation’ (littera de donatione)
(1), or through an unspecified process (1). The reasons for this increase of
convictions for this year, during which the banna were in general particularly
numerous, remain unknown.
55
ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, m. 4-6.
56 ADCO, Dijon, B 9170, m. 8 and 9.
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The banna condempnata as an Expression of the Castellan’s Toughness on
Crime
The banna condempnata sometimes indirectly express the castellan’s will
to assert his power through sanctions. This is the case, for example for the
accounting year 1327-1328,57 during which 17 of the 24 banna of this type
were inflicted because the persons failed to show up when summoned to an
expedition (“quia non fuit in cavalcatam ad succursum terre”), for an amount
ranging between 10 and 60 sous. This large number of banna can be inter-
preted as an affirmation of the will to inflict stiff punishments on those who
were failing their lord and could not be trusted during troubled times. A door
remained open for those who showed repentance (and might possibly have
indicated their willingness to participate the next time they were summoned):
there is one case of banna concordata for failure to participate in an expedition
(“quia non fuerunt in cavalcatam ad deffensam terre”), in the amount of 20
sous. This was clearly exceptional, because failure to answer the call to arms
was a common occurrence, and was sanctioned as such: in 1329-1330 of 27
banna condempnata 15 were imposed on those who did not show up for the
cavalcata.58
The banna condempnata also sanctioned other collective misbehaviours.
In 1329-1330, 11 of them were inflicted on 15 individuals responsible for caus-
ing violence in a meadow;59 during the previous accounting year, a group of
people had to pay a total of 15 fines, each one for letting his cattle trespass in
someone else’s wood.60 With these different cases, each time involving several
persons, we have the impression that the sanction responds, at least in part, to
a desire to firmly curb behaviour which, because it was not isolated, presented
a particular threat to public order and social peace within the castellany.
There is an evolution during the second half of the fourteenth century.
During the year 1356-1357, the cases of unprocedural compositions represent
32 of the 102 banna concordata presente judice;61 28 of them were issued to
57 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, m. 21.
58 ADCO, Dijon, B 9163, m. 3.
59 “Pro quadam violentia facta in quodam prato domine de Layiaco una cum quibusdam
complicibus suis”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9163, m. 3.
60 “Pro eo quod dicebatur emisisse animalia sua in nemore Guillermi de Nuncziaco”; ADCO,
Dijon, B 9162, 1328-9, m. 27.
61 “Quia indebite composuit cum […] ante quod animalia sua muncta fuissent in
dampnum”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, m. 7.
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people who did not show up when the alarm was sounded.62 These cases do not
involve direct violence, as in some of the examples discussed above, but are to
do, once again, with disobedience to the public authority of the count and his
representatives. While such offences remain numerous, the difference this time
is that agreements were reached – hence their presence among banna
concordata. This willingness to negotiate indicates a relaxation in the way the
castellan exercised his function. It should also be noted that the five banna
condempnata for this accounting year give more details about the reasons for
the conviction, as if such details were necessary to justify the condempnata
type of fines because they no longer represented the norm.
The Prison in the Light of the Accounting Records
Mentions of the prison in the banna are relatively limited: ten during the
period under study,63 two among the banna condempnata, and eight in the
banna concordata. The reason for a fine in connection to the prison (such a
fine could sometimes be added to another one for a common offense), was, in
half of the cases (five), the rescuing of an inmate by force. The other charges
were the prison warden’s promise to get someone out of the prison; being
found outside the prison during the time of one’s supposed incarceration; aid-
ing a prisoner escape; having someone incarcerated without good reason;64 and
finally leaving prison without authorisation. As to the causes of imprisonment
itself, they varied greatly in severity; the fines indirectly teach us that they
ranged from the theft of a mantle65 to setting fire to a house66 and to informing
someone about mortgaged goods.67 We also learn that the same prison could be
62 “Quia non venit ad forcridum quando dominus Montis Beleti abstulit quemdam captum
familiaribus curie”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, m. 7 and 8.
63 To designate the prison, priso and carcer (and other words of the same lexical family such
as incarcerare) are used indiscriminately.
64 “Recepit a dicto lo dousire quia incarcerari fecit Johannem Muliera”; ADCO, Dijon, B
9172, 1365-6, m. 15, banna concordata.
65 “Recepit a Johanne Ruffi quia cepit quendam mantellum et fregit carcerem domini”;
ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, 1350-1, m. 14, banna concordata.
66 “Recepit a Martino Farquet quia inculpabatur posuisse ignem in domo Beronini Butafua
et exivit de carcere et fugavit in ecclesiam Sancta Concordia infra ecclesiam de mandato
judicis”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1325-7, m. 13, banna concordata.
67 “Receptis ab Hugonino Comtat quia adnotificaverat gentibus domini Symonis de Sancta
Cruce gaygiamentum quod volebat facere Petrus de Genoy et fregit prisonem domini”; ADCO,
Dijon, B 9161, 1315-6, m. 35, banna condempnata.
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used both by the count’s and the bishop’s judiciaries.68 The number of men-
tions of escapes suggests that this feat was not at all complicated,69 although
help might be needed,70 sometimes provided by the person in charge of surveil-
lance himself.71 It was also possible to get out of prison by asking permission,72
in particular from the castellan.73 At the time, imprisonment was not used as a
punishment but to ensure that the offender would not flee before appearing in
court or his execution.74 The various examples cited clearly show that this fear
was not unfounded. Another example, however, shows that pre-trial incarcera-
tion was not always very strict: Jacquet Tavernier composed for a fine of 4
florins because, while he was supposed to be incarcerated, he was seen walking
outside the prison without the permission of the castellan before re-entering the
prison on his own. It was not uncommon that the escape was merely one stage
in an individual’s run-in with the law. Consider the example of a re-offender
from the town of Pont-de-Vaux, Martin Farquet, who, after having beaten a
clerk in 1312-1313,75 was himself beaten until bleeding by a man and a woman
a few years later,76 before being accused of setting fire to a house. Incarcerated,
he escaped and sought refuge in a church. For this transgression, he managed
to compose for the amount of 8 livres of which only 100 sous, at first, could be
accounted for in the castellany computus. The amount was never recovered in
68 “Recepit a dicto Gentet d’Avites quia fregit carcerem domini episcopi et domini comitis”;
ADCO, Dijon, B 9166, 1352-3, m. 12, banna concordata.
69 “Recepit a dicto Jogaton quia perysonem domini fregit; ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, 1349-50,
m. 5, banna concordata.
70 “Recepit a Guillermo Pitit de Albigniaco condempnato per judicem in sex libris
viennensibus quia inculpabatur auxilium dedisse cuidam carcerato ut ipso a carcere recederet”;
ADCO, Dijon, B 9171, 1362-3, m. 23, banna condempnata.
71 “Recepit a dicto Tricaut quia dictum Gentet promisiit ire de carcere ubi ipsum
custodiebat”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, 1350-1, m. 14, banna concordata.
72 “Recepit a Bernardo Badodi incarcerato apud Pontem Vallium quia a carcere recessit
sine licentia”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9176, 1375-6, m. 14, banna concordata.
73 “Recepit a Jaqueto Tavernier quia dictum nobis captum et in prysone domini
incarceratum absque licentia castellani visum fuit et in dicta carcere solus intravit”; ADCO,
Dijon, B 9171, 1361-2, m. 7, banna concordata.
74 “Carcer non fuerit introductus ad penam, sed ad custodiam”; Statuta Sabaudiae of 1430,
cited by CARRIER, “Une justice”, p. 241.
75 “De IIII libris turensibus receptis de Martino Farqueti pro eo quod verberavit quemdam
clericum”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, m. 18, banna.
76 “Recepit a Perrono Perroudi et ejus pedisseca pro eo quod inculpabantur fecisse
sanguinem Martino Falquet”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1324-5, m. 4, banna concordata.
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its entirety: the individual fled once more, and the sale of his property yielded
a mere 15 livres.77 His name never appears in the banna again.
Making Connections: The banna and Other Types of Data from the Ac-
counts
The section on banna, and the computi more generally, are quite terse: the
information is recorded as succinctly as possible. The typical entry in the
banna section is a rather short sentence stating the amount of the fine, the name
of the culprit, the reason for the fine (i.e. the crime), and sometimes the vic-
tim’s name. In the other sections, too, the information is limited to the essen-
tials: accounting records are very different from other kinds of documents, such
as the Fournier Register which was used by Le Roy Ladurie for his study of
Montaillou. But accounting records also have two advantages over other docu-
ments: first of all, they provide information on different subjects, from the
price of cereals to wages and the cost of materials for the renovation of the
castle; and secondly, they constitute series spanning decades or even centuries,
providing us with the same type of data over a considerable period. And this
enables diachronic studies.
In this section I propose to explore through a handful of examples the ana-
lytical potential of comparing the data from the banna with data from the other
sections of the computi, in particular the laudes et vende, the tax on real-estate
transactions (both land and houses). This brief methodological exploration is
particularly useful for reconstructing local social trends and aspects of every-
day life, including micro-economic strategies.78 The comparison enables us to
follow the same individuals both in a judicial context (where some of their
schemes were deemed transgressive) and in the local property market, where
their conduct was no less strategic. The analysis may reveal for example, that
behind a crime such as a fight or the destruction of a field lay a previous land
transaction between the parties, with the seller forced by necessity to part with
77 “Recepit de bonis Martini Farqueti qui anno praeterdicto concordaverat ut in computo
precedenti ad octo libras de quibus jam computaverat in suo computo de centum solidis et plus
non potuit recuperare quia fugiit XL solidos viennenses”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1327, m. 17,
banna concordata.
78 On this approach, see I. EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, “The castellany accounts of late-medieval
Savoy: a source-oriented approach’, New Europe College Odobleja program Yearbook (2014),
pp. 81-109, at pp. 91, 97-99.
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his land and never overcoming his resentment at the perceived injustice of the
sale.
Certain family names are particularly frequent in both the banna and the
laudes et vende, notably Taillefer (by far the most frequent), Catin, and Moy-
rod. It appears that certain families were active for some years but after a point
they completely disappear from the record. Other families appear only in the
laudes and never in the fines or vice-versa. In the laudes et vende from the end
of the thirteenth century, several sales or leases were made by two men named
Taillefer, father and the son. They either took out leases or simply bought
several pieces of lands from a number of different people.79 The frequency of
the purchases suggests that the family was pursuing a strategy of expansion and
enlargement of its landed patrimony. At the same time, in the banna, men
named Taillefer received several fines for a variety of reasons. In one case,
Poncet Taillefer “occupaverat iter publicum”:80 he was fined because he had
occupied the public road. Such instances of encroachment on public land are
not uncommon in the Savoyard computi; in this case, it seems the family would
stop at nothing in its efforts to expand their landed possessions. In an another
account, a woman named La Bretta appears both in the laudes et vende and in
the banna. In the two first instances, she was the owner of two pieces of land
sold to the Taillefers.81 In the third one, Poncet Taillefer was fined because he
had ploughed her wheat field.82 It is quite possible that, as the owner of the
adjacent plot of land, Taillefer was eying the rest of La Bretta’s property and
sought to assert his claim to her field by ploughing it.
The opposite scenario is illustrated by the Palmier family: people sharing
this name appear quite late in the laudes. They start to sell land in the middle
of the fourteenth century.83 But in the fines we can follow their exploits already
from the end of the thirteenth century: one of them got into a fight.84 Another
79 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1288-9, dorse, 1291-2, m. 6; B 9156, 1293-4, m. 1, 1294-5, m. 3.
80 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1290-1, m. 5.
81 “De III solidis receptis de Poncio Tallifer de Bosco pro medietate laudis pecie terre
duarum peciarum terre empte de Iohanneta Labreta et eius filio pretio triginta sex solidorum”
(ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1293-4, m. 1); “de XVII denariis receptis a Bernardo Tayllifer pro
medietate laudis terre empte a dicta La Breta duodecim solidis” (1294-5, m. 3).
82 “De VI solidis VIII denariis receptis de Ponceto Tallifer pro eo quia essaravit bladum alla
Breta”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9157, 1298-9, m. 5.
83 “Recepit ab Hugonino Seraphini pro terra empta a Johanino Palmerii de Reissosa […]”;
ADCO, Dijon, B 9168, 1356-7, m. 4.
84 “De L solidis receptis a filio Bernardi Palmerii pro rixa quam habuit cum filio Poponi
cui fecit sanguinem”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9154, 1286-7, dorse.
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one kept his neighbour’s fishing net without his permission, called someone a
thief but could not prove it,85 stole a woman’s clothes when she was in her field
so she stayed naked,86 and refused to accept a mediation brokered by the castel-
lan.87 The near-complete absence of this family from the records of property
acquisition, in stark contrast with their many appearances as culprits in the
fines, suggests a different mode of engaging with society, more spontaneous
and less strategic, focussing on obtaining satisfaction in the present – by what-
ever means – rather than making plans for the future. It is noteworthy that the
transgressive conduct by members of this family, of the kind summarised
above, lasted for decades. In this case, the laudes et vende do not say much
about socio-economic relations between this family and others; rather, it is the
absence of the family from the laudes et vende that is revealing, particularly
when considered in light of the data from the banna.
The computi’s judicial data, however, do not open a window onto criminal
acts alone. Certain passages and mentions point to exchanges, indeed some-
times the dialogue, between the central fiscal administration (later known as
the chambre des comptes) that audited the castellany accounts and the castellan
who had to justify his management of the castellany, including, at the judicial
level, before the auditores computorum.
The Institutional Dialogue between the Castellan and the Central Ad-
ministration
In the early accounts preserved for the castellany of Pont-de-Vaux, the
passages reflecting an exchange between the central administration and the
castellan are limited in number, length, and message. In 1275-1276, the castel-
lan was enjoined to recover the rest of what was due to the count in the matter
of some cereals – if he was able to do so (“et injunctum est castellano quod
residuum debitorum recuperet si potest”).88 The final moderating sentence was
85 “De XXVII solidis VI denariis receptis de Johanne Palmer d’Avites pro eo quod ceperat
retia vicini sui sine licentia; de L solidis receptis de dicto Johanne Palmer pro eo quod vocavit
alium latronem nec potuit probare”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1288-9, dorse.
86 “De XL solidis receptis de Johanne Palmerii quia spoliavit quamdam mulierem in campo
suo de omnibus vestibus ita quod remansit nuda”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1290-1, m. 5.
87 “De XVI solidis receptis de Johanne Palmer quia noluit obedire cuidam compromisso
facto per castellanum”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, 1291-2, m. 6.
88 ADCO, Dijon, B 9153, 1275-6, m. 1.
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meant to soften the initial injunction that might seem quite strict. The recovery
of what was due to the count and his court was explicitly entrusted to the
castellan according to his possibilities. No obligation of success was imposed,
merely an obligation to use the means available to him. A comparable mention
appears in the account for 1290-1291: at the end of the clame, there is the men-
tion “et si plus recuperare potest, de ipsis debet conputare”.89
In the account of 1285 these instructions take a different form.90 While
previously they had been integrated in the main body of text of the roll, written
in the same hand and the same ink as the rest of the section, in 1285 the in-
structions were added in the left margin by another hand. They recall the exis-
tence of a bannum (“memorandum quod de XL solidis Parisiensium quod debet
filius Alaboci pro parjurio non computat quia non recuperavit sed debet
recuperare et computare”). We can reconstruct the dialogue between the
castellan and the auditors: summoned to explain the absence of this case from
the section, the castellan justifies it (“non computat quia non recuperavit”); the
auditors remind him clearly and firmly of the duties of his office (“sed debet
recuperare et computare”).
The instructions included in the section for the banna may also have been
motivated by the negligence of a castellan who omitted to give details of the
clame in two consecutive records.91 In the first one, he is asked to include the
details in the following accounts and, in both records, to make a readjustment
if necessary. This request, however, had no effect: the sections devoted to the
clame in the records for the following years give only the total amount of the
clame. This procedure must have ultimately been validated by the court, since
no further requests of this type were made thereafter.
In some cases, the castellan answers (or, as seen in the last example, in the
end does not answer) the requests of the court. In other cases, he gives the
impression of preventing comments or requests that could have been made by
the auditors. In the account for 1317-1318, one of the banna condempnata
concerns a man who stole another’s trap and was sentenced to a fine of 100
89 ADCO, Dijon, B 9155, m. 5.
90 ADCO, Dijon, B 9154, 1285, m. 1.
91 First time: “de LIII solidis IIII denariis receptis de clamis per dictum tempus, de quibus
non reddidit particulas quia dicebat eas dimisisse per oblivionem. Injunctum est sibi quod in alio
computo reddat particulas, et secundum plus vel minus eidem computentur”; ADCO, Dijon, B
9156, 1293-4, m. 2. Second time: “de LXX solidis receptis de clamis per idem tempus obvenien-
tibus quarum oblitus est particulas quas reddere debet et si plus contineant plus computabit”;
ADCO, Dijon, B 9156, 1294-5, m. 3.
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sous (the equivalent of 5 livres). In the entry, it is pointed out that only 4 livres,
13 sous and 9 deniers could be recovered;92 the amount appears twice in the
entry, rather than only once at its beginning, as was common. The reader has
the impression that the castellan insisted not only on the effort made to recover
the sum, but also on the importance of what was recovered (1,125 deniers).
Even if he was still short of the target, the amount recovered was close enough
to that of the conviction (1,200 deniers) – 94%, to be exact.
A few years later, the case of a certain Boschacius Alacorna (or Delacorna)
was the subject of an attentive follow-up by the central fiscal administration.
One of the banna concordata of 1324-1325 concerns Bertrand Bailliet, who
paid a fine for his brother Johannet Bailliet, sentenced by the judge to 12 livres
for striking Boschacius with his sword and for having killed pigs belonging to
the latter’s wife.93 Of these 12 livres, half was remitted by the count ex gratia
as per the testimony of Jean Maréchal, castellan of Bâgé. The following lines
give more details about the event. A note was entered (“et est sciendum
quod…”) to the effect that the fine of 60 sous to which Boschacius was sen-
tenced for striking Johannet Bailliet atrociter with a bar (esparra),94 as well as
the 40-sous fine to be paid by the person who provided him with his weapon,
were not accounted for because the case was pending in the court of appeals.
The castellan is enjoined to recover these amounts once the appeal is decided,
as best he can, and answer for these amounts in the next account (“tum injunc-
tum est castellano quod finito termino appellationis recuperet condempnatio-
nes ut melius poterit et de ipsis computet in suo primo computo”). The case did
not progress during the following accounting year, and the appeal was still
being considered.95 It was only in the following account that an evolution is
apparent: Boschacius pays a bannum condempnatum of 24 sous because it was
not possible to recover more, at least according to the castellan (“et plus non
potuit recuperare quia non invenit de quo, ut dicit”);96 the mention ut dicit
clearly marks the care taken by the court with regard to this statement. Finally,
92 “De IIII libris XIII solidis IX denariis Viennensium receptis a Perrone de Molendino de
Chavenes quia sustraxerat Bertino quamdam nansam et fuit condemptus in centum solidis
Viennensium sed non potuerunt plus recuperari nisi dicte quatuor libre tresdecim solidos et
novem denarios”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, 1317-8, m. 49.
93 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, m. 4.
94 The fact that it was his brother Bertrand who paid the fine was probably due to the
seriousness of Johannet’s injuries.
95
ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1325, m. 8.
96 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1325-1327, m. 13.
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the case is closed during the following year: in a bannum concordatum,
Boschacius pays 6 sous. The entry in the account specifies that, from the initial
sentence of 60 sous, 24 were retrieved (“recepit a Boschacio Alacorna
condempnato ut in computo precedenti in sexaginta solidis de quibus recupe-
raverat et computaverat de viginti quatuor solidis Viennensibus”).97 Under half
of the amount due for the initial conviction was thus finally collected, after
several years and at the cost of a final agreement after several attempts to re-
cover the entire amount.
During the same period, Hugues Peliczon was sentenced to two fines of 40
sous each; the nature of his crime was not specified in this first entry. No sum
was recorded, however, because an appeal was once again pending,98 but the
auditors insisted that the castellan take care of this matter: “et est injunctum
Hugoni Burdini ut finito anno dictas condempnationes procuret levari”. In the
following accounting year, one of the cases was settled through an agreement,
but the other, about which we learn that it was caused by the diversion of a
watercourse, was not settled: Hugues Peliczon had meanwhile fled, and conse-
quently the castellan was ordered to recover the amount from the sale of his
possessions (“et non computat quia fugiit. Sic est ei injunctum quod super eius
bonis recuperetur”).99 A year later, 14 sous from this sale are listed under the
banna condempnata per judicem.100 Unlike Boschacius, Hugues Peliczon’s
case was not closed through an agreement.
The fines for which payment had not been made – or had not been made in
full – were in the end grouped in a separate section, called the banna de arra-
gio, and in the accounts followed immediately after the banna condempnata.
Arragium is one of the many variants of the noun areragium (arrieragium,
arrayragium, and so on), designating ‘what is due’; it is also used in French in
the form arrérages since at least 1267.101 At Pont-de-Vaux, this section appears
in the 1349-1350 accounting year,102 but it needs to be stressed that the rolls are
missing for the period from 1330 to 1348. Elsewhere in the Savoyard area, the
97 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1327, m. 17.
98 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1325-7, m. 13 and 1327, m. 17.
99 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1327-8, m. 21.
100 ADCO, Dijon, B 9162, 1327-8, m. 28.
101 J.F. NIERMEYER, Mediae Latinitatis lexicon minus (Leiden, 1976), s.v. arrieragium; Ch.
Du Fresne DU CANGE, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, 5th edn. (Niort, 1883-1887), s.v.
areragium; CNRS/Université Nancy 2/ATILF, Trésor de la langue française informatisé (Paris,
2004), <http://stella.atilf.fr/>.
102
ADCO, Dijon, B 9165.
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section appears sooner: in Saint-Rambert (in the Bugey), it dates from 1331-
1332,103 while in Aiguebelle (bailiwick of Savoy), it dates from 1344-1345.104
The section is not fundamentally different from the earlier entries about out-
standing fines analysed above; rather, its novelty lies in the fact that it provides
a formal framework for such entries. Generally speaking, such cases were
initially recorded in the section on banna condempnata (almost always at the
very end of it) for about two accounting periods, with a note that the amounts
are not accounted for because an appeal was pending. Only in the following,
third accounting period is the case included under the rubric banna de arragio.
In other words, the condemned party had about two accounting years to pro-
vide a resolution, and indeed sometimes the matter was closed in the second
accounting year. This, however, is far from being the most common case. All
cases that have not been settled at this stage are then found in the banna de
arragio. This systematic approach testifies to the rigour and perseverance of
the judicial and administrative apparatus: enjoined by the auditores computo-
rum, occasionally in the gravest terms, the castellan did not easily let go of
unpaid fines.
Let us take the example of a group of men convicted for attempting, one
night, to abuse a woman; of them, two fled. The case is first mentioned in the
banna condempnata of 1349-1350, but the fines are not accounted for because
the condemned had appealed (in subsequent accounts the marginal note “vide”
draws attention to this matter).105 In the following accounting year, the case
remains in the same section, but the fines are still not collected because of the
appeal, per the instructions given by Galesius de Baume, an advisor of the
count. As the appeal lingered, the castellan was ordered to recover the amounts
unless the condemned won their appeal.106 In 1351-1352, the case is included
in the banna de arragio but remains on appeal. Furthermore, the newly ap-
103 ADCO, Dijon, B 9744.
104 ADS, Chambéry, SA 7939; M. ACHAIN, Comptes de châtellenie Aiguebelle 1275-1348:
Transcription des comptes de châtellenie d’Aiguebelle dans le comté de Savoie: SA 7922 à 7943,
<https://www.academia.edu/9263507/Comptes_de_ch%C3%A2tellenie_Aiguebelle_1275-1348>,
p. 160.
105 ADCO, Dijon, B 9165, 1349-50, m. 5.
106 “Non computat quia dicti condempnati appellaverunt et dominus Galesius de Balma,
consiliarius domini, mandavit dicto castellano justis causis subemitibus ut cesset ab ipsis
compellendis de presenti. Et quia appelationes deserte videntur injungitur ei ut ipsis
condempnationes recuperet ita quod de ipsis in suo sequenti computo valeat computare nisi aliud
justitia apponeretur per ipsos quare praedicta recuperari non deberent”; ADCO, Dijon, B 9165,
1350-1, m. 15.
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pointed castellan did not recover the amounts of the convictions because, “ut
asserit”, he did not know that they had to be recovered because he could not
get a copy of the previous account. He even produced a letter from Jean de
Montangio, judge of Bugey, attesting that the appeal of one of the men in-
volved was still pending. The document does not seem to convince the auditors
completely, since the castellan was still instructed to recover the amounts of
the fines and account for them in his next account; if he failed to do so without
justification, he was to be charged for the amounts.107 A year later, the case
appeared in the banna de arragio section. For one of the five men involved –
one of the two fugitives – a mention was added in the right margin that “ampli-
us non fiat mentio”; we are informed that he was absolved. For the second
fugitive, the amount is not taken into account because it was asserted that the
previous castellan, Jean Bérard, had recovered the amount, but if it turned out
that this was not the case, he (Bérard) was liable for the amount: “non compu-
tat quia Johannes Berardi dictus Cusins castellanus ibidem ante ipsum recupe-
ravit ipsos, et de ipsis computare debet. Et nisi dictus Johannes reperiatur
computase, supra ipsum precise allocentur”. This points to the castellan’s
personal responsibility for his management of criminal justice. The appeal was
still pending for the other three. The court renewed its request, stating that the
case must be examined diligently so that the fines might be accounted for in the
next accounting year, unless the castellan has a good reason not to do so (“et
prout in computo precedenti injuntum fuit, injungitur iterato eidem quod pro-
curet diligenter causas terminari, ita quod de ipsis condepnationibus possit in
computo sequenti computare nisi juste se possit excusare”). Unsurprisingly,
the case appears again in the following year in much the same terms, including
the castellan’s liability in case of unjustified failure to recover the fines.108
Finally the matter is settled in 1354-1355,109 when no more mention of the
fugitives is made – this might mean that Jean Bérard covered the amount him-
107 “A qua condepnatione appellaverunt et adhuc sunt in prosequtione appellationes ut dicit.
Et idem castellanus, ut asserit, ignoravit dictas condempnationes fore recuperandas quia copiam
computi habere non potuit. Et etiam ostentit litteras domini Johannis de Montangio, judicis Terre
Baugiaci, testificantes ut dictus Jacopinus suam appellationem adhuc prosequitur inhibendo
dicto castellano non contra ipsum procedet donec causa appellationis fuit terminata, quam
litteram reddit. Et injungitur dicto castellano quod dictas condempnationes recuperet ita quod
de ipsis in computo sequenti et sibi ipsum allocentur nisi juste se posit excusare”; ADCO, Dijon,
B 9166, m. 4.
108
ADCO, Dijon, B 9166, 1353-4, m. 20.
109 ADCO, Dijon, B 9167, m. 5.
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self. The other three men were granted a remission,110 whereby the fine was
reduced to 31 livres, 13 sous and 4 deniers, which had already been paid. It
took five years, from 1350 to 1355, to achieve this result, but the amount of
money involved was substantial.
What can be concluded from the analysis of these various examples of
interactions between the castellan and the auditors and clerks of the central
administration? First of all, that some of these remarks concerned matters inter-
nal to the financial administration, with little consequences in the outside
world – this is the case, for example, when the court asks the castellan to indi-
cate the specific details of the clame. Secondly, some other remarks did have
an impact on society – this is the case of demands for the recovery of fines by
threatening to charge the amounts in question to the castellan if he failed to get
things done. This threat could only stimulate his zeal, with the consequences
that one can imagine for the individuals fined. The institutional dialogue be-
tween the court and the castellan is, in fact, not really a dialogue in the true
meaning of the term: when the court answers the castellan’s explanations, it is
always to push him to recover the money – first with the proviso that he should
do so if he is able (“si potest”), then with more insistence. And the castellan
adopts a ‘rhetorical submission’, because of his position entails, in particular,
his personal commitment in the settlement of litigious amounts.
Conclusions
At first glance, the lists of clame and, even more so, of the banna, testify
to a century in which behaviours considered improper were at once many and
varied in nature, most often petty but sometimes involving real violence. What
is more, the banna open a window onto the communications between the
castellan and the court, and even beyond the judicial realm, onto social trends
at the local level. The communication that was established between the castel-
lan and the central financial administration (i.e. the chambre des comptes)
through the instructions inserted in the accounting rolls on specific matters
testifies, in the beginning, to a system which is still establishing itself: the
110 “[…] et qui appellaverant, ut in arragio computorum precedentium et in suplicatione per
eos domino porrecta remissis sibi duabus partibus dictarum condempnationum per dominum
contemplatione et ad supplicationem dicti domini archidiaconi ut per litteram domini de
remissione datam in Ponte Vele die XXV° mensis Novembris M° CCC° LIIII° quam reddit et sine
aliqua condicione”.
250 AUDE WIRTH-JAILLARD
instructions were modulated with a rather accommodating “si potest”. Thereaf-
ter, the instructions declined in number and were found mostly in the banna
condempnata and banna de arragio, but they occasionally became more direct
and threatening. Once the system was in place and functioning, it was possible
to be more demanding on the few points that still posed problems. The harsher
line taken by the central administration had consequences for society: ordered
to recover the fines from the convicts under pain of being charged themselves
for the amounts, the castellans could only take a harder stance against those
reluctant or unable to pay.
Conversely, a different dynamic is at play when agreements (concordata)
were encouraged and remissions of part of the fine granted. While agreements
are attested rather early, they are formalised procedurally with the appearance,
around 1315, of a separate section for banna concordata; their numbers rela-
tive to the total cases of fines grew over time. Over the same period the first
cases of remissions appeared among the banna condempnata;111 it was not
uncommon that half of the amount of the fine was cancelled by the count. Even
the banna de arragio went in the same direction of showing moderation, not-
withstanding that their very existence was proof that even the smallest fines
were not forgotten. Thus, an initial bannum condempnatum, a condemnation,
when finally paid by the culprit, sometimes after several years, had already
been reduced, usually to half of the original amount (with one exception).112
The banna de arragio remained small in number, to the point that between
1360-1361 and 1370-1371 there were none at all. Together, the low frequency
of arrears for penal fines and the high frequency of agreements (concordata)
show that the system worked well overall, with the exception of those few
cases where appeals were pending for quite a long time. Agreements also had
the advantage of lower legal costs and a timely collection of the fine, since they
were settled quickly – certainly before being recorded in the castellany account
that was prepared for the audit (there are no cases of unpaid banna concorda-
ta). The sum may have been lower, but at least it was paid.
This trend, however, should not be seen as a sign of expediency or lenience
on the part of the central administration, which, on the contrary, did not relent
in seeking to keep track of every unpaid fine, even through appeals that lasted
several years. That the expenses incurred sometimes exceeded the sum of the
fine in some cases (for some fines were quite modest) suggests that the sym-
bolic dimension of justice was valued even more than the profits brought by its
administration.
111 ADCO, Dijon, B 9161, 1315-6, m. 35.
112 ADCO, Dijon, B 9175, 1373-4, m. 22.
From Chirograph to Roll: The Records
of Thirteenth-Century Anglo-Jewish Moneylending*
DEAN A. IRWIN
O
n the feast day of St. Thomas the Martyr (29 December) 1275, the ab-
bot of St. John’s (Colchester) and Walter of Essex went to the Colches-
ter archa.1 This was one of a series of chests, or archae, in thirteenth
century England, the primary purpose of which was to hold acknowledgements
of debt.2 These were the records generated by Jewish moneylending activities,
which outlined the extent and terms of each individual transaction.3 The pair
had been tasked, by a royal order dated 24 November, with opening the chest,
* I would like to thank Dr Richard Cassidy for reading and commenting upon a draft of this
paper. Any errors which remain are my own.
1 London, The National Archives [henceforth TNA] C 47/9/48.
2 Henceforth referred to as acknowledgements for ease. On the archae system see, most
recently, R.R. MUNDILL “The ‘Archa’ system and its legacy after 1194”, in: Christians and Jews
in Angevin England: The York Massacre of 1190, Narratives and Contexts, ed. S. REES JONES
and S. WATSON (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 148-162.
3 On acknowledgements, see D.A. IRWIN, “The materiality of debt to Jews in England,
1194-1276”, Jewish Historical Studies 49 (2017), pp. 56-71.
......................................................................................................................................
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political
Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2020), pp. 251-272.
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scrutinising its contents, and enrolling the acknowledgements held in it.4 That
process was undertaken in the presence of the chirographers who administered
the archa, and the roll produced was sent to the king.5 At the time it was
searched, 44 acknowledgements, owed to twelve creditors, ranging in size from
£1 (20s) to £46 13s 4d (70 marks), were found in the chest.6 During the winter
of 1275-1276, officers across the country, at twenty separate urban centres,
were undertaking the same task, though only seven of these scrutinies (includ-
ing the roll from Colchester) have survived.7 A number of other scrutiny rolls
have survived from across the thirteenth century. Two rolls from 1240 list the
contents of the Cambridge and Lincoln archae respectively.8 An inventory of
the London chest, which was produced in December 1272, has also survived,9
as have eleven rolls produced during the winter of 1290-1291, after the general
expulsion of the Jews from England.10 In that sense, the Colchester roll forms
part of a series of similar documents. It differs from the other scrutinies in one
key respect: not only has the roll itself survived, but so have a number of the
acknowledgements which were enrolled on it (more on this below). These
scrutiny rolls have traditionally been used by historians to inform wider discus-
sions of the scale and extent of Jewish moneylending activities. In contrast, this
essay sets itself three closely connected tasks. First, it will explore the adminis-
trative context within which the rolls were produced. Secondly, it will examine
the relationship between scrutinies and the acknowledgements that they re-
corded. Thirdly, it will consider the use of the documents after their production
4 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the Reign of Edward I … A.D. 1272-1281 (London, 1901),
p. 127.
5 Ibid., p. 126; TNA C 47/9/48.
6 These are terms of account which denote a certain number of silver pennies. There were
twelve pennies in a shilling and twenty shillings (240d) in a pound. A mark was equivalent to
two-thirds of a pound (13s 4d or 160d). For consistency, I have standardised all sums throughout
this paper with the original sum being provided in parenthesis.
7 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1281, pp. 126, 127;
Calendar of the Close Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1279 (London, 1900), p. 260.
The orders for the scrutiny of the chests at Lincoln, Oxford and Stamford were, for some reason,
issued twice. The surviving inventories are of the archae at Bedford [TNA E 101/686/7],
Colchester [TNA C 47/9/48], Exeter [TNA E 101/249/31], Hereford [Calendar of the Plea Rolls
of the Exchequer of the Jews, ed. H. JENKINSON (London, 1929), pp. 230-238], Northampton
[TNA E 101/249/33] and York [TNA C 47/9/49], with the Bedford and Northampton scrutinies
having suffered particularly extensive damage.
8 TNA E 101/249/3, 4.
9 TNA E 101/249/15.
10
TNA E 101/250/2-12. Rolls have survived for the archae at Bristol, Canterbury,
Cambridge, Devizes, Exeter, Hereford, Lincoln, Norwich, Nottingham, Oxford, and Winchester.
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by both the Crown and parties to the debt.11 As a result, it will be seen that
much can be learned about the nature and use of the scrutiny rolls by consider-
ing the records from these three perspectives.
Any discussion of the scrutinies must be prefaced with a more general note
on the Crown’s regulation of Jewish moneylending activities during this pe-
riod.12 The Articles of the Jewry (1194) introduced, for the first time, rules
specifying how transactions in which Jews lent money to Christians were to be
recorded and stored.13 In terms of this study, the Articles did two important
things. First, they specified that a record of each individual transaction was to
be produced. Initially, this was to be upon the instrument of a bipartite chiro-
graph, though from 1233 that changed to a tripartite document, with the foot
being sealed by the debtor.14 Secondly, they established what has become
known to historians as the archae system. It had been intended that a series of
six or seven chests would be established at strategic urban centres across the
country.15 Those chests were to be administered by two Christian chirogra-
phers, elected from the local urban community, two Jewish chirographers,
elected from the Jewish community, and two scribes (scriptores), who would
be responsible for producing the acknowledgements. From this point onwards,
for a debt to be considered valid, a record of it needed to have been produced
by one of those clerks with a portion of it being deposited in one of those
chests. In effect, this meant that there were three parties to a debt: the debtor,
the creditor, and the Crown. The number of archae grew rapidly and, by 1218,
seventeen had been established across England.16 Additionally, following the
introduction of the Statute of the Jewry (1275), which prohibited Jews from
lending money at interest, a second set of archae was established.17 This argu-
ment was first proposed by Peter Elman in 1939 on the basis of the headings on
11 The importance of considering not only the production of medieval rolls, but also their
“active use”, can be seen in R. CASSIDY, “Recorda splendidissima: The use of the pipe rolls in
the thirteenth century”, Historical Research 85 (2012), pp. 1-12, esp. pp. 2-3.
12 J. and C. HILLABY, The Palgrave Dictionary of Medieval Anglo-Jewish History (London,
2015), pp. 98-99.
13 Roger of Howden, Chronica Magistri, ed. W. STUBBS, 4 vols. (London, 1870: Rolls
Series), 3, pp. 266-267.
14 H.G. RICHARDSON, English Jewry Under Angevin Kings (London, 1960), p. 294.
15 Chronica Magistri, p. 266.
16 HILLABY, The Palgrave Dictionary of Medieval Anglo-Jewish History, p. 95.
17 On the Statute, see P.A. BRAND, “Jews and the Law in England, 1275-90”, English
Historical Review 115 (2000), pp. 1140-1144.
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the post-Expulsion scrutinies.18 These listed the debts according to whether
they had been found in the veteres archae (Old Chests) or novae archae (New
Chests). According to Elman’s argument, the Old Chests contained the records
of Jewish moneylending activities produced before 1276. With the introduction
of the 1275 Statute, Jews were forced to shift to dealing in commodities rather
than money and, as such, a new set of chests was established to house those
new commodity bonds which were generated after 1280. Although elements of
that argument were comprehensively challenged by Robin R. Mundill in his
doctoral work, I have recently revived it, with much amendment, on the basis
of the archival evidence.19 That is an important distinction within the context
of this piece because, for reasons which will be explored below, it is only the
records associated with the veteres archae which are considered here. Unfortu-
nately, only post-Expulsion rolls for the Old Chests at Devizes, Exeter, and
Hereford have survived from 1290-1291, with the majority of those rolls detail-
ing the contents of the New Chests.20 Although the Lincoln scrutiny was la-
belled as listing the contents of the Old Chest, it appears that that was a clerical
error, given that it lists commodity bonds, so that roll will not be considered
here.21
The scrutiny rolls have long been known to historians of medieval Anglo-
Jewry. In 1895, B.L. Abrahams published a valuable, if problematic, summary
of the creditors listed in the 1290 scrutinies, along with the total amount of
money or goods which were owed to them.22 A particular limitation of that
piece was that it did not provide the names of the debtors, or the details of
individual transactions. Several decades later, Peter Elman examined the scruti-
nies as part of his studies of Jewish finance.23 Although important from a
historiographical perspective, much of Elman’s work was challenged by Mun-
dill. From 1987 onwards, using the srunities, Mundill’s scholarship did much
18 P. ELMAN, “Jewish trade in thirteenth century England”, Historia Judaica 1 (1939), pp.
91-104, at p. 97.
19 R.R. MUNDILL, The Jews in England, 1272-1290 (unpublished doctoral thesis, St.
Andrews University, 1987), pp. 111-114; D.A. IRWIN, “From archae to archives”, Archives 52
(2017), pp. 1-11, at pp. 5-6.
20 TNA E 101/250/2, 5, 11.
21 TNA E 101/249/12; IRWIN, “From Archae to Archives”, p. 6.
22 B.L. ABRAHAMS, “The condition of the Jews of England at the time of their expulsion in
1290”, Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England 2 (1894-1895), pp. 76-105.
23 See, e.g. P. ELMAN, “Jewish finance in thirteenth-century England”, Transactions of the
Jewish Historical Society of England 16 (1945-1951), pp. 89-96. 
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to advance our understanding of Anglo-Jewish moneylending activities.24 In
particular, by considering the debtors as well as the creditors, he was able to
map effectively the geographical and social distribution of debts. That model
served as the foundation for the doctoral work of Hannah Meyer and Carl Fei-
busch, who both followed the example set by Mundill, with exciting results.25
My own work has advanced a less favourable interpretation of scrutinies, argu-
ing that they have “traditionally relegated acknowledgements to a secondary
position” in the historiography on Anglo-Jewish moneylending.26 From a prac-
tical perspective, however, that makes sense, not least because the details of
many more transactions have survived as enrolments than as original chiro-
graphs. While it has been possible to trace 348 acknowledgments, Mundill
calculated that the particulars of more than three thousand transactions have
survived when all of the financial records – scrutiny and receipt rolls, which
recorded Jewish tallage payments – are treated together.27 That figure is re-
duced to around 750 debts when the scrutinies of the veteres archae are treated
in isolation. Even so, more than twice as many debts have been transmitted to
us by the inventories of the veteres archae than have survived as chirographs.28
In the pages which follow, however, it will be seen that the scrutinies can only
be fully understood when they are considered within the context of the ac-
knowledgements which they enrolled. Moreover, it will be argued that, al-
though both types of documents record the details of Jewish moneylending
activities, the reasons for which they were created and used could, and did,
vary considerably.
24 See, e.g. R.R. MUNDILL, England’s Jewish Solution: Experiment and Expulsion, 1262-
1290 (Cambridge, 1998), esp. ch. 6; ID., “Christian and Jewish lending patterns and financial
dealings during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries”, in: Credit and Debt in Medieval England
c.1180-c.1350, ed. P.R. SCHOFIELD and N.J. MAYHEW (Oxford, 2002), pp. 42-67.
25 H. MEYER, Female Moneylending and Wet-Nursing in Jewish-Christian Relations in
Thirteenth-Century England (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009), esp.
ch. 2; C.E. FEIBUSCH, Jews and Credit in Late Thirteenth-Century England (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of California, 2013). See also H. MEYER, “Gender, Jewish creditors, and
Christian debtors in thirteenth-century Exeter”, in: Intersections of Gender, Religion and
Ethnicity in the Middle Ages, ed. C. BEATTIE and K.A. FENTON (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 104-124.
26 IRWIN, “From archae to archives”, p. 3.
27 MUNDILL, England’s Jewish Solution, p. 8. I am in the process of analysing those
acknowledgements for my doctoral thesis: Dean A. IRWIN, Acknowledging Debt to Jews in
England 1194-1276 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Canterbury Christ Church University, ongoing).
28 It is difficult to be more precise because several of the 1275 scrutinies – in particular those
of the Bedford and Northampton archae – have suffered extensive damage.
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The full integration of the scrutinies into the scholarship on the Jews of
medieval England has been somewhat impeded by the manner in which histori-
ans have traditionally accessed them. Much of the historiography has focussed
upon the legal records, in the form of the Jewish plea rolls, which have been
the subject of a long, though as yet incomplete, drive towards publication.29 No
such organised efforts towards publication have been made in relation to the
financial records generally, or the scrutiny rolls specifically. That being said,
isolated rolls have been edited by individual historians. In 1913, for example,
H.P. Stokes transcribed the scrutiny of the Cambridge archa which were pro-
duced in 1240.30 Similarly, as part of his study of The Jews of Medieval Ox-
ford, Cecil Roth transcribed the 1290 scrutiny of the Oxford nova archa,
though he was unaware of the existence of the 1275 scrutiny of the vetus ar-
cha.31 Important work in this area is also being undertaken by Julie L. Mell and
Ethan Levi Margolis, who are in the process of editing the 1240 scrutiny of the
Lincoln archa, which will be accompanied by a scholarly introduction. Both
historians have already made important contributions to our understanding of
that roll.32 Equally, advances in modern technology mean that the scrutinies are
more accessible than ever. Photographs of those rolls in The National Ar-
chives’ E 101/249-250 series have been made available online via the Anglo-
American Legal Tradition website.33 Consequently, with the exception of the
scrutinies of the Colchester and York chests, held in a Chancery series, and the
Bedford archa, held elsewhere in the E 101 series, all of these rolls can now be
accessed digitally on the internet. It remains to be seen, however, whether this
will have a positive impact upon their use in the historiography.
The fundamental difference between acknowledgements and the entries on
a scrutiny roll must first be confronted. That is, when debts were enrolled, they
were not faithfully transcribed; rather, the main particulars of the transaction
were summarised. Conventionally, those details would be the names of the
29 HILLABY, The Palgrave Dictionary of Medieval Anglo-Jewish History, pp. 133-135.
30 H.P. STOKES, Studies in Anglo-Jewish History (London, 1913), pp. 252-275.
31 TNA E 101/250/9, transcribed in C. ROTH, The Jews of Medieval Oxford (Oxford, 1951),
pp. 174-179; TNA E 101/249/32.
32 E.L. MARGOLIS, Evidence that the Majority of Medieval English Jews were not
Moneylenders, with an Emphasis on Document E 101/249/4 (unpublished master’s thesis, North
Carolina State University, 2015); J.L. MELL, The Myth of the Medieval Jewish Moneylender, 2
vols. (London, 2017), 1, esp. pp. 169-173, 182-184.
33 “Exchequer: Accounts Various: The Jews”, Anglo-American Legal Tradition, <http://
aalt.law.uh.edu/E101nos249_255.html> (accessed on 15 March 2019). Unless otherwise stated,
the references in this paper refer to the original manuscripts.
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debtor and creditor, the principal which had been borrowed, and the date upon
which the transaction was recorded. In some instances, the date of repayment
would be entered as well. This detail was omitted from the post-Expulsion
scrutinies produced in London by governmental clerks, but can be seen in those
rolls which were produced in 1275.34 Peculiarly, the two earliest extant scru-
tiny rolls, from 1240, omitted the date of the transaction but did include the
date upon which repayment would become due.35 That is especially curious
because, to identify an individual transaction, it is the date upon which it was
recorded, rather than the date of repayment, which is needed.
That the enrolments were summaries rather than transcriptions, has tradi-
tionally been highlighted as a cause for concern by historians. In relation to the
post-Expulsion scrutinies, for example, Mundill remarked that “the forty sur-
viving membranes, alas, only contain abbreviated records of the transac-
tions”.36 The precise implications of the enrolment process can be better under-
stood by directly comparing surviving acknowledgements with their corre-
sponding summaries. As has already been highlighted, the evidence from the
Colchester archa makes such an undertaking possible. Of the 44 transactions
which are listed on the 1275 scrutiny, eight have survived in their original
form.37 Unfortunately, one of those documents has suffered some damage,
which prevents it from being compared in this way.38 Even so, much can be
learned by considering the relationship between the remaining seven acknowl-
edgements and the scrutiny roll entries. As Table 1 illustrates, the Colchester
acknowledgements were relatively consistent in length, being formed of be-
tween 108 and 112 Latin words. In contrast, the corresponding scrutiny roll
entries were slightly more variable, consisting of between 29 and 44 words. As
such, an average of 68.18% of text was lost during the enrolment process. That
such a high proportion of the text was omitted would seem to justify Mundill’s
concerns.
It is, however, important to take into account the nature of the text which
was lost. Acknowledgements were not complicated legal documents, the provi-
sions of which could be expressed in a variety of ways. Rather, they were high-
ly formulaic documents, the diplomatic of which was reasonably consistent,
34 See, for example, TNA E 101/250/2-12; TNA E 101/249/31-33.
35 TNA E 101/249/3, 4. 
36 MUNDILL, England’s Jewish Solution, p. 125.
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26 November 1258 WAM 9037 112 39 65.18%
23 April 1262 WAM 9053 109 36 66.97%
30 March 1265 WAM 9031 108 44 59.26%
20 May 1269 WAM 9052 109 29 73.39%
11 July 1269 WAM 9059 110 35 68.18%
20 July 1269 WAM 9017 109 31 71.56%
7 July 1270 WAM 9056 110 30 72.73%
12 December 1270 WAM 6698 92 33 N/A1
Average amount of text
omitted:
68.18%
1 This is the acknowledgement which has been damaged and, as such, cannot be directly
compared with the scrutiny roll summary.
irrespective of place or date of production.39 Aside from the unique features
that were specific to an individual transaction, which were enrolled, acknowl-
edgements invariably commenced with a general address and included a pen-
alty clause, a note that the debt was secured on the debtor’s lands and goods,
and their confirmation of the record. Even the date upon which repayment
would become due was, to some extent, part of this formula, given that that
was consistently specified on, or in relation to, a series of major feast days (e.g.
Easter or Michaelmas). It was these elements, rather than the particulars which
made an individual transaction unique, which were lost in the translation from
chirograph to roll. In this respect, concerns about the nature of the scrutiny
entries would appear to be unfounded. Moreover, although Mundill criticised
the use of the phrase “extant bonds” to describe transactions listed on the scru-
tinies, given that we know the nature and form of the omitted text, that phrase
is not as inaccurate as it might seem at first.40
The formulae employed in the writing of acknowledgements might have
been consistent, but they were not static. Over the course of the thirteenth
39 I have completed a full analysis of the diplomatic of all 348 extant acknowledgements as
part of my doctoral work: IRWIN, Acknowledging Debt to Jews in England 1194-1276, ch. 3.
40 MUNDILL, England’s Jewish Solution, 125.
259From Chirograph to Roll
century, new features would be added from time to time. One such addition
came in 1256 when the county (comitatum), or the city in which the debtor was
resident, also began to be included in acknowledgements at some centres of
production, such as London and Norwich. At the Colchester archa on 29 May
1269, for example, “Robert of Stamford, knight of the county of Essex” bor-
rowed £15 from “Samuel son of Aaron, a Jew of Colchester”.41 Through the
addition of a marginal note, that feature subsequently came to be integrated
into the scrutinies. This feature was absent from the rolls produced during the
1240s, though the enrolment of Abraham of Berkhamsted’s debts, compiled in
1250, did include a note identifying the county to which a debt related.42 Sig-
nificantly, those notes were added six years before the earliest surviving evi-
dence of the county being specified in an acknowledgement.43 All of the later
scrutinies included this additional information. From the 1275 scrutiny of the
Colchester archa, it can be seen that debtors were located in the counties of
Essex, Cambridge and Suffolk, as well as in the town of Colchester itself.44 It
is important to note that in the post-Expulsion scrutinies, and in the 1275 scru-
tiny rolls produced in the Exchequer style,45 this was included as part of the
summary rather than in the margin. It is important to note also that where the
length of the summaries was calculated in Table 1, that figure includes the
marginal note, irrespective of whether the summary also included that informa-
tion. Much has already been said about the ways in which the features of ac-
knowledgements were transmitted in the scrutinies. This particular instance
might reflect a case where the reverse was true. It was relatively common for
governmental rolls, such as the fine rolls, to include a marginal note, highlight-
ing the county to which the piece of business related.46 It would make sense,
therefore, that such a feature would come to be included in the scrutiny rolls,
and by extension acknowledgements to make it easier for the Crown to identify
and trace debts and debtors.
Here an important distinction between the scrutinies of the veteres and
novae archae must be highlighted. No discernible difference can be detected
between the summaries of the acknowledgements held in the Old Chests, and
41 WAM 9052.
42 TNA E 101/249/6.
43 TNA E 101/249/5 m. 2.
44 TNA C 47/9/48.
45 On this term, see below.
46 See, for example: “Translations”, Fine Rolls of Henry III Project, <https://finerolls
henry3.org.uk/content/calendar/calendar.html> (accessed on 30 March 2019).
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the commodity bonds held in the New Chests. That, in and of itself, is inher-
ently a cause for concern, however. The introduction of the Statute of the
Jewry (1275) did more to the records of Jewish business activities than just
prohibit the imposition of interest, forcing a transfer to dealing in commodities.
It also saw the length of the documents which recorded those transactions
increase considerably. A typical example, which was produced at the London
nova archa on 12 May 1282, is composed of 439 Latin words – nearly four
times more words than the longest acknowledgements.47 Despite this, the
length and nature of the summaries when the documents were enrolled, did not
change. Consequently, although the scrutinies of the Old and New Chests have
traditionally been treated together in the historiography, actually the latter
documents hide considerably more than the former. That feature makes the
enrolments of the novae archae more problematic than those of the veteres
archae. It would be a relatively easy task to reconstruct the full text of the
acknowledgements, given that we know the text which is absent, but the same
is not true with the summaries of commodity bonds. Much work remains to be
done on the diplomatic of post-Statute bonds in order more fully to understand
the implications of the enrolment process. Such scholarship will be compli-
cated by the fact that it has only been possible to trace six commodity bonds to
date, compared to 348 acknowledgements.48 Upon this basis, it seems clear
that, although the scrutinies of the veteres and novae archae are almost identi-
cal, they should not, and cannot, be considered in the same way from an admin-
istrative perspective.
Although the contents of the scrutiny rolls are relatively simple, the factors
which contributed to their production were more nuanced. In recent decades,
historians have sought to link the orders for scrutinies to be conducted with
fresh financial impositions upon the Jewish community.49 According to this
argument, prior to a new tallage being levied upon the Anglo-Jewish commu-
nity, the king would issue orders that the chests were to be sealed, with their
contents being searched by royal officers and their contents enrolled. This
process had two advantages for the Crown. First, it presented a way in which
47 TNA DL 25/3409.
48 Mundill knew of at least TNA C 146/1360, DL 25/1182, 3409, and Hereford, Herefordshire
Archive and Records Centre AH 81/34. To that list, I can only add: Leicester, Record Office of
Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland 26D53/2534 and Hull, Hull History Centre U DDWB/23/4. 
49 Z.E. ROKEAH, “A hospitaller and the Jews: Brother Joseph de Chauncy and English Jewry
in the 1270s”, Jewish Historical Studies 34 (1994-1996), pp. 189-207, at p. 191; MUNDILL,
England’s Jewish Solution, p. 75.
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the potential wealth of the Jews of England could be assessed, prior to any
financial exactions being made. Secondly, and more importantly, it allowed the
Crown to ascertain the precise nature of the debts owing to individual creditors
and trace those transactions if this subsequently became necessary. That was
particularly important because Jewish tallage payments could take two forms.
Either the Jew could fulfil his or her obligations with a cash payment, or they
could transfer their outstanding debts to the Crown to meet the obligations
assessed upon them. It was therefore important for the royal government to
know not only what debts were held by the Jews but also, crucially, which of
those were better debts, which could be more easily collected. Consequently,
it was common for lists of debts to be entered onto the receipt rolls which
record Jewish tallage payments. Indeed, the 1262 receipt roll is comprised
entirely of debts which were transferred to the Crown, with the transactions
being listed according to the archa from which they were removed.50 This roll
in particular highlights the importance of the scrutinies in relation to royal
finance. Four orders have survived which were sent to the chirographers of the
archae at Canterbury, Colchester, Norwich, and Nottingham detailing the pro-
cess which was undertaken.51 These reveal that it was only those “charters,
tallies and instruments” (“cartas, tallias, et instrumenta”) which had been
transferred to the Crown “since the last scrutiny” (“post ultimum scrutinium”)
that were to be removed from the archae and sent to London.52 This presum-
ably refers to the scrutinies which were ordered on 17 July 1261, which were
presumably conducted in the late summer and early autumn of that year.53
Though that may sound similar to a scrutiny roll, the receipt rolls only recorded
those debts which were used as payment, and they did not conventionally in-
clude the date of the transaction or repayment. Consequently, it would not be
possible to accurately trace an individual transaction based upon one of those
entries in the way that it would when dealing with the scrutinies.
Clearly, then, there was a link between tallages and scrutinies. From an
administrative perspective, however, the scrutiny rolls also served an important
function within the context of Anglo-Jewish moneylending activities. As K.
Scott long ago noted, “a scrutiny was a very important event for all creditors”
because “once a scrutiny had been held, the rolls resulting were treated as a
50 TNA E 101/249/10.
51 WAM 6726, 6733, 6888, 9003.
52 Ibid.
53 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the reign of Henry III A.D. 1258-1266 (London, 1910), p.
186.
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final statement of the enforceable debts in the area concerned”.54 That is to say,
the rolls provided additional securities for creditors because they served to
confirm the outstanding debts and, by extension, make them easier to collect.
It is unfortunate that Scott chose to discuss the importance of the scrutinies for
creditors, given that the authority of an acknowledgement would normally
prevail. Moreover, the debt would usually be enforced according to the particu-
lars listed on the chirograph, in the absence of which the creditor would ordi-
narily not have a claim on the debt anyway.55 In that sense, the scrutinies were
more valuable to the Christian debtors. From the Jewish plea rolls it is clear
that they understood the importance of the scrutinies for launching a successful
legal challenge against a debt (more on this below). That can be seen, for ex-
ample, in the aftermath of the 1239 and 1240 scrutinies. The Jewish plea roll
for 1244-1245 shows that scrutiny rolls could, and did, form the basis of chal-
lenges to individual debts.56 In general, debtors could use the scrutiny rolls in
three key ways to challenge or evade their obligations. First, they could claim
that the acknowledgment had not been found in the archa at the time of the last
scrutiny.57 It had been established since 1194 that a debt would only be valid if
a record of it had been deposited in an archa – from 1239 onwards it was to be
deposited within ten days.58 Debtors did not necessarily have to rely on existing
scrutinies to support their case but, rather, could pay a fine to have the relevant
archa scrutinised. An example of that can be seen in 1268, when a debtor
named William requested that the London archa to be searched for traces of a
debt which Elias, son of master Moses, claimed of him.59 In that particular
case, the tactic backfired because the acknowledgement was indeed found in
the archa.60 Secondly, debtors could contend that although the debt had been
owed, it had been repaid or, for whatever reason, cancelled at the time of the
54 K. SCOTT, “The Jewish arcae”, The Cambridge Journal of Law 10 (1950), pp. 446-455,
at p. 454.
55 J. OLSZOWY-SCHLANGER, Hebrew and Hebrew-Latin Documents from Medieval England:
A Diplomatic and Palaeographical Study (Turnhout, 2015), pp. 141-143.
56 See, e.g. Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 1, Henry III, A.D. 1218-
1272, ed. J.M. RIGG (London, 1905), pp. 75, 96, 103; Select Pleas, Starrs, and Other Jewish
Charters from the Exchequer of the Jews A.D. 1220-1284, ed. J.M. RIGG (London, 1902), pp. 10,
13.
57 Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 2, Edward I, 1273-1275, ed.
J.M. RIGG (London, 1910), pp. 193-194.
58 MUNDILL, “The ‘Archa’ System and its Legacy after 1194”, p. 155.
59 Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 1, p. 162.
60 Ibid.
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scrutiny.61 Thirdly and finally, the debtor could argue that the particulars of the
debt which were expressed in the acknowledgement differed from those listed
on the scrutiny roll.62 In the case of the latter two eventualities, as Scott recog-
nised, the authority of the scrutiny roll would appear to have superseded that of
the acknowledgement as the final word on the matter. That, in and of itself,
was remarkable because the only other types of document which could defini-
tively challenge an acknowledgement were a starr, or quitclaim, issued by the
creditor, which cancelled the debt and any future claim that they might have to
repayment, and a direct order from the king.63 Either of those documents would
usually cancel the debt completely, however, rather than offering a different
interpretation of the transaction itself.
Scrutinies, then, were not merely introduced to secure the Crown’s income.
Rather, they also played an important role in the process of Jewish money-
lending more generally, ensuring that the rights of the creditors and debtors
were observed. Admittedly, those additional protections were double-edged.
For all that they could aid the parties to a debt, it cannot be disputed that the
Crown had a vested interest in knowing precisely what was owed to the Jews.
Over the course of the thirteenth century, it showed itself perfectly willing to
exploit that information for its own financial gain.64 Consequently, exemptions
could be purchased, as happened in 1267, when the Jews of Bristol promised
to pay a fine of £333 6s 8d (500 marks), so that they would not be tallaged, or
the archa scrutinised, for a year.65 Be that as it may, from an administrative
perspective, the scrutinies formed a vital element in the process of Jewish
moneylending activities during this period.
The multifaceted contexts in which the scrutinies were produced and used
by the Crown and by parties to the debts, also serve to explain why it was un-
necessary for a full transcription of the acknowledgement to be provided. The
records of individual transactions not only recorded a debt but also represented
a legally enforceable contract. That was not the case with the enrolments. From
the perspective of the Crown, it was sufficient to know the extent of the trans-
61 Select Pleas, Starrs, and Other Records from the Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, A.D.
1220-1284, ed. J.M. RIGG (London, 1902), pp. 55-56.
62 Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 2, p. 194.
63 OLSZOWY-SCHLANGER, Hebrew and Hebrew-Latin Documents from Medieval England,
pp. 137-140.
64 See, e.g. R.C. STACEY, “1240-60: A watershed in Anglo-Jewish relations?”, Historical
Research, 61 (1988), pp. 135-150.
65
WAM 9004.
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actions contained within a given archa. Moreover, the dates of the transactions
were added so as to ensure that individual records could be traced at a later
date. Similarly, for the creditor and debtor a full transcription would have
served little purpose. Those details could easily have been obtained from the
acknowledgement. Equally, if the debtor sought to dispute the validity of a
debt, it would have been sufficient for the debt to be listed on the scrutiny (or
not, as the case may have been). In that way, the particulars of the debt could
be checked against the original record. In this respect, although acknowledge-
ments and scrutinies recorded the same details, it is important to recognise that
their purpose and use differed quite significantly.
Although relatively few scrutiny rolls have survived, it is clear that they
were compiled with reasonable frequency from the second half of the thirteenth
century. Before considering that evidence, however, it is important to note that,
when the Crown had first introduced regulations governing Jewish money-
lending activities, a very different form of enrolment had been envisioned. The
Articles of the Jewry (1194) had not only specified the form in which Jewish
debts were to be recorded but also, crucially, they had stated that a roll was to
be kept which recorded the debts which were deposited into, and removed
from, each individual archa.66 That roll was to be produced and maintained by
those assigned to administer the archa. There is little evidence that that specifi-
cation was adhered to, however. The notable exception to that comes in the
form of the so-called Norwich Day-Book, a series of four rolls which cover the
period 1225 to 1227. They record when Christians borrowed money or made
repayments.67 There are other early examples of inventories of individual
chests, though these were nowhere near as detailed as the Day-Book and it is
not entirely clear whether they were produced for the same purpose.68 On the
whole, however, it seems that this requirement was broadly disregarded. In-
deed, had the 1194 regulations been adhered to, there would have been no
reason for the Crown periodically to order that their contents be searched and
enrolled.
From at least 1239 onwards, a more hands-on approach to monitoring the
contents of the archae was adopted with the introduction of scrutinies.69 The
earliest references to scrutinies being ordered come from 1239, in anticipation
66 Chronica Magistri, p. 267. 
67 WAM 6686, 6687, 6693, 9012, transcribed in V.D. LIPMAN, The Jews of Medieval
Norwich (London, 1967), pp. 187-225.
68 See, e.g. TNA E 101/619/54.
69 HILLABY, The Palgrave Dictionary of Medieval Anglo-Jewish History, p. 96.
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of the tallage imposed in that year, which was assessed at the rate of a third of
the value of the chattels and bonds of an individual Jew.70 The same process
was followed the following year in anticipation of the Worcester Tallage which
required the Jewish community to pay £13,333 6s 8d to the Crown.71 Crucially,
two of the rolls produced in that year – from Cambridge and Lincoln – have
survived, though it is by no means certain how common such undertakings
were at this point.72 From 1250 onwards, the orders for scrutinies can be traced
in the patent rolls and, to a lesser extent, the close rolls. In that year, an order
was issued for John of Wyville and master Roger of Gosbeck to go to the Can-
terbury archa to scrutinise its contents, with a second order being dispatched
to officials in Kent and Canterbury to support and aid their endeavours.73
Slightly later, in 1255, similar orders were issued in relation to the Hereford
and Worcester archae.74 In 1258, it would appear that the archae more gener-
ally had been transported to the Tower of London, when Adam of Greinville,
James le Sauvage and William Aguillon, the constable of the Tower, were
ordered to enrol the contents of all the chests held there.75 The reverse was true
in 1261, when orders were issued to pairs of officers who were assigned to go
on circuits enrolling the archae across England.76 George of Dover and Wil-
liam Haselbech, for example, were tasked with enrolling the debts held in the
chests at Canterbury, Colchester, Norwich, Sudbury, and Cambridge.77 In 1269,
another general scrutiny was initiated with an order being issued “to make
scrutiny of the chests of the chirographers of the Jews in the city and Tower of
London”, with the Christian and Jewish chirographers of each chest being
commanded to appear at London to assist in the process.78 The final scrutiny
order of Henry III’s reign came in 1272, when William of Middleton, an offi-
70 On this, see R.C. STACEY, “Royal taxation and the social structure of medieval Anglo-
Jewry: The tallages of 1239-242”, Hebrew Union College Annual 56 (1985), pp. 175-249, at pp.
177, 178. Stacey suggests that it might have been traditional for a scrutiny to be conducted prior
to the levying of a tallage; however, there is no evidence for this either way.
71 Ibid., pp. 176, 185-186. 
72 TNA E 101/249/3, 4.
73 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the reign of Henry III… A.D. 1247-1258 (London, 1908),
pp. 69, 70.
74 Calendar of the Close Rolls of the reign of Henry III… A.D. 1254-1256 (London, 1931),
p. 51.
75 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the reign of Henry III… A.D. 1258-1266, p. 2.
76 Ibid., p. 186.
77 Ibid.
78 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the reign of Henry III… A.D. 1266-1272 (London, 1913),
p. 382.
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cial at the Exchequer of the Jews, was ordered to go to the Norwich chest.79
Early in the following year, orders were again issued for a general scrutiny of
the archae to be conducted by pairs of officers, despite the fact that the new
king – Edward I – had yet to return to England from crusade.80 The London
archa was not included in that list, presumably because it had already been
scrutinised in December 1272.81 As has already been noted, similar orders were
issued at the end of 1275.82 Eighteen of those orders were listed in the patent
rolls, however, two more – for the London and Warwick archae – are listed in
the close rolls.83 It is important to note, therefore, that there was no uniform
way of conducting scrutinies. Orders were periodically issued for officers to
visit an individual archa or group of archae, or the chests could be transported
to London so as to be enrolled there. Equally, individual chests could be sin-
gled out to be scrutinised.
Just as there was no standard way of conducting the scrutinies, there was
no typical way of producing them. The debts could either be enrolled consecu-
tively or could be grouped together under headings naming individual credi-
tors. The former approach was adopted when the archae were enrolled after the
Expulsion (1290), as well as by those who produced the rolls of the Colchester
and York archae in 1275. On the whole, however, it was more common for the
debts to be grouped together under headings in 1275, and that is also the case
for the surviving 1240 rolls. That is not to say those rolls were produced with
more precision. Indeed, even when the debts were listed consecutively it was
common for the debts to be grouped together according to the creditor.84 In the
case of the 1275 Colchester scrutiny, for example, the first seven entries named
Samuel son of Aaron of Colchester as the creditor, while the following three
debts were in the name of Cresse son of Genta, a Jew of London.85 To some
extent, this might be taken to reflect a deliberate editorial practice by those
tasked with producing the scrutiny rolls. It may also reflect the practice, at
some archae such as London, Lincoln, and Nottingham, of storing documents
79 Ibid., p. 708.
80 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1281, p. 6.
81 TNA E 101/249/15; Calendar of the Close Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-
1279, p. 6.
82 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1281, pp. 126, 127.
83 Calendar of the Close Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1279, p. 260.
84 I am grateful to Dr John Sabapathy for making me think again about this aspect of my
analysis.
85 TNA C 47/9/48, m. 1.
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together with a piece of string threaded through a small whole in the bottom
left hand corner of the parchment. There are even some rare instances where
what appears to be the original string has survived, showing that that was,
indeed, the purpose for the holes.86 Consequently, it may well have been that
acknowledgements were stored together according to creditor in the chests, and
that was reflected in the enrolment process. This practice was very much a
local one, however, and cannot be found in documents produced at other ar-
chae, such as Canterbury. Crucially, such evidence is also absent from the
acknowledgements produced at the Colchester archa. That being said, that
chest was not an especially busy one and, as such, it would presumably have
been a relatively simple task to keep the debts grouped together without such
measures being taken. More generally, the way in which the various mem-
branes of the scrutiny were sewn together could also vary, which also impacted
upon how the clerks used the parchment. The 1275 scrutinies of the Colchester
and York chests, and the 1290 rolls, were produced in the Chancery style,
whereby the parchment was sewn to the foot of the previous membrane. In that
instance, the transactions would be entered only onto the recto side of the roll,
as was conventional. Conversely, the 1240 rolls, and the majority of those
produced in 1275, were sewn together in the Exchequer style, where all of the
membranes were sewn together at the head.87 There, both sides of the parch-
ment – recto and verso – would be used. Such differences in production most
likely stemmed from the background and training of those tasked with produc-
ing the rolls.
These variances serve to highlight another important, though less tangible,
difference between acknowledgements and scrutiny rolls. Although the Crown
heavily regulated Jewish moneylending activities, the records themselves were
the product of an urban context. The clerks who wrote the acknowledgements
could be drawn from the ranks of the clerks of the city rather than being scribes
trained in the offices of royal government or, indeed, the Exchequer of the
Jews.88 At Canterbury, for example, Richard the Clerk was identified as the
clerk of both the city and the archa from the end of the 1260s until at least the
86 See, e.g. TNA E 210/40, 175.
87 The manner of producing rolls has most recently been discussed in N. VINCENT,
“Enrolment in medieval English government: Sickness or cure?”, in: The Roll in England and
France in the Late Middle Ages, ed. S.G. HOLZ et al. (Berlin, 2019), pp. 103-146, at p. 126.
Unfortunately, this volume came too late to be considered in this piece. 
88 IRWIN, Acknowledging Debt to Jews in England, 1194-1276, ch. 2. 
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imposition of the Statute of the Jewry in 1275.89 Equally, an acknowledgement
would have been deposited in the archa in the presence of the two Christian
and two Jewish chirographers who would, ordinarily, have been the neighbours
of, at the very least, the creditor. The opposite was the case with the scrutinies.
When those orders were issued, they conventionally named royal officers, or
the abbots of local religious houses, to complete the task. This is seen perhaps
most clearly in the scrutiny orders which were issued at the beginning of Ed-
ward I’s reign. In 1273, the archae were divided between four officials, all of
whom had connections with the Exchequer of the Jews. Thomas Esporun had
served as a justice of the Jews in the 1250s, while Hamo Hauteyn and Robert
Ludham were serving justices of the Jews.90 Similarly, Adam of Winchester
had served at the Exchequer of the Jews since the mid-1260s.91 In contrast, the
1275 instructions were issued to royal officers more generally. There were still
some involved who had connections with the Jewish exchequer, though Robert
of Ludham was the only officer named in both sets of orders. William of
Middleton, for example, who was again assigned to visit the Norwich chest,
was an official at the Exchequer of the Jews from 1265 to 1276.92 Royal offi-
cers more generally were named to the task as well. The patent roll entry ex-
plicitly identified Bartholomew le Jovene as the constable of Bristol Castle.93
Both Walter of Heylun and Bartholomew of Suthleye were royal justices, while
Hugh of Stapleford was the sheriff of Buckingham.94 There was even a repre-
sentative of the main Exchequer – Roger of Northwood – who was assigned the
task of scrutinising the Canterbury archa.95 Nor was it just secular officers who
were named. The abbots of St. John’s (Colchester), St. Mary’s (York), and St.
Augustine’s (Bristol), as well as the Prior of St. Catherine’s (Lincoln) were all
89 Ibid.
90 C.A.F. MEEKINGS, “Justices of the Jews, 1218-68: A provisional list”, Historical
Research 28 (1995), pp. 173-188, at p. 181; Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 6, Edward
I, 1279-81, ed. P. BRAND (London, 2005), p. 53.
91 Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 6, pp. 40-41.
92 F. PEGUES, “The clericus in the legal administration of thirteenth-century England”, The
English Historical Review 71 (1956), pp. 529-559, at p. 548.
93 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1281, p. 127.
94 A.M. SPENCER, Nobility and Kingship in Medieval England (Cambridge, 2014), p. 149;
C. BURT, Edward I and the Governance of England, 1272-1307 (Cambridge, 2013), p. 95; J.R.
MADDICOTT, “Edward I and the lessons of baronial reform: Local government, 1258-80”,
Thirteenth Century England 1 (1985), pp. 1-30, at p. 26. 
95 A.J. MUSSON, “Northwood, Roger de”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford,
2004), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198
614128-e-20337?rskey=M75RSv&result=1> (last accessed on 30 March 2019).
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ordered to assist in the process. These are some of the more prominent individ-
uals assigned to the task, though each can be linked to the royal administration
in an official capacity. It seems clear then that, although the Crown was content
to allow members of the urban community to administer the archae, it was to
its own officers that it turned when it came to enrolling the contents of the
chests. Ultimately, it was the word of those officers which would triumph if
any doubt was cast upon a transaction.
Even the manner in which the urban and royal officers were paid varied.
The chirographers and clerks would have been paid according to the transac-
tions which were added and removed from the chests. From 1194 onwards, the
clerks were to be paid 2d – half by the debtor and half by the creditor – for
producing the acknowledgement.96 Equally, by the 1270s, it had been estab-
lished that debtors would pay 4d if a debt was to be removed from the archa,
with 1d going to each of the chirographers.97 In contrast, it appears that the
Crown covered the expenses of those tasked with producing the scrutinies. In
1240, an entry in the liberate rolls reveals that William of St. Edmunds and
Peter Chaceporc were paid £10 for activities relating to Henry III’s demesne
manners and, crucially, “opening the chests of the Jews in certain boroughs”.98
Similarly, although it comes from outside the period covered by this paper and
relates to the scrutiny of a nova archa, an order from 1276 required that Philip
of Willoughby be paid £6 13s 4d (10 marks) for having produced a scrutiny of
the London chest, and of the writings of Thornton Abbey, in 1276.99 Again,
this serves to reinforce the difference between the acknowledgements and the
scrutinies, or the urban and royal contexts.
The contrasting backgrounds of those responsible for administering and
scrutinising the chests also serves to highlight another important dimension of
the scrutiny process. That is, it helped to maintain the integrity of the archae
system. In effect, their introduction resulted in the establishment of a two-
tiered system of records relating to Anglo-Jewish moneylending activities.
Prior to the 1240s it had been incumbent upon the staff of an individual archa
to ensure that the Crown’s regulations were adhered to, and that the acknowl-
edgements were properly produced and stored. In the event that this was not
the case, either party to the debt would have needed to resort to a legal chal-
96 Chronica Magistri, p. 266.
97 See, e.g. Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 2, p. 1.
98 Calendar of the Liberate Rolls of the Reign of Henry III… A.D. 1226-1240 (London,
1916), p. 482.
99 Calendar of the Patent Rolls of the Reign of Edward I ... A.D. 1272-1281, pp. 148, 168. 
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lenge in the Exchequer of the Jews in an attempt to rectify the record. In con-
trast, the introduction of the scrutinies saw (often itinerant) regulators begin
intermittent visits to the chests. In that respect it ensured that the chirographers
and clerks assigned to each chest were fulfilling their obligations and comply-
ing with their oaths to faithfully execute the duties of their office. It also pre-
vented the staff from duplicitously adding or removing an acknowledgement
from the chest or adjusting their particulars, because any discrepancy could be
easily detected upon the enrolments. If such a circumstance was believed to
have occurred, a case could be brought against the offending officer in the
Exchequer of the Jews.100 In that respect, the introduction of scrutinies not only
reinforced the integrity of the archae system but also the acknowledgements
themselves.
A final point needs to be made in relation to the actual, as opposed to the
intended, use of the scrutiny rolls by the Crown. As Richard Cassidy’s work on
the English pipe rolls has shown, although historians have traditionally ignored
the “active use” of medieval rolls, it is just as important to consider this as one
of the reasons for which the rolls were produced.101 In many ways the lifespan
of a scrutiny roll would have been considerably shorter than that of other gov-
ernmental rolls. That is because a scrutiny roll represented a snapshot of the
debts in an archa at a given time. That picture would invariably change as
debts were added or removed from the chests and payments were made towards
outstanding transactions. Having said that, the lifespan of a scrutiny roll could
be longer than might be anticipated, given that the cases from the 1244-1245
roll cited above referenced scrutinies which had been produced by “Brother
Geoffrey” in 1239.102 Moreover, there were various reasons why acknowledge-
ments might not be held in the chest at the time of the scrutiny but were valid
transactions nonetheless. The Crown might have ordered, for example, that the
debts owing to a particular creditor be removed from the chest and sent to
London until the Jew fulfilled his own financial obligations, when they might
be returned.103 Equally, the debts of a Jew would be transferred to the Crown
upon the conversion of a Jew. This occurred in 1259 when, after Elias l’Eveske
converted to Christianity, an order was issued for the London archa to be
searched for debts owing to him.104 Intriguingly, the rolls themselves contain
100 See, e.g. Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, 2, pp. 193-194.
101 CASSIDY, “Recorda splendidissima”, p. 3.
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remarkably few traces of use by the Crown or its officials. No attempts were
made in the margins of the 1275 or 1290 rolls, for example, to denote which
debts were subsequently transferred to the Crown as fines or tallage payments,
or which debts had been paid off. That is in contrast with the 1240 scrutiny
rolls, which were annotated in this way.105 On the whole, however, it was not
standard practice for the records. This is strikingly different from the receipt
rolls which Crown officers might update in that way.106 That, in turn, might
suggests that the scrutiny rolls were consultative documents, rather than ones
were actively used by royal officers. That would also strengthen the argument
that the rolls were produced for more complicated reasons than just to secure
the Crown’s finances.
To conclude, historians have traditionally mined the contents of the scruti-
nies to inform wider discussions of medieval Anglo-Jewish moneylending
activities. As this paper has argued, much can be learned as well from consid-
ering the rolls within an administrative context. This reveals that, although the
scrutiny rolls were important documents for the Crown, they also had a signifi-
cant role to play in Jewish moneylending transactions more generally. More-
over, it was not just the Crown which could exploit the information contained
in these documents. As has been seen, creditors and debtors were just as capa-
ble of making use of the records to further their own legal cases. Besides, it has
been seen that, to understand fully the nature of the scrutinies, it is necessary
to consider them within the context of the acknowledgements which they en-
rolled. That process was completed with more precision than has traditionally
be recognised in the scholarship on the topic. It has been argued here that using
the records generated by Jewish business activities as a starting point is partic-
ularly important. Finally, it has been shown that, although acknowledgements
and scrutinies have traditionally been treated together in scholarship, they
differed from each other in more than just form. Rather, they emerged out of
two different – and, at times, contrasting – contexts, with the former emanating
from the urban environment while the latter were very much a product of royal
government. Ultimately, it has been shown that the scrutinies have much more
to contribute to our understanding of Jewish moneylending activities than has
traditionally been the case. It might be hoped, therefore, that historians will
<http://aalt.law.uh.edu/H3/E159no32/bE159no32dorses/IMG_0134.htm> (last accessed 31 March
2019>.
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TNA E 101/249/3, 4.
106 See, e.g. TNA E 101/249/10.
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move beyond the analysis of the particulars of debts which have been pre-
served on those rolls. Although much can be learned by such work, still more
can be gained by considering the administrative contexts within which these
rolls were produced and used.
Churchwardens and their Accounts in Transylvania,




The opening sentence of a book review of Beat Kümin’s seminal work
The Shaping of a Community: The Rise and Reformation of the English
Parish c. 1400-1560, accurately describes the increasing significance for
scholarly research of a particular type of written source produced within the
ecclesiastical sphere from the late Middle Ages onwards:1 “Churchwardens’
accounts are fast threatening to oust wills from their position as the first port of
call for historians seeking to recreate the religious and social experience of
* The present work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for
Scientific Research, CNDI-UEFISCDI, project PN-III-P4-ID-PCCF-2016-0064: “Naºterea elitei
intelectuale in Europa Centralã: Formarea profesorilor la Universitatea din Viena (1389-1450)
/ The Rise of an Intellectual Elite in Central Europe: The Formation of Professors at the
University of Vienna, 1389-1450”.
1 B.A. KÜMIN, The Shaping of a Community: The Rise and Reformation of the English
Parish c. 1400-1560 (Aldershot, 1996: St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History).
......................................................................................................................................
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe: Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political
Impact, ed. Ionuþ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI, Utrecht Studies in Medieval Literacy, 50 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2020), pp. 273-303.
DOI <10.1484/M.USML-EB.5.120747>
274 ADINEL C. DINCÃ
‘ordinary’ English people in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries”.2 This per-
spective has been shared without any qualms by other academics, who have
explained this historiographical turn in England by acknowledging the survival
rate of English accounts, which is higher than anywhere else in Europe,3 with
over 200 account books of this sort still extant, dating from the mid-fourteenth
century until the Reformation.4 Fortunately, the momentum gained by the anal-
ysis of late medieval and early modern parish accountability almost three de-
cades ago has not been lost in the intervening period; on the contrary, it has
triggered, and not only in the United Kingdom, a string of editions, mono-
graphs,5 and methodological reflections.6 Following the pattern set since the
Middle Ages of the dialogue between centres and peripheries, this type of
historical investigation has reached the eastern European areas of the medieval
Latin Church somewhat later,7 a fact determined by the quantity and quality of
2 P. MARSHALL, review in The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 48.1 (1997) pp. 166-168.
3 F. FUCHS, “Spätmittelalterliche Pfarrbücher als Quellen für die dörfliche Alltagsge-
schichte”, in: Die Pfarrei im späten Mittelalter, ed. E. BÜNZ and G. FOUQUET (Ostfildern, 2013),
pp. 213-232; E. CURZEL, “Sul ruolo economico delle chiese di villaggio nel tardo medioevo:
Notizie da libri di conti dell’area trentina”, Geschichte und Region – Storia e Regione 24 (2015),
pp. 62-72.  
4 Ch. HAIGH, review in The American Historical Review 102.5 (1997), pp. 1472-1473; A.
FOSTER, “Churchwardens’ accounts of early modern England and Wales: Some problems to note
but much to be gained”, in: The Parish in English Life 1400-1600, ed. K. FRENCH, G.G. GIBBS,
and B.A. KÜMIN (Manchester, 1997), pp. 74-93.
5 E. DUFFY, The Voices of Morebath: Reformation and Rebellion in an English Village
(New Haven, 2003).
6 It would not be conceivable to deliver here a coherent historiographical narrative
regarding the late medieval and early modern parish as an international research topic. Suffice it
for the present  to mention the comparative analysis provided by KÜMIN, Shaping of a Community
and ID., “The English parish in a European perspective”, in: The Parish in English Life, pp. 15-
32; see also E. BÜNZ, “Einleitung: Die spätmittelalterliche Pfarrei als Forschungsgegenstand und
Forschungsaufgabe”, in: ID., Die mittelalterliche Pfarrei: Ausgewählte Studien zum 13.-16.
Jahrhundert, (Tübingen, 2017), pp. 3-76. The internet-based initiative launched by Beat Kümin
at the History Department of the Warwick University provides a great service to all interested in
studying parish history in general and churchwardens’ accounts in particular, by offering various
instruments of bibliographical nature to the entire academic community: <https://warwick.ac.uk/
fac/arts/history/research/parishnetwork/>. Besides the British documentation, which is the focal
point of the entire project, continental circumstances are addressed as well. There is, however, an
absence of any reference to Transylvania.
7 Some excellent Czech examples: Mìstský farní kostel v èeských zemích ve støedovìku
[The urban parish church in the Czech lands during the Middle Ages], ed. J. HRDINA and K.
JÍŠOVÁ (Prague, 2015: Documenta Pragensia Supplementa 6); O. SCHMIDT, “Le chiese par-
rocchiali, l’economia e i libri contabili nella provincia ecclesiastica di Praga del basso medioevo”,
in: Redde rationem: Contabilità parrocchiali tra medioevo e prima età moderna, ed. A. TILATTI
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the sources extant in the archival repositories of these regions, their survival
being usually much more negatively influenced by the lower level of literacy
at the time of their initial production and by more violent post-medieval cir-
cumstances than in other continental regions.8
The specific purpose of this article is to present a view from the periphery
through a preliminary examination of churchwardens and their accounting
activity in the sources relating to Transylvania,9 the easternmost province of
the Hungarian kingdom,10 a borderland of Latin Christianity in its own right,
from the earliest documentary mentions (mid-fourteenth century) up to the first
twenty years of the Protestant Reformation (1560s). The sources on Transylva-
nian churchwardens, both edited and unedited, have not yet been methodically
analysed from the perspective put forth here. The many difficulties, palaeo-
graphical and otherwise, associated with the (usually informal) redaction of the
sources pertaining to the history of the late medieval Transylvanian parish have
understandably kept researchers away. Yet it is clear that these documents,
however challenging, can no longer be ignored, as they prove to be multi-
faceted and extremely rich. Not only do they provide information that is miss-
ing from other Transylvanian sources, but they bring in fresh details about a
pre-modern institution that was present throughout Europe.
The general facts regarding churchwardens and their account books have
long been established.11 The fabrica ecclesie, basically the money dedicated to
the construction and continual repair of the church and the buildings belonging
to the parish (churchyard, chapels, treasury, and so on), is the key notion in this
respect, defining the churchwardens’ area of responsibility. These guardians
and administrators of church funds, usually called in Transylvanian historical
and R. ALLORO (Verona, 2016), pp. 249-274.
8 For an introductory discussion of the historical conditions of the creation and survival of
written sources in Transylvania, see A.C. DINCÃ, “Le fonti scritte, edizioni e studi”, in:
Storiografia medievistica in Romania: L’ultimo quartro di secolo: Atti del Convegno di studio
(Roma-Orte, 19-20 gennaio 2017), ed. M. MIGLIO and I.-A. POP (Rome, 2018), pp. 35-46.
9 On Transylvania during the medieval and early modern centuries, see H. ROTH, Kleine
Geschichte Siebenbürgens (Kologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 2007), and The History of
Transylvania, 1, ed. I.-A. POP and Th. NÄGLER (Cluj-Napoca, 2010).
10 P. ENGEL, The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526, trans.
T. PÁLOSFALVI (London and New York, 2005).
11 Still valuable as an overview are some general works regarding the subject: J.H. BETTEY,
Church and Parish: An Introduction for Local Historians (London, 1987: Batsford Local History
Series), pp. 54-66; N.J.G. POUNDS, A History of the English Parish (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 231-
236. For the early development of the institutions, see C. DREW, Early Parochial Organisation
in England: The Origins of the Office of Churchwarden (York, 1954).
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records vitrici or aeditii / editii in Latin and Kirchenväter in German sources,12
were lay representatives of the parish community elected from among its most
influential members and charged with a well-defined term of office, usually
one or two years. Their labour as churchwardens should in theory be unpaid,
but in fact certain details in the sources indicate that their effort was not left
entirely unremunerated. In addition to their main task of collecting and disburs-
ing a communal pot of money for the maintenance of the nave of the church
and other parish buildings, churchwardens were deeply involved in various
aspects of parish life, taking decisions that affected the entire community. They
were held accountable by the parishioners and thus had to make reports (ratio-
nes) about their specific actions, which involved the keeping of detailed regis-
ters (registra and matriculae) with records of sums coming in (perceptae) and
payments going out (expensae). In essence, churchwardens’ accounts are just
that: lists of figures and brief descriptions of how the money was raised, or
what it was being spent on. Such records account for income and expenditure
in the ‘charge and discharge’-format favoured by medieval accountants, or in
the later and more familiar ‘credit and debit’-format of double-entry bookkeep-
ing. Mundane as the details provided by these lists may be, they were some-
times additionally flavoured by commentaries and analysis made by the con-
temporary scribe, increasing the value of an individual’s written record.
The churchwardens’ financial registers are a very generous source of his-
torical information. For instance, the entries relating to maintenance and re-
pairs are revealing because they offer clues as to what a certain church may
have looked like in a distant past; they document physical changes that took
place within parish churches, mirroring the transformation of the practice of
worship; the lists of books belonging to a parish church offer a unique insight
into the long-lost parish libraries, and so on. This type of source is a distinctive
expression of medieval pragmatic writing and, as such, has great significance
for historical research concerned with the development of the literate mentality
in pre-modern communities. However, as much as these account books can be
exploited in a comparative and multidisciplinary manner for discussing admin-
istrative, political, cultural, and religious developments, they do not offer the
ideal (and much desired) sources for an exhaustive reconstruction of parish
life.13
12 KÜMIN, Shaping of a Community, p. 22.
13 B.A. KÜMIN, “Late medieval churchwardens’ accounts and parish government: Looking
beyond London and Bristol”, English Historical Review 119 (2004), pp. 87-99.
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II. Transylvanian historians, be they German, Hungarian or Romanian,
have not often focussed on the institution of the medieval churchwarden. The
tasks involved in their office were described in monographs devoted to Saxon
communities as part of the ecclesiastical administrative mechanism,14 closely
related to the function of the parish priest. The emphasis was placed on the
elective nature of the appointment, with short descriptions of the churchwar-
dens’ assignments, seen as evidence of the autonomous social responsibility of
the communities: churchwardens supervised the revenues and administered the
assets of the church, from buildings to graveyards to liturgical vessels. This
charge was not considered important enough in municipal or administrative
history,15 and was only mentioned as a subsidiary commission compared to
those of the public servants who occupied higher elected positions.
Recent contributions, mainly focussed on the larger political entity of the
Hungarian kingdom, have acknowledged the commission of the churchwarden
in Transylvania in passing, mostly when dealing with the urban environment
that is better reflected in the published sources.16 Nonetheless, the opening
sentence of all these studies remarks on the meagre quantity of sources and on
the lack of a coherent overview of the subject. Historical inquiries have con-
14 G.A. SCHULLERUS, “Kleine Kunstgeschichtliche Mitteilungen”, Korrespondenzblatt des
Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde 33 (1910), pp. 70-76 and ID., “Ein Blick in das
Kirchliche Leben einer sächsischen Landgemeinde vor der Reformation”, in: Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Ev. Kirche a.b. in Siebenbürgen: Bischof d. Friedrich Teutsch, dem Meister
sächsischer Volks- u. Kirchengeschichte, zum 70. Geburtstage am 16. September 1922
(Hermannstadt [now Sibiu], 1922), pp. 1-45; F. TEUTSCH, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche
in Siebenbürgen, 2 vols. (Hermannstadt, 1921-1922), 1, pp. 64, 79, 152, 154, 313, 315, and 2,
pp. 153, 188, 280, 285, 304, 311, 313, 499; G.E. MÜLLER, Die deutschen Landkapitel in
Siebenbürgen und ihre Dechanten, 1192-1848 (Hermannstadt, 1936), pp. 400-401, and ID., Stühle
und Distrikte als Unterteilungen der Siebenbürgisch-Deutschen Nationsuniversität 1141-1876
(Hermannstadt, 1941), pp. 66, 161; G. GÜNDISCH, “Sächsisches Leben im 13. und 14.
Jahrhundert”, in: Geschichte der Deutschen auf dem Gebiete Rumäniens, ed. C. GÖLLNER
(Bucharest, 1979), p. 57; P. PHILIPPI, “800 de ani ‘Ecclesia Theutonicorum Ultrasilvanum’”, in:
Muzeul Brukenthal, Sibiu, România, Catalogul expoziþiei “800 de ani Biserica Germanilor din
Transilvania”, ed. Th. NÄGLER (Thaur bei Innsbruck, 2003), pp. 19-20.
15 G. SEIWERT, “Chronologische Tafel der Hermannstädter Plebane, Oberbeamten und
Notare: Erste Abteilung von 1309-1499”, Archiv des Vereins für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde
12 (1875), pp. 189-256; F. ZIMMERMANN, “Chronologische Tafel der Hermannstädter Plebane,
Oberbeamten und Notare in den Jahren 1500 bis 1884”, Archiv des Vereins für Siebenbürgische
Landeskunde 19 (1884), pp. 529-578; F. STENNER, Die Beamten der Stadt Brassó (Kronstadt)
von Anfang der stadtischen Verwaltung bis auf die Gegenwart (Kronstadt [now Braºov], 1916).
16 M.-M. DE CEVINS, L’Église dans les villes hongroises à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris,
Budapest, and Szeged, 2003), pp. 126, 132, 154, 251.
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fined the churchwarden’s function within the wider topic of ecclesiastical
life,17 whether in the parish or the conventual environment. Even the most
recent work on the topic, Beatrix Romhány’s analysis of the mendicant orders
and their managerial skills and tasks, stresses the scarcity of primary-source
information.18
III. Against this dominant historiographical perception of limited and poor-
ly investigated sources, the data tabulated in the Annex reveals the exact oppo-
site: there are 131 documentary references to vitrici in Transylvanian towns
and villages, roughly 90 of whom are mentioned by name. These figures are
indeed high, considering the general scarcity of documentary evidence typical
of a remote area of Latin culture in the Middle Ages. Some considerations
prompted by this surprisingly large amount of information need to be pointed
out. The chronological period taken into consideration spans over two centu-
ries, starting with the year 1359, the earliest mention of a Transylvanian
churchwarden. Although the archival sources examined (both edited and un-
edited; see their list in the Annex) offer further information about the vitrici
ecclesiae in the period after 1560,19 the task of inventorying late medieval and
early modern sources regarding church administrators will be postponed for a
future project.
An initial observation based on the data presented in the table shows the
uniform, almost year-by-year chronological distribution of references regarding
Transylvanian churchwardens, with only two large gaps, six and seven years
respectively, between mentions. This uniformity offers a hint both of the place
of the office and its holder within the community and of the importance of the
tasks performed. It should also be mentioned that the sources reveal three cate-
17 A. KUBINYI, “Plébánosválasztások és egyházközségi önkormányzat a középkori
Magyarországon” [Parish priest elections and parochial autonomy in late medieval Hungary]
Aetas 2 (1991), pp. 26-46. 
18 B. ROMHÁNYI, Kolduló barátok, gazdálkodó szerzetesek: Koldulórendi gazdálkodás a
késõ középkori Magyarországon [Mendicant friars, manager monks: The economic activity of the
Mendicant orders in late medieval Hungary] (doctoral dissertation, Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Budapest, 2013; published in Budapest, 2018), chapter “Vitricus, Provisor, Kirch-
vater”.
19 A now lost manuscript of the churchwarden’s account of Bartolomeu village covering the
period 1560-1763 was copied around 1900 by the historian and archivist Julius Gross and has
been published in Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Kronstadt, vol. 8.2, Annales ecclesiastici
1556 (1531)–1706 (1763), ed. J. GROSS, G. NUSSBÄCHER, and E. MARIN (Braºov and Heidelberg,
2002), pp. 194-215.
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gories of churchwardens, according to the institution where they carried out
their activity: parish churches (urban and rural), mendicant convents (Francis-
can and Dominican), and hospitals (as institutions supported financially by a
congregation). Most sources refer to the parish church administrators, while the
vitrici of the Franciscan friary of ªumuleu-Ciuc (Schomlenberg, Csíksomlyó)
and the Dominican convent of Sighiºoara (Schäßburg, Segesvár) are each men-
tioned only once. Their special status within the convent suggests their lesser
involvement in other urban activities,20 since the mendicant orders’ sources of
income were begging and the selling of indulgences. Hospital lay administra-
tors barely make their appearance, with only some notices regarding the hospi-
tals in Sibiu (Hermannstadt, Nagyszeben), Braºov (Kronstadt, Brassó) and
Turda (Thorenburg, Torda).21 The brief mentions suggest the presence of more
than one establishment in Sibiu and Braºov, where a separate warden adminis-
tered the leprosarium (the vitricus leprosorum as opposed to the vitricus
hospitalensis).
Geographically, the documents mentioning Transylvanian churchwardens
are grouped in clusters around the main towns of the province (see the map
below): Sibiu, Braºov, Bistriþa (Bistritz / Nösen, Beszterce) and Cluj-Napoca
(Klausenburg, Kolozsvár), except for Tãºnad (Trestenburg, Tasnád), a borough
belonging to the Transylvanian diocese situated in the north-west, outside the 
20 Unlike parish and hospital churchwardens, the convents had an appointed administrator;
see ROMHÁNYI, Kolduló barátok, gazdálkodó szerzetesek, p. 247. These churchwardens were
nonetheless accountable to the founding municipal body, and even acted as members of the town-
council; see the case of Johannes Bessel from Sighiºoara. The Franciscans from ªumuleu-Ciuc
were granted the right to elect a vitricus from among the conventual brothers only in 1519. 
21 For additional information regarding the functioning of the hospitals and the hospital-
churchwardens’ tasks in the Hungarian kingdom and especially in the Transylvanian towns, see
M.-M. DE CEVINS, “Assistance et charité en Hongrie médiévale (fin XIIIe-début du XVIe siècle)”,
in: Pour une histoire sociale des villes: Mélanges offerts à Jacques Maillard, ed. Ph. HAUDRÈRE
(Rennes, 2006), pp. 381-402 (here n. 92); J. MAJOROSSY and K. SZENDE, “Hospitals in medieval
and early modern Hungary”, in: Europäisches Spitalwesen: Institutionelle Fürsorge in Mittelalter
und Früher Neuzeit, ed. M. SCHEUTZ et al. (Vienna and Munich, 2008), pp. 409-454; P.
MUNTEANU BEªLIU, Spitalul  ºi biserica spitalului din Sibiu, secolele XIII-XVIII (Sibiu, 2012), pp.
160-171.
280 ADINEL C. DINCÃ
Map of Transylvania with places where churchwardens are mentioned in the historical
records.
Carpathian arch. With only a few exceptions (such as the Szekler market-town
of ªumuleu-Ciuc or the Hungarian-populated villages around Cluj), the church
administrators were located mainly in Saxon towns and villages. The ratio of
urban vs. rural mentions is almost 1:1, mostly due to the source regarding Jelna
village (Senndorf, Zsolna), which alone accounts for 36 entries in the table and
mentions the names of some 30 churchwardens. Comparatively, although the
towns of Braºov and Sibiu are better represented in the table, in 23 and 26
documentary references respectively, the number of individual churchwardens
that can be identified comes to less than ten names each (9 and 7 respectively).
The largest number of churchwardens, about 100 individuals called by
their names or just referred to by their office, were administrators of the parish
church. Some are also mentioned in the documentary record beyond their
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church-related duties, as honourable citizens holding positions of trust, serving
as witnesses in notarial documents,22 or involved in trials. As previously stated,
vitricus ecclesie was a significant dignity in any community, and the holders of
this office usually carried out at least one other function associated with public
service: iuratus / Ratsherr on the town or village council, villicus / Stadthan,
and even mayor. In the urban context, the office implied the status of civis, a
juridical notion applied to those inhabitants who owned property and were
subject to local taxation. The careers of some fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
individuals that could be traced in the documentary record afford fresh insights
into the complex public life of Transylvanian towns and villages. By way of
example, we might mention Nicholaus Pheffersak, who also held the office of
mayor of Sibiu;23 Georgius Sartor / Zabo, probably the same person as the
holder of the office of royal judge and mayor of Sibiu;24 Jacobus Medwischer,
Sibiu’s mayor and judge;25 Sigismundus Perlhelfter / Gemmarius, iuratus and
villicus in Braºov;26 and Johannes Benkner, civis iuratus, provisor hospitalis,
churchwarden, administrator in charge of wine, villicus, judge of Braºov and
castellan of Bran fortress.27 The situation was probably similar in villages,
although this involves extrapolating from the Jelna account register.28
Precious information can be culled regarding churchwardens’ tasks, agency
as individuals, but also ‘occupational hazards’:29 they acted as witnesses and
executors of the last wills and testaments of parishioners;30 they had control
over the assets of the church (houses, plots within towns, arable lands), mean-
ing they could sell, exchange, and buy property;31 they looked after the proper 
22 See the Table in the Annex, under 25/02/1457.
23 SEIWERT, “Chronologische Tafel”, pp. 208-209: 1418-1422, 1430-1431.
24 Ibid., p. 212: royal judge (1471); p. 213: mayor (1496-1497).
25 Zs. SIMON, “The late medieval churchwarden’s accounts of Sibiu / Hermannstadt (1505-
1511)”, in: Literacy Experiences Concerning Medieval and Early Modern Transylvania,  ed. S.
ANDEA and A.C. DINCÃ (= special issue of Anuarul Institutului de Istorie “G. Bariþiu” 54
(2015)), pp. 67-87, at p. 68 (1492-1509). 
26 STENNER, Die Beamten der Stadt Brassó (Kronstadt), p. 103 (1530-1544).
27 Ibid., pp. 9-10 (1535-1565).
28 An edition of this account book is forthcoming: A.C. DINCÃ, The Rural Parish in Late
Medieval Transylvania: Churchwardens’ Accounts of Jelna (1455-1570).
29 As pointed out by DE CEVINS, L’Église dans les villes hongroises, p. 127, n. 29, the office
of vitricus was not defined by law in medieval Hungary.  
30 See the last will and testament of Georgius Holczmeniger (Table, 3/12/1506), penned by
the notary Lucas Duerner: “iuxta arbitrium vitrici ecclesie Cibiniensis”.
31 See Table, 27/02/1485, 20/06/1487, 31/05/1510, 17/10/1528.
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Comparative chart: Jelna – Braºov – Sibiu.
functioning of all aspects of the parish estate, from maintenance of graveyards
to repairs of damaged roofs and from the wood for heating the church during
the winter to the acquisition of holy vessels and objects of worship. Involve-
ment in parish life meant more than the simple administration of assets, and in
some circumstances churchwardens also acted as representatives of the congre-
gation in affairs related to church patrimony,32 religious art,33 and architec-
ture.34 Churchwardens could also influence certain ecclesiastical procedures,35
such as conducting investigations into the pastoral commitments of the parish
priest towards the parishioners. An interesting perspective on the urban organi-
sation and division of parishes is afforded by the case of Braºov, where, next
to the main St. Mary’s parish church, known today as the Black Church, two
32 See Table, 15/05/1398, 21/02/1411, 4/11/1424, 7/04/1428, 23/04/1487.
33 See the inscription on the Mãnãstireni (Cluj county) parish church sacristy door, dating
from the first quarter of the sixteenth century: “Georgius Wossari vitricus ecclesiae”; J. BALOGH,
Az erdélyi renaissance [Transylvanian Renaissance] (Kolozsvár, 1943), p. 266.
34 See, e.g. the contribution of Bistriþa’s 1503 churchwarden Stephanus Sartor / Schneider
to the building of the parish church’s tower in 1509; S. SALONTAI, “Die Stadtkirche als
Repräsentationsmittel des aufstrebenden Bürgertums: Die St. Nikolauskirche in Bistritz”,
Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde 39 (2016), pp. 76-90, esp. pp. 86-88.
35 KUBINYI, “Plébánosválasztások”, p. 285.
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chapels functioned with their own administrative personnel: St. Catherine’s
chapel within, and St. Martin’s chapel outside the city walls.
As with any pecuniary activity, the churchwarden’s office also came with
some finance-related risks: accusations of negligence, theft, fraud and abuse.36
IV. The various circumstances of the churchwardens’ involvement in the
life of urban and rural congregations are unexpectedly many, in contrast to the
paucity of the extant written records of their work, in particular the records of
the accounts of their managerial duties with respect to the parish church, the
convent, or the hospital. A fragment of a Sibiu’s churchwarden’s account rep-
resenting a financial report from 1505-1511 has recently been published.37
Such reports were regularly submitted by the incumbent churchwarden to the
church council and the parish priest. In Braºov, although church documents
from 1550 mention the registers held by the Kirchenvater Christiannus Hir-
scher38 – “seinen kirchen Registeren”39 – no church accounting record has been
preserved. Another fragment of post-1560 parish accounts regarding Bartolo-
meu village,40 today part of Braºov, has been lost, probably in the Second
World War.
The Matricula Plebaniae Cibiniensis,41 the inventory of Sibiu’s parish
36 To cite only the case of Lechinþa parish church in 1452, where some valuable items had
been stolen as a result of the churchwarden’s negligence. For the precise reference, see the Table.
37 SIMON, “Churchwarden’s accounts of Sibiu”. 
38 He was also the town’s vigesimator and villicus; see STENNER, Die Beamten der Stadt
Brassó (Kronstadt), p. 68. 
39 Quellen Kronstadt, 3, p. 589.
40 Quellen Kronstadt, 8.2, pp. 194-215.
41 MS Alba Iulia, Batthyaneum Library, II.135. The research history of the Matricula has
been considered of the utmost importance from a linguistic perspective, especially in the
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century: A. KURZ, “Die ältesten
deutschen Sprachdenkmale und die bis jetzt bekannte älteste Handschrift der Sachsen in
Siebenbürgen, mitgetheilt aus dem Original-Fragment einer auf Pergament geschriebenen
Hermannstädter Kirchenmatrikel des XIV. und späterer Jahrhunderte”, Serapeum 16 (1848); F.
MÜLLER, Deutsche Sprachdenkmäler aus Siebenbürgen (Hermannstadt, 1864), pp. 16-21, 32-34;
G. SEIWERT, “Das älteste Hermannstädter Kirchenbuch”, Archiv des Vereins für Siebenbürgische
Landeskunde 11.3 (1874), pp. 323-410; E. VARJÚ, “A gyulafejérvári Batthyány-könyvtár” [The
Batthyány Library in Alba-Iulia], Magyar Könyvszemle 7 (1899), pp. 134-175, 209-243, 329-345,
Magyar Könyvszemle 8 (1900), pp. 17-55, 131-169, 228-250, 337-361, and Magyar Könyvszemle
9 (1901), pp. 24-52, 256-279; R. SZENTIVÁNYI, Catalogus concinnus librorum manuscriptorum
Bibliothecae Batthyanyanae (Szeged, 1958: Bibliotheca Universitatis Szegediensis 294), pp. 158-
169. 
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church, recorded the items in its possession, both movables (such as sacred
vessels for liturgical celebration, vestments, and books) and buildings, as well
as the amounts of money that the institution received and spent at certain times.
In view of the data contained in it, and in particular some explicit details, this
‘church book’ (liber ecclesiae) can in part be classified as a ‘churchwarden’s
account book’ (rationes vitrici). Today, only an isolated fragment of about 40
parchment sheets of what must have been a voluminous tome is preserved. The
fragmentary state, as well as the rearrangement of the sheets that occurred
during the eighteenth-century re-binding, altered the original structure of the
book, and therefore caution is urged in the use of the often undated informa-
tion. A detailed presentation of this account, together with palaeographical
suggestions regarding the dating of some annotations, will be the subject of a
future study.
Incidentally, it should be noted that a similar historical source has been
created, surprisingly not in the medieval urban environment – as one would
have expected – but in a small parish church, in the village of Jelna, just a few
kilometres away from a major German commercial hub: Bistriþa, in the north-
ern part of Transylvania. The Jelna St. Peter’s parish’s churchwardens’ ac-
counts cover the period 1455-1570 and provide a wealth of information about
this small rural community. The accounts describe in detail and in an unparal-
leled manner various aspects of the everyday life of a rural parish of Transylva-
nia in its last century of Catholic life and during the first generation after the
adoption of the Lutheran Reformation. The register, with its 99 folia containing
financial reports compiled first in Latin by the parish priest and later in Ger-
man by the secular administrator of the parish, is apparently the most compre-
hensive source of its kind to have survived from the medieval kingdom of
Hungary.
Administering parish funds was the most important task of the Jelna
churchwarden during his term of office, which usually lasted one to two years.
Thus, the warden’s primary job was to collect and disburse money for the
maintenance of the fabrica ecclesie: heating, various repairs, the building of
the church tower, the contracts of the painters decorating the inside walls of the
church and repainting the altar. The revenue of the parish of Jelna was pro-
vided mostly from the administration of arable land and the sale of the surplus
of agricultural goods, such as grain, flour (from the church’s mill), and wine.
Bequests made in last wills and testaments or other forms of pious donations
represented an irregular, but sometimes significant source of income for the
285Churchwardens and their Accounts in Transylvania
parish church: the Jelna church owned some important relics, suggesting it was
a site of increased local devotion and therefore a source of some income.42
Most of the relics of Jelna are remnants of the saints themselves (that is, pri-
mary relics), but there are also a number of objects representing contact relics
(such as a piece of the Virgin’s garment or thorns from the crown of Christ).
Among the saints, the majority are martyrs of the early Church: the eleven
thousand virgins and the ten thousand martyrs, the holy Empress Helena, Saints
Cosmas and Damian, Saints John and Paul, Saint George, Saint Blasius the
bishop. Also, most – if not all – were the beneficiaries of popular cults
throughout Christendom. A discordant note is struck by the presence of relics
of Saint Dominic, the only ‘modern’ saint, and of the holy kings of Hungary.
There is no direct mention of a salary paid to other church-related person-
nel (such as chaplains, preachers, and bell-ringers), although they are men-
tioned in the account book, and several times they are the beneficiaries of wine,
grain, and money. Payment in accommodation, money, food, beer, and wine
was also made to lay contractors, such as painters, masons, or carpenters.
Another important aspect brought up by the Jelna account book concerns
the levels of literacy of both ecclesiastical and lay personnel involved in the
life of a rural parish community. The parish priests from Jelna used the above-
mentioned register for more than a hundred years,43 not only for financial ac-
counts but also to put in writing other relevant facts and deeds about the parish.
For example, in the second decade of the sixteenth century, Andreas Thomel,
who came from Bistriþa, wrote a short history of the entire Bistriþa region in the
margins of the accounting records, in a very small and highly abbreviated cur-
sive. He noted among other matters local and supra-regional political or reli-
gious events as well as natural disasters, such as the terrible flood of 1508.
42 C. COVACIU, “Relicvele în viaþa religioasã transilvãneanã în Evul Mediu târziu: Emer-
genþa unor culte în ambianþa parohialã” [Relics in Transylvanian religious life during the late
Middle Ages: The emergence of saints’ cults in the parish environment], in: Parohia în Tran-
silvania medievalã: Perspective asupra vieþii religioase, administrative  ºi culturale în cadrul
comunitãþilor de coloniºti germani [The parish in medieval Transylvania: Perspectives on
religious, administrative and cultural life in the communities of German colonists], ed. A.C.
DINCÃ (Cluj-Napoca, 2020, forthcoming). 
43 Disparate information on the Jelna parish priests makes it difficult to reconstruct full
biographies. Yet some relevant data, such as the education at the universities of Vienna and
Cracow acquired by priest Thomas, can be culled from various sources; see A.C. DINCÃ,
“Unknown books from medieval universities: Some Transylvanian examples”, in: University of
Pécs 650th Jubilee in Education: “University and Universality, the Place and Role of the
University of Pécs in Europe from the Middle Ages to Present Day”, ed. Á. FISCHER-DÁRDAI, I.
LENGVÁRI, and É. SCHMELCZER-POHÁNKA (Pécs, 2017), pp. 163-176, at p. 167.
286 ADINEL C. DINCÃ
This underlines once again the often underestimated role of writing and written
communication in the life of a small village. Books, mostly of liturgical con-
tent, but also volumes of sermons or texts of various genres are mentioned
several times. In addition, the register also gives an interesting picture of the
impact of the Reformation on the small parish library. Several books are re-
corded in 1558, when volumes printed in German predominated. It is also
particularly striking that the Catholic books have not been removed and are still
specified as part of the church treasury: Missale, Antiphonale, Graduale in
Latin and Cantionale, Bible and catechism in German. Parishioners even left
money in their last wills and testaments for the endowment of the church with
books. Equally illustrative are the relatively many references to an elementary
school sponsored by the church, as the record has preserved the names of a
number of schoolteachers (scolasticus or Schulmeister): Michael, Thomas,
John, Jacob, Caspar, etc.
V. As the main aim of this essay was to offer both an introduction and an
overview of the topic, quite a few issues are inevitably left without discussion.
But one fact should be clear: these lay guardians of church assets, the “providi,
honesti et laboriosi viri”, as they are called in the Jelna register in accordance
with the practice of the Catholic church,44 played a much more important role
in Transylvania around 1500 than has been assumed previously. A closer anal-
ysis of some of the sources now available, such as the Jelna register, suggests
that the lack of interest of both historians and social historians in this topic is
truly unmerited. The churchwardens’ presence in the complex process of ad-
ministering the parish church must be re-evaluated (and first of all with regard
to their involvement in construction works).45 A fresh examination of the his-
torical records preserved in Transylvanian archives is a first step in this direc-
tion, because no systematic research has been conducted thus far into the volu-
minous but unorganised collections of church institutions from the cities men-
tioned above (such as Sibiu and Braºov), where miscellaneous packages of
hundreds of archival documents are unclearly described and identified.
Based on the information retrieved so far from the available sources, the
churchwardens’ activity appears to have been more coherent in the settlements
44 See I. FORREST, Trustworthy Men: How Inequality and Faith Made the Medieval Church
(Princeton, 2018).
45 E. BÜNZ, “Die Bauern und ihre Kirche: Zum Bauboom auf dem Land um 1500”, in: Die
mittelalterliche Pfarrei, pp. 153-185.
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populated by the German hospites. This fact should not lead to the erroneous
assumption that the institution of churchwarden was some sort of monopoly of
the Transylvanian Saxons. Rather, the comparatively higher degree of literacy
among the German-speaking population, which enjoyed the privilege of auton-
omous administration, was more urbanised, and was in closer contact with
Central European and Italian practices, was conducive to a far better reflection
of the churchwardens’work in the archival records. It is no surprise that the few
remnants of churchwardens’ accounts are related precisely to the areas inhab-
ited by the Transylvanian Saxons. Whether the account books of vitrici such as
those of Jelna, Sibiu, and Braºov were once much more widespread and have
since been lost, or whether the opposite holds true and these cases were excep-
tional in late medieval Transylvania, and lay administrators did not generally
use registers but merely scribbled receipts, is at this stage very difficult to
answer. Incidental notes made on books by parish priests from various loca-
tions, starting from the late fifteenth century and resembling the kind of lists
from churchwardens’ accounts, may lend some support to the latter interpreta-
tion.46 A definitive answer will only come after a more rigorous examination of
the archival records is undertaken. Such an examination will doubtless bring to
light more information about churchwardens in medieval and Reformation
Transylvania.
46 1482-1488, c.: BV, Archiv und Bibliothek der Honterusgemeinde, Capitlul  þãrii Bârsei,
I E, no. 144 (Liber promptuarii capituli Braschowiensis), f. 217r; 1533, c.: Biblioteca docu-
mentarã “Zaharia Boiu” Sighiºoara, f. 90, guard-leaf, inner back cover.
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Annex
The data in the table below is drawn from several editions of documents and studies:
BERGER, U-R 2 BERGER, A., “Urkundenregesten aus dem alten Bistritzer
Archive von 1203-1526, Teil II”, in: Programm des evange-
lischen Obergymnasiums A.B. und der damit verbundenen
Lehranstalten (Bistritz [now Bistriþa], 1894), pp. 5-44.
DINCÃ A.C. DINCÃ, “Der Buchbesitz der Marienkirche in Her-
mannstadt um die Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts”, Zeitschrift
für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde 41 (2018), pp.17-32.
IPOLYI IPOLYI, A., “Adalékok a magyar domonkosok történetéhez”,
Magyar Sion 5 (1867), pp. 590-609.
JAKAB, Kolozsvár oklevéltár Koloszvár Oklevéltár története [Documents con-
cerning the history of Cluj], 1, ed. E. JAKAB (Buda, 1870).
KMJKV 2 A kolozsmonostori konvent jegyzõkönyvei (1289-1556), ed.
Zs. JÁKO, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1990).
Quellen Hermannstadt Quellen zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens aus Sächschischen
Archiven, 1, Rechnungen aus dem Archiv der Stadt Her-
mannstadt und der Sächschischen nation, 1380-1516 (Her-
mannstadt, 1880).
Quellen Kronstadt Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Kronstadt: Rechnungen
aus dem Archiv der Stadt Kronstadt, 3 vols. (Braºov, 1886-
1896), 1, 1503-1526; 2, 1526-1540; 3, 1475, 1541-1550,
1570.
SEIVERT, Die Grafen SEIVERT, J., “Die Grafen der sächsischen Nation und Her-
mannstädtischen Königsrichter im Großfürstenthum Sieben-
bürgen”, Ungrisches Magazin 2 (1782), pp. 261-302.
SIMON and SZABÓ Zsolt SIMON and András Péter SZABÓ, Die Rechnungs-
bücher von Bistritz, 1 (2013), <https://www.ungarisches-
institut.de/images/content/projekte/bistritz/simon/Rechnun
gen_Bistritz_IV_a_17.pdf>.
Székely Oklevéltár 1 Székely Oklevéltár, vol. 1, ed. K. SZABÓ (Kolozsvár, 1872).
Székely Oklevéltár 8 Székely Oklevéltár, vol. 8, ed. B. SAMU (Budapest, 1935).
SZEREDAI, Notitia SZEREDAI, A., Notitia veteris et novi Capituli Ecclesiae Al-
bensis Transilvaniae: ex antiquis et recentioribus literarum
monumentis (Alba Carolina, 1791).
Ub Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen,
ed. F. ZIMMERMANN et al., vols. 2, 1342-1390 (Sibiu, 1897); 3,
1391-1415 (Sibiu, 1902); 4, 1416-1437 (Sibiu, 1937); vol. 5,
1438-1457 (Bucharest, 1975); 6, 1458-1473 (Bucharest, 1981);
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7, 1474-1486 (Bucharest, 1991); 8, <http://siebenbuergenur
kundenbuch.uni-trier.de/>.
Other sources have already been identified in the footnotes.
Additionally, the digitisation of archival sources has increased the chances of iden-
tifying documents referring to churchwardens and their activity, even if such documents
have not yet been edited. The digitisation project of documents preserved in Romanian
archives (county branches, abbreviated SJAN, <http://arhivamedievala.ro/>), together
with the earlier implemented Hungaricana portal (abbreviated MOL: <https://archives.
hungaricana.hu/>), comprising online images of documents from Hungarian archives
and museums, have been extraordinarily useful in the discovery of new parish-related
material. Another archival holding, the patrimony of the Lutheran Church in Braºov
(abbreviated Archiv und Bibliothek der Honterusgemeinde) has been also been made
available online as part of the Endangered Archives Programme: <https://eap.bl.uk/
project/EAP040>.
The following abbreviations are used for counties:
AB Alba county, Romania
BN Bistriþa-Nãsãud county, Romania
BV Braºov county, Romania
CJ Cluj county, Romania
CV Covasna county, Romania
MS Mureº county, Romania
SB Sibiu county, Romania
SJ Sãlaj county, Romania
SM Satu Mare county, Romania
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No. Date Place Archival Source Edition Observations
1. 1359  ªura Mare, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






2. 20/12/1384 Braºov, BV BV, Archiv und Bi-
bliothek der Honterus-
gemeinde, Capitlul þãrii




3. 25/05/1386 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






4. 7/03/1395 Braºov, BV BV, Archiv und Bi-
bliothek der Honterus-
gemeinde, Capitlul þãrii



















6. 4/04/1402 Marpod, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,
Serie U. V, No. 1154 +
SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale parohii-
lor evanghelice C.A.
sãteºti, 1. Acte, 26. Pa-





7. 21/02/1411 Moºna, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale paro-
hiilor evanghelice C.A.
sãteºti, 1. Acte, 13. Pa-






















291Churchwardens and their Accounts in Transylvania
No. Date Place Archival Source Edition Observations
10. 4/11/1424 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,



















13. 7/04/1428 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,







14. 7/04/1428 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,





15. 1432 Sibiu, SB Biblioteca Naþionalã a
României, filiala Alba-
Iulia (Batthyaneum)
MS. R. II. 135, f. 22v
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21. 11/11/1452 Lechinþa, BN SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale paro-
hiilor evanghelice C.A.
sãteºti, 1. Acte, 24.









22. 1453 Nuºeni, BN MOL DL 63054 - -
23. 24/02/1454 Ocna Sibiului, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale parohii-
lor evanghelice C.A.
































27. 1456 Jelna, BN SJAN SB, Colecþia
“Brukenthal”, B.268
- -
28. 25/02/1457 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,
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29. 3/07/1464 Braºov, BV BV, Archiv und Bibli-
othek der Honterusge-
meinde, Capitlul þãrii









30. 18/10/1464 Satu Nou, BV BV, Archiv und Bibli-
othek der Honterusge-
meinde, Capitlul þãrii
























34. 9/12/1468 Tãºad, SM MOL DL 65094 - -
35. 8 /12/1469 Slimnic, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale paro-
hiilor evanghelice C.A.
sãteºti, 1. Acte, 24. Pa-






36. 29/06/1474 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,




37. 2/07/1475 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-
stadt, 3, p. 616
-
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38. 10/01/1477 Braºov, BV SJAN BV, Primaria
Municipiului Braºov,















40. 18/01/1485 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






41. 27/02/1485 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






42. 24/04/1485 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-
stadt, 3, p. 644
vitricus ad
leprosus
43. 1486 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-















46. 23/04/1487 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






47. 20/06/1487 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






48. 20/06/1487 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






49. 9/09/1487 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,
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52. 14/04/1488 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






53. 10/12/1488 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,






54. 1489 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-










56. 22/05/1489 Irina, SM SJAN MM, Fond fami-
lial Irinyi, No. 19
- -
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61. 14/12/1491 Cluj-Napoca,
CJ
SJAN CJ, Fond Primã-
ria Municipiului Cluj,























































67. 6/04/1494 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Fond Magis-
tratul oraºului ºi scau-
nului Sibiu, 3. Seria
actelor financiar
contabile ºi de impune-
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68. 15/07/1494 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,
































72. 1498 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-























75. 18/02/1503 Noiºtat, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,
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76. 22/02/1503-
11/01/1506






77. 27/12/1503 Bistriþa, BN SJAN CJ, Primãria ora-





















































85. 6/01/1506 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Fond
Magistratul oraºului ºi
scaunului Sibiu, 3. Se-
ria actelor financiar
contabile ºi de impune-
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88. 27/06/1508 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale paro-
hiilor evanghelice C.A.
sãteºti, 1. Acte, 42. Pa-







89. 6/03/1510 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,












91. 1/02/1512 Belin, CV SJAN CJ, Fond familial
Kemény de Ciumbrud






















93. 21/10/1512 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-
stadt, 1, p. 197
-





95. 9/04/1514 Cisnãdie, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente ale paro-
hiilor evanghelice C.A.
sãteºti, 1. Acte, 13. Pa-




96. 3/12/1516 Sibiu, SB SJAN SB, Colecþia de
documente medievale,
Serie U. V, No. 198
- -
97. 8/11/1518 Bistriþa, BN SJAN CJ, Primãria Ora-






98. 24/03/1519 Bistriþa, BN SJAN CJ, Primãria
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99. 20/05/1519 Bistriþa, BN SJAN CJ, Primãria Ora-





















102. 4/01/1522 Stâna de Mureº,
AB













103. 6/11/1522 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-
stadt, 1, p. 374
-
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109. 7/07/1529 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-




















































116. 27/11/1542 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-







302 ADINEL C. DINCÃ
No. Date Place Archival Source Edition Observations








118. 10/11/1544 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-
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124. 27/02/1548 Braºov, BV - Quellen Kron-

























U V, No. 1341
- kirchen vät-
ter
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                       One of the most important developments in European history took 
                             place in communication. A transition is clearly visible from illiterate
                              societies to societies in which most members are active users of the
                              written word. This complex process, which started in Antiquity, and
                           is still not complete, gained momentum during the Middle Ages. This 
series is intended to provide a forum for publications on the history of non-verbal, oral 
and written communication in the Middle Ages. Interest in the subject is now 
widespread within the worldwide community of medieval studies; and ever more 
scholars are becoming convinced of the potential of studying the tensions between 
oral and literate modes of thought.
Accounts and Accountability 
in Late Medieval Europe
Records, Procedures, and Socio-Political Impact
Accounts and Accountability in Late Medieval Europe traces the momentous 
transformation of institutions and administration under the impact of accounting 
records and procedures, c. 1250–1500. The volume’s focus on the materiality and 
organising logic of a range of accounts is complemented by close attention to the 
socio-political contexts in which they functioned and the agency of central and local 
officials. 
The volume is divided into three parts: the role of financial accountability in the 
political designs of late medieval states, the uses of accounts auditing and information 
management as tools for governance, and their impact on the everyday life of local 
communities. Covering both the centre and the periphery of medieval Europe, from 
England and the Papal curia to Savoy and Transylvania, the case studies evince the 
difficult passage from the early experiments with financial accounts towards an 
accountability of office.
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